Timing of the City Centre Rail Tunnel: Auckland and Government agencies views

Transcription

1 Timing of the City Centre Rail Tunnel: Auckland and Government agencies views Workstream Report 21 April 2011 Page 1 of 13

2 Table of contents 1 Introduction Auckland View Rail network constraints Bus network constraints Roading network constraints Additional central city stations Western Line Capacity Constraint Benefit Cost Ratio Costs of delay Construction cost inflation Commercial development in advance of designation Planning blight Transport blight Loss of agglomeration benefits Loss of transport user benefits Land Use Changes Central government agencies view Benefit Cost ratio and timing Summary of Ministry of Transport and Treasury views on timing Realising the benefits from electrification Capacity into the CBD, sequencing and prioritisation An alternative approach to timing: advantages and disadvantages List of Tables Table 1 Rail and mode share by distance from station... 4 i

3 1 Introduction Workstream nine timing of the City Centre rail tunnel was tasked with producing a report that covers: (a) technical factors influencing timing options (b) impacts of timing options (c) key milestones that are required before the project becomes operational (d) timing interdependencies between this project and other related projects and Auckland s land use aspirations expressed in the emerging Spatial Plan. The Working Group was not able to reach a consensus view on the optimal timing of the City Centre rail tunnel project. Therefore, this paper identifies the viewpoints of Auckland and Government agencies respectively. 1

4 2 Auckland View Auckland has expressed a clear view that the City Centre rail tunnel should proceed through the investigation, planning, design and construction phases so that it can be completed within 7.5 to 10 years dependent on the procurement method chosen. This is seen to be critical to address forthcoming constraints in the rail, bus and road networks serving the Auckland City Centre. This is critical for facilitating Auckland s aspirations for a stronger city centre with significant employment, residential and tertiary student growth. 2.1 Rail network constraints The key rail operational issue is the capacity constraint at Britomart that limits train movements to a practical maximum of 21 per hour/ direction. This is expected to be reached by 2013/14 in terms of train paths. However, according to the Business Case, the passenger carrying capacity may extend to The rate will be influenced by factors such as fare price and City Centre growth factor drivers. Minor increases to capacity are offered by increasing the rail sets from Onehunga from 3 cars to 6 cars (which requires the lengthening of platforms on the Onehunga Line). Lengthening trains from six car sets to eight car sets is not easy due to the length of platforms at stations around the network and that the current EMU rolling stock procurement is limited to 6-car sets 1. Therefore, lengthening trains beyond 6- car sets would require infrastructure upgrades and potentially a further procurement of rolling stock. In addition, the platform lengths planned for the City Centre rail tunnel stations will not accommodate longer trains. Total inbound hourly capacity at Britomart Station is 16,170 (assuming 770 seated and standing passengers per 6 car set). However, it is worth pointing out that for the Western Line the capacity pinch point is Kingsland and for the Southern Lines the point is at Newmarket and Ellerslie, and short of running express services bypassing Newmarket and having other trains stop at Newmarket from the south and west the actual likely capacity is much less in real terms into the central city. In addition, service reliability and punctuality is expected to suffer as both patronage grows and the number of services operated into Britomart nears the maximum threshold. The current rail service pattern is Britomart centric, so any delays or incidents at or in the approaches to Britomart often quickly result in knock on delays across the rail network. 2.2 Bus network constraints Bus network constraints were identified as when key bus lanes in the central city exceed capacity, defined as more than 100 buses per peak hour/direction. Specifically these are: Fanshawe Street in Symonds Street (Karangahape Road to Wellesley Street) in Symonds Street (Khyber Pass Road to Karangahape Road) in Albert Street southbound by Albert Street northbound by Note the a three-car EMU will have the same capacity as a current four-car SA/SD train. 2

