Stream Session 2. Risk Management. Sponsored by. NSW MINING Learning from the past for a safer future

Transcription

1 Stream Session 2 Risk Management Sponsored by NSW MINING Learning from the past for a safer future

2 Stream Session 2 Risk Management Sponsored by NSW MINING Learning from the past for a safer future

3 NSW MINING Learning from the past for a safer future NSW MINING Learning from the past for a safer future

4 Application of RISKGATE to managing strata failure in an Australian coal mine Philipp Kirsch, Associate Professor, UQ-SMI-MISHC John Turner, Mine Manager, Mandalong, Centennial Peter Corbett, Regional Technical Services Manager, Centennial West Jill Harris, Senior Research Officer, UQ-SMI-MISHC Darren Sprott, MD, Design Solutions

5 What is RISKGATE? Prompts, not procedures. The discussion is important! Online Body of Knowledge. Built by the mining industry. Developed by UQ and UNSW. Managed by ACARP. Based on Bow-tie Analysis. Comprehensive (approaching 20,000 controls). Easy to use. Can be used with other RM tools such as WRAC. Case Studies

6 RISKGATE Structure Case Studies

7 Mining companies involved in building RISKGATE Case Studies

8 Mining company days to build a BOK Adani Anglo American Austar Bandanna BMA/BHP Caledon Centennial Glencore Xstrata Gujarat NRE Peabody Rio Tinto Case Studies

9 Interfacing with Stature risk management software RISKGATE Case Studies 2014 NSW Mining OHS Conference Hunter Valley, NSW Stream 2: Risk Management; 19 May 2014, 4.05pm

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11 Outcome Centennial employees can now quickly import the elements they have identified as being relevant to their particular needs from RISKGATE into Stature. The RISKGATE information can be edited to reflect the language and terminology used on site as every site is different

12 LW15 Installation Road Failure Mandalong Mine A Case Study into the application of RISKGATE John Turner Mine Manager Mandalong Mine

13 Mandalong Mine- Overview Key Facts: q Centennial Coal opera,ons located near Morisset in southern Lake Macquarie, NSW q Mandalong is a thick seam longwall opera,on u,lising narrow longwall panels (160m) and innova,ve mine design to minimise subsidence and associated impacts q Due to the reduced extrac,on width, Mandalong relies on high retreat rate and minimum reloca,on dura,ons to operate at a rate of around 5MTPA

14 CURRENT STAGE OF MINING Longwall 16 Maingate 17 Maingate 18 Mains

15 Background Business plan challenges meant that it was critical that that Mandalong safely relocated the longwall from LW14 to LW15 in the minimum possible period Due to improved development rates, LW15 Installation Road was completed and ready for pre installation of available longwall equipment prior to the completion of LW14 The roadway had been standing for app. 10 days at the time of failure

16 Longwall 15 Installation Road Due to the size of the longwall supports a roadway of 9-10m wide is required to be driven (normal roadway width 5.2m) This roadway is developed in 2 passes, with secondary support installed prior to widening During the first pass, the roadway exhibited signs of high horizontal stress Similar conditions were experienced in LW13 and LW14 installation road but did not lead to roadway failure

17 Broken roof and floor heave in first pass due to high horizontal stress

18 Fall was 50m long and over 4m high After a risk based review of the options of recovery vs driving a new roadway, it was decided that a new roadway would be driven within the stress relieved area adjacent to the fall.

19 New Installation Road Fall Proposed new install road in stress relief shadow Case Studies

20 After this roof fall, how do we convince all stakeholders that we can safely drive and install a longwall in a widened roadway?

