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Wholesale call origination on the public telephone network provided at a fixed location Wholesale call termination on individual public telephone networks provided at a fixed location Response to Consultation 14/14 (Response to Public Consultation 07/14) 2 ND October 2014 Gibraltar Regulatory Authority Communications Division 2 nd floor Eurotowers 4 1 Europort Road Gibraltar Telephone +350 20074636 Fax +350 20072166 Email: communications@gra.gi Web:http://www.gra.gi

CONTENTS Executive Summary... 1 1. Introduction... 4 1.1 Regulatory Background... 4 1.2 Scope of the review... 7 1.3 Previous reviews... 8 1.4 Market characteristics... 8 1.5 Structure of this document... 10 2. Market Definition... 11 2.1 Methodology... 11 2.2 Wholesale fixed call origination... 12 2.3 Wholesale call termination... 14 2.4 Summary of preliminary conclusions... 15 3. Market Analysis... 18 3.1 Methodology... 18 3.2 Competiton assessment: wholesale fixed call origination/wholesale fixed call termination... 19 3.3 Preliminary conclusions and SMP designation if appropriate... 20 4. Designation of undertakings with SMP... 22 5. SMP Obligations... 23 5.1 Competition problems in the relevant markets... 23 5.2 Principles in determining SMP obligations... 23 5.3 SMP obligations: wholesale fixed call origination/wholesale fixed call termination... 24 Annex A Notification of Draft Measures Pursuant to Article 7(3) of Directive 2002/21/EC... 32 Summary Notification Form... 33

Executive Summary The communications regulatory framework requires the Gibraltar Regulatory Authority (GRA or the Authority) to define relevant markets susceptible to ex-ante regulation, appropriate to national circumstances in accordance with the market definition procedure outlined in the Framework Directive 1. In addition, the Authority is required to conduct an analysis of the relevant markets to decide whether or not they are effectively competitive and, having identified competition problems, propose appropriate regulatory measures. The Authority has also taken into account the EC s recent Draft Recommendation on Relevant Markets. On 23 rd May 2014, the Authority issued a national consultation on wholesale call origination and wholesale call termination on public telephone networks provided at a fixed location (Public Consultation No. 07/14). The Authority received submissions from one operator, Gibtelecom, by the close of the consultation period. The Authority thanks Gibtelecom for its submission. Having considered the views of the respondent, the Authority sets out in this document its conclusions regarding the market review process including its SMP obligations and subsequent notification to the Commission, BEREC and other NRA s in accordance with Article 7 of the Framework Directive. Market Definition The Authority proposes to define the following wholesale fixed markets: Wholesale call origination on the public telephone network provided at a fixed location Wholesale call termination on individual public telephone networks provided at a fixed location Market Analysis The markets defined were analysed to see if there was evidence of market power. The analyses took into consideration a range of factors in the assessment of market power including countervailing buyer power and potential competition. Article 16(4) 2 of the Framework Directive 3 states, 1 DIRECTIVE 2002/21/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) OJ [2002] L 108/33. 2 Directive 2009/140/EC Better Regulation Directive outlines amendments to Article 16(4) of Directive 2002/21/EC on a Common Regulatory Framework. 3 DIRECTIVE 2002/21/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) OJ [2002] L 108/33. 1

