DOUGLAS FONTAINE EDUCATION MBA, (Masters in Business Administration), Walter A. Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley
|
|
- Kelly Bailey
- 6 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 DOUGLAS FONTAINE OFFICE: Compass Lexecon 1111 Broadway Street, Suite 1500 Oakland, CA (510) direct (510) fax EDUCATION 1987 B.S., Business Administration, University of California at Berkeley 1993 MBA, (Masters in Business Administration), Walter A. Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 2013 Executive Vice President Compass Lexecon 2009 Senior Vice President and Managing Director Compass Lexecon 2006 Managing Director - Competition Policy Associates 2004 Senior Consultant - Competition Policy Associates Inc Partner - AES Consulting, LLC 1997 Managing Consultant, LECG, Inc Managing Consultant, The Tilden Group 1993 Senior Economist, LECG Inc Research Analyst/Associate, EconomInc
2 TESTIMONY Muze, Inc. v. Alliance Entertainment Corp., et al, No RSWL (CWx) (N.D. Cal.) Ronald L. Jones, et al., v. Hewlett-Packard Company, No (Sup. Ct. CA) SELECTED CONSULTING EXPERIENCE Antitrust For 33 state attorneys general, conducted a review of the claim that Apple and the largest U.S. book publishers agreed to elevate prices for electronic books. Central to the assignment was the most favored nations (MFN) clause included in each agreement between Apple and individual book publishers, and how the MFN clause plausibly could have served as a mechanism to coordinate the conduct of book publishers, in particular with respect to the renegotiation of their contracts with Amazon. The district court found that Apple conspired with the publishers to raise e-book prices. For Live Nation (formerly Clear Channel Entertainment), examined allegations that the company had engaged in various practices, including vertical foreclosure and predatory overbidding, to foreclose competition in the putative market for the promotion of live rock concerts. The key elements of the work were a demonstration that the relevant market alleged by Plaintiffs was inconsistent with sound economics and the evidence, analyses of concert ticket pricing data that showed Live Nation s prices were often lower than those charged by rival promoters, and a demonstration that the damages models put forward by Plaintiffs expert were woefully incomplete and ultimately were based on an assumption of impact. Much of the testimony of Plaintiffs expert was excluded by the judge and the case was dismissed on summary judgment. For Netflix, analyzed claims brought by a class of Netflix subscribers alleging that Netflix and Wal-Mart entered into an agreement through which Wal-Mart agreed to exit the business of online DVD rentals in exchange for Netflix s agreement not to enter the business of selling new DVDs. Led the preparation of expert reports in opposition to class certification, liability/impact, and damages. Plaintiffs case was dismissed on summary judgment. For Micron, a DRAM manufacturer, assessed allegations that it and several other DRAM suppliers devised and implemented a boycott to preclude the adoption of RDRAM, a proprietary DRAM technology developed by Rambus, Inc. Central to the analysis was an evaluation of the specific collusive actions alleged by Rambus and whether these actions were consistent with cartel theory and with pricing data and other relevant evidence. The case concluded with a jury trial and a verdict in Micron s favor. For Apple and AT&T Mobility, analyzed claims brought by a class of iphone purchasers centered on the contention that they were misled as to their ability to switch to another cellular carrier (in particular T-Mobile), and that as a result they overpaid for cellular service for their iphones. Led the preparation of an expert report in opposition to class certification that focused on the economics of systems-level competition and a detailed examination of cellular service prices charged by T-Mobile and AT&T.
3 For several DRAM manufacturers, assessed the competitive effects of conduct undertaken by Rambus while a member of a JEDEC subcommittee tasked with formulating DRAM standards. Principle assignments included the delineation of the relevant markets, an assessment of Rambus market power prior to and following the promulgation of the relevant standards, and an analysis of the standards setting process at JEDEC and the impact of Rambus actions on members decision-making. For Micron, a DRAM manufacturer, analyzed a claim that it had formed an agreement with other major DRAM suppliers to boycott the use of a packaging technology developed by Tessera. The focus of the work was on demonstrating that Micron selected an alternative, in-house solution for reasons consistent with its economic self-interest. For American Honda and Honda Canada, assessed an allegation that the two entities, along with other automobile manufacturers, reached an agreement to implement policies to restrict the exportation of new vehicles from Canada into the U.S. Developed a series of analyses to demonstrate that the disputed policies of American Honda and Honda Canada were consistent with each company s independent economic interests. For motion picture distributors Sony and Paramount, examined claims that each had reached an agreement with motion picture exhibitors to foreclose competition from an independent theatre operating in the Lower Manhattan area of New York. Plaintiffs asserted that the supposed agreements were designed to limit, if not eliminate, their ability to license top grossing motion pictures, in favor of the Defendant exhibitors theatres located in the pertinent film zone. For Monsanto, assessed allegations that the company s joint marketing and sales agreement with Scotts represented an attempt to monopolize the putative market for non-selective herbicides (NSH), under both sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Prior to the formation of the Monsanto/Scotts venture, Scotts had acquired from the plaintiff the exclusive right to market plaintiff s NSH, and under that agreement, plaintiff was to receive royalties and other payments. According to plaintiff, Scotts and Monsanto reached an agreement whereby Scotts would divest to an ineffective competitor its rights pertaining to the plaintiff s NSH. For Barnes & Noble, analyzed plaintiff s allegations that Barnes & Noble and other superstore defendants induced and received from book publishers various categories of discounts in violation of 2(a) and 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act. According to plaintiff, because these same discounts were unavailable to plaintiff and other independent book retailers, Barnes & Noble was able to price its books, and engage in a variety of activities, that injured competition and adversely impacted plaintiff s business. For Gemstar-TV Guide International, evaluated patent misuse claims brought by set-top box (STB) manufacturers as a defense in an ITC Section 337 proceeding. According to the STB manufacturers, Gemstar s licensing practices included tying, package licensing, grantbacks and other activities that suppressed competition in interactive program guide technology and related applications.
