73rd MORSS CD Cover Page UNCLASSIFIED DISCLOSURE FORM CD Presentation

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1 73rd MORSS CD Cover Page UNCLASSIFIED DISCLOSURE FORM CD Presentation 712CD For office use only June 2005, at US Military Academy, West Point, NY Please complete this form 712CD as your cover page to your electronic briefing submission to the MORSS CD. Do not fax to the MORS office. Author Request (To be completed by applicant) - The following author(s) request authority to disclose the following presentation in the MORSS Final Report, for inclusion on the MORSS CD and/or posting on the MORS web site. Name of Principal Author and all other author(s): R. Wesley Nimon & Ricky Hall Principal Author s Organization and address: Phone: Fax: wesley.nimon@navy.mil Original title on 712 A/B: An Experimental Analysis of the Relative Efficiency of Alternative Assignment Auction Formats Revised title:_same as above Presented in (input and Bold one): (WG20), CG, Special Session, Poster, Demo, or Tutorial): This presentation is believed to be: UNCLASSIFIED AND APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

2 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 23 JUN REPORT TYPE N/A 3. DATES COVERED - 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE An Experimental Analysis of the Relative Efficiency of Alternative Assignment Auction Formats 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) ONR 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR S ACRONYM(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR S REPORT NUMBER(S) 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES See also ADM201946, Military Operations Research Society Symposium (73rd) Held in West Point, NY on June 2005., The original document contains color images. 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT SAR a. REPORT unclassified b. ABSTRACT unclassified c. THIS PAGE unclassified 18. NUMBER OF PAGES 17 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18

3 An Experimental Analysis of the Relative Efficiency of Alternative Assignment Auction Formats R. Wesley Nimon, PI Achieving Human Resource Solutions Through Innovative Research

4 Efficiency and Auction Design Research Basic Research Addresses a Few Fundamental Questions - How and what weight to apply to the Sailor s bid? - Does contention level matter? - Which auction format is more efficient? (1 st vs. 2 nd Price) 3

5 Background Developed experimental software environment Results to empirically inform the auction design Conducted experimental auctions Southern Methodist University University of Mississippi University of Memphis 4

6 Basic Structure of the Experiments Subjects are presented with list of jobs Total Score = Fitness Score + Bid Score Optimization across Total Scores determines assignments For each job the bidder s reservation wage (RW) is given For the awarded job the subject receives Gamebucks = Bid-RW Subjects exchange their Gamebucks for US dollars at a preannounced exchange rate. This is their payment. 5

7 Experimental Auction Environment Subject s Screens Achieving Human Resource Solutions Through Innovative Research

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9 Cumulative payment to date (including Game Money of $15): $16.50

10 First Price, Low Contention Auctions Table 2 First Price, Low Contention, Winning Bids 120 (Avg. Bid/RW -1)* Bid Weight (%) Mem phis OleMiss SMU 9

11 Data 900 observations Only winning bids were used Initial rounds were excluded to account for improved level of task understanding Bid RW Parameterization of Experiments - High (3 jobs/6 bidders) to Low (5 jobs/6 bidders) Contention Level - Bid Weights: 10%, 20%, 33%, 50%, 66%, & 80% - First Price = βˆ + βˆ ˆ ( Auction Round #) + ε

12 Regression Model Estimated 1 ( BidW) + βˆ RW + βˆ FS + εˆ Bid = βˆ + βˆ Contention + βˆ Memphis + βˆ Mississippi + βˆ Independent Variables First Price Auctions Dependent Variable: Bid Rsquare = 0.63 (BidW ) Intercept Contention Memphis Mississippi RW FS *** 14.87*** *** 25.03*** 4.08*** 1 11

13 Elasticity Estimates Bid to Bid-Weight Elasticity (Low Contention) ε Bid,BidW = and at 10% and 50% Bid-Weights, respectively - Increase in Bid Weight from 10% to 50% Approximately a 28% reduction in bid amounts 12

14 Assessment of Market Power Bid = ˆ β + ˆ β + ˆ 0 1( RW ) β 2 ( Fitness) + ε. Factors Limiting Coefficient on the Fitness Score Market Power Memphis Mississippi SMU Modified VL *** High Contention Only *** High Bid Weight Only *** 4.9*** 3.08*** High Bid Weight and High Contention *** indicates significance at the P value< 0.01 level 13

15 Back-up Slides Achieving Human Resource Solutions Through Innovative Research

16 1st Price vs. Generalized 2 nd Price Auction 1 st Price Auction Bid Weight = 2% Max Bid = $500 Generalized 2 nd Price Auction Bid Weight = 2% Max Bid = $500 Bids Received - $500 - $500 - $500 Bids Received 15

17 1 st Price vs. Generalized 2 nd Price Auction 1 st Price Auction Bid Weight = 2% Max Bid = $500 Generalized 2 nd Price Auction Bid Weight = 2% Max Bid = $500 Bids Received - $500 - $500 - $500 Bids Received - $500 - $350 - $250 16

18 First vs. Second Price Auction Format First to Modified VL Auction Contention: High Contention: Low % Change in Bid/RW and Payment Bid-weight 20% 80% Bid/RW -24.6% -6.9% Payment 60.2% 81.5% Bid/RW -2.6% -22.3% Payment 70.6% 8.3% 17