Antitrust Assessment of MIF and the tourist test

Transcription

1 The Role and Regulation of Interchange Fees in European Payments Cards Bruxelles, 15 June 2011 Antitrust Assessment of MIF and the tourist test Andrea Amelio * European Commission *The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of DG COMP or the European Commission 1

2 1. Introduction Historical overview Description of theory of harm Use of MIT to correct for the harm Caveats Conclusions 2

3 2. Historical overview Visa I and Visa II decisions (2001/2002), MasterCard decision (2007), Visa decision (2010) MIFs are a restriction of competition between acquirers by effect because they have an inflationary effect on prices to merchants To comply with competition rules MIFs need to be justified by efficiencies that are passed on to consumers MasterCard Decision: MIFs a restriction of competition, but not prohibited as a matter of principle as possibility of an efficiency justification explicitly accepted in the Decision Efficiency justification brought forward by MasterCard prior to the Decision rejected General allegations to efficiencies of payment card system as a whole are not sufficient Instead, concrete demonstration of efficiencies generated by MIFs and the benefits brought to merchants and their subsequent purchasers MasterCard provisional settlement: Based on tourist test at 0.3% (credit) and 0.2% (debit) Data from national central bank studies Additional transparency measures regarding the honour-all-cards rule (HACR), no-surcharge rule (NSR), blending and exclusive dealing provisions 3

4 2. Historical overview: VISA Simultaneously: MasterCard appeal of the 2007 decision in front of the Court of First Instance Study commissioned to obtain more precise data for a wider set of EU countries Visa SO in April 2009 April 2010 Visa offered commitments for immediate debit card transactions To reduce its MIFs for cross-border and domestic transactions in nine countries to 0.20% Measures to increase transparency and competition along the same lines as MasterCard Commission made commitments binding for four years in December 2010 Investigation of Visas credit card transactions continues 4

5 What harm can the MIF do? 5

6 2. Interchange fees MIF increases marginal cost of acquiring and decreases marginal cost of issuing Hence, it tends to incentivize issuing of cards to the detriment of acquiring Impact of the MIF: 1. Price structure: allows to decide who pays what share for payment service, merchants or cardholders or rather how consumers pay for payment service: directly to their own banks or indirectly via higher prices to the merchant and the merchants bank 2. Price level: if cost pass-through of issuing and acquiring is not identical, MIF influences the total fee level (issuing plus acquiring fee) 6

7 2. Interchange fees Basically the MIF simulates three-party schemes greater freedom in determining their prices across markets In principle, there is nothing wrong with having asymmetric price structures in two-sided markets (advertising media, game consoles, ) But there is one difference in payment card markets which is significant: on the merchant side, typically no price signals are transmitted because merchants normally do not (cannot) price discriminate according to the payment instrument used 7

8 3. Relaxing Baxters assumptions Baxter (1983) is first two-sided market analysis of payment networks banks can not influence overall price level but only the volume of transactions the output maximizing MIF level maximizes both total welfare and consumer welfare Two strong assumptions of Baxter: 1. Merchants reject cards if they do not benefit from them 2. Banks are perfectly competitive In reality, however, merchantswillingness to pay for cards consists of two factors: Transactional benefits (e.g., immediate cost benefits compared to other means of payment) Business stealing (e.g., the competitive desire to accept cards to offer customers a good service) However, second category does not constitute a genuine benefit to merchants overall, because the benefits of business stealing evaporate at an aggregate level 8

9 3. Relaxing Baxters assumptions Merchants are therefore reluctant to decline cards even if they impose additional cost, which allows banks to agree collectively high MIFs As a result, card usage increases merchants marginal cost relative to other means of payment (recovered through increases in retail prices) Instead of internalizing positive externalities, negative externalities are created Cardholders are generally not aware of this and do not take this negative externality of card usage into account. Furthermore higher retail prices are born by all consumers (including cash users), not the individual card user 9

10 3. Relaxing Baxters assumptions Banks thereby introduce hidden cost, crowding out usage of potentially cheaper payment instruments (eg, more use of credit cards vs. debit cards, even if the cardholder does not value the credit element, sponsored by higher MIF) With imperfectly competitive banks, the cost pass-through of issuing and acquiring will generally not be identical Australian experience: pass-through in acquiring full, pass-through in issuing less than full (imprecise estimates) In this situation, increasing the MIF beyond the output maximizing level (at a profit maximizing level) pays off for banks: It shifts revenues to issuing (where a part can be retained as profit), and shifts costs to acquiring (where they are passed on to merchants) 10

11 Optimal MIFs: Is tourist test an appropriate test for 101 (3)? 11

12 4. The tourist test MIF With competitive issuers, optimal fee makes merchants indifferent between payment instruments (see Wright, 2003): Tourist test fee = merchants net transactional benefits (avoided cost of non-card payments) If tourist test fee is positive, it incentivizes adoption and usage of an efficient payment instrument by consumers without creating hidden costs Optimal MIF internalizes usage and membership externalities 12

13 4. The tourist test MIF In Rochet and Tirole (2007), tourist test fee is below profitmaximizing fee for banks (as business stealing among merchants is not exploited) Relation to cost-based regulation: merchant benefit measured on the acquiring side (additional cost of non-card payments) rather than on the issuing side (issuing costs that benefit merchants), avoiding also issues of cost allocation across sides. With imperfect competition (pass-through in issuing below 1): consumer welfare tourist test fee total welfare 13

14 4. The tourist test MIF Tourist test fee weighs efficiency and consumer benefits It provides a benchmark that focuses on the primary market failure (lack of price signals for final consumers on the merchant side) Tourist test fee makes market one-sided (equivalent to perfect surcharging) Tourist test fee is easier to measure than the precise consumerwelfare maximizing fee (measuring elasticities at all levels is very difficult) 14

15 4. The tourist test MIF Farrell (2006) (an economic advisor to the Australian MIF regulation) first recommended tourist test fee Transactional benefits: exclude additional spend/business stealing (cancel out across merchants or across time) Difference between debit and credit not obvious From a legal point of view, tourist test fee provides a reasonable benchmark for applying Article 101(3): (i) contribution to improve economic growth, (ii) consumers receive a fair share, (iii) indispensable restriction, and (iv) eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question 15

16 5. Some caveats Full adoption: If consumer adoption and usage of payment instrument would be almost complete even without MIF, limited benefits can be achieved If payment instrument is almost free of charge even without MIF, further incentives may not be necessary Hence, if adoption without MIF is wide and cardholder fees are low, it may be possible that consumers lose with tourist test fee compared to zero MIF Less restrictive means of achieving efficiencies: in this case MIFs are not justified. For example, per transaction MIFs do not seem appropriate for direct debit as incentives can be provided directly by the merchant to the payer given the long-term relationship between them. 16

17 Conclusion 17

18 6. Conclusion MIF might be used by payment card associations in an anticompetitive way to extract rents from consumers and push more expensive cards However, if capped appropriately, MIF may generate efficiencies by promoting efficient payment instruments Possible policy benchmark: do not allow MIF such that card payments would harm merchants (tourist test) Additional cross-checks to make sure that the proclaimed benefits of the MIF can work in practice 18