21 The Problem This was the first installation road failure that Mandalong had experienced At the time of the risk assessment, the cause of the roadway failure had not been confirmed It was critical that a new installation road was driven in the shortest possible period, whilst ensuring the risk of another roadway failure was effectively managed Case Studies

22 The Problem (cont.) Challenge was to convince our workforce, senior management, regulators and most importantly ourselves that we could safely drive and install a longwall in the roadway To ensure this, we had to ensure all risks were covered in our risk assessment and that we looked outside our own experience base (body of knowledge) Case Studies

23 The Solution - RISKGATE Riskgate Strata Control was reviewed as part of RA scoping (refer next slide) Used Initiating Events to produce a comprehensive list of possible factors that may have contributed to the roadway failure Enabled the review team to be aware of risks and issues outside of their experience base Case Studies

24 Learnings from using RISKGATE Initially used both Initiating Events and Suggested controls out of Riskgate but the amount of information would have overwhelmed the team Information was reviewed as part of the scoping process, and list of possible initiating events prepared for presentation to team Case Studies

25 Outcome from using RISKGATE At the time of the risk assessment, the cause of the strata failure had not been confirmed Using RISKGATE allowed the team to be satisfied that we had considered all possible causes (initiating events) in the assessment The success of this risk assessment allowed mine management to satisfy the needs of all stakeholders, so that we could commence the safe development of the new Installation Road Case Studies

26 Acknowledgements CENTENNIAL COAL / Mandalong ACARP, 9 coal companies, ~10 suppliers, 2 regulators 100+ industry experts, 20+ affiliated experts RISKGATE Management Group: John Hempenstall, Dave Mellows, Tony Egan David Cliff, Jim Joy, Tilman Rasche RISKGATE Topic Leaders David Cliff, Mark Spinks, Gul Kizil, Tilman Rasche Bruce Hebblewhite, Alastair Torrance, Robin Burgess-Limerick Peter Bergin, Jim Galvin, David Williams RISKGATE team: Jill Harris, Barbara Whittaker, Darren Sprott, Carol Bond, Shirley Shi, Jirui Li CONTACTS: p.kirsch@uq.edu.au

27 NSW MINING Learning from the past for a safer future NSW MINING Learning from the past for a safer future

28 Beyond Prescription: Strategies for Transitioning to Risk Based Regulation Neil Gunningham NSW MINING Learning from the past for a safer future

29 The Project Coal mining WHS legislation and the mining industry have moved away from prescription towards risk based OHS regulation and management. However, there remain obstacles to effective risk based regulation, because: (i) mines inspectors; (ii) industry middle management and (iii) the relevant trade union; all prefer prescription. And (iv) some/many companies are not effectively implementing a systemic risk based approach to safety Accordingly, this project examines (a) what is going wrong (b) how can it be fixed NSW MINING Learning from the past for a safer future

30 An Industry Half-Pregnant : the interrupted journey from prescription to systemic risk-based regulation The Inspectorates (i) Codes of practice/recognised standards often interpreted prescriptively (ii). A systemic risk-based approach to inspections? Three approaches identified 1 substantial engagement in systemic risk-based inspection and audit 2 some engagement with this approach, but only at a relatively superficial level, 3 predominantly prescriptive in its approach. NSW MINING Learning from the past for a safer future

31 Reforming the Inspectorates Incrementalism or a clean slate? Recruitment a new levy? Training simulation training; interactive training Learning by doing a more systematic approach Secondment to other risk based regulators Constraining discretion scorecards and risk oversight tools Removing prescriptive regulation- WHS (Mines) Reg 2014, Qld RIS Changing inspectors interpretation of codes of practice- training and oversight Cultural change change the mindset or change the people- leadership, vision, measure and reward success, tangible goals Resources shifting the balance from reactive to proactive inspection, structural change/ specialisation NSW MINING Learning from the past for a safer future

32 Engaging Middle Management Middle management commonly prefer prescription especially statutory office holders Risk assessment involves management judgement and taking responsibility Following prescriptive rules avoids risk of external or internal blame if things go wrong some engineers like to sleep easy. They have a compliance mentality. They are not interested in managing risk NSW MINING Learning from the past for a safer future

33 What needs to change? Minimise prescriptive reg (see above) Take greater responsibility for shaping regs, codes/standards, guidance material Risk based inspectors should ask questions, not tell management what to do Establishing a blame free culture (think commercial aviation) Ensure risk assessment is not just an add on, and ensure all management adequately trained Provide adequate time and resources for risk assessment Mine managers/sses the level of safety you get is the level the boss wants NSW MINING Learning from the past for a safer future

