Nuclear Accident in Japan: NRC Early Protective Action Recommendations

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1 Nuclear Accident in Japan: NRC Early Protective Action Recommendations National Radiological Emergency Preparedness Conference April 18, 2011 Patricia A. Milligan, CHP Senior Technical Advisor for Preparedness & Response Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response 1

2 Status of site prior to earthquake Reactor #3 Operating Reactor #4 Shutdown for Maintenance Reactor #2 Operating Reactor #1 Operating Reactor #5 & 6 Shutdown for Maintenance 2

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4 NPP site post Tsunami March 11,

5 Plant Response Earthquake Earthquake Caused Automatic Shutdown of 3 Operating Units Offsite Power Lost Initial indications are that Emergency Diesels were operating 14m Tsunami (less than 1 hour later) All Emergency Back-up Power Lost 8-10 hours later Station Batteries Depleted 5

6 NRC Response Ops Center 24/7 Team of experts to Tokyo First team deployed on March 12 Additional teams have been deployed Support to U.S. Ambassador and Japanese Coordinating Environmental Monitoring with DOE & EPA PARs 6

7 March 12, 2011 early in the day 7

8 March 12, later in the day 8

9 March 14,

10 March 15,

11 March 16,

12 Emergency Planning Zones and Protective Action Recommendations Why 50 miles? Limited and uncertain data was available Significant challenges to 3 units and at least 2 spent fuel pools on site Potential for large offsite release existed Elevated dose rates on site presented challenges to crews attempting to stabilize reactor Limited offsite data suggested serious damage to fuel Winds shifting from out to sea to land 12

13 Emergency Planning Zones and Protective Action Recommendations Why 50 miles? US government cannot affect the outcomes in Japan US government can only take actions to protect its citizens Evacuation recommendation to 50 miles afforded protection to US citizens in uncertain and challenging conditions 13

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15 Emergency Planning Zones and Protective Action Recommendations Two emergency planning zones (EPZ) around each nuclear power plant 10 mile EPZ plume exposure planning zone 50 mile EPZ ingestion exposure planning zone EPZ size established: to protect against most accident sequences to provide a substantial basis for expansion of response efforts as needed beyond the EPZ distances 15

16 Basis for Emergency Planning What is the basis for the existing Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) the nuclear power plants in US? Emergency planning in the US is based on a range of accidents including most severe Two EPZs (10/50 miles) around each NPP Exact size and shape of EPZ is a result of detailed planning which includes consideration of the specific conditions at each site, unique geographical features of the area, and demographic information. 16

17 Domestic Considerations No U.S. Health Effects from radiation fall out from Fukushima U.S. Plants Designed for External Events NRC has initiated additional inspections at all U.S. Plants NRC conducting Near-Term and Long-Term Reviews. 17

18 NRC Near Term Review Evaluate Fukushima Daiichi Events Domestic Operating Reactors and Spent Fuel Pools External Events Station Blackout Severe Accident Mitigation Emergency Preparedness Combustible Gas Control Staff will brief the Commission in public meetings on May 12 and June 16 ; final recommendations in public meeting July

19 NRC Longer Term Review Begin as soon as NRC has sufficient technical information from the events in Japan -no later than the completion of the 90 day near term report Include specific information on the sequence of events and the status of equipment during the duration of the event. Evaluate all technical and policy issues related to the event to identify potential research, generic issues, changes to the reactor oversight process, rulemakings, and adjustments to the regulatory framework that should be conducted by NRC. Evaluate potential interagency issues such as emergency preparedness. Applicability of the lessons learned to non-operating reactor and non-reactor facilities should also be explored. Provide a report with recommendations, as appropriate, to the Commission within six months from the start of the evaluation for Commission policy direction. 19