Research Brief. Reducing the number and impact of vehicle strikes on railway underline bridges. T854 - August Background.

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1 Research Brief Reducing the number and impact of vehicle strikes on railway underline bridges Background Over the last ten years, between 1400 and 2200 underline bridge strikes have been reported to Network Rail each year, and other infrastructure managers also have similar problems. For example, approximately twenty bridge strikes are reported to London Underground annually. These incidents occur when an overheight vehicle is driven under a bridge and collides with it. The result of such incidents is often damage to the driven vehicle and bridge, but these occurrences can also be hazardous to the driver of the high vehicle, bus passengers, other road users in the vicinity and to trains travelling over the damaged bridge and their occupants. There are also financial costs associated with bridge strikes, which are borne by the railways and vehicle owner. Some of these costs result from delays to trains while the integrity of the bridge is assessed. According to Network Rail, the cost of delays including cancellations in due to bridge strikes at underline bridges was 4.8m. Aims and scope The aim of this project (still under way during 2012) is to determine the effectiveness of current and future bridge strike prevention methods and make recommendations for RSSB R&D Programme Block 2 Angel Square 1 Torrens Street London EC1V 1NY enquirydesk@rssb.co.uk default.aspx 1

2 Reducing the number and impact of vehicle strikes on railway underline bridges improvement and adoption of new methods if necessary. This project comprises three work packages. Work package 1, completed during 2011, was carried out by RSSB and its objective was to review and summarise research projects, literature, legislation and incident investigations relevant to bridge strikes and associated prevention methods, and carry out a survey of high vehicle drivers. Work package 2 was carried out by TRL and its objectives were to: Identify the causal factors associated with bridge strikes, so as to better target action to reduce the number of incidents. Review existing methods of bridge strike prevention in terms of effectiveness, design suitability and usability. Review potential future methods of reducing bridge strikes. While measures to reduce bridge strikes would also reduce train delays resulting from such incidents, this study did not investigate the impact of bridge strikes on train delays. Overline bridge strikes (where road vehicles strike a bridge over a railway line) were also not included in the scope of this study. Work package 3 was designed to develop a set of technical and user requirements for design and implementation of bridge strike prevention methods, and test the effectiveness of new methods and equipment against the requirements. This workstream is not now envisaged - see conclusions and next steps sections (below). Overview of research methods The following research methods were used to deliver work packages 1 and 2: 1 A review of literature, to summarise research projects, literature, and legislation relative to bridge strikes and associated prevention methods. 2 An analysis of data from bridge strike incidents, from 1 January 2000 to 17 August 2010, mostly extracted from the Safety Management Information System (SMIS). 3 Results of a driver survey, which covered: information about the driver, their vehicle, route planning and preparation, equipment, signs and markings, training and awareness of bridge strikes and their prevention. 4 A survey of 16 regularly struck low bridge sites to assess the quality and quantity of information and warnings presented to drivers, and to identify any instances of good and bad 2 RSSB

3 practice along with factors present within those environments which would increase the likelihood of a driver error. 5 A detailed analysis of driver tasks (from journey preparation activities to reporting a bridge strike), describing potential errors and performance shaping factors in order to understand the range of underlying causes of bridge strikes. 6 Interviews with manufacturers of products which could reduce bridge strikes, to gain an insight into any research they carried out while developing the product, and any monitoring of its effectiveness in reducing bridge strikes. 7 Interviews with highway authorities, to gain an insight into their perspective on bridge strike risk and prevention. 8 A review of vehicle operator policies to identify elements of good and bad practice in relation to bridge strike prevention. 9 Interviews with HGV and bus drivers from small and large companies, managers, trade associations, training providers, an examining body and an enforcement body to identify current practice and potential areas for improvement with regards to training. Key results The research identified that bridge strikes can arise as a result of: Errors or violations during load stowing. Errors or violations in relation to measuring the height of the vehicle. Errors or violations during route planning or navigation (this includes not making a new plan having encountered a diversion), increasing the likelihood of unexpectedly encountering a low bridge, and subsequently, violations. Failure to notice, read or interpret traffic signs, compare the height of the vehicle to the height restriction, and reevaluate the route plan (ie divert or turn back if necessary). Poor signing for low bridges, including insufficient advance and alternative route signing, incorrect signs, poorly maintained and obscured signs. Poor vehicle alignment with the bridge, including not moving to the highest point of an arch bridge or making an evasive manoeuvre to avoid oncoming vehicles. Following a bridge strike incident, two further undesirable outcomes were noted: vehicle drivers failing to promptly report the strike to the Rail Authority, or not reporting the bridge strike at all. 32% of drivers surveyed identified 'drivers not knowing the height of their vehicle' as the main cause of bridge strikes. Poor route RSSB 3