34 The broader picture: an immature industry? Our systems are clogged with useless paperwork that doesn t control risk. People without the technical competencies and knowledge of the OHSMS are appointed to supervisory positions. Its like pulling people of the street and making them brain surgeons G2 and G3 training alone is not sufficient for effective risk management Corporate develops a management system but it should be developed at site level and when it isn t there s no ownership Some mines are woeful. God help us if we don t overview them. Risk management is only as good as the people doing it. If you don t have the right input from the right people, its useless There is an unwillingness to delay production to put in place the necessary safety measures Risk management is not well applied. It needs education and this is lacking in the industry We skirt mining disasters on a regular basis. Do not think for a moment that the recent history in NSW that reflects the lack of a disaster means that there is an absence of risk and an absence of near misses. NSW MINING Learning from the past for a safer future

35 Where next? Is it worth completing the journey? effective management of OHS nearly always requires employers to develop measures to address OHS risks. The need for industry leadership: we ve come a long way but the last couple of years has been a plateau. We need another step change - There is a lack of leadership at senior levels when it comes to safety we did one step change with zero harm but now we need another and it s not happening. (Senior Inspector, NSW). - There s a feeling the risk assessment tools have grown stale., the danger is we don t think something can happen when it can, so I question our judgement. (Electrical Engineer, emphasis added). - There is a lack of leadership. There is no engagement with the CFMEU or with the inspectorate about the big picture stuff. (Senior Manager, NSW). - The industry has not set a clear direction. It has not provided leadership on this and so you can t expect the inspectorate to have a clear direction either. (Senior Inspector, NSW). - If we have no leadership and drive then you can t expect the blokes to have commitment it will become the lowest standard set by management. NSW MINING Learning from the past for a safer future

36 Problems at senior management level Many respondents, felt that senior management did not understand the problems confronting risk management or how to address serious flaws in the way it is currently being implemented. mantra: all really good organisations have one thing in common an expectation that shit happens, But sense that chronic unease was giving way to complacency long time since the last disaster a lack of leadership has been a major factor in many past disasters: inquiries into the Fukushima, Pike River, Deepwater Horizon, West Virginia and Montara disasters all emphasised leadership failings. NSW MINING Learning from the past for a safer future

37 What s needed? Industry leadership and a new Step Change Better understanding by Head Office of risk management challenges at site level- More education, training and awareness at mine site level- both crew and middle management Culture eats systems for breakfast it needs to become a way of life. You need to breath a safety culture into everyone, and you need to audit and review everything you do. NSW MINING Learning from the past for a safer future

38 Bottom lines The approach most likely to ensure high standards of OHS in the mining industry is systemic risk management, effectively implemented. For those who are mature in terms of implementing systemic risk management, then regulation should be mainly about scrutinising how effectively they have implemented that approach. But mines that are not yet mature will need to be given more direction by inspectors having regard to regulations, codes and guidance material, currently, the industry is not half as good as it thinks it is. Senior management seems, at least in a number of organisations, to be unaware of either the nature or the extent of these problems. it is two decades since Moura and almost two decades since Gretley. It may be that, as the inquiry into the Deepwater Horizon put it: time without a harsh reminder of what can happen NSW [has] MINING dulled Learning from in some the past for places, a safer future the careful edge essential to hazardous work.

39 NSW MINING Learning from the past for a safer future NSW MINING Learning from the past for a safer future

40 Safety Matters for Demonstration of VAM-RAB Technology at Mandalong Gary Bowman Manager of Electrical Engineering May

41 Outline Ø Background to Project Ø Project Safety Integration Ø Safety Process and Features Ø Outcomes and Learnings Ø Where to from here 41

42 Background Ø Centennial sought a means of reducing dilute methane in ventilation air (VAM) Ø Worked with Corky s Sustainable Energy to demonstrate their Ventilation Air Methane Regenerative Afterburner VAM-RAB Ø Funding was granted from the NSW Government Clean Coal Fund to demonstrate a 10m3/sec unit Ø Corky s had a technical design, focus turned to making it a safe design, acceptable to the Mine and its Regulators 42