5 The Fanshawe Street corridor is forecast to experience the greatest increase in demand. It is already one of the key congestion points in the current bus network identified by Parsons Brinkerhoff in studies of the bus corridors Fanshawe Street, Albert Street and Britomart. Of the other corridors, Symonds Street has a current congestion point near Auckland University, and is also expected to experience a large increase in demand if the City Centre rail tunnel is not constructed. Of concern is the fact that the roads that form the bus corridors are some of the most congested at the moment and are likely to experience increased congestion in the future. The Queen Street corridor has a lower capacity due to higher demands for pedestrian movements. It also has less scope for bus priority. Due to an estimated decline in capacity for bus services, the Queen Street corridor is forecast to be over capacity from Local bus priority treatments to move buses through traffic congestion are also likely to reduce road capacity. Treatments would be required at several intersections on each corridor based on the congestion indicated in Flow Transportation Specialists Ltd, City Centre SATURN Traffic Model Network Performance and Model Capabilities, November While there are opportunities to improve bus operations in the central area, in terms of service routings, termini and priority treatments, these are likely to add only marginal capacity that will be quickly absorbed by improved service frequencies. The earliest date for operation of the City Centre rail tunnel, 2021, coincides with the date at which all bus corridors would have reached their capacity (without further bus priority upgrades). The project delivery time outlined in the Business Case would enable the City Centre rail tunnel to start operation in time to relieve the Symonds Street bus corridor (which would have reached the limit of its upgraded capacity). According to the Business Case, the rail network would reach its capacity (without major upgrade) three years later, in Roading network constraints The Government is investing significant amounts of money in the upgrade of the central area motorway through the Grafton Gully, Central Motorway Junction, Victoria Park Tunnel and Newmarket Viaduct projects. Critical to protecting the long-term benefits of these projects is that the release of key system bottlenecks by these projects especially the Victoria Park Tunnel project is not absorbed by induced traffic when more sustainable alternatives are available. A traffic model prepared for the Auckland City Centre (Flow Transportation Specialists Ltd, City Centre SATURN Traffic Model Network Performance and Model Capabilities, November 2010), showed that the intersections on many key corridors into and out of the City Centre are operating at or close to capacity in the existing situation. The streets with the highest delays included key bus corridors (Queen Street, Symonds Street and Fanshawe Street), as well as the motorway connections. The highest levels of congestion were experienced on State Highway 1 approaching from the north. The modelling also found that intersection delays were higher and average speeds lower during the evening peak. The average operational speed in Auckland City Centre was between 10km/h and 15km/h. 3

6 Significant investment in additional road capacity would be required to address congestion within Auckland City Centre. This is contrary to the Auckland Transport Plan 2009 and New Zealand Transport Strategy. With no new road capacity planned and percent additional traffic by 2041, it is anticipated that delays and congestion would grow. It is also likely that the peak would spread, affecting more people over a greater length of time. Increases in the average car occupancy would reduce these impacts, but are unlikely to provide a substantial relief for congestion. The Business Case also states that roading capacity in the central city has already been reached. There are no realistic opportunities to expand roading capacity in the central area, but there are some opportunities to reallocate existing road space to public transport, pedestrians and cyclists. 2.4 Additional central city stations Britomart s location at the northern edge of the central city gives it excellent connectivity with ferry services but by the very location, limits its walkable catchment. The current employment core of the central city is the midtown area centred around the Queen Street, Wellesley Street, Victoria Street and Albert Street blocks. This area is between 700 metres and one kilometre from Britomart by the most direct walking route. The area of patronage influence for railway stations diminishes sharply as a factor of distance. This is more strongly the case for employment functions at the trip end than residential trip origins. Beyond 800 metres from the station, the rail mode share has largely disappeared. The City Centre rail tunnel proposes stations at approximately 800-metre intervals which includes the vast majority of the central city within its walkable catchment. The 2005 Washington Metropolitan Transportation Authority Development Related Ridership Survey identified the following trends for mode share and distance from stations. Table 1 Rail and mode share by distance from station Distance from station Rail mode share Car mode share Office Residential Office Residential At station 35% 54% 48% 29% 400 metres 23% 43% 66% 41% 800 metres 10% 31% 83% 54% Additional stations are required to be able to effectively serve the whole city centre by rail. The difference in catchments between current stations (in purple) and future planned stations (Parnell in green; City Centre rail tunnel stations in red) is shown clearly in the two graphics below. 4

