SISA Policy Brief no An Assessment of the US Drone Campaign in Pakistan and its Repercussions

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1 SISA Policy Brief no An Assessment of the US Drone Campaign in Pakistan and its Repercussions Qandeel Siddique 8 April 2013

2 An Assessment of the US Drone Campaign in Pakistan and its Repercussions Qandeel Siddique Centre for International and Strategic Analysis SISA 2013 All views expressed in the policy brief are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Centre for International and Strategic Analysis. The text may not be printed in full or part without the permission of the author. Queries can be directed to: Centre for International and Strategic Analysis Phone: (+47) Internet: 2

3 An Assessment of the US Drone Campaign in Pakistan and its Repercussions Background The rapid rise in the technological development of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs) has translated into a surge in their popularity in both defense and commercial industries around the world. Since 2005, the number of countries with drone capability has doubled, and most are vying to ameliorate this capability and field their own drone systems. The United State, along with Israel, is one of the leading developers of UAS and amassed a large drone arsenal. In 2001, the US possessed 50 drones; at the time of writing it has over 7,500. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or drones come in different shapes and sizes and provide a range of different functions. Tactical drones are chiefly used for intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance purposes, and have been the drone-of-choice for most countries worldwide in recent years. However, the demand for the acquisition of armed or combat UAVs continues to grow. Presently, three countries United States, United Kingdom and Israel are seen using these armed, killer drones. The US Drone Campaign in Pakistan Drones are the centerpiece of Obama s global war on terror, most of which takes place in Pakistan s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The US drone program in Pakistan has been operational since mid The US drone fare is also active in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Yemen. However, while the American UAV program is run cardinally by Pentagon in most of these countries the drone war inside Pakistan has hitherto fallen under the exclusive purview of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Although this might change in the future: earlier this month, on 22 March 2013, the White House announced its decision to seek a transfer of the drone program from the CIA to Pentagon. During the President Bush era, , a total of 52 US drone attacks were carried out against alleged terrorist hideouts in FATA. After President Obamas inauguration in 2009, the same year witnessed more drone attacks in Pakistan than the Bush years combined. In the years from the total number of drone strikes under Obama stand at

4 The number of civilian casualties, resulting from the US drone operations in FATA, varies: the dominant narrative in the US places the number in the tens, while most Pakistani officials claim that thousands of innocent lives have been lost to American drone strikes. Rigorous data compiled by The Bureau of Investigative Journalism suggests that the figure is anywhere from in the course of Presently, US drones strike Pakistan on average one every four days, and the militant-to-civilian kill ratio could be as low as 1:5. Despite the fact that it has been ongoing for nine plus years, a thorough understanding or analysis of the effects of the American drone program in Pakistan and whether (or the extent to which) it accomplishes what it sets out to do remains lacking. Utility versus Efficacy of Drones Although there are technological and tactical advantages to the employment of drones in the war on terror inside Pakistan, their disadvantages arguably overshadow any such gains. Firstly, even as a technology the precision of UAVs is still in the developing stage and the high collateral damage reinforce both the inaccuracy and unreliability of human and electronic intelligence involved. Secondly, combating terrorism requires a multipronged approach that is not limited to hovering over the Pakistani tribal belt or striking alleged terrorist huts that is, terrorism as an ideology cannot be undermined via military operations. The current approach has and is likely to continue breeding a blowback that possibly works in the favor of jihadist organizations for it justifies their terrorist activities on top of generating more wrath and vengeance. Advantages of Drones Proponents of UAVs in asymmetric warfare hail its advantages over other military forms presently available. Advantages of UAVs include their smart bomb technological qualities, including precision and high endurance. UAVs are also purportedly cost-effective although this is open to dispute since the overall costs of creating and running an unmanned aerial system, which can take up to 170 personnel to man, can have an equivalent cost to that of a manned aircraft. An important impetus behind the spread of the American drone campaign and its popularity within the US has been the no body bags returning home dialectic that is, pilotless planes like drones pose little to no risk to the lives of the 4

5 pilot or UAS crew who are situated remotely. Drones also avoid logistical issues raised by deploying troops on ground or other military actions. One canon of policy literature has argued that the US drone program in FATA has proved productive to winning the war on terror namely, that it targeted militants and disrupts al- Qaeda and Taliban networking. In other words, drones are beneficial to fighting asymmetrical warfare. Furthermore, it is maintained that tribal locals support and welcome the intervention for its effectiveness in eliminating terrorists (who have long terrorized locals). However, another body of literature contends that drones are worse than other forms of military operations since these lower the political cost of going to war, making it an easier enterprise to assume. They also fuel anger and resentment against the US as well as against the local government and military, making larger groups susceptible to radical ideology. In addition, drone strikes are largely considered to constitute extra-judicial killings and as such, in breach of international law. This potential illegality then calls into question human rights practices of western democracies. The recent debate in the US regarding the use of drones against American citizens has further brought the issue to fore. Disadvantages of Drones Disadvantages of drones entail the considerable collateral damage, including civilian casualties, to arise as a by-product of the operations. Both personality strikes (targeting individuals) and signature strikes (attacks on suspicious areas) as well as repeat strikes carried out on rescuers or medical personnel who tend to the site of a drone strike result in a significant number of innocent deaths. According to some estimates, only 2% of those killed by UAV strikes have been high-value targets the rest comprise of low-level militants who do not qualify as posing a direct threat to American security, or uninvolved local tribesmen. The ongoing UAV program in FATA also augments anti-western in particular, anti-americanism sentiment in the target population, but also increasingly in people worldwide as manifested in rising levels of protests (now seen even in the US). 5

