CURRICULUM VITAE DRAGAN JOVANOVIC

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1 CURRICULUM VITAE DRAGAN JOVANOVIC CONTACT ADDRESS Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) Universitätsstrasse Düsseldorf Germany Phone: +49(0) jovanovic@dice.hhu.de Web: PERSONAL INFORMATION Date of Birth: August 9, 1983 Citizenship: Germany, Serbia CURRENT POSITION Postdoctoral Researcher, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), University of Düsseldorf (since 10/2012) RESEARCH INTERESTS Industrial Organization, Competition Policy, Contract Theory, Behavioral and Experimental Economics EDUCATION 09/2012 Dr. rer. pol. (Ph.D. in Economics), University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) Title: Four Essays in Industrial Organization (summa cum laude) Supervisors: Prof. Dr. Justus Haucap, Prof. Dr. Christian Wey 09/2007 Diploma (M.Sc.) in Economics, Ruhr University Bochum ACADEMIC POSITIONS 08/ /2012 Doctoral Researcher and Ph.D. Student, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), University of Düsseldorf 10/ /2011 Visiting Scholar, Recanati Business School, Tel Aviv University (invited by Prof. Yossi Spiegel) 10/ /2009 Doctoral Researcher and Ph.D. Student, Chair of Competition Theory and Policy, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg 04/ /2007 Microeconomics Tutor, Chair of Competition Theory and Policy, Ruhr University Bochum 1

2 10/ /2007 Student Assistant, Chair of Competition Theory and Policy, Ruhr University Bochum WORKING PAPERS (DETAILS ON PAGES 4-5) An Equilibrium Analysis of Efficiency Gains from Mergers (with Christian Wey), DICE Discussion Paper No. 64 Mergers, Managerial Incentives, and Efficiencies Partial Public Ownership and Managerial Incentives Investment Behavior in a Constrained Dictator Game (with Michael Coenen), DICE Discussion Paper No. 77 Managerial Incentives and Competition in Two-sided Markets Competition in Germany s Minute Reserve Power Market: An Econometric Analysis (with Justus Haucap and Ulrich Heimeshoff), DICE Discussion Paper No. 75 WORK IN PROGRESS Hold-up and Social Identity: An Experimental Approach (with Michael Coenen) Good Advice? Strategic Outsourcing of Managerial Competencies and Competition (with Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt) Mergers, Partial Ownership, and Efficiencies Promotion and Incentives in Teams EXPERT REPORTS Diskriminierende Gebotsbeschränkungen im deutschen Großhandelsmarkt für Strom: Eine wettbewerbsökonomische Analyse (with Veit Böckers and Justus Haucap), on behalf of RWE AG CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS AND INVITED TALKS 09/2012 Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik, Göttingen 09/2012 EARIE Conference, Rome 08/2012 EEA-ESEM Conference, Malaga 04/2012 Spring Meeting of Young Economists, Mannheim 04/2012 Conference on the Economics of PPPs, Barcelona 03/2012 MaCCI Inaugural Conference, Mannheim 03/ rd Workshop on the Economics of ICTs, Oporto 01/2012 RES PhD Meeting, London 11/2011 Strategy/IO Seminar at Recanati, Tel Aviv 09/2011 EARIE Conference, Stockholm 07/2011 CRESSE Conference, Rhodes 04/2011 IIOC Conference, Boston 09/2010 EARIE Conference, Istanbul 04/2009 Hohenheimer Oberseminar, Hamburg 2

3 ATTENDED SUMMER SCHOOLS AND WORKSHOPS 05/2010 Competition and Innovation Summer School (CISS 2010), Turunc, Turkey 05/2009 STRIKE/COST/KU Leuven Workshop on The Economics on Industrial Organization and Innovation, La Bastide d Anjou, France 07/2009 Advanced Econometrics (Prof. C. Cameron), BGPE Course, Neuburg am Inn, Germany 10/2008 Workshop on Industrial Organization and Antitrust Policy, DIW, Berlin 04/2008 Frontiers in Microeconomics (Prof. P. Manzini, Prof. M. Mariotti), BGPE Course, Bad Mergentheim, Germany TEACHING EXPERIENCE Winter 2010 Summer 2010 Summer 2009 Winter 2008 Summer 2008 Winter 2007 Summer 2007 European Competition Policy (Case Study Seminar) University of Düsseldorf, Bachelor Network Economics (Tutorials) University of Düsseldorf, Bachelor New Institutional Economics (Tutorials) Energy Economics (Seminar) Competition Economics (Seminar) Economic Theory and Policy (Tutorials) University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Bachelor European Competition Policy (Reading Course) Industrial Economics (Tutorials) Media Economics (Seminar), Economic Theory and Policy (Tutorials) University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Bachelor European Competition Policy (Reading Course) Regulatory Economics (Seminar) Microeconomics (Tutorials) Ruhr University Bochum, Bachelor INTERNSHIPS AND SCHOLARSHIPS 09/ /2007 Scholarship from the Federation of German Industries (BDI, Bronnbacher Stipendium) 08/ /2006 Internship, RWE Systems AG, Corporate Controlling 08/ /2004 Internship, Sozietät Dr. Adamsen (Auditing, Tax Advisory, and Business Consulting) 3