7 Constraint 2.5 Western Line Capacity Analysis by the Ministry of Transport demonstrates that the electrified system s peak seating capacity on the Western Line will be exceeded from Glen Eden to Grafton in 2016 shortly after implementation of electrification in 2013/2014. A seating to standing ratio (SSR) of will be exceeded between Baldwin Ave and Grafton stations from At the previous Auckland Regional Transport Authority (ARTA) standard SSR of 1.4, trains would be at capacity from Avondale to Mt Eden in At the same time, bus services from the source areas for the Western Line perform poorly, especially from more outlying areas owing to slow travel times and limited bus priority measures on the Northwestern Motorway and Great North Road west of Pt Chevalier. This is reflected in relatively low patronage of peak period buses from the west in contrast to ongoing strong rail patronage growth. Without extensive additional bus priority measures, especially on the Northwestern Motorway around interchanges, and on Great North Road between New Lynn and Pt Chevalier, it is unlikely that buses will be much more attractive than they are at present for any displaced rail customers. Therefore, there is significant risk is that these customers are lost to public transport entirely owing to the inability of the rapid transit system to provide for them. 2.6 Benefit Cost Ratio This forms part of the economic efficiency assessment that the New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA) makes for its transport investments. The elements of this evaluation are: 1. Strategic fit, which is whether proposals fit with the NZTA s strategic direction (as set out in NZTA s Investment and Revenue Strategy) and address significant national or regional issues. 2. Effectiveness, which is how the NZTA considers how well proposals contribute to a particular strategic objective. Proposals achieving longterm, integrated and enduring solutions rate highest. 3. Economic efficiency, which is whether proposals use resources efficiently and offer long-lasting benefits. This is assessed through the BCR for proposals that add new or improved infrastructure or services 2 The 1.7 SSR was agreed between ARTA, the Ministry of Transport, and KiwiRail as part of the process leading up to the procurement of EMUs. 5

8 Recent examples of NZTA funded projects with low economic efficiency include: Waikato Expressway, Nguaruawahia Section detailed design and construction 1 November Tauriko Bypass Investigation 24 March Vickers Road to New Plymouth Investigation 24 March Waikato Expressway, Te Rapa Bypass Final Design and Construction 2 March These projects were funded because of a wider assessment of their strategic fit and effectiveness. While the BCR is a useful measure of the relative value of projects, within the methodological limitations of the Economic Evaluation Manual, it is not the only measure used in New Zealand to determine whether project should be funded or not. It is also important to understand that the transport benefits do not start accruing until the new service opens and people start using the train services in the new rail tunnel. However, in practice as soon as a project of this nature is confirmed as going ahead businesses and the public start anticipating its eventual delivery by where they buy their residence or locate their businesses and business/property values take this into account. Should the project be delayed then businesses and potential customers then start making decisions on location etc that do not factor in the City Centre rail tunnel i.e. the customer may well locate outside the City Centre and the benefit is lost for a number of years until a further decision is made on location. This real-life decision-making process needs to be taken into account in relation to political decision-making about this There is a view that the project timing should be driven by the First Year Rate of Return. The FYRR analyses the project benefits in the first year. The optimal start time is then derived from these benefits relative to the opportunity cost of the project. This is a reasonable approach for projects that have the vast majority benefits coming online in the first year of operation. This would account for most projects. This is unlikely to be the case for rail or transformational projects in general, where it takes time for all of the benefits to come online. There is a significance divergence here between road and rail. It takes a significant amount of time for people to begin switching mode share. Furthermore, the supply of rail is not constrained in the same way that it is for road because you can increase the number of carriages, whereas road has a fixed supply. In other words, the nature of the timing of benefits for rail violates an assumption for which FYRR hinges on. A better approach might be to see in which year the total net present value benefits are maximised. This would require an analysis of how the total benefits change with a postponement of the project, rather than just the first year. 2.7 Costs of delay There are a range of costs around delaying a project Construction cost inflation Overall increase in costs owing to construction cost inflation, which is generally higher than the increase in the consumer price index due to competition for increasingly scarce key inputs. This increase in costs may (or may not) be counterbalanced by an increase in benefits if the benefit stream increases with time. 6

