Ex-post merger evaluation at the UK Competition Commission

Transcription

1 Ex-post merger evaluation at the UK Competition Commission Robin Finer Director of Economic Analysis 28 June 2013 The views expressed in this presentation are those of the presenter and are not necessarily those of the UK Competition Commission

2 Introduction What I aim to cover today Why we do ex-post merger evaluation at the CC. The methodologies applied in various evaluations to date. What we have learnt from past evaluations. What determines our choice of methodology for carrying out an evaluation. How we take forward what we have learnt. (I won t be focusing today on our evaluations of the effectiveness of our remedies, which is another programme of work that we carry out, nor our internal end-of-inquiry reviews.) Slide 2

3 Why we do ex-post merger evaluation at the CC. The methodologies applied in various evaluations to date. What we have learnt from past evaluations. What determines our choice of methodology for carrying out an evaluation. How we take forward what we have learnt. Slide 3

4 Why do we do ex-post evaluation of mergers? To learn lessons about the way we have analysed issues in the past, which could be improved in future inquiries. More specifically, analysing markets where mergers have been cleared is interesting in three respects: Allows test of CC belief that merger would not substantially lessen competition. If no substantial lessening of competition, allows test of whether this is for reasons identified by the CC. If there has been a lessening of competition, allows examination of how (and how quickly) market participants respond to this. More generally, learn more about how markets respond to significant increases in concentration. In markets with blocked mergers, can still assess some predicted future developments. Slide 4

5 Why we do ex-post merger evaluation at the CC. The methodologies applied in various evaluations to date. What we have learnt from past evaluations. What determines our choice of methodology for carrying out an evaluation. How we take forward what we have learnt. Slide 5

6 What we have done to date 2005 study of 10 cleared CC mergers carried out by PwC study of four cases (2 blocked mergers, 1 cleared merger and 1 regulatory inquiry) carried out by CC staff economists study of eight merger decisions (mixture of conditional clearances, unconditional clearances and prohibitions), of which three were resolved at the OFT stage and five at the CC stage. Carried out by Deloitte and Professor Steve Davies study of two cleared CC mergers carried out by LEAR. 2013/14 study of??? carried out by??? Slide 6

7 PwC Report March 2005 (jointly commissioned with OFT and BIS) Detailed study of 10 of the 29 cases that the CC cleared without remedies during the period Interviewed a number of market participants for each case. Chose to focus on the views of the customers of the merging parties. Competitive constraints identified by PwC as currently important very similar to those identified by the CC. In particular, CC appears to have generally good record at predicting where entry is likely to act as a significant competitive constraint. Seems to have found it more difficult to predict circumstances where buyer power is likely to act as a significant competitive constraint. Slide 7

8 CC staff review of past cases January 2008 Detailed study of 3 CC merger cases from the period (just prior to new legislation) two prohibitions and one clearance. Cases selected on the basis that (a) not covered by PwC study and (b) raised complex issues. Conducted desk research and interviewed a number of market participants for each case. Concluded that decisions were basically sound although market developments were not always what had been expected, not clear that differences would have led to alternative decision. Other lessons included: benefit of published guidelines; possible advances in thinking on vertical issues; better distinction between unilateral and coordinated effects; more focused consideration of merger-specific effects, rather than extent of competition in the market. Slide 8

9 Deloitte Report March 2009 (jointly commissioned with OFT and BIS) - methodology Study of eight merger cases decided in the period three resolved at the OFT stage and five referred to the CC. Mixture of unconditional clearances, conditional clearances and prohibitions. Cases selected so that a range of analytical issues and industries represented. Conducted desk research, interviewed a number of market participants and sent some written questionnaires for each case. Merger simulation exercise carried out by Professor Davies assess the implicit modelling and data collection by the agency, based on information available at the time of the merger. Slide 9

10 Deloitte Report March 2009 (jointly commissioned with OFT and BIS) -findings Some suggestion that there may have been a tendency to overstate barriers to entry and expansion in early CC decisions under the Enterprise Act. In retail mergers, the differences in choice of geographic market definition and intervention thresholds could have been more clearly explained. More clarity on approach to decision of whether or not to include in-house supply in relevant market? Merger simulation exercise suggested that analysis was generally consistent, coherent and transparent. Some question as to whether the authorities always collected the right data. Slide 10

11 LEAR Report September 2011 Study of two cleared CC mergers, both in the retail sector (GAME/Game Station video games (2008); HMV/Ottakar s books (2006)). Difference-in-difference analysis of prices, supplemented by a survey of market participants. In both cases, the LEAR analysis found that prices had declined following the merger (and that the merging parties prices in one case had decreased more than their competitors prices). The qualitative evidence also supported the view that there had not been a substantial lessening of competition in either case. Highlighted difficulties in obtaining useful data for conducting this kind of exercise, given lack of publicly available information and absence of information-gathering powers. Slide 11

12 Why we do ex-post merger evaluation at the CC. The methodologies applied in various evaluations to date. What we have learnt from past evaluations. What determines our choice of methodology for carrying out an evaluation. How we take forward what we have learnt. Slide 12

13 Choosing what to evaluate and how to do it (1) Clearances or prohibitions? Easier to evaluate the authority s predictions about the development of the market in clearances. Sample selection bias? Recent cases or more time elapsed? Need enough time since the decision to collect relevant information. If allow too long, harder to isolate the impact of the decision from other developments? Slide 13

14 Choosing what to evaluate and how to do it (2) Qualitative or quantitative methodologies? Some questions better answered quantitatively. Can be very difficult to obtain the necessary information. External consultants or in-house evaluation? Possible (perceived) independence issue if done in-house and may be harder to set aside time for the exercise. Absorb lessons learnt more easily if doing the work in-house than if reading an externally produced report? Slide 14

15 Why we do ex-post merger evaluation at the CC. The methodologies applied in various evaluations to date. What we have learnt from past evaluations. What determines our choice of methodology for carrying out an evaluation. How we take forward what we have learnt. Slide 15

16 How do we take forward what we learn? We have published all of our reports in full, which enables internal and external stakeholders to benefit from their findings and methodology. The CC s Analysis Group is responsible for the evaluation programme and ensures that evaluations take place and that the findings are disseminated: When we updated our published merger guidance, the process was informed by evaluations. We hold internal seminars (at staff and member level) where the findings are presented and discussed. The evaluation findings complement the issues that arise from our internal end-of-inquiry reviews which systematically occur shortly after we have completed an investigation. Slide 16

17 More details at... Slide 17