4 For American Airlines, evaluated plaintiffs' claims of price and non-price predation and prepared economic analyses detailing the company's pricing, yield management and capacity planning models and decision-making. For Vysis, a genomic disease management company, evaluated the competitive effects of the company's licensing practices with regard to DNA probe patents and related fluorescent in-situ hybridization (FISH) techniques. Created a presentation made to the Department of Energy demonstrating that Vysis licensing practices were conducive to the widespread dissemination and adoption of the FISH technology. For several durable goods manufacturers, including Eastman Kodak, Rolm Corporation, Siemens Medical Systems, and Hewlett-Packard, prepared economic analyses rebutting plaintiffs monopolization and tying claims related to various putative aftermarkets. The HP and Kodak cases also involved preparing reports in opposition to class certification. Mergers/Joint Ventures For cinema advertising companies National CineMedia and Screenvision, examined whether their proposed merger likely would engender competitive harm in either of the markets in which they operate: (i) as sellers of advertising, and (ii) as purchasers of access to theatre owners screens. In the advertising marketplace, analyses focused on demonstrating that the relevant market should not be delineated narrowly to include cinema advertising only, but rather properly was defined to include other forms of video advertising, namely television (broadcast and cable) and digital (online and mobile). With respect to the purchase of screen access, work centered on a demonstration that the merger would not provide the parties with a material increase in bargaining power vis-à-vis theatre owners. The parties abandoned their plans to merge in March For Sony ATV (the music publishing division), analyzed the likely competitive effects that would result from its acquisition of EMI s music publishing division. In particular, examined the combined entity s publishing rights from a number of angles, including category of rights, customer size, and customer usage, to assess whether post-merger the company reasonably could exercise market power to the detriment of licensees. The FTC cleared the transaction in June For Yahoo!, assessed the likely effects on competition arising from a proposed acquisition of Yahoo! s online job search and recruiting business, Hotjobs, by Monster. A key element of the analysis was to consider the merger s likely impact in light of the two-sided market in which the parties operated the sale of job postings and other services to employers and the resume postings and job searches by prospective employees. For PolyGram Holding and Warner Music Group, evaluated the competitive effects of a joint venture agreement and related moratorium on pricing and advertising entered into between the parties. The joint venture agreement was established to facilitate the production of the 1998 Three Tenors concert in Paris and the resulting album and video products. The moratorium was designed to limit the parties ability to aggressively discount and promote prior Three Tenors catalog during the ten-week period immediately following the release of the new album.
5 For Universal Music, prepared an economic assessment of the notified merger between AOL and Time Warner, and the related joint ventures between Time Warner and EMI, dealing with the online promotion and distribution of music, music compression standards, and possible leveraging strategies in internet services. For Movies.com, a proposed joint venture between the Walt Disney Company and Fox Entertainment Group, Inc., prepared sections of a white paper submitted to the DOJ assessing the efficiencies generated by the integration and the inability of the venture to behave anticompetitively in distributing their films via the video-on-demand. For Cadence Design Systems, assessed the competitive effects of its proposed merger with CCT, a developer of place and route software technologies. Intellectual Property/Damages For Carpenter Technology Corporation, a supplier of wrought and powdered metals, evaluated and critiqued the lost profits damage model submitted by plaintiffs. Conducted numerous analyses to demonstrate the conceptual and mechanical flaws undermining the model s reliability and reasonableness. For Skanska AB, a construction conglomerate, responded to damages claims arising from its supposed breach of an agreement to jointly acquire, with Petitioner, an Argentinean construction firm. Developed arguments and analyses supporting the view that Petitioner s claims were properly assessed under the loss of chance theory of damages. For a biotechnology firm, prepared estimates of price erosion due to plaintiff's breach of a licensing agreement and sales to non-authorized retail channels. For a real estate partnership, constructed a lost profits analysis based upon an inability to develop and operate a medical office building in Evanston, Illinois. For Norwest Bank of Iowa, rebutted plaintiff s lost profits claims based upon the alleged inability to develop a wireless refueling and engine diagnostic application. For GTE Cellular, rebutted plaintiffs comparable transactions damages analysis in a dispute over the transfer of a cellular franchise into an existing partnership. For an independent energy wholesaler, prepared a damages analysis related to PG&E s failure to abide by the terms of an existing purchase contract. For a bio-pharmaceutical company, estimated the lost profits owed as a result of defendant s infringement of a patented transdermal estrogen replacement therapy. Policy/International Trade For SoundExchange, an organization that represents record labels in various channels of digital music distribution, developed alternative benchmark methodologies to determine a range of
