Yucca Mountain Transportation Lessons Learned

Transcription

1 Yucca Mountain Transportation Lessons Learned Bob Bob Halstead State of Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects Fred Dilger, PhD Black Mountain Research Dave Ballard, PhD Department of Sociology, CSU-Northridge Waste Management 2011 Phoenix, AZ March 3, 2011 Additional documentation available at

2 Overview Yucca Mountain terminated Blue Ribbon Commission evaluating options Yucca Mountain transportation lessons learned applicable to future storage and disposal facilities: o National Impacts o Site Selection o Facility Licensing o Transportation Plan & Safety Concerns o Physical Protection o Mostly Rail Scenario o Rail Security Regulations

3 Key DOE Documents 1986 Environmental Assessment (EA) for Yucca Mountain 2002 Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for Yucca Mountain 2008 OCRWM Total System Life-Cycle Cost Analysis 2008 Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) for Yucca Mountain 2008 Rail Corridor and Rail Alignment EIS 2008 DOE Rail Line CPCN Application to STB 2008 DOE Repository License Application to NRC 2009 DOE National Transportation Plan

4 Now-Terminated Yucca Mountain Transportation System (2008 SEIS) Ship 9,495 rail casks (2,800 trains) & 2,650 truck casks over 50 years [p.6-8] If No 2 nd Repository: 21,909 rail casks (about 6,700 trains) & 5,025 truck casks [p.8-41] Average 1-3 trains (3-5 casks per train) & 1-2 trucks (1 cask per truck) per week for 50 years Every day, for 50 years, one or more loaded casks on rail or road, from 76 shipping sites to a single national repository or storage site

5 National Transportation Radiological Impacts (SEIS) Incident-free exposures to the public (up to rem for person in a traffic jam): cumulative total 2,500 per-rem dose and 1.5 latent cancer fatalities (LCFs) Incident-free exposures to workers (dose limited to 0.5 rem per year by administrative controls): cumulative total 13,000 person-rem and 7.6 LCFs Maximum reasonably foreseeable transportation accident (probability about 5 in one million per year): 34 rem dose to maximally exposed individual (MEI), 16,000 person-rem population dose and 9.4 LCFs in urban area; and cleanup-costs of $300,000 to $10 billion Successful act of sabotage or terrorism: rem dose to MEI, 32,000-47,000 person-rem population dose and LCFs in an urban area; and cleanup costs similar to a severe transportation accident. Source: DOE SEIS 2008, Pp. 6-15, 6-21, 6-24, 6-27, 8-41, G-56, & CR-467.

6 OCRWM Transportation Life Cycle Cost Estimates (2007 $) Total Transportation (a) (b) $ billion Development and evaluation.740 billion Cask systems (c) billion Rolling stock & facilities.380 billion System support billion Operations execution billion Nevada rail infrastructure project billion (a) $780 million spent (b) $ billion total for repository including transportation thru 2133 (c) Unit costs: truck casks-$4.4 million; rail casks- 4.5 million; rail overpacks- 4.5 million; TAD canisters million

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8 Future Shipments Will Be A Matter of National Concern SNF & HLW currently stored at 76 sites in 34 states SEIS representative routes to Yucca Mountain would have traveled 22,000 miles of railways and 7,000 miles of highways SEIS representative routes to Yucca Mountain would have traversed 44 states, the District of Columbia, 33 Indian nations, and about 836 counties with a population of about 161 million (2005 Census estimates) million people live within one-half mile (800 meters) of these rail and highway routes Routes to Yucca Mountain would have affected most of the nation's congressional districts (330 in the 110th Congress).

9 Transportation Requirements Must Be Addressed in Site Selection 1984 DOE repository siting guidelines (10 CFR ) qualifying, favorable & potentially adverse conditions 1986 DOE first repository environmental assessments applied transportation guidelines; Yucca Mountain worst site 1987 Congress ignored Yucca Mountain transportation DOE SEIS 2008 selected Caliente rail alignment longest new US rail project in 80 years, 300+ miles, $2.7 billion; rail routes to Caliente would have traversed downtown Las Vegas DOE SEIS 2008 routed all highway shipments through Las Vegas metropolitan area 1984 DOE siting guidelines for transportation provide appropriate guidance for future site screening

10 Condition Davis Canyon Utah Deaf Smith Texas Hanford Washington Richton Mississippi Yucca Mountain Nearest Mainline Railroad (miles) Nearest Alternative Railroad (miles) Not Identified Rail Access New Construction (miles) Rail Access Cost (Million 1985 Dollars) Nearest Interstate Highway (miles) Nearest Alternative Interstate (miles)

11 Proposed Caliente Rail Corridor

12 Radiation Exposure Zones in Las Vegas

13 Transportation Will Be Considered in Facility Licensing the NRC s NEPA responsibilities do not end at the boundaries of the proposed repository, but rather extend to the transportation of nuclear waste to the repository. Without the repository, waste would not be transported to Yucca Mountain. Without transportation of waste to it, construction of the repository would be irrational. Under NEPA, both must be considered. NRC ASLB, May 2009 NRC ASLB admitted 46 NEPA transportation contentions: 17 submitted by California, 16 by Nevada, 8 by California and Nevada Counties, 3 by the Nuclear Energy Institute, & 2 by the Timbisha Shoshone Tribe. Admitted contentions include: design of shipping containers; modal options; route selection; selection of the Caliente rail alignment; environmental impacts of rail line construction and operation; routine radiation exposures; consequences of accidents, terrorism and sabotage; and emergency response capabilities.