6 As mentioned previously the technological advantages of armed UAVs may be exaggerated, as the technology has still not been perfected for target killing. One factor is latency which is the delay between movement on ground and the transmission of a video image to the drone pilot; the other is the blast radius of currently available missiles that extend from meters. For reconnaissance purposes too, UAVs are open to flaws. The US is heavily dependent on electronic intelligence to gather information on possible targets; however, given the lack of human intelligence and the fact that most people in the area share similar features, mistakes can be easily made (as is reflected in the number of civilians killed, as well as alleged terrorist who were targeted by drones but later found to still be alive). The US drone program in Pakistan has strained political relations between Pakistan and United States, and also caused economic upheaval. Furthermore, it has led to the dispersion of militant groups to other areas of Pakistan where they can regroup and continue their activities. A major argument pointing to the inefficacy of drone attacks to counter terrorism is that they remain a military tactic, not a strategy. Combined with the perceived lower political and psychological threshold involved in using UAVs, their spread has arguably and inversely lead to the bolstering of the jihadist narrative that sees its struggle against foreign occupation justified in the backdrop of regular American UAV strikes in Pakistan. The Jihadi narrative emanating from Pakistan has embedded the US drone attacks in its so-called defensive jihad which the Pakistani Taliban believes itself to be fighting. Since the onset of the program, articles are dedicated to drones in jihadi magazines. Statements from militant leaders and perpetrators of various terrorist attacks (including the New York Times Square car bomb attempt) often name US drone attacks and the Pakistani governments complicity in allowing them as a reason behind their act of terror. Hence it appears that political and strategic maneuvers are currently being sacrificed at the altar of the attractive short-term tactical and technological gains, as well as the compelling low-risk, low economic and political costs offered by the UAVs. On the basis of the consequential negative effects of the ongoing US led drone campaign in Pakistan it is postulated 6

7 that the said campaign is proving counterproductive to the global war on terrorism and its stated aim of targeting terrorists or terrorism, or eliminating threats to the US or the West in general from terrorists. Pakistani Government s Complicity According to information provided by WikiLeaks as well as information from interviewees in Pakistan, it seems to this author that the Pakistani government is likely to have given the carte blanche for most parts to the US to carry out its drone campaign in FATA. The US has also maintained that its program is conducted with agreement from the Pakistani state. However, the support by the GoP is likely nuanced, and relative to circumstances. It appears that since the Raymond Davis case the CIA agent who killed two Pakistanis in Lahore GoP endorsement of the drone program took a downward turn, which eventually lead to the closing of Shamsi air force base (allegedly used for drones) in late This is reflected in the gradual opposition by the Foreign Office that grew more vocal overtime and marked the shift from verbally threatening to lodge complaints against US drones to the UN to actually doing it (which eventually led to the UN inquiry on the subject in January 2013). Why Drones are Relevant for Third Party Countries The anti-drone voice by civil liberties and human rights groups, and more poignantly, by the Pakistani Foreign Office, has been gaining momentum in recent years. And this voice may continue both in light of the findings from the UN inquiry that challenge the legality of US drone strikes in Pakistan, as well as rising American awareness of the adverse affects of drone attacks. Compared to the rest of the world, the US (along with India) remained one of few countries where drones programs were popular. However, on 27 March 2013, and in the aftermath of the national attention gleaned from the long-lasting filibuster where Senator Rand Paul accused Obama s drone policy of abusing executive power, antidrone activists launched April s Day of Action, a month of protests across the US against military, companies, as well as universities that play a role in the drone war. 7

8 Such developments are relatively new and it is unclear at this point to what end they will serve to influence the US drone program in Pakistan or other countries. The anti-drone voice in fact has been around for a longer time, and despite it, the present day sees the appeal and practice of UAVs to continue undeterred. The report on which this policy brief is buttressed, therefore, addresses the need for third party countries to be cognizant of the various pitfalls associated with drone operations in countries like Pakistan and possibly use this information to revise their policy stance vis-à-vis drones. Policy recommendations Most countries will be affected by the increased use of drones. Close allies of the US, such as Norway, cannot take for granted that other, less-allied countries, similarly acknowledge the perceived benefits of UAV use. The full scope of the ramification of drone use is difficult to determine at present. However, more immediate censures might be indicative of a future trend. For instance, the Norwegian Oil Fund has come under criticism by the international charity Reprieve for investing in companies that manufacture combat drones. The major nodes of concern for third parties revolve on the issues of: The questionable efficacy of the drone operations as a major component in the global war on terrorism: drones are unpopular amongst large segments of the population in the countries to which they are subjected, and are used by jihadist groups as part of their propaganda (to attract more recruits as well as legitimize their terrorist activities). Worldwide too, American UAV attacks are largely unpopular, and there is a growing recognition of the illegality, breach of international law and human rights, of US target killing via drones. NATO member countries that implicitly or explicitly support the US drone campaign in legally questionable conflict zones, and collaborators to unmanned aerial systems used in target killings, should therefore be cognizant of the its questionable legality in international law and the adverse effects it yields. Drone proliferation: as more and more countries acquire drone technology, there is an overhang risk of hostile states, or even non-state actors, using drone capability (intelligence gathering or attacks) against rivals. Countries invested in companies who are manufacturers of drone parts or provide drone technology to countries 8

9 engaged in potentially illegal usage of UAVs should reconsider their role in the larger scheme of drone proliferation. As more countries have acquired (at least tactical, if not combat) drone technology the precedent set by the US may spell danger as other nations carry out drone missions in the name of their version of the war on terror. Having already launched an inquiry into the employment of US drones, the UN may in the future inspect roles of individual NATO countries in the illegal drone war. The UN has hinted as much, and countries like United Kingdom have already faced charges for their assistance in the US-led extra-judicial killings in Pakistan. It is therefore to the benefit of concerning third parties to re-evaluate their engagement. 9