Fall, 2002 Course Website: Economics 818
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1 Prof. James Peck Office (440 Arps): Fall, 2002 Course Website: Economics 818 The Economics of Information: Syllabus and Reading List Course Objectives: This course will provide you with useful tools for understanding current research and performing your own research on theoretical economic models with asymmetric information. The course will also expose you to current "frontier" work and "classic" articles on a wide range of information-related topics. Course Requirements: Students will be required to present one of the papers to the class and to write a short (5 page) referee's report on a (different) relevant paper. The presentation and referee's report each will make up 50 % of the final grade. If there is not enough time for everyone to present a paper, then a take-home final exam will be given to those who do not present a paper. (Papers preceded by an asterisk, *, are required and will probably be covered in class. Other papers are for your information. Survey papers are marked with **.) I. Preliminaries Green, J. and N. Stokey, "Two Representations of Information Structures and Their Comparisons," IMSSS Technical Report No. 271, September Malueg, D. A., "Comparing Comparisons of Experiments," University of Iowa Working Paper # 85-39, September II. Subjectivity, Correlation, and Common Knowledge *Aumann, R. J., "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1974.
2 *Aumann, R. J., "Agreeing to Disagree," Annals of Statistics, Geanakoplos, J. and H. Polemarchakis, "We can't disagree forever," J. Econ. Theory 28 (1982), Aumann, R. J., "Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality," Econometrica, January 1987, III. Speculation and Asset Markets *Milgrom, P. and N. Stokey, "Information, Trade, and Common Knowledge," J. Econ. Theory, 26, 1982, Tirole, J., "On the possibility of speculation under rational expectations," Econometrica , Morris, S., Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information, Econometrica, Vol. 62, No. 6, 1994, Hart, O. and D. Kreps, "Price destabilizing speculation," J. Polit. Econ., October 1986, Manuelli, R. and J. Peck, "Exchange rate volatility in an equilibrium asset pricing model," IER (31), 1990, Kyle, A. S., "Informed speculation with imperfect competition," Rev. Econ. Studies, 56 (1989), Cass, D. and K. Shell, "Do Sunspots Matter?", J. Polit. Econ., 91 (1983), Azariadis, C., "Self-fulfilling prophecies," J. Econ. Theory, 25 (1981), Manuelli, R. and J. Peck, "Sunspot-like effects of random endowments," J. Econ. Dynamics and Control 16, 1992, IV. "Walrasian" Rational Expectations Models Radner, R., "Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices," Econometrica, 47 (1979), *Grossman, S. and J. Stiglitz, "On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets," AER, Vol. 70, 1980,
3 V. Rational Expectations with Explicit Price Formation (including Auction Markets) Dubey, P., J. Geanakoplos, and M. Shubik, "Revelation of Information in Strategic Market Games: A Critique of Rational Expectations Equilibrium," J. Math. Econ., 1987, Jackson, M. and J. Peck, "Asymmetric information in a competitive market game: reexamining the implications of rational expectations, Economic Theory 13, (1999), *Milgrom, P., "Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, 49, 1981, Jackson, M. and J. Peck, "Speculation and Price Fluctuations with Private, Extrinsic Signals," J. Econ. Theory, 55, 1991, **McAfee, P. and J. McMillan, "Auctions and Bidding," J. Econ. Lit., 25 (1987), Pesendorfer, W. and Jeroen M. Swinkels, Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions, Amer. Econ. Rev., June 2000, VI. Bank Runs and Financial Crises *Diamond, D. W. and P. H. Dybvig, Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity, Journal of Political Economy 91, 1983, Peck, J. and K. Shell, Equilibrium Bank Runs, J. Polit. Econ., forthcoming. *Morris, S. and H.-S. Shin, Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks, American Economic Review 88(3), June 1998, VII. Information Cascades Banerjee, A., "The Economics of Rumours," Rev. Econ. Studies, 1993, *Bulow, J. and P. Klemperer, "Rational frenzies and crashes," J. Polit. Econ., 102 (1), 1994, 1-23.
4 VIII. Signalling Models Spence, M., "Job Market Signaling," Q. J. E., 1973, **Riley, J., "Signaling," in The New Palgrave: Allocation, Information, and Markets, (J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, P. Newman, eds.), The Macmillan Press Limited, W. W. Norton: New York and London, 1989, *Cooper, R. and T. Ross, Prices, Product Qualities and Asymmetric Information: The Competitive Case, Rev. Econ. Studies, 1984, IX. Search Models *Burdett, K. and K. Judd, "Equilibrium Price Dispersion," Econometrica, 1983, Robert, J. and D. O. Stahl II, "Informative price advertising in a sequential search model," Econometrica, 1993, **Diamond, P., "Search Theory," in The New Palgrave: Allocation, Information, and Markets, (J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, P. Newman, eds.), The Macmillan Press Limited, W. W. Norton: New York and London, 1989, *Prescott, E. C., Efficiency of the Natural Rate, Journal of Political Economy, 1975, vol. 83, no. 6, Dana, J. D. Jr. (1998), Advanced purchase discounts and price discrimination in competitive markets, Journal of Political Economy, 106, Dana, J. D. Jr. (1999), Using Yield Management to Shift Demand When the Peak Time is Unknown, Rand Journal of Economics, 30, Carlton, D.W., Market behavior with demand uncertainty and price inflexibility, American Economic Review 68 (1978), *Deneckere, R. and J. Peck, Competition over price and service rate when demand is stochastic: a strategic analysis, Rand Journal of Economics 26 (1995), X. Mechanism Design **Myerson, R., Mechanism Design, in The New Palgrave: Allocation, Information, and Markets, (J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, P. Newman, eds.), The Macmillan Press Limited, W.
5 W. Norton: New York and London, 1989, Neeman, Z., Property Rights and Efficiency of Public-Good Mechanisms under Asymmetric Information, 1994 mimeo. *Myerson, R., and M. Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading, Journal of Economic Theory, 29: XI. Miscellaneous Topics Okuno-Fujiwara, M., A. Postlewaite and Kotaro Suzumura, Strategic Information Revelation, Rev. Econ. Stud., 1990 (57), *Bagwell, K., Commitment and Observability in Games, Games and Economic Behavior, February 1995, Vol. 8, Number 2, Levin, D. and J. Peck, To Grab for the Market or to Bide One s Time: A Dynamic Model of Entry, Ohio State University xerox, July Note to students of Industrial Organization: The Economics of Information is extremely important to the study of Industrial Organization, and many of the papers covered are explicitly IO papers. However, this course does not provide complete coverage of IO theory. Topics that may not be covered include: 1. Vertical restraints: resale price maintenance, returns, slotting allowances. 2. Contract theory. 3. Product differentiation and spatial competition. 4. Price discrimination. 5. Reputation, predation, and limit pricing. 6. Research and development. This publication/material is available in alternative formats upon request. Please contact John-David Slaughter (410-F Arps Hall, ) for further information. Students with disabilities are responsible for making their needs known to the instructor and seeking assistance in a timely manner.
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