Where a national regulatory authority determines that a relevant market is not effectively competitive, it shall identify undertakings which individually or jointly have a significant market power on that market in accordance with Article 14 and the national regulatory authority shall on such undertakings impose appropriate specific regulatory obligations referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article or maintain or amend such obligations where they already exist. Where there is a finding of SMP, the Authority is obliged to impose obligations to remedy competition problems. SMP obligations are outlined in Regulation 10 to 14 of the Communication (Access) Regulations 2006 4. Such obligations may include: Obligation of transparency Obligation of non-discrimination Obligation of accounting separation Obligation to meet reasonable requests for access Price controls and cost accounting. In the analysis of the markets, the Authority assessed that Gibtelecom has 100% market share in both markets. The Authority has assessed prospective competition and has assessed factors which may qualify Gibtelecom s ability to price independently of any competitors. The conclusion is that Gibtelecom will remain dominant in these markets for the lifetime of this review. The Authority therefore proposes to designate Gibtelecom as having SMP in the markets for wholesale call origination and wholesale call termination on the public telephone network provided at a fixed location. SMP Obligations The Authority proposes to apply the following SMP obligations on Gibtelecom in the wholesale markets for call origination at a fixed location and call termination on its own fixed network: Transparency Non-discrimination Accounting Separation Access Price controls and Cost Accounting. The Authority has considered regulatory options in light of its overall objectives and in the context of the problems identified in the relevant wholesale markets. The Authority has found that its proposed SMP obligations are appropriate, proportionate and justified in light of the market failures identified. The application of SMP 4 Communications (Access) Regulations 2006, Communications Act 2006. 2

obligations on relatively small authorised operators in Gibraltar must take due account of the limited resources available to such operators to engage in detailed regulatory compliance arrangements. The Authority believes the SMP obligations set out in this market review support the objectives outlined in the Communications Act 2006 as to how the Authority should exercise its functions. SMP obligations imposed aim to address market failure, to protect consumers against the exercise of market power and to promote competition in the wholesale fixed markets. 3

1. Introduction 1.1 Regulatory Background European regulatory background The European regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services is a set of five Directives 5 : Directive 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (the Framework Directive) 6 Directive 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities (the Access Directive) 7 Directive 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (the Authorisation Directive) 8 Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (the Universal Service Directive) 9 Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (the Privacy Directive) 10. Gibraltar regulatory background These five European Directives were implemented in Gibraltar as part of the Communications Act 2006 11 (the Act). The legislation enables the Authority to carry out reviews of competition in relevant electronic communications markets to ensure that regulation remains appropriate in the light of changing market conditions. 5 As Amended in 2009. 6 See footnote 1 above. 7 DIRECTIVE 2002/19/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 7 March 2002 on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive) OJ [2002] L 108/7. 8 DIRECTIVE 2002/20/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive) OJ [2002] L 108/21. 9 DIRECTIVE 2002/22/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users' rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive) OJ [2002] L 108/51. 10 DIRECTIVE 2002/58/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic communications) OJ [2002] L 201/37. 11 Communications Act 2006, Act No. 15, 2006. The latest regulatory reform package of 2009 was included in Communications Act 2006 (Amendment) Regulations 2011, 26 May 2011. 4

In conducting a market review the Authority must take account of the SMP procedures in the Act, sections 38-41, (the SMP procedures) as well as the provisions dealing with co-operation with the European Commission, BEREC 12 and the regulatory authorities in the Member States, sections 22-24. Section 39 of the Act requires the Authority to take due account of all applicable guidelines and recommendations which have been issued or made by the European Commission in pursuance of the provisions of a European Community instrument. In particular, when undertaking a market review, this means that the Authority should take due account of the Commission Recommendation of 17 December 2007 on relevant product and service markets 13 (the Recommendation), the accompanying Explanatory Note 14, and the Guidelines on market analysis and SMP assessment 15 (the SMP Guidelines). Details of the process for undertaking market reviews, and in specifying regulatory obligations which can be imposed on the foot of an SMP finding, are elaborated in the Communications (Access) Regulations, 2006 16. It should be noted that Gibraltar does not have competition legislation. Whereas undertakings in other Member States have access to both ex ante and ex post means of addressing potentially anti-competitive behaviour, only ex ante means are available in Gibraltar. This needs to be considered when defining the necessary SMP obligations. It is important to recognise that the markets in this review are already subject to regulation. In order to take this into account, the EC recommends the use of a modified greenfield approach, where markets are analysed absent regulation 17, except when that regulation is not in relation to an SMP obligation, or is related to another market. The Authority is following the approach recommended by the European Commission, and has taken account of the various guidelines and recommendations published by the European Commission, as well as the experience of other European NRAs. The Recommendation has been taken into account when deciding which markets will be reviewed. 12 Body of European Regulators of Electronic Communications. 13 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 17 December 2007 on relevant product and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, (2007/879/EC). 14 Brussels, (C(2007) 5406), SEC(2007) 1483 final. 15 Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, (2002/C 165/03), 11.07.02 16 Communications (Access) Regulations, LN. 2006/076)5.6.2006, amended as COMMUNICATIONS (ACCESS) (AMENDMENT) REGULATIONS 2011, 26 May 2011. 17 At the retail level, any existing regulation at the wholesale level will be included in the analysis. 5