43 Acknowledgement and Disclaimer Funded by Coal Innovation NSW through the Clean Coal Fund, which is administered by the Minister for Mineral Resources Any views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of Coal Innovation NSW or the NSW Government 43

44 Safety Integration Ø Designed using CHAIR (Construction Project) Ø Onsite move from CHAIR to MDG1010 for acceptability for mine site perspective Ø Independent HAZOP review 44

45 Complex Design and Safety Requirements Safety sits above V model process manage safety in the design Concept of Verification Operation and AS Operations and Maintenance AS IEC Validation Safety Requirements Project definition Requirements and Architecture Detailed Design Implementation System Verification and Validation Integration Test, and Verification Project Test & Integration Risk Assessments 45

46 Safety Design Ø 196 Hazards Identified (Chair 1) Ø 2 only managed by SIL (safety critical) deflagration caused by uncontrolled machine operation or uncontrolled fuel source Ø 192 managed by Australia Standards/MDG s and risk assessment controls Ø R&D project/first-of-type Centennial had specific safety and environmental requirements; Ø Engagement of mine regulators who had specific views and thoughts. 46

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48 Key Design Aspects Key design aspects added during the risk/design process: Ø Considered return air to the inlet reversal valves as part of the mines return airway (We considered the machine to be directly coupled to the mine) Ø Deflagration internal pressure detection, over temperature detection Ø Inlet fuel limits exceeded Ø Response time to methane event How quickly can the plant isolate from the Mine; Underground monitoring, multiple independent layers of protection. 48

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50 Outcomes Ø Both the Safety Requirement Specification and the Verification and Validation plan were peer reviewed to confirm achieved SIL Ø Hazardous area assessment Audited to confirm installation was compliant to the hazardous area zoning Ø Electrical installation standards audited- AS3000, AS3007, IS audits and Arc flash Ø Mechanical installation standards audited some MDGs required tailoring Ø Class 3 Gas Appliance Approval for burners 50

51 Learnings Commissioning of this type of plant very difficult onsite Ø First of type so the predicted operational parameters agreed upon in the commissioning risk assessment were not practical Ø The redefining of operational limits managed under the Mine Change Management System which required review of the risk assessment and effect of safety functionality. MUST HAVE Robust Change Management Process. Ø Key hold points established in the commissioning process this included review of all relevant risk assessment actions and completion of audits before progressing to each stage eg, Pre Power, Powered, Cold Commissioning, Hot commissioning (Heating with Burners, Simulated VAM and Mine VAM) Ø Comfortable with design team 51

52 Where to From Here Ø Complete VAM Simulation trial Ø Connect to Mine ventilation system for 12 months and final evaluation 52

53 Questions 53

54 NSW MINING Learning from the past for a safer future NSW MINING Learning from the past for a safer future

55 Investigating differential risk factors through comparison of coal fatalities in Australia, China, India, South Africa and the United States of America Dr Jill Harris 55

56 Analysis of global coal mining fatalities Benefits of collecting and analysing safety data (e.g. fatalities, injuries, high potential incidents): Identify prevalence of incidences Better understand the causes of safety failures Monitor the effectiveness of past and current safety interventions Communicate performance (e.g. corporate, industry reports) To guide health and safety strategy (i.e. continual improvement, design advances) Alert industry to lessons learnt Encourage vigilance 56

57 Global coal mining fatalities How do broad organisational, societal, economic, legislative or environmental conditions affect safety performance in coal mining? The objective of this study is to undertake a comparative analysis of coal mining fatalities across different countries; to provide a foundation of information for a more informed debate on safety management priorities for coal mining To determine if the hazards identified in the RISKGATE body of knowledge could be used to categorise safety data in Australia as well as that of other key mining countries 57

