Scott K. Shriver. September Master of Business Administration, June 2005 Anderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles

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1 Scott K. Shriver Phone: (310) Fax: (650) Memorial Way Stanford, CA Web: Education September 2010 Ph.D., Marketing, June 2011 (Expected), Primary advisor: Harikesh S. Nair, Associate Professor of Marketing Master of Arts, Economics, September 2008 Master of Business Administration, June 2005 Anderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles Master of Science, Physics, April 1995 Bachelor of Arts, English Literature, May 1992 University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Research Interests Network effects, online social networks, online commerce Technology adoption/diffusion, new product development High technology and information technology product markets Alternative energy, green marketing Empirical industrial organization, applied econometrics Dissertation Research Network Effects in Alternative Fuel Adoption: Empirical Analysis of the Market for Ethanol Reading committee: Harikesh Nair, Wes Hartmann, Peter Reiss (GSB Economics), Han Hong (Stanford Economics) Abstract: This paper investigates the importance of network effects in the demand for ethanolcompatible vehicles and the supply of ethanol fuel retailers. An indirect network effect, or positive feedback loop, arises in this context due to spatially-dependent complementarities in

2 the availability of ethanol fuel and the installed base of ethanol-compatible vehicles. Marketers and social planners are interested in whether these effects exist, and if so, how policy might accelerate adoption of the ethanol fuel standard within a targeted population. To measure these feedback effects, I develop an econometric framework that considers the simultaneous determination of ethanol-compatible vehicle demand and ethanol fuel supply in local markets. The demand-side of the model considers the automobile purchase decisions of consumers and fleet operators, and the supply-side model considers the ethanol market entry decisions of competing fuel retailers. I propose new estimators that address the endogeneity induced by the co-determination of alternative fuel vehicle demand and alternative fuel supply. I estimate the model using zip code level panel data from six states over a six year period. I find the network effect to be highly significant, both statistically and economically. Under typical market conditions, entry of an additional ethanol fuel retailer leads to a 12% increase in consumer demand for ethanol-compatible vehicles. The entry model estimates imply that a monopolist requires a local installed base of at least 204 ethanol-compatible vehicles to be profitable. As an application, I demonstrate how the model estimates can inform the promotional strategy of a vehicle manufacturer. Counterfactual simulations indicate that subsidizing fuel retailers to offer ethanol can be an effective policy to indirectly increase ethanol-compatible vehicle sales. Under Review / Completed Manuscripts Hofstetter, Reto, Scott Shriver and Harikesh Nair, User-Generated Content and Social Ties: Evidence from an Online Social Network, Revise and Resubmit at Management Science. Abstract: We use variation in wind speeds at surfing locations in Switzerland as exogenous shifters of users' propensity to post content about their surfing activity onto an online social network. We exploit this variation to test whether users' social ties on the network have a causal effect on their content generation, and whether content generation in turn has a causal effect on the users' ability to form social ties. Economically significant causal effects of this kind can produce positive feedback that generate multiplier effects to interventions that subsidize tie formation. We argue these interventions can therefore be the basis of a strategy by the firm to indirectly facilitate content generation on the site. The exogenous variation provided by wind speeds enable us to measure this feedback empirically and to assess the return on investment from such policies. We use a detailed dataset from an online social network that comprises the complete history of social tie formation and content generation on the site. The richness of the data enable us to control for several spurious confounds that have typically plagued empirical analysis of social interactions. Our results show evidence of significant positive feedback in user content generation. We discuss the implications of the estimates for the management of the content and the growth of the network. Shriver, Scott and V. Srinivasan, What if Marketers Put Customers Ahead of Profits?, completed manuscript. Abstract: We conduct a thought experiment of what would happen if a marketer were to put customer welfare ahead of firm profits. We examine a duopoly where one of the firms does not maximize profit, but instead maximizes customer surplus subject to a minimum profit 2

3 constraint. Customer surplus is defined as the sum of consumer surplus, i.e., the dollar value the consumer attaches to the product minus its price, taken over all consumers served by the firm. For the surplus-maximizing firm, profit is constrained to be at least X percent (where X might be, for example, 80%-90%) of the profit it would have obtained under a profit maximization objective. The model assumes customer willingness to pay for quality is uniformly distributed and that customers follow a simple decision rule: when presented with two products of known quality and price, purchase one unit of the product which maximizes surplus, or if surplus is negative for both products, elect not to purchase any product. We further assume that both firms have the same marginal cost of production that is convex (quadratic) in quality. Competition between firms is modeled as a two-stage game, which is solvable by backward induction. In the first stage, one of the firms, whose identity is exogenously specified, moves first and decides its quality level, fully anticipating the quality response of the second firm and the subsequent price competition. The second firm observes the first firm s quality level and then decides its own quality level, also anticipating the subsequent price competition. In the second stage, firms take qualities as given and choose prices simultaneously in accordance with a Nash equilibrium. Two possibilities are considered: (a) the first mover is the profit maximizing firm, and (b) the first mover is the customer-surplus maximizing firm. We compare the results to the corresponding base case of Moorthy (Marketing Science, 1988) where both firms are profit maximizing. We find that firms can deliver significant additional value to their customers by forgoing small amounts of profit. The effectiveness of this strategy depends upon which firm is the first mover. When the surplus-maximizing firm moves first, it is always able to secure the role of the high quality producer, which is more surplus-efficient. In this case, 5%-10% increases in customer surplus relative to the competitive benchmark cost 6%-12% of potential profits. By contrast, when the surplus-maximizing firm moves second, the identity of the high quality producer depends upon the value of the minimum profit constraint. For this case, we find that sacrificing 20% of profits is sufficient to more than triple the customer surplus it would have provided under a profit-maximizing objective. These gains are achieved by the surplusmaximizing firm leap-frogging the first mover to become the higher quality producer. Although larger relative gains are possible for surplus-maximizing firm when moving second, for any level of minimum profit, the firm would still do better in absolute terms were it to move first. Publications in Refereed Journals Buie, Marc W. and Scott Shriver (1994), "The Distribution of Water Frost on Charon, Icarus, pp Selected Work in Progress Shriver, Scott and Harikesh Nair, An Empirical Model of Online Network Formation. Shriver, Scott, Chain Effects and Distribution Economies in Ethanol Retailing. 3