Since the consultation on the wholesale fixed call origination and termination markets began, the European Commission has published a new Draft Recommendation on Relevant Markets, supported by a draft Explanatory Note. Although the proposed measures in the Draft Recommendation have not yet come into effect, the Authority has considered their potential impact on this market review. The Draft Recommendation defines four relevant markets as being susceptible to ex ante regulation. These are: Market 1: Market 2: Market 3: Wholesale call termination on individual public telephone networks provided at a fixed location Wholesale voice call termination on individual mobile networks a) Wholesale local access provided at a fixed location b) Wholesale central access provided at a fixed location for mass market products Market 4: Wholesale high-quality access provided at a fixed location. The new Market 1 corresponds to Market 3 as defined in the 2007 Recommendation, and as analysed in this market review, and so the Authority s analysis and conclusion on this market would be unchanged by the adoption of the new Recommendation. However, the wholesale market for call origination on the public telephone network provided at a fixed location is no longer considered as susceptible to ex ante regulation. This means that the Authority would conduct a three criteria test to determine whether barriers to entry in the wholesale fixed call origination market in Gibraltar indicated a continuing need for ex ante regulation. The Authority notes that entry to the wholesale call origination market is, to a great extent, dependent on the operators' ability to develop or acquire a direct access link to the end customer. In its Explanatory Note, the EC explains that, at a Europe-wide level, a range of wholesale access products are available and in use, alongside NGA roll-out and transition to all-ip networks. This is the basis on which the EC has concluded that the forward-looking barriers to entry to the wholesale fixed call origination market are no longer high, although it also notes that most NRAs found in their last round of market reviews that the wholesale market for fixed call origination was still characterised by high and non-transitory barriers to entry. The situation in Gibraltar is that there is very limited alternative infrastructure, and there has been negligible interest from potential operators in offering an alternative retail access and/or calls service based on wholesale inputs. The Authority has recently reviewed the retail fixed access and calls markets, and has identified ongoing competition problems. The Authority notes that there is no regulatory barrier to the development of such a service, but that high structural barriers persist. The Authority therefore concludes that there remain high and non-transitory barriers to entry to the market for wholesale call origination on the public telephone network provided at a fixed location, and so the first criterion is met. In the Authority s view, there is no indication of a clear tendency towards effective competition, so the second criterion is also met. The absence of competition legislation in Gibraltar means that the third criterion regarding the sufficiency of competition law cannot be considered. 6

