MTO at the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority how we are organised and why

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1 MTO at the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority how we are organised and why Dept. of Nuclear Power Plant Safety Swedish Radiation Safety Authority Analyst, Human and Organisational Factors Specialist

2 About the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) Under the Ministry of the Environment Budget approx. 40 million euros 300 employees Radiation safety Safety Radiation protection Security/Non-proliferation

3 Swedish law on Nuclear Activities establishes legal authority of SSM Licensee retains full responsibility for safety for all phases including plant closure and final disposal of nuclear waste and they bear the full and sole responsibility for taking all necessary action to achieve safety SSM ensures that the licensee takes this responsibility and supervises that the activity is carried out safely SSM may close plants that do not meet the set safety requirements

4 Department of Nuclear Power Plant Safety The department is responsible for Supervision of reactor plants to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements Inspection and review Evaluation of safety and radiation protection

5 Nuclear Facilities in Sweden Communication

6 The interaction Man-Technology- Organisation A system perspective on how radiation safety is affected by the relationship between: Human's abilities and limitations Technical equipment and the surrounding environment The organisation and the opportunities it provides

7 The Man-Technology-Organisation section at SSM 11 human factors specialists Responsible for the supervision at nuclear power plants in the following areas: Safety management and organisation (E.g. Quality assurance, management systems, organisational changes) Safety culture (also responsible for the departments coordination of safety culture)

8 The Man-Technology-Organisation section at SSM (cont.) Competence, fitness for duty, suitability, education and staffing, knowledge management Working conditions MTO-perspective/ergonomics of control room work and plant modification (Human Factors Engineering) Incident analysis and risk analysis with MTOperspective (learning from experience)

9 The Man-Technology-Organisation section at SSM (cont.) Together with specialists from other departments we Inspect and review Make decisions Sustain requirements and recommendations Make investigations Initiate research and participate in international collaboration in these areas

10 Requirements SSMFS 2008:1 The Swedish Radiation Safety Authority s Regulations concerning Safety in Nuclear Facilities Requirements General advice No specific requirements on Safety Culture

11 Requirements covering some aspects of MTO and Safety Culture Some paragraphs concerning organisation, management and control of the nuclear activity Suitable organisation and resources Management system The licensee shall ensure: Competence Working conditions Etc.

12 Contribution to other departments Other nuclear facilities Waste management Final repository for spent fuel Decommissioning Industry handling radiation Medical care

13 We need to have professional skills and competence in the following areas Management system and quality assurance Organisations function and operation, management and group psychological aspects Safety culture and safety leadership Methods and principles for competence assurance and for ensuring adequate staffing

14 Human factors engineering Methods for investigation of incidents and conditions with MTO-perspective Methods for risk analysis with MTO-perspective Physical, psychological, social, technical and organisational conditions that affect people's abilities and motivation

15 There are two ways to look at the human contribution in safety issues Person approach: Focus on individuals errors and mistakes. Actions aimed toward people at the operator level (the sharp end). System approach (SSM s view): Focus on contributing factors in the whole system (organsiation, technology). Actions aimed toward situations and organisations.

16 Safety Culture SSM uses the definition from IAEA Safety Culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organisations and individuals, which establishes that, as an overriding priority, protection and safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance. (IAEA Safety Glossary 2007)

17 Tools available Inspections Compliance with our requirements Minor inspections/site visits Information gathering Follow ups Specific topics Reviews Compliance with our requirements

18 Examples of regulatory work from the MTO- perspective Analysis and learning from incidents and events Working conditions supporting safe performance Managing organisational changes Assuring competence and personnel

19 Analysis and learning from incidents and events The licensee needs to: Recognise incidents Analyse Take action Learn System and process Method for analysis Assessment of effects

20 Managing control room modifications Major changes in the control rooms The licensee needs to: Have proper control of the process including the human factor aspects of the modification Control and review before implementation

21 Working conditions in support of safe performance The performance of humans, either as individuals or in a group is affected by their working conditions The licensee needs to provide proper working conditions so that work can be carried out safely

22 Managing organisational changes Organisational changes can have positive or negative effects of importance to safety, depending on how they are prepared, implemented, and monitored The licensee shall have a procedure for managing organisational changes

23 Assuring competence and personnel Focus on the system to analyse which competence is required, now and in the future, considering factors such as retirements, future plant modifications, maintenance plans etc. An adjacent issue has been to sort out the in-house competence needed in plants when tasks or functions are outsourced to contractors The regulatory position is that the licensee should within his own organisation have enough competence to order, manage, and evaluate the work performed by the contractor

24 SSM has identified areas with need for improvements The ability to capture organisational factors/aspects in incident analysis Transfer of knowledge (retiring staff younger generation) in terms of effectiveness of competence transfer Signs of personnel not following procedures - safety culture

25 SSM has identified areas with need for improvements (cont.) The use of early warning signals of high workload more effectively to have a proactive and long term approach for ensuring enough personnel and contractors since the NPPs are in a continuous state of modernisation and power up-rate

26 Thank you! Any questions?