9 2.7.2 Commercial development in advance of designation There is a very real possibility of commercial development occurring on the City Centre rail tunnel route that would either increase costs significantly, delay its construction, or preclude the project for the foreseeable future. Specifically, if the Westfield Downtown redevelopment goes ahead without an agreement of how to accommodate the tunnel through its basement, then the City Centre rail tunnel project is not likely to go ahead for the foreseeable future. This means that the protection of the route is required immediately. Otherwise, the very likely consequence is for the costs and timescales of the project to be significantly extended Planning blight The delay between designating a route and implementation the project that is the subject of the designation can lead to planning blight as it imposes constraints to developments. This is particularly the case for parcels of land needed to be acquired in their entirety to construct the project where the residual property can only be developed after the project is completed. The hardship requirements of the Public Works Act means that once a route is designated, the requiring authority may be required to purchase properties in advance of their being needed for the project. This can involve substantial holding costs as only short-term, often lower-value, uses can be used to gain holding revenue until the project itself is constructed. Another form of planning blight is where upzoning has taken place in expectation of improved accessibility but that improved accessibility has been delayed. This can lead to either a freezing of development if minimum floor area ratios, employment or residential densities are imposed, or suboptimal site utilisation if there are no such minimum requirements Transport blight Delays to the congestion relief and accessibility benefits of a project could encourage development to relocate elsewhere where it is less likely that there would be strong uptake of public transport. This has a double effect: 1. Increasing the level of congestion on the network beyond that had the project proceeded at an earlier timeframe. 2. Reducing the uptake of public transport owing to the lower level of its attractiveness at the alternative location Loss of agglomeration benefits One of the key benefits of the City Centre rail tunnel proposal is to enable further employment growth in the Auckland City Centre, particularly targeted at more productive jobs to increase the overall productivity of the city centre. This also has flow-on gains to the entire region and nation. If these benefits are delayed, then there is a delay in economic development to both Auckland and New Zealand Loss of transport user benefits As road travel speeds decrease over time with increasing congestion, bus travel times commensurately increase, even in areas with significant but incomplete bus priority measures, over what would be the case when the congestion relief benefits of the City Centre Rail Tunnel project would achieve. This has the dual effect of making public transport less attractive and car travel relatively more attractive which delays 7

10 the transport user benefits both for car drivers and public transport customers of the project. 2.8 Land Use Changes To maximise the benefits of development around the station areas identified in the Business Case, maximising the land use that can take advantage of the improved accessibility is necessary. This would most likely involve upzoning these areas to permit greater employment densities and higher floor area ratios. This would likely take place during the Auckland Council s process to develop a Unitary Plan, replacing the current legacy council district plans. While this is not a short process, it is likely that it would readily be able to be completed well in advance of any completion date for the City Centre rail tunnel. Hence it should not be seen as a timing constraint. 8

11 3 Central government agencies view 3.1 Benefit Cost ratio and timing Timing decision needs to take account of when the project becomes economically efficient. The project has been assessed, based on current information (including an allowance for wider economic benefits), under a scenario where construction begins in ten years time. This is to test whether a later construction date, which takes advantage of higher forecast future patronage and therefore benefits, results in a positive benefit to cost ratio. The results suggest that, although the benefit to cost ratio improves, the growth in benefits over time is not enough to achieve a positive economic return in this timeframe. Funding constraints The Government has signalled that the Crown s fiscal position and strategy means that there is unlikely to be additional central government funding for delivering on Auckland s strategic aspirations (beyond that already signalled for investment), and even where there is, the Government will be very careful about what it chooses to invest in. Agencies will be seeking to get better value out of existing investments, and to prioritise investment to the highest-value use. The strategic case for central government funding or intervention will receive particular attention. There are constraints in public sector funds for major capital projects and the Government has set the reasonable expectation of a high standard for capital funding proposals, filtered through a multi-layered business case process led by the Treasury, collectively known at the Capital Asset Management (CAM) framework. The Christchurch Earthquake of 22 February 2011 and the relatively high level of public debt held by the Government adds to this constrained fiscal climate. At the same time, a large number of big ticket transport items are working their way through the funding pipeline, of which the CBD rail tunnel is but one. 3.2 Summary of Ministry of Transport and Treasury views on timing Realising the benefits from electrification The government is currently undertaking a $1.6 billion programme to upgrade and electrify the Auckland rail network, this will improve the frequency, speed reliability and quality of rail services. The former ARTA s Rail Development Plan notes that the investment in electrification will: Reduce congestion, improving freight travel times and road user journey time reliability Encourage intensification of development along rail corridors Increase economic activity and labour productivity in the CBD The government is keen to see evidence of these results being achieved from its current investment in electrification Capacity into the CBD, sequencing and prioritisation Modelling results indicate that with electrification, and taking into account the effect of rail capacity constraints, total rail morning peak patronage is likely to almost triple from a 2010 survey figure of around 9,500 to a modelled estimate of 28,000 by