The Authority s view is that its analysis and conclusions on the wholesale market for call origination on the public telephone network provided at a fixed location as set out in this consultation remain valid in the event of the adoption of the EC s new Draft Recommendation on Relevant Markets. 1.2 Scope of the review The main purpose of a market review is to identify the competitive conditions prevailing in a market by assessing systematically the competitive constraints that are faced by undertakings in the market. A market review commences by defining a market, which is then analysed to assess the degree of effective competition. The competition assessment determines whether any undertaking is found to have Significant Market Power (SMP), which is held to be equivalent to the concept of dominance under competition law, and is defined as the ability to behave independently of competitors, suppliers and ultimately businesses and consumers in that market. If there is no SMP, the market is effectively competitive and does not require ex ante regulation 18. If there is SMP, then the market is not effectively competitive and ex ante regulation should be imposed, at either the wholesale or the retail level (or both), to counteract the potential negative effects of the competition problems that can be caused by the SMP operator. This review is concerned with two markets in Gibraltar: Call origination on the public telephone network provided at a fixed location (Market 2) Call termination on the public telephone network provided at a fixed location (Market 3). These wholesale markets are included in the EC s Recommendation 19 as being susceptible to ex ante regulation 20. The markets for wholesale call origination and call termination concern the wholesale interconnection inputs required to offer retail calls services. Call origination and call termination, and sometimes call transit, together form the interconnection facility needed to convey a call from the caller to the destination. The Authority has recently consulted 21 on its review of the markets for retail access and calls, and has found that the fixed incumbent operator Gibtelecom has SMP in the markets for retail access; local calls; and international calls for residential and business customers. 18 Ex ante regulation is the application of regulation before an abuse of power has necessarily occurred. The reasoning behind its application is that finding that an operator has SMP means that the operator is likely to have the incentive and motivation to behave in a way which exploits its market power to the detriment of competitors and ultimately to consumers. Ex ante regulation can be contrasted with ex post regulation, which investigates an incident which has already happened. 19 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION of 17 December 2007 on relevant product and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, (2007/879/EC). 20 See the discussion of the EC s new Draft Recommendation on Relevant Markets in Section 1.1. 21 Public consultation 01/14. 7

1.3 Previous reviews The market for wholesale fixed call origination was last reviewed in 2011 22, and the Authority designated Gibtelecom with SMP, on the basis of its high and persistent market share of 100%. The Authority s assessment was that no other factors mitigated Gibtelecom s market power, and a full suite of remedies was imposed. The market for wholesale fixed call termination was last reviewed in 2011 23, and the Authority designated Gibtelecom and CTS with SMP for call termination on their own network. Appropriate remedies were imposed on both SMP operators. 1.4 Market characteristics The wholesale markets for fixed call origination and fixed call termination are linked to the retail markets for voice calls. The Authority has recently consulted 24 on its review of the markets for retail access and calls, and has characterised the retail markets as follows. Retail markets for voice calls In Gibraltar, access to the public switched telephone network at a fixed location is currently provided by: Analogue exchange lines offering low capacity connections, where up to 2 calls can be made at the same time (PSTN analogue or ISDN basic rate access); High capacity connections where 3 or more calls can be made simultaneously (Digital ISDN exchange lines such as ISDN 30); ADSL/VDSL-based broadband connections. Fixed voice services in Gibraltar consist of: Standard narrowband call services, using the analogue lines (including calls to mobiles and ISDN calls); Managed voice over broadband services 25 ; Unmananged Voice over IP (VoIP) services 26 ; and 22 GRA, Decision Notice 09/11, 30 November 2011. 23 GRA, Decision Notice 09/11, 30 November 2011. 24 Public consultation 01/14. 25 This is a voice service provided over a broadband connection, not requiring a conventional narrowband telephone line. This is typically a managed service with Quality of Service parameters similar to conventional PSTN services. 26 This type of call refers to using the Internet for making calls, typically using a computer to make the calls. An example of this type of service is Skype. 8

