The most popular European Model: the Ownership Unbundling (OU) But not the only way

Transcription

1 The most popular European Model: the Ownership Unbundling (OU) Totally separated companies (generation and supply activities not compatible with transmission) No common shareholders between generation/supply activities and transmission No common person in the management or boards of the companies The EU law says: it is clearly an effective and stable way to solve the inherent conflict of interests between producers, suppliers and transmission system operators, it is the most effective tool by which to promote investments in infrastructure in a non-discriminatory way, fair access to the network for new entrants and transparency in the market. [EU law 2009/72/EC] But not the only way 1

2 3 options in Europe Ownership Unbundling (OU) : clear-cut separation Independent System Operator (ISO) : a fully unbundled System Operators without the grid assets (still belonging to an integrated company) Independent Transmission Operators (ITO) : a Transmission System Operator owning the assets and belonging to a vertically integrated company, with special rules to guarantee its independence RTE is an ITO 2

3 Transmission System Operators : the 3 models in Europe OU (OU) ISO ITO Coexistence of two models 3

4 Europe s experience : avoid the ISO! According to EU experience, a TSO shall have full control on all system and asset operation They are too interdependent Maintenance Development Operation Separating the Owner of the Grid and the System Operator is very risky : Giving the proper incentives to the Owner for developing the Grid is a nightmare Just as the efficient and flexible management of both maintenance and congestion Most European countries who experimented ISO went back : Italy chose the ISO in 2000 but changed to OU in 2005 (lack of investments) Swiss, Spanish former ISOs have bought back the network they didn t own Greece has changed in 2012 from ISO to ITO 4

5 RTE s experience : being an ITO RTE is still a 100% subsidiary of EDF According to EU legislation and RTE s experience, a TSO may remain the subsidiary of the former monopoly, provided that : It is managed independently from its shareholder It is granted an economic and financial autonomy RTE s Top management is appointed by the Minister Their salary and bonus decided by the Minister EDF has no control on operational decisions All relevant charges are recovered through a transmission tariff RTE s investments are approved by the Regulator RTE may issue bonds EDF receives the dividends from RTE ( 200 billions in 11) 5

6 A pragmatic step-by-step approach In 2000: RTE as a division of EDF, with an independent management reporting to the Regulator In 2004: RTE becomes a company, its legal name is «RTE EDF Transport» In 2012: RTE changes its legal name into «RTE» and is certified by the Regulator. Supervisory Board: 4 members appointed by the government, 4 by EDF, 4 elected by RTE s employees Executive Board «the only body competent for decisions and actions related to operation, maintenance and development of the French transmission grid and power system» 6

7 The positive outcomes of independent TSOs Having independent TSOs in Europe has dramatically boosted cooperation in the field of transmission and markets It has fostered innovation ENTSOE is the official body of European TSOs. Among various tasks, it is drafting «European Grid Codes» to bring coordination and harmonization CORESO is a common subsidiary of TSOs from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and UK that perform day-to-day operational studies for coordination and security: monitoring, supervision, coordination and advice The Ten-Year Network Development plan is planning about 42,000 km of new transmission infrastructure in the next ten years 7

8 Some challenges for EU TSOs Changing transit flows due to wind and solar in Germany Big hourly changes in cross-border exchanges 8 GW (generation in Germany: wind wind+solar) GW (exchanges) 09/24 09/25 09/26 09/27 09/28 09/29 09/30 Exchanges of electricity between France and Germany on 24 th to 30 th September France Germany Germany France

9 The question of «independent Regulators» Transmission System Operators must be regulated (not in competition on a given territory) The EU law asks for Regulators «independent from any other public or private entity» Necessary in Europe because of many state-owned utilities (conflict of interest for several governments) Drawbacks: Potential inconsistencies between government and regulator s strategies and decisions When creating the Regulator, difficulty to find competent and «independent» staff: long learning process Some EU Regulators are weak 9

10 Conclusion: it works! A well shared opinion that current situations (extensive cross-border trade, 94 GW of wind power installed capacity, 50 GW of solar in Europe ) would be impossible to manage with the old organization A better power system security (despite 2 major incidents in the last 10 years initiated in still integrated companies!) A necessary and continuous evolution of the rules to make possible the changes in the European energy policy A cooperative spirit between TSOs, regulators and market parties Innovation has been stimulated 10

11 Are Japan and Europe similar? Both at a key change in their energy policy Both need to increase inter-regional exchanges and improve coordination Both need for major grid investments Same tradition of integrated utilities and reluctance to change a very complex industry But Different culture Japan is an archipelago with far less loop flows than EU One single government in Japan: no need for an Independent Regulator, possible regulation by the Ministery Stronger links between employees and their companies 11

12 Key (and humble) recommendations Keeping System Operation together with transmission assets is crucial Unbundling with the ITO model is a reasonable, well functioning evolution Coordination through a CORESO type entity, in charge of monitoring and advising for operation for congestion management and global security, is very efficient First class regulation needed, an opportunity for a specific Japanese governance to avoid drawbacks of Independent Regulators, because no state-owned utility Most important: The good solution will be a Japanese one 12

13 + THANK YOU 13