6 rates, consistent with the relevant statutory objectives, that digital service providers should pay to copyright holders for the right to transmit sound recordings to satellite radio subscribers. Projects for SoundExchange have related to proceedings involving satellite radio and webcasting. For the Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance, examined the impact on the competitive conditions facing Canadian firms as a result of implementation of the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA, or the Byrd Amendment ). Under the CDSOA, antidumping and countervailing duties imposed and collected on imports from Canada are distributed to qualifying U.S. firms that compete directly with the Canadian enterprises upon which the duties were assessed. Analyses performed focused on whether these distributions to qualifying U.S. firms likely would strengthen the competitive abilities of U.S. recipients and thereby inflict economic injury on their Canadian counterparts. For Universal Music, assessed the competitive effects of certain terms and provisions in the Standard Contract between Bureau Internationale des Sociétés Gérant les Droits d Enregistrement et de Reproduction Méchanique (BIEM) and International Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) in light of then prevailing marketplace conditions facing the music industry. In addition, considered whether competition, the overall efficiency of the music industry, and consumer welfare would benefit from certain changes to the Standard Contract. For Protect America, co-authored a white paper that assessed the economic efficiencies engendered by proposed legislation to establish a formal system of national catastrophe insurance.
GILAD LEVIN Broadway Street, Suite 1500 Oakland, CA (510) direct (510) fax
GILAD LEVIN OFFICE: Compass Lexecon 1111 Broadway Street, Suite 1500 Oakland, CA 94607 (510) 285-1211 direct (510) 285-1245 fax glevin@compasslexecon.com EDUCATION 2000 M.A., Economics (Fields: Industrial
More informationCATHERINE BARRON. Compass Lexecon th Street NW, Suite 501 Washington, DC (202) (main) (202) (direct)
CATHERINE BARRON Compass Lexecon 555 12 th Street NW, Suite 501 Washington, DC 20004 (202) 753-5200 (main) (202) 753-5225 (direct) PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Compass Lexecon (and predecessor organizations)
More information4/13/2018. Evolving Standards on Resale Price Maintenance, Tying and Other Vertical Restraints. Program Overview
Evolving Standards on Resale Price Maintenance, Tying and Other Vertical Restraints Practising Law Institute: Developments in Antirust Law & Regulation 2018 Craig G. Falls 2018 Dechert LLP Program Overview
More informationABUSE OF DOMINANCE. John Pheasant Lecture to National Law University, Jodhpur 24 January 2014
ABUSE OF DOMINANCE Lecture to National Law University, Jodhpur 24 January 2014 2 The Competition Laws Cartels Abuse of dominance Control of mergers 3 Competition Policy Goals The Protection of: Competitive
More informationCOMPASS LEXECON. Kevin Carl Green, Executive Vice President, Compass Lexecon
Kevin Carl Green, Executive Vice President, Compass Lexecon 1999 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1150 Los Angeles, CA 90067-6028 Tel. 310-728-2024 E-mail: kgreen@compasslexecon.com Dr. Green holds a Ph.D. in
More informationCHAPTER 13 Antitrust Laws A detailed analysis of the antitrust law implications of the target company's activities is not required in every acquisitio
CHAPTER 13 Antitrust Laws A detailed analysis of the antitrust law implications of the target company's activities is not required in every acquisition. Except for the possibility of a target company's
More informationEconomics Institute for Competition Officials
Global Antitrust Institute Economics Institute for Competition Officials November 2015 Predatory Pricing and Bundled Discounts Bruce H. Kobayashi, Professor of Law and Director, Global Antitrust Institute
More informationSEMINAR SERIES NEW SESSIONS. SECURITIES ERISA and fiduciary liability ANTITRUST ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE
SEMINAR SERIES 2018 2019 NEW SESSIONS SECURITIES ERISA and fiduciary liability ANTITRUST ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE M&A LITIGATION Share price; disclosure; and governance WHITE COLLAR and SEC LITIGATION INTELLECTUAL
More informationAppendix N: Market Structure Law. TV Stations Ownership
Appendix N: Antitrust and Market Structure Law Restrictions on size of ownership, and on vertical and horizontal ownership Examples Entry control: gov. licensing Merger Approvals Divestiture Media Ownership
More informationAntitrust Issues Regarding Risk-Sharing Arrangements and Communications with ACOs and Other Healthcare Integrated Delivery Systems