4 Presentations and Seminars User-Generated Content and Social Ties: Evidence from an Online Social Network NET Institute Conference, New York, NY, April 2010 Marketing Science, Cologne, Germany, June 2010 Entry in Markets with Indirect Network Effects: An Empirical Model of Alternative Fuel Adoption Marketing Science, Ann Arbor, MI, June 2009 Stanford PhD Program Third Thursday Seminar, January 2010 Measurement of Indirect Network Effects in the Market for Alternative Fuel Vehicles Marketing Science, Vancouver, BC, June 2008 Stanford Policy and Economics Research Roundtable, Stanford, CA, April 2008 Scholarships & Awards NET Institute Summer Research Grant, 2010 Jaedicke Family Fellowship, Stanford GSB, Dean's Scholar, UCLA Anderson School, Detuschman Venture Fellow, UCLA Anderson School, 2004 Parsky Fellow, UCLA Anderson School, 2004 John Motley Morehead Scholar, UNC, 1992 BA awarded with Distinction, UNC, 1992 Cum Laude, UNC, 1992 Phi Beta Kappa, UNC, 1991 Teaching Interests Marketing management (MBA) Data and decisions / statistics (MBA) Pricing strategy (MBA) Market research/assessment (MBA) New product development (MBA) Empirical models of consumer demand (PhD) Teaching Experience Data and decisions, teaching assistant for Harikesh Nair, Stanford GSB, 2010 Pricing strategy, teaching assistant for Harikesh Nair, Stanford GSB, 2008 & 2009 Marketing management, teaching assistant for Wes Hartmann, Stanford GSB, 2008 Statistical mechanics, teaching assistant for Robert Laughlin, Stanford,

5 Selected PhD Coursework Marketing Quantitative research in marketing I (V. Srinivasan), II (M. Draganska) Dynamic methods for consumer and firm decisions (H. Nair) Advanced empirical methods (W. Hartmann) Bayesian inference: methods and applications (S. Narayanan) Consumer behavior (J. Aaker) Behavioral decision making (I. Simonson) Economics Core microeconomics and game theory I, II, III (M. Jackson) Industrial organization I (J. Levin), II (T. Bresnahan), III (L. Einav) Core macroeconomics I (N. Jaimovich) Econometrics Econometric methods I (P. Hansen), II (K. Singleton), III (P. Reiss) Advanced econometrics II (H. Hong) Bayesian statistics and econometrics (J. Strnad) Statistics Stochastic processes I, II ANOVA Multivariate analysis Teaching Teaching effectiveness Professional Service Reviewer for o Management Science Membership o American Marketing Association o INFORMS Professional Experience 2004: Associate, GKM Ventures, Los Angeles, CA Developed investment recommendations by evaluating business plans and performing due diligence, financial analysis, and industry research for a $100M later-stage technology fund : Director of Information Technology, Totality Corporation, San Francisco, CA Tapped to design, implement, and maintain technical infrastructure for a venture-funded e- commerce managed service provider Directly hired a department of 30 with four operating units: software development, infrastructure engineering, enterprise applications, and user support Managed $50M of capital expenditures, $3M annual operating budget 5

6 : Manager of Information Systems, Digital Domain, Venice Beach, CA Created the first IT department at a startup visual effects facility: grew the department to a staff of six and an annual operating budget of $400K : Systems Engineer, Electronic Data Systems, San Francisco, CA Assigned to engagements to analyze requirements, design and develop systems, and provide quality assurance 1990: Summer Associate, Morgan Stanley International, London, England Developed financial models for corporate mergers and acquisitions References Harikesh S. Nair Associate Professor of Marketing 518 Memorial Way 518 Memorial Way Stanford, CA Stanford, CA V. Seenu Srinivasan Adams Distinguished Professor of Management Phone: (650) Phone: (650) harikesh.nair@stanford.edu srinivasan_seenu@gsb.stanford.edu Wes Hartmann Associate Professor of Marketing 518 Memorial Way 518 Memorial Way Stanford, CA Stanford, CA Peter C. Reiss MBA Class of 1963 Professor of Economics Phone: (650) Phone: (650) hartmann_wes@gsb.stanford.edu preiss@stanford.edu Personal US citizen Avid traveler: visited 35 countries on 6 continents Enjoy mountaineering, distance running, jazz and golf 6