Carrier Selection IP (CSIP) voice services 27. As of June 2013, there were a total of 23,282 exchange lines 28. Gibtelecom, the incumbent, is the only operator which offers fixed line services. A market entrant, CTS, began offering fixed services within certain parts of the jurisdiction in the last quarter of 2008, but has since exited the market. In addition to the traditional narrowband calls services, Gibtelecom provides voice services using a Carrier Select (CS) code, routing the traffic via its own VoIP gateway to a third party for onward conveyance via the Internet 29. Although Gibtelecom markets this service as VoIP, it differs from standard VoIP services as it does not require an internet connection. It is accessed by dialling in a three digit prefix prior to the telephone number a customer wishes to call. At present Gibtelecom s CSIP services are used for international calling only. In the retail calls market, the Authority published a decision notice on Carrier Pre- Selection (CPS) in 2005 which outlined the CPS procedures and how it should be implemented in Gibraltar. To date no operator has provided CPS based voice services. Wholesale markets The wholesale markets which are linked to the retail calls markets generally involve three parts: call origination; transit; and call termination. Call origination services on the public telephone network provided at fixed locations include call set-up, switching and connection for the initial stage of the call. They incorporate conveyance from an end-user to the next stage in the call routing (either call termination or to the point of interconnection). Transit services comprise the pure conveyance of calls between two operators across a third transit operator. This incorporates both national and international calls. Call termination provides call completion and switching functionality at the terminating end of a call. It involves the conveyance of calls from the end of the previous stage (either call origination or to the point of interconnection), to the called end-user via the local loop. The three markets combined enable the conveyance of a call across the public telephone network. The EC Recommendation indicates that NRAs are to define the boundaries of each element of the interconnection market according to the particular network topology in their jurisdiction. In Gibraltar, every fixed network is based on a single switch, and there is therefore no transit element required for the conveyance of a call across the public telephone network. 27 This type of access refers to a carrier select service which allows calls to be made over the internet using a VoIP gateway and which is managed by the operator via a third party and is dialled by using a three digit prefix. This service does not require a residential broadband connection. 28 As per Gibtelecom data request. 29 This service is described as Carrier Select IP service (CSIP). 9

The Authority proposes to define the boundaries of the markets for call origination and call termination in line with the way those functions are performed by a local exchange. Figure 1: Structure of the Interconnection Markets in Gibraltar based on a telephone call made within one network One single switch Call origination Call termination As Figure 1 indicates, interconnection in Gibraltar is made up of call origination and call termination. At present, Gibtelecom is the only provider of fixed call origination and fixed call termination in Gibraltar. 1.5 Structure of this document Chapter 2 sets out the Authority s analysis to define relevant markets susceptible to ex-ante regulation. Chapter 3 analyses the markets defined to identify whether any undertaking(s) enjoys a position of SMP. Chapter 4 designates undertakings with SMP. Chapter 5 describes competition problems and proposes SMP obligations. 10

2. Market Definition 2.1 Methodology The market definition procedures are designed to identify in a systematic way the competitive constraints encountered by providers of electronic communications networks and services. Market definition is not an end in itself it is concerned with identifying the boundaries of a market so that the competitive conditions can be assessed, and, if appropriate, ex ante regulation can be put in place, or maintained. According to the European Court of Justice 30, a relevant product market comprises all products or services that are sufficiently interchangeable or substitutable with its products, not only in terms of the objective characteristic of those products, their prices or their intended use, but also in terms of the conditions of competition and/or the structure of supply and demand for the product in question. In essence, this leads to a definition of the market s boundaries. The process involves considering constraints arising on both the demand and supply sides of a market (and their interaction). The constraints are those which would apply to a so-called hypothetical monopolist 31, such that the hypothetical monopolist would be constrained in price setting behaviour. Hence, critical to the market definition process is the degree of substitution identified on the demand and supplysides of the market. The Communications Act 2006 requires the Authority to take due account of all applicable guidelines and recommendations which have been issued by the European Commission relating to market identification and analysis 32. As per the Commission s guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of SMP, demand-side substitutability is used to measure the extent to which consumers are prepared to substitute other services or products for the service or product under investigation, whereas supply-side substitutability indicates whether suppliers other than those offering the product or service in question would switch in the immediate to short term their line of production to offer the relevant products or services without incurring considerable additional costs. The Commission s guidelines also require the geographic coverage of markets to be considered. A relevant geographic market comprises the area in which the undertakings concerned are involved in the supply and demand of products and/or services, in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from neighbouring areas because the conditions of competition are appreciably different in those areas. The Authority s proposed definitions for the wholesale markets for fixed call origination and fixed call termination are set out in the next section. 30 See, for example, Case 322/81, Michelin v. Commission [1983] ECR 3461, as well as the Commission Notice on the definition of relevant markets for the purposes of Community competition law ( the Commission Notice on Market Definition ) OJ 1997 C 372/3, and the SMP Guidelines. 31 A method for identifying market boundaries is known as the hypothetical monopolist test (also known as the SSNIP test, small but significant non-transitory increase in price test). This test assesses whether a hypothetical monopolist is able to increase price profitably for a product or service. 32 Section 39(1). 11