January 21, 2015 Antitrust Issues Regarding Risk-Sharing Arrangements and Communications with ACOs and Other Healthcare Integrated Delivery Systems Stephen Paul Mahinka Chair, Life Sciences Industry Group
More informationNational Judicial Academy National Conference for Newly Elevated High Court Justices
National Judicial Academy National Conference for Newly Elevated High Court Justices 24-25 January, 2015 Bhopal, India Samuel Weinstein Attorney Legal Policy Section, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department
More informationCompetition and the Transgenic Seed Industry
Competition and the Transgenic Seed Industry Diana L. Moss Vice President and Senior Fellow American Antitrust Institute Organization for Competitive Markets 2009 Food and Agriculture Conference August
More informationSteven Waters Principal
Principal PhD Economics University of California at San Diego MA Economics University of California at San Diego BA Economics Brigham Young University Dr. Steven Waters is a principal in the Competition
More informationEconomic Fundamentals:
Economic Fundamentals: Vertical and Coordinated Effects in Mergers Debra J. Aron, Ph.D. Navigant Economics Northwestern University May 27, 2016 Disclaimer This presentation covers only a sampling of the
More informationANTITRUST COMPLIANCE GUIDELINES
ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE GUIDELINES I. POLICY It is the policy of the SMART CARD ALLIANCE to comply fully with the antitrust laws applicable to trade association activities. In furtherance of this policy,
More informationAntitrust Traps in the Hospitality Industry. Presenters. Penalties and Enforcement. February 3, 2010 Houston, Texas
Antitrust Traps in the Hospitality Industry February 3, 2010 Houston, Texas Presenters Banks Brown, Partner, McDermott Will & Emery, New York, NY General Counsel for the American Hotel & Lodging Association,
More informationThe Capitol Forum February 21, 2014
The Capitol Forum February 21, 2014 Gogo Litigation: Gogo Class Action Survives Motion to Dismiss; Litigation Will Center on Whether Gogo s Exclusive Contracts Foreclosed Competition Conclusion On January
More informationVertical Restraints, Exclusive Dealing, and Competition on the Merits
Vertical Restraints, Exclusive Dealing, and Competition on the Merits Global Antitrust Institute Hawaii November 2015 October 30, 2012 1 The Economics of Vertical Restraints 2 Vertical Restraints Definition:
More informationTHE EU MERGER REGULATION: SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
THE EU MERGER REGULATION: SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES FOURTH EDITION By ALISTAIR LINDSAY Barrister, Monckton Chambers ALISON BERRIDGE Barrister, Monckton Chambers MAXWELL THOMSON REUTERS PAGE Preface v Dedication
More informationSocial Networks and Antitrust: The Problem of Diverse Consumer Preferences
Social Networks and Antitrust: The Problem of Diverse Consumer Preferences Frank Pasquale Schering-Plough Professor in Health Care Regulation and Enforcement, Seton Hall Law Affiliate Fellow, Yale Information
More informationECON 7950: Competitive Strategy
Introduction ECON 7950: Competitive Strategy Terry College of Business University of Georgia What is in the News? January 2015 Net neutrality. Pay-for-delay settlements of pharmaceutical patent lawsuits.
More informationHow Antitrust Agencies Analyze M&A
practicallaw.com PLC Corporate & Securities PLC Finance PLC Law Department CONTENTS Horizontal Mergers Market Definition Market Shares and Concentration Competitive Effects Powerful Buyers Entry Analysis
More informationCH 17 sample MC Name: Class: Date: Multiple Choice Identify the choice that best completes the statement or answers the question.
Class: Date: CH 17 sample MC - 80 Multiple Choice Identify the choice that best completes the statement or answers the question. 1. Deregulation is defined as the a. use of government rules to regulate
More informationINPUT FORECLOSURE IN TELECOMS/MEDIA VERTICAL MERGERS: THE MEO/GMC CASE
INPUT FORECLOSURE IN TELECOMS/MEDIA VERTICAL MERGERS: THE MEO/GMC CASE BY ALÍPIO CODINHA, MARIANA COSTA, MARTA RIBEIRO & PEDRO MARQUES 1 1 Alípio Codinha is Deputy Director of the Merger Department. Mariana
More informationWHAT EVERY BUSINESS SHOULD KNOW ABOUT PRICE DISCRIMINATION
KEELEY, KUENN & REID WHAT EVERY BUSINESS SHOULD KNOW ABOUT PRICE DISCRIMINATION Prepared by the Law Firm of KEELEY, KUENN & REID 150 North Wacker Drive, Suite 1100 Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 782-1829 FAX
More informationINTERNATIONAL DIGITAL PUBLISHING FORUM ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE POLICY AND GUIDELINES
INTERNATIONAL DIGITAL PUBLISHING FORUM ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE POLICY AND GUIDELINES It is the policy of the International Digital Publishing Forum ("IDPF" or "the Forum") to comply with all antitrust and
More informationOnline Vertical Restraints: divergence of competition policy
July 2017 Online Vertical Restraints: divergence of competition policy Fiona Scott Morton, Yale University CRESSE Online commerce is often good for competition Brown, J. R. and A. Goolsbee (2002). Does
More informationAnswer both questions. (Question II has a multi-page text for analysis.)