12 Rail trips into the CBD will grow from around 5,000 in 2010 to around 11,400 by Morning peak bus trips into the CBD, under the electrified do minimum, are expected to increase by around 19,500 from a 2010 survey figure of 23,180, to a modelled estimate of 42,675 by A large proportion of the bus trips will come from the Northern Busway, which, is forecast receive around 15,300 trips by Construction of the CBD rail tunnel will increase network trips by 9,500, including around 6,000 additional trips into the CBD. The tunnel will reduce bus trips by around 4,000 tips, or approximately ten percent of the total. These figures indicate that the majority of demand for access into the CBD will come from bus services, followed by the electrified rail network and the CBD rail tunnel, which generate similar growth. This suggests that the priority for investment in CBD access is ensuring continued growth of bus patronage, particularly through the Northern Busway 3, followed by ensuring the success of rail electrification and the CBD rail tunnel. In practice, rail and bus modes are complementary and therefore capital and operational investment in these modes needs to be pursued in parallel. This is primarily a matter for Auckland Council, Auckland Transport and the NZ Transport Agency. However, the central agencies view is that a holistic, multimodal investment programme, which is achievable within likely available funding, is required provide an understanding of the entire picture of capacity provision to and within the CBD. This needs to occur within the context of Auckland Council s overall Master Plan for the CBD and its spatial plan 4. Development of such a programme is well beyond the scope of this Review, but it is seen as a necessary step to clarify how the CBD rail tunnel sits alongside other priorities for meeting demand for trips into and within the CBD, along with the rest of the network. It also appears that there is much that can be done to optimise current bus operations in the CBD. Implementing improvements in this area would provide greater confidence that investment in existing infrastructure is being maximised before further funding is sought An alternative approach to timing: advantages and disadvantages Central agencies view is that one course of action is to enable protection of the route for the CBD rail tunnel now, but re-examine funding for construction once there is experience and evidence from the operation of the electrified network. This has the advantage of enabling electrification to demonstrate the benefits from rail investment in terms of patronage growth, suburban intensification and CBD labour growth and productivity. It also provides time: for Auckland Council to finalise, and begin to implement the City Centre Masterplan and Auckland spatial plan, and allow for a better appreciation of they way integration with these plans will improve the project benefits 3 Modelling indicates that the Northern Busway will provide a major source of trip capacity into the CBD during the 2041 morning peak. The Additional Waitemata Harbour Crossing Network Plan: Passenger Transport Report indicates that some form of additional capacity for the Busway will be required in the Fanshawe Street area by The need to understand the entire picture of CBD capacity provision (presumably via the Auckland spatial plan process) was agreed by Chief Executives. 10

13 to develop an achievable, holistic multimodal programme for transport in the CBD, which would provide an understanding of the entire picture of capacity provision, show how the CBD rail tunnel fits alongside other key priorities and support a thorough analysis of alternatives to identify and implement measures to improve the effectiveness and capacity for bus operations in the CBD for further work to improve central and local government understanding of the economic effects, particularly job location effects, of investment in public transport for rail patronage growth to occur, which will improve the benefit to cost ratio for the project, particularly if the growth is higher than forecast. In combination, these effects will provide much more confidence when reassessing the project and will increase the benefits. The key disadvantage of making a later decision is that it will delay the onset of the benefits associated with the project, but this must be weighed against the advantages of delaying the costs. A later decision will also lead to some patronage loss from the rail capacity constraint, although this could be mitigated by alternative service patterns. Nevertheless, the number of passengers lost to rail and the associated congestion costs are, on their own, insufficient to justify the costs of project construction. 11