2.2 Wholesale fixed call origination Product market Following the methodology set out by the EC, the Authority s starting point is call origination provided over the public telephone network. The Authority considers that the main alternatives to purchasing and supplying wholesale call origination over the public telephone network include building an alternative access network, and buying wholesale access on an existing network. The Authority has considered these alternatives to the purchase and supply of wholesale call origination on the public telephone network as follows: Constructing an alternative access network; leasing capacity on an existing access network; using wholesale broadband access; using Next Generation Access (NGA) networks; self-supply. Is the construction of an alternative access network a good substitute for wholesale call origination? Demand side The Authority has considered whether a purchaser of wholesale call origination would switch to construct its own access network in response to a SSNIP in the price of wholesale call origination. The Authority s preliminary view is that the construction of an alternative access network (which could include cable, fibre, or wireless connection) would involve considerable time and investment, and much of the investment would be sunk costs. Supply side The Authority has considered whether a supplier of other connections to an end user would switch to supply wholesale call origination in response to a SSNIP. The Authority s preliminary view is that there is no other infrastructure already available in Gibraltar, so any supplier would not be able to switch supply in response to a SSNIP. Proposal: the construction of an alternative network is not a substitute for wholesale call origination Is leasing wholesale capacity on an existing access network a good substitute for wholesale call origination? Demand side The Authority has considered whether a purchaser of wholesale call origination would switch to lease wholesale capacity on another access network in response to a SSNIP in the price of wholesale call origination. This could be, for example, by using 12

an established connection to an end user, such as leased lines, or an unbundled local loop. The Authority s preliminary view is that, in the case of leased lines, there are significant functional differences between the products, and significant differentials in the pricing. In the case of unbundled local loops, no operator currently offers this in Gibraltar, and is unlikely to do so in response to a SSNIP in the price of call origination, due to the high investment cost. Supply side The Authority has considered whether a supplier of leased access capacity would switch to supply wholesale call origination in response to a SSNIP. The Authority s preliminary view is that the time and costs involved indicate that it is unlikely that a supplier of alternative leased access capacity would switch to supply call origination. Proposal: leasing wholesale capacity on an existing access network is not a substitute for wholesale call origination Is wholesale broadband access a good substitute for wholesale call origination? Demand side The Authority has considered whether a purchaser of wholesale call origination would switch to purchase Wholesale Broadband Access (WBA) in response to a SSNIP. In its review of the retail access, local and international calls markets, the Authority found that VoB retail calls and Carrier Selection IP calls were good substitutes for calls over the public telephone network, but that unmanaged VoIP calls (for example, using a service such as Skype) were not. The Authority has therefore considered whether a purchaser of wholesale call origination would switch to purchase WBA in response to a SSNIP in the price of call origination. The Authority s preliminary view is that a purchaser of wholesale call origination would not switch to purchase WBA because of the functional differences and cost differentials, particularly in terms of the retail product which the purchaser could offer. Supply side The Authority has considered whether a supplier of WBA would switch to supply wholesale call origination in response to a SSNIP. The Authority s preliminary view is that the functional differences between the products indicates that a supplier would not be able to switch at negligible cost and within a short timeframe. Proposal: wholesale broadband access is not a good substitute for wholesale call origination Does the public telephone network include all delivery technologies? The Authority has considered whether the public telephone network would include NGA or is limited to legacy PSTN infrastructure. The Authority s preliminary view is that the use of NGA would represent the use of a more efficient technology to deliver 13