14 DOE 2009 Transportation Plan Insufficient detail regarding repository transportation requirements and logistics Concealed information about transportation system costs and infrastructure upgrades Ignored radiological impacts, stakeholder safety and security concerns Failed to incorporate lessons from WIPP Failed to adopt NAS 2006 recommendations for risk management and risk communication

15 Transportation Plan: Adopt NAS Recommendations - 1 Undertake detailed surveys of transportation routes to mitigate hazards of very-long-duration, fully engulfing fires Expand DOE TEC to obtain outside advice on social risk, including impact and management Establish advisory group to characterize, communicate, and mitigate the social, security, and health and safety risks of transportation Undertake additional analyses of very long duration fire scenarios, develop measures to prevent shipments from encountering such fires Use full-scale package testing as part of integrated package performance program (testing to destruction should not be required) Continue involvement of states and tribes in routing and scheduling of foreign and DOE research reactor spent fuel shipments Ensure state designation of highway routes are supported by sound risk assessments, and affected states fulfill their regulatory responsibilities

16 Transportation Plan: Adopt NAS Recommendations - 2 Implement mostly rail option, using intermodal transportation, and avoid extended truck transportation program Publicly identify DOE suite of preferred highway and rail routes to a federal repository as soon as practicable, involving states and tribes Fully implement DOE dedicated train decision before commencing the large-quantity shipments to a federal repository (avoid general trains) Negotiate with commercial spent fuel owners to ship older fuel first, except where storage risks at specific plants dictate otherwise. Immediately begin to execute DOE responsibilities defined in section 180 of the NWPA, and include emergency responders in program planning and communication with affected communities DOE, DHS, DOT, and NRC Develop criteria for protecting sensitive information about transportation, facilitate access to open information Examine options for changing the organizational structure of the DOE repository transportation program

17 Physical Protection of Shipments Will Be A Major Concern Nevada 1999 petition to NRC: shipments are vulnerable, strengthen regulations 10 CFR [PRM-73-10] DOE FEIS 2002: casks vulnerable to attack NAS 2006: malevolent acts a major technical and societal concern; independent examination of security needed DOE SEIS 2008: release from successful attack could result in LCFs, cleanup costs $300,000-$10 billion NRC 2010: Proposed rule to enhance physical protection of shipments (comment period ends ) DOE repository shipments exempt from 10 CRF GAO, NAS, Nevada: Ship older fuel first to reduce consequences of successful terrorism or sabotage

18 Sites that Lack Rail Access

19 Maximum Use of Rail May Not Be Feasible DOE, Nevada, NAS: Rail preferred mode DOE mostly rail scenario: 93% commercial SNF 28 reactors that lack direct rail access would account for 35% of SNF inventory under proposed action, contracts 21 reactors would have shipped rail casks by heavy haul truck (HHT), miles, total 565 miles (or barge at 16 reactors) HHTs up to 220 feet (67.1 meters) in length, with gross vehicle weights up to 500,000 pounds (227,000 kilograms). 23 reactors would have used 17 shortline RRs, for connection to mainline RRs, miles, total 1,360 miles DOE NTP: No NWF funds for infrastructure upgrades Credible mostly rail scenario may be 65-75% commercial SNF

20 DOE SEIS Heavy Haul Truck Route Callaway Reactor to Fulton, Missouri

21 DOE SEIS Shortline Rail Route Fulton, Missouri to Mexico, Missouri

22 Rail Shipments Must Comply with New TSA & PHMSA Regulations DOE rail routes to Yucca Mountain selected prior to TSA & PHMSA security rules effective designated high threat urban areas (HTUAs) in 28 states, requiring new chain of custody and control requirements 27 routing risk analysis factors (urban areas, iconic locations) 63 of 70 rail routes to YM would have traversed one or more HTUAs; 30 HTUAs in 25 states, 39 cities >100,000, 12 state capitals, would have been traversed 18 rail carriers would have been required to develop plans UP would have been required to prepare plans for at least 36 HTUAs and cities; NS & CSX, at least 21 plans each Implications for future cross-country rail shipments unclear

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24 Conclusions Transportation must be given equal consideration with storage and disposal, at every stage, in planning and implementing a successful national nuclear waste management program. Critical transportation requirements, such as mainline rail access and interstate highway access, must be addressed at the very beginning of site selection National Academy of Sciences 2006 recommendations provide a template for resolving public concerns about transportation safety and security Risk assessment, risk management, and risk communication will be required over the entire life of operations - for storage, transportation, and disposal.