4 Reducing the number and impact of vehicle strikes on railway underline bridges planning and drivers not understanding signs were also identified by a significant proportion of drivers as the main cause of bridge strikes. In addition, this study found that: 43% of truck drivers do not use anything to measure the height of their vehicles. More drivers used a standard road map or atlas than used the Trucker's Atlas or other guide, which includes the heights and locations of many low bridges. 56% of truck drivers either rarely or never took account of low bridges during route planning. 31% of respondents received no information or guidance from their employer on how to avoid hitting low bridges. About 10% of drivers used satellite navigation systems for route guidance, but it was unclear what proportion of the systems in use took account of low bridges when setting a route. This study has identified a lack of suitable and usable products to support drivers in the tasks that they would need to carry out in order to avoid low bridges. It is extremely difficult to find vehicle height measurement products available in Great Britain, and while route planning and low bridge warning products do exist, this study has identified some issues with their usability which would limit their effectiveness. For some products, questions remain over their scope and accuracy (particularly where these products utilise databases of low bridge heights and locations). The heights of low bridges included in these databases tend to be taken from road signs; thus, it is very important that these signs are accurate. The amount and quality of information, training and support that drivers receive also varies by company, with some companies providing regular training to emphasise the safety issues around low bridges, whereas agency drivers and employees of other companies receive no post-qualification information or training. During mandatory training (pre- and post- qualification) for high vehicle drivers, opportunities to inform and warn about low bridges are missed. Conclusions A wide range of human errors can lead to bridge strikes, each with a variety of causal factors. The granularity of the available data is not sufficient to support choosing one or two areas to concentrate efforts; rather, a range of issues need to be addressed. These are broadly: 4 RSSB

5 Development, provision and use of products such as height measurement tools, route planning tools and in cab low bridge warnings. Improvements to the bridge environment, traffic signs and signing schemes, to enable drivers to divert away from the bridge at a suitable location, and to stop drivers from having to make difficult decisions or turning manoeuvres (or in some cases reversing their vehicle back out of roads). Improvements to vehicle operators' policies and practices to ensure drivers are supported in knowing the height of their vehicle and navigating routes using the relevant tools, procedures and information. Training to prevent bridge strikes and raise awareness of their consequences and to know what to do in the event of a bridge strike. Engagement and co-ordination between the Rail Authority, product manufacturers, vehicle operators and highway authorities, to encourage development and adoption of tools and procedures and to share information and best practices. Improved incident reporting and data gathering, to ensure that the cause of each reported bridge strike can be more readily identified, and to trial different bridge strike prevention measures. Effective enforcement of current regulations; for example, spot checking vehicle height indicators, detection and punishment of those who have been involved in a bridge strike incident. It is, however, recognised that enforcement agencies have a range of issues to tackle and would need to prioritise their efforts in this area among their other tasks. There is a complex interplay between these different areas; none are likely to eliminate the problem of bridge strikes on their own. It is likely that the following areas would benefit from the rail industry's efforts: 1 Improving incident reporting and data gathering. 2 Continued implementation of bridge protection measures that fall under the rail authority's remit. 3 Engagement with highway authorities, product manufacturers and vehicle operators. In order to reduce bridge strikes, some tasks would need to be carried out or improved by others. These include: RSSB 5

6 Reducing the number and impact of vehicle strikes on railway underline bridges 4 Improvements to existing products and development of new products. 5 Improvements to bridge environments and implementation of new measures. 6 Improvements to vehicle operator policies and practices. 7 Provision and maintenance of road vehicle driver training materials and improved driver training to prevent bridge strikes, raise awareness of the issues surrounding bridge strikes and to inform drivers of the relevant rules, best practices and procedures. 8 Better and more effective enforcement by the Police and other authorities Next steps This research project has identified the key actions that would contribute the most to reducing the incidence of bridge strikes at railway underline bridges. Three of these (listed above) would be best led by railway organisations: 1 Would require a proposal for improvements to the Safety Management Information System, which is managed by RSSB and a proposal for change should be promoted by Network Rail. 2 Requires continued action by 'Rail Authority' bodies, broadly Network Rail and Transport for London. 3 Is a continuation of current activity whereby Network Rail actively engages with other organisations involved in the Bridge Strike Prevention Group. The other five activities (also listed above) are more suitable for leadership by road-orientated organisations and, while Network Rail and Transport for London should continue to press for improvements they would not be in a position to implement them. None of these eight issues appears to require specific research activities, and therefore it is recommended that the research stage of this activity (ie the possible phase three of this project) should be closed now, and the actions required publicised widely via the Bridge Strike Prevention Group. Contact Michael Woods Head of Operations and Management Research R&D Programme, RSSB enquirydesk@rssb.co.uk 6 RSSB