58 Method Overview of methodology Access narratives of coal mining fatalities in five countries ( ) Classify each narrative according to 16 common coal mining hazards (RISKGATE) Country Source of narra2ves Checks to reduce coding errors Australia MISHC database compiled by David Cliff Compilation of data China India Normalisation across countries a. Total hours worked per year b. Production (metric tonne, raw) South Africa US State Administra,on of Work Safety of China Directorate General of Mines Safety, Ministry of Labour & Employment, Government of India Chamber of Mines of South Africa Mines Safety & Health Administra,on (MSHA) website, Fatalgrams (number of of fatalities ) (1,000,000 ) (1,000,000 metric hours) tonnes) Frequency Rate = (total coal number production of worker [metric hours) tonnes]) 58

59 Example of fatality narratives Australia China India South Africa US 59

60 Results: Total coal mining fatalities (2006 to 2010) Country Total number of fatalities Australia 9 China 4712 India 519 South Africa 85 US 177 Total coal production (per million metric tonne) Total number of hours worked (per million hours) N/A China: ,550 people missing (not included as fatali,es) 60

61 Fatal Injury Frequency Rates (Production) China Poor safety record, but rapidly improving Reasons for improvement? Reduc,on in the number of small unregulated mines Increase in larger mines mechanisa,on & improved safety prac,ce Increasing enforcement FIFR (produc,on) weaknesses Fails to take into account the size of the workforce or length of,me at work (over,me, length of shi^) 61

62 Fatal injury frequency rates (hours worked) Surface & Underground Upper Big Branch explosion 29 died Surface only High safety performance of Australia FIFR (hrs) Environmental(geotech?)? Country 5yr average Organisa,onal Aus 0.02 India 0.11 Technical SA 0.13 Legisla,ve US 0.21 Societal FIFR (hrs) 5 yr average Country Surface Underground Aus India SA US Underground only Similar safety outcomes Underground mining more dangerous 62

63 Hazards causing fatalities Top three hazards causing coal mining fatali,es ( ) Country Australia Collisions (3) Isola,on - mechanical (2) Strata (1), Tyres (1), Isola,on Hydraulic (1), Slips/trips/falls (1) China Explosions (1619) Inrush (715) Strata (616) India Collisions (170) Strata (120) Isola,on - mechanical (70) South Africa Collisions (30) Strata (22) Isola,on - mechanical (16) US Explosions (49) Collisions (46) Strata (26) Australia had only 1 death as a result of a major hazard, but they cause many deaths in other countries Collisions may not cause mul,ple deaths, but it does cause many deaths 63

64 Australian coal mining safety performance Key Aspects to Australian Mining OHS Legisla2ons Risk Management Major Hazards Management Plans Duty of Care Employer Employee Stakeholder Involvement Workplace plays an inherent role in implemen,ng OHS management 64

65 Coal mining fatalities in Australian ( ) Qualitative changes over 2 decades Change in the types of hazards that were causing most deaths : 4 multiple death accidents (strata, outburst, explosion, inrush) : 0 multiple death accidents; no deaths from explosions, inrush, outburst; strata deaths dropped from 13 to 5 Quantitative & qualitative change in analyses of coal mining fatalities in Australia 65

66 Conclusion Australia s very good safety performance (fatalities) Underground is more dangerous than surface coal mining in US and South Africa, but not in Australia Major hazards continue to cause most deaths in China and the US; but not in Australia, India and South Africa Risk-based legislation may be driving the improvement in Australian coal mines Across countries there is evidence of a maturity or journey model in regard to managing hazards 66

67 Project team Philipp Kirsch Meng Shi Jirui Li David Cliff Ankita Gagrani Anand Krishna Ahmad Tabish Deepanshu Arora Kishore Kothandaraman 67

68 Tonight 6pm Pre dinner drinks in Trade Exhibition Hall 7pm Innovation Awards Dinner in the Marquee Tomorrow 6.30am Breakfast opens in Redsalt Restaurant 7.30am Trade Exhibition Hall open 8.40am Plenary starts in Ballroom NSW MINING Learning from the past for a safer future

69 NSW MINING Learning from the past for a safer future NSW MINING Learning from the past for a safer future