similar call origination services, and for this reason, the delivery technology is not relevant. Proposal: the public telephone network is technologically neutral, and includes fixed call origination on current and next generation networks. Should self-supply of call origination be included in the market? The Authority has considered the guidance in the EC s Explanatory Note, such that in many cases, the incumbent is the only firm which is in a position to provide a potential wholesale service. In the instance where there is no merchant market, and where there is potential consumer harm, it is justifiable to construct a notional market which would include the self-supply of the incumbent. The Authority s preliminary view is that the self-supply of the incumbent operator should be included in the wholesale market for call origination. Proposal: self-supply of call origination should be included in the market. Geographic market According to established case law, a relevant geographic market comprises an area in which the demand and supply characteristics are similar across the area, and which can be distinguished from neighbouring areas where there is evidence that there is a clear and persistent boundary in the conditions of competition 33. The Authority believes that the geographic market for wholesale call origination is Gibraltar. There are no appreciable differences in the conditions of demand or supply within Gibraltar, and similar services are offered on the same terms and conditions throughout. Proposal: the geographical scope of the market for wholesale call origination is all of Gibraltar. 2.3 Wholesale call termination Product market When a call is made to a fixed phone, whether from a fixed line or from a mobile on another network, the call passes from the originating operator to the terminating operator. The terminating operator charges a fee to the originating operator for connecting the call to its customers, which is known as a call termination charge. The call termination charge is paid by the originating operator and passed on to the caller in the retail price it pays for a call. Call termination charges may take the form of a simple per-minute rate or alternatively may take the form of a two-part charge, comprising a call set-up charge and a pre-minute charge. Call termination charges may be separated into peak, off-peak and weekend rates. Call termination charges are normally expressed on a per-minute basis (aside from any set-up charge which is expressed as a flat fee) but charges are typically levied on a per-second basis. 33 See also Draft review of the BEREC Common Position on geographical aspects of market analysis (definition and remedies), BEREC, 5 December 2013. 14

The EC s Explanatory Note recognises that call termination is the least replicable wholesale input used to provide retail services. When considering the demand side and the supply side, a call can only be terminated on the called individual s network, so that the market is effectively termination on an individual network. The Authority considers that, although there are no demand or supply side substitutes for wholesale call termination on an individual network, it may be that there are constraints arising from the retail level. The Authority has therefore considered whether demand side substitution at the retail level constrains the pricing of wholesale fixed call termination. Demand side substitution would need to be taken into account if alternative means of making calls (such as by using a mobile rather than a fixed line, so that the mobile network would terminate the call), or if other types of messaging were used. In its review of the related retail markets, the Authority found that, at the retail level, a mobile call was not a substitute for a fixed call, and this finding indicates that mobile call termination could not provide a sufficient constraint on the pricing of fixed call termination from a demand or supply perspective. Proposal: the wholesale market for fixed call termination has no demand or supply side substitutes, and is not constrained by demand side retail substitution. Geographic market According to established case law, a relevant geographic market comprises an area in which the demand and supply characteristics are similar across the area, and which can be distinguished from neighbouring areas where there is evidence that there is a clear and persistent boundary in the conditions of competition 34. The Authority believes that the geographic market for wholesale call termination is Gibraltar. There are no appreciable differences in the conditions of demand or supply within Gibraltar, and similar services are offered on the same terms and conditions throughout. Proposal: the geographical scope of the market for wholesale call termination on an individual network is all of Gibraltar. 2.4 Summary of preliminary conclusions The Authority s preliminary conclusions as set out in the consultation were as follows: Wholesale fixed call origination There is a market for wholesale fixed call origination on the public telephone network; 34 See also Draft review of the BEREC Common Position on geographical aspects of market analysis (definition and remedies), BEREC, 5 December 2