Industrial Organization Field Exam, August 2008 Answer both questions. (Question II has a multi-page text for analysis.) Question I: Consider an industry with M upstream firms and N downstream firms. All
More informationCH 17 sample MC. Name: Class: Date: Multiple Choice Identify the choice that best completes the statement or answers the question.
Class: Date: CH 17 sample MC Multiple Choice Identify the choice that best completes the statement or answers the question. 1. When a government agency establishes rules to influence economic activity,
More informationUniversity of Miami Law Review
University of Miami Law Review Volume 69 CAVEAT March 2015 RESPONSE The E-Books Conspiracy: Crossing the Line Between Applying and Creating Law TOM CAMPBELL * In response to John B. Kirkwood, Collusion
More information... University of Deusto School of Law
UNIVERSIDAD DE DEUSTO ANTITRUST PROGRAM OUTLINE Professor Jesse W. Markham, Jr. Marshall P. Madison Professor of Law University of San Francisco markham@usfca.edu January 18, 19 and 20 and 22, 2011 SESSION
More informationAntitrust Considerations in Healthcare. Cory A. Talbot ( )
Antitrust Considerations in Healthcare Cory A. Talbot (10 26 17) What are we going to talk about? The basics of antitrust enforcement How antitrust enforcement works in some areas of the healthcare arena
More informationLESSON FIVE MAINTAINING COMPETITION
LESSON FIVE MAINTAINING COMPETITION LESSON DESCRIPTION This lesson introduces the rationale for maintaining and strengthening competition, and illustrates the U.S. experience with antitrust laws and other
More informationEU Competition Law and E-Commerce: Love-hate relationship?
EU Competition Law and E-Commerce: Love-hate relationship? Giorgio Monti 22 August 2015 Three themes 1. What does EU competition law have to say with regard to the way e-commerce is developing? 2. How
More informationOverview: Limiting Market Power
Overview: Limiting Market Power Introduction to Anti-trust Price Fixing Monopolization Predatory Pricing Tying and Extension of Monopoly Other Practices Common Property Resources 1 People of the same trade
More informationU.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. Predatory Pricing
U.S. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Predatory Pricing This questionnaire seeks information on ICN members analysis and treatment of predatory pricing claims. Predatory pricing
More informationMicroeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools
Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools NINTH EDITION Chapter 13 Controlling Market Power: Antitrust and Regulation Learning Objectives 13.1 Define a natural monopoly and explain the averagecost
More informationMerger Review in the United States and the European Union. Jeffrey I. Shinder Constantine & Partners
Merger Review in the United States and the European Union Jeffrey I. Shinder Constantine & Partners What is Antitrust? Fairness Law Protect smaller firms from larger firms Disperse business power Distribute
More informationThe E-Books Conspiracy: Crossing the Line Between Applying and Creating Law
Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law From the SelectedWorks of Tom Campbell 2015 The E-Books Conspiracy: Crossing the Line Between Applying and Creating Law Tom Campbell Available at: https://works.bepress.com/tom_campbell/28/
More informationINTERNATIONAL SECURITIES ASSOCIATION FOR INSTITUTIONAL TRADE COMMUNICATION ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE POLICY
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES ASSOCIATION FOR INSTITUTIONAL TRADE COMMUNICATION 1.0 Antitrust Compliance Policy ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE POLICY The policy of the International Securities Association for Institutional
More informationBundling And Monopoly Leveraging: Implications For Antitrust And Innovation
Common Threads? Bundling And Monopoly Leveraging: Implications For Antitrust And Innovation Richard Gilbert University of California, Berkeley Lisbon Conference on Competition Law and Economics 18 October
More informationThe Abuse of a Dominant Market Position. Mihail Busu, PhD Romanian Competition Council
The Abuse of a Dominant Market Position Mihail Busu, PhD Romanian Competition Council mihail.busu@competition.ro Introduction 3 basic elements of competition law prohibit - Anti-competitive agreements
More informationChapter 17 Regulation and Antitrust Law
Chapter 17 Regulation and Antitrust Law 17.1 Regulation 1) Regulation consists of rules administered by to influence economic activity by determining prices, product standards and types, and the conditions
More informationMerger Analysis and Anti-Trust
Merger Analysis and Anti-Trust Merger: The process in which two or more independently owned firms join under the same ownership. This process could be a merger, takeover, integration, or acquisition. It
More informationAntitrust Policy in Health Care: Searching for a Strategy That Works Roger Feldman July 16, 2009
Antitrust Policy in Health Care: Searching for a Strategy That Works Roger Feldman July 16, 2009 Outline of Presentation Brief outline of antitrust tools Discuss recent developments in horizontal mergers
More information1 of 23. Controlling Market Power: Antitrust and Regulation. Economics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e.
1 of 23 2 of 23 In 1997, a U.S. court blocked the proposed merger of Staples and Office Depot, the nation s two largest office- supply retailers. P R E P A R E D B Y FERNANDO QUIJANO, YVONN QUIJANO, AND
More informationUNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND IT; ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND IT; ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS Fifth Edition E. Thomas Sullivan Irving Younger Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus University of Minnesota Law School Jeffrey L. Harrison Stephen C.