4 LANGUAGES German (native speaker) Serbian/Croatian (native speaker) English (fluent) French (moderate) COMPUTER SKILLS Latex, Scientific Workplace, Stata, Maple, MS Office, Windows MEMBERSHIPS European Economic Association (EEA) Verein für Socialpolitik e.v. Verein zur Förderung der wettbewerbsökonomischen Forschung e.v. REFERENCES Prof. Dr. Justus Haucap Prof. Dr. Christian Wey Universitätsstrasse 1 Universitätsstrasse Düsseldorf (Germany) Düsseldorf (Germany) haucap@dice.hhu.de wey@dice.hhu.de Prof. Yossi Spiegel, Ph.D. Prof. Dr. Hans-Theo Normann Tel Aviv University Universitätsstrasse 1 Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, Düsseldorf (Germany) spiegel@post.tau.ac.il normann@dice.hhu.de WORKING PAPERS (DETAILS) An Equilibrium Analysis of Efficiency Gains from Mergers (with Christian Wey), DICE Discussion Paper No. 64 Abstract: We analyze the efficiency defense in merger control. First, we show that the relationship between exogenous efficiency gains and social welfare can be non-monotone. Second, we consider both endogenous mergers and endogenous efficiencies and find that merger proposals are largely aligned with a proper social welfare analysis which explicitly considers the without merger counterfactual. We demonstrate that the merger specificity requirement does not help much to select socially desirable mergers; to the contrary, it may frustrate desirable mergers inducing firms not to claim efficiencies at all. Mergers, Managerial Incentives, and Efficiencies Abstract: We analyze the effects of horizontal mergers and synergies on managerial incentives to enhance productive efficiency. In contrast to synergies, efficiency gains resulting from managerial effort may be realized by all firms before and after a merger. We show that synergies always suppress managerial incentives within the nonmerging firms, whereas the effect on the merged firm is ambiguous. An important implication for merger policy is that changes in 4

5 consumer surplus cannot be exclusively inferred from the merged firm's output level anymore as proposed by Farrell and Shapiro (1990). Competition in Germany s Minute Reserve Power Market: An Econometric Analysis (with Justus Haucap and Ulrich Heimeshoff), DICE Discussion Paper No. 75 Abstract: The German reserve power market was subject to important regulatory changes in recent years. A new market design was created by synchronization and interconnection of the four control areas. In this paper, we analyze whether or not the reforms led to lower prices for minute reserve power (MRP). In contrast to existing papers, we use a unique panel dataset to account for unobserved heterogeneity between the four German regional markets. Moreover, we control for endogeneity by using weather data as instruments for electricity spot market prices. We find that the reforms were jointly successful in decreasing MRP prices leading to substantial cost savings for the transmission system operators. Partial Public Ownership and Managerial Incentives Abstract: We analyze the impact of partial public ownership (PPO) on managerial incentives. A novelty of the paper is that it explicitly considers competition in the product market. We find that PPO negatively affects managerial incentives when all firms are partially owned by the government. When partially public firms compete with private firms, the effects on managerial incentives crucially depend on the degree of competitive pressure. Thereby, PPO induces either partially public firms or their private competitors to offer stronger managerial incentives. This result is essentially confirmed even if the government's primary concern is consumer protection rather than social welfare. Managerial Incentives and Competition in Two-sided Markets Abstract: We analyze the effects of competition and indirect network externalities on managerial incentives within two-sided platforms. Using a moral hazard model, we specify that each platform consists of one principal and one agent. Thereby, managerial effort aims at increasing platform quality. First, we highlight that the effects of competition cannot be unambiguously characterized by the business stealing effect and the rent reduction effect. Second, we demonstrate that it is rather each platform's relative profitability and each group's adoption possibilities which shape managerial incentives when competition or indirect network externalities are varied. Investment Behavior in a Constrained Dictator Game (with Michael Coenen), DICE Discussion Paper No. 77 Abstract: We analyze a constrained dictator game in which the dictator splits a pie which will be subsequently created through simultaneous investments by herself and the recipient. We consider two treatments by varying the maximum attainable size of the pie leading to either high or low investment incentives. We find that constrained dictators and recipients invest less than a model with self-interested players would predict. While the splitting decisions of constrained dictators correspond to the theoretical predictions when investment incentives are high, they are more selfish when investment incentives are low. Overall, team productivity is negatively affected by lower investment incentives. 5