More informationDoing Deals: Avoiding Antitrust Pitfalls During Due Diligence and Transition Planning
Doing Deals: Avoiding Antitrust Pitfalls During Due Diligence and Transition Planning 5 When competitors start considering a merger, they should involve their antitrust counsel from the beginning. Managing
More informationPlayboy Enterprises, Inc. Annual Shareholders Meeting May 21, 2008
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. Annual Shareholders Meeting May 21, 2008 FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS This presentation contains forward-looking statements as to expectations, beliefs, plans, objectives and future
More informationReport on the Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Slotting Allowances and Other Marketing Practices in the Grocery Industry
Report on the Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Slotting Allowances and Other Marketing Practices in the Grocery Industry A Report by Federal Trade Commission Staff February 2001 INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE
More informationChapter 3 Information Systems, Organizations, and Strategy
Management Information Systems: Managing the Digital Firm 1 Chapter 3 Information Systems, Organizations, and Strategy LEARNING TRACK 1: THE CHANGING BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY A combination
More informationMost Favored Nation Clauses: Is It the End of the Road?
Most Favored Nation Clauses: Is It the End of the Road? Webinar co-hosted by Steptoe & Oxera Consulting 25 October 2017 Today s webinar agenda What are MFNs? Why are the European authorities concerned?
More informationANTITRUST FOR PURCHASING PROFESSIONALS Protecting Competition in Florida
ANTITRUST FOR PURCHASING PROFESSIONALS Protecting Competition in Florida Attorney General of Florida Antitrust Division Lizabeth Brady Chief, Multistate Antitrust Enforcement ANTITRUST LAWS SHERMAN ACT
More informationIntellectual Property: Economics
Intellectual Property: Economics When It Has To Be Right To prevent the hypothetical from lapsing into pure speculation, this court requires sound economic proof of the nature of the market and likely
More informationTHE AMA HANDBOOK OF DUE DILIGENCE
This is a complete list of the nearly-400 ready-to-use forms you ll find in The AMA Handbook of Due Diligence, the most exhaustive guide available on how to properly perform a due dilgence investigation
More informationVertical restraints, digital marketplaces, and enforcement tools
EUROPEAN COMMISSION Johannes Laitenberger Director-General for Competition, European Commission Vertical restraints, digital marketplaces, and enforcement tools ICN Annual Conference 2018 New Delhi, 22
More informationCase 1:17-cv Document 1 Filed 11/20/17 Page 1 of 23 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Case 1:17-cv-02511 Document 1 Filed 11/20/17 Page 1 of 23 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 450 Fifth Street, NW Washington, DC 20530; Plaintiff, v. AT&T
More informationThe Competition and Antitrust Laws Prohibit collusion between competitors, such as price-fixing. Prohibit monopolization through mergers. Examine geog
COMPETITION AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS by Paul Stephen Dempsey Director, Institute of Air & Space Law McGill University Copyright 2010 by Paul Stephen Dempsey The Competition and Antitrust Laws Prohibit collusion
More informationTaking advantage of market power
Taking advantage of market power This fact sheet explains what a substantial degree of market power is and when taking advantage of that power is illegal under section 36 of the Commerce Act. It is intended
More informationQuantification of Damages in Exclusionary Practice Cases. Paolo Buccirossi 1
Quantification of Damages in Exclusionary Practice Cases by Paolo Buccirossi 1 1. Introduction The antitrust treatment of potentially exclusionary conducts is particularly challenging. In recent years
More informationMargin Squeeze / Refusal to deal. Valérie MEUNIER Service économique Autorité de la concurrence
Margin Squeeze / Refusal to deal Valérie MEUNIER Service économique Autorité de la concurrence 12 mars 2010 Outline Introduction - Context Margin squeeze definition Simple margin squeeze model Transatlantic
More informationTying Arrangements: Avoiding Antitrust Liability Leveraging Market Power Arguments and Seller Defenses
Tying Arrangements: Avoiding Antitrust Liability Leveraging Market Power Arguments and Seller Defenses DEVELOPMENT AND HISTORY OF TYING LAW May 1, 2012 Howard M. Ullman Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP
More informationcompetition policy r Palgrave Publishers Ltd 1
Definition Competition policy, also known as antitrust policy in the United States, is a body of legislated law designed to promote and maintain competition in markets. Abstract This article discusses
More informationLiberty/Ziggo and Liberty/DeVijver: Phase II cable mergers in the Netherlands and Belgium
Liberty/Ziggo and Liberty/DeVijver: Phase II cable mergers in the Netherlands and Belgium Discussion Gregory S. Crawford Dept. of Economics University of Zurich Association of Competition Economists Conference
More informationAbuse of Dominance Under Art 102 Towards multiple standards?
Abuse of Dominance Under Art 102 Towards multiple standards? Giorgio Monti 9 July 2011 Article 102 Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial
More informationThe Anticompetitive Effects of The Apple E-book Price Fixing Conspiracy
The Anticompetitive Effects of The Apple E-book Fixing Conspiracy William Giroux and Dr. Roger Blair Department of Economics, University of Florida On July 10th, 2013, Apple was found guilty of conspiring
More informationPLAINSCAPITAL BANK APPLE PAY TERMS AND CONDITIONS - BUSINESS
PLAINSCAPITAL BANK APPLE PAY TERMS AND CONDITIONS - BUSINESS Last Modified: 6/19/2015 These terms and conditions ( Terms and Conditions ) are a legal agreement between you and PlainsCapital Bank that governs
More informationAntitrust Trouble Through Aggressive Pricing: Let s Count the Ways
Westlaw Journal Antitrust Litigation News and Analysis Legislation Regulation Expert Commentary VOLUME 22, issue 6 / october 2014 Expert Analysis Antitrust Trouble Through Aggressive Pricing: Let s Count
More informationAntitrust in Friday, January 29, 2016
Antitrust in 2016 Challenges and Conundrums for the West Coast in 2016 Friday, January 29, 2016 2016 Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. All rights reserved. Throughout this presentation, Cleary Gottlieb
More informationMERGER POLICY FOR INNOVATION
MERGER POLICY FOR INNOVATION RICHARD GILBERT PROFESSOR EMERITUS UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY INNOVATION CONCERNS FOR MERGER POLICY Merger may curtail or delay investment in research and development,
More informationPrice-Cost Tests in Unilateral Conduct Cases. Presented by ICN Unilateral Conduct Working Group
Price-Cost Tests in Unilateral Conduct Cases Presented by ICN Unilateral Conduct Working Group Tuesday, July 19, 2011 Introductory Remarks This Teleseminar will be recorded and posted on the ICN website
More informationAntitrust Considerations of Proposals to Limit Rebates
July 15, 2018 I. Introduction Antitrust Considerations of Proposals to Limit Rebates In May 2018, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) introduced a policy Blueprint setting forth actions and
More informationFormalism, Functionalism, and Consensus in Competition Law. Daniel A. Crane University of Michigan November 11, 2014
Formalism, Functionalism, and Consensus in Competition Law Daniel A. Crane University of Michigan November 11, 2014 Formalism and Functionalism U.S.: Rules (formalism) versus standards (functionalism)
More informationThe Future Legacy of the AT&T/ T-Mobile Merger Case
CPI Antitrust Chronicle October 2011 (2) The Future Legacy of the AT&T/ T-Mobile Merger Case Jonathan L. Rubin Rubin PLLC www.competitionpolicyinternational.com Competition Policy International, Inc. 2011
More information4th Annual Advanced Patent Law Institute at USPTO Antitrust and SSO Developments
4th Annual Advanced Patent Law Institute at USPTO Antitrust and SSO Developments Jeffrey Blumenfeld Robert Lipstein Crowell & Moring 1001 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Washington, DC 20004 jblumenfeld@crowell.com
More informationAntitrust Compliance Procedures
Antitrust Compliance Procedures Adopted by the Northeast Gas Association Board of Directors June 4, 2003 Objective The Northeast Gas Association (NGA) and its member companies are committed to full compliance
More informationEBOPS 2010 Overview of the service categories
EBOPS 2010 Overview of the service categories Regional Seminar on International Trade Statistics Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, 26-29 September 2016 United Nations Statistics Division Karoly Kovacs, Chief, Statistics
More informationCRESSE 2019 Lawyers Course
CRESSE 2019 Lawyers Course The Role of Economics in Competition Law and Practice July 5 th Monday, July 8 th, 2019 Rhodes, Greece Detailed Course Contents (Minor changes on the timing of the sessions can
More informationEconomics in antitrust and competition Our services
Economics in antitrust and competition Our services Economic evidence in competition law September 2017 KPMG.com/in Rapidly increasing awareness of competition law, rising number of cases before the Competition
More informationInternet Sales and Contractual Restrictions of Competition Law Lessons learnt from the EU e- Commerce Sector Inquiry
Internet Sales and Contractual Restrictions of Competition Law Lessons learnt from the EU e- Commerce Sector Inquiry Some examples Nespresso.gr (499) Delonghi Nespresso Lattissimo Pro Statistics on e-commerce
More informationAntitrust Final Examination
Antitrust Final Examination 2006 2 hours The examination is worth 980 total points. The examination has two parts. The first part consists of an essay question worth 700 points. The second part consists
More informationOverview of ECO410H and Introduction to Horizontal Merger Assessment ECO410H1F. Organizing Questions for Today. Class 1
Overview of ECO410H and Introduction to Horizontal Merger Assessment Class 1 1 ECO410H1F Mergers and Competition Policy Prof. Murdock Syllabus Take a moment to skim through section titles Highlight some
More informationFERRELLGAS ANTITRUST LAW COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK
FERRELLGAS ANTITRUST LAW COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK To: All Ferrellgas Employees Our Company is committed to full compliance with the letter and spirit of all laws that apply to our business. We take particular
More informationCastries, St. Lucia, March 29-31, 2011
WIPO-ITC Regional Training Seminar: Assessing the Economic Contribution and Performance of Creative Industries to National Economies - The Canadian Experience Castries, St. Lucia, March 29-31, 2011 Table
More informationThe U.S. is getting new data for a New Economy and it s about time. BUSINESS WEEK. calibrating a new economy. Economic Classification Policy Committee
The U.S. is getting new data for a New Economy and it s about time. BUSINESS WEEK calibrating a new economy Economic Classification Policy Committee www.census.gov/naics hat is NAICS? NAICS (pronounced
More informationAvoiding Antitrust Violations in Competitor Collaborations
presents Avoiding Antitrust Violations in Competitor Collaborations Lessons From FTC/DOJ Enforcement Actions and Litigation A Live 90-Minute Audio Conference with Interactive Q&A Today's panel features:
More informationOpen Access To Broadband Networks: A Case Study Of The AOL/Time Warner Merger. by Daniel L. Rubenfeld & Hal J. Singer
Open Access To Broadband Networks: A Case Study Of The AOL/Time Warner Merger by Daniel L. Rubenfeld & Hal J. Singer Presented by Kevin Morgan and Michael Lewis Outline Introduction: the key players Horizontal
More informationThe Anti-monopoly Commission of the State Council. Anti-monopoly Guideline on Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights.
The Anti-monopoly Commission of the State Council Anti-monopoly Guideline on Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights (Exposure Draft) (December 31, 2015) Preamble Anti-monopoly and intellectual property
More informationPerfect Competition Chapter 7 Section 1
Perfect Competition Chapter 7 Section 1 Four Conditions of Perfect Perfect competition is a market structure in which a large number of firms all produce the same product. Many buyers and sellers Identical
More informationPROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Econ One Research, Inc., Los Angeles, CA and Arlington, VA. Skyline Economics LLC, Arlington, VA Founder & Principal
Stephan M. Levy, Ph.D. Senior Economist Arlington, Virginia Tel: 703.934.9100 Email: slevy@econone.com PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Econ One Research, Inc., Los Angeles, CA and Arlington, VA Senior Economist
More informationINDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION FUTURE TREND OR SURVIVAL STRATEGY
INDUSTRY CONSOLIDATION FUTURE TREND OR SURVIVAL STRATEGY 1996 Telecom Cable and Broadcasting Summit, February 21, 1996, Toronto, Canada James P. Catty 1996 Introduction Some comments on technology, without
More informationStille Trademark Guidelines
Stille Trademark Guidelines Introduction Trademarks and their proper usage help protect corporate and product identities. In Stille s case, our brand name and trademarks are some of our most valuable assets.
More informationThe Value of Personal Information to Consumers of Online Services: Evidence from a Discrete Choice Experiment
19 June 2014 The Value of Personal Information to Consumers of Online Services: Evidence from a Discrete Choice Experiment By Sarah Butler and Garrett Glasgow Recent years have seen rapid growth in privacy-related
More informationCHAPTER 8: SECTION 1 A Perfectly Competitive Market
CHAPTER 8: SECTION 1 A Perfectly Competitive Market Four Types of Markets A market structure is the setting in which a seller finds itself. Market structures are defined by their characteristics. Those
More informationTransaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies
JLEO, V18 N1 95 Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies Paul L. Joskow Massachusetts Institute of Technology This article discusses the application of transaction cost economics (TCE)
More informationA Discussion about Industrial Structure Model of Television Channels in China
1738 A Discussion about Industrial Structure Model of Television Channels in China Yang Ting, Wan Xiao School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing, P.R.China, 100044 (E-mail:
More informationMergers and Acquisitions: Primer on Economic Considerations in the FTC and DOJ Horizontal Merger Approval Process
Order Code RS22606 February 15, 2007 Mergers and Acquisitions: Primer on Economic Considerations in the FTC and DOJ Horizontal Merger Approval Process Summary Edward Vincent Murphy Analyst in Financial
More informationGabriel Baron. Master in Economics, Hebrew University, Jerusalem 1999 Laurea, Bocconi University, Milan, 1994
October 2007 CURRICULUM VITAE Gabriel Baron OFFICE: Compass Lexecon PO.BOX 7183 Davidson Building Tel Aviv 61070 5 Southampton Street London WC2E 7HA direct: +44 20 7632 5125 +972 3 6242686 mobile: +44
More informationAdvanced Licensing Agreements 2017
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Course Handbook Series Number G-1307 Advanced Licensing Agreements 2017 Volume One Co-Chairs Marcelo Halpern Ira Jay Levy Joseph Yang To order this book, call (800) 260-4PLI or fax
More informationObjective: What conditions must exist for perfect competition? What are barriers to entry and how do they affect the marketplace?
Perfect Competition Objective: What conditions must exist for perfect competition? What are barriers to entry and how do they affect the marketplace? *Be sure to leave a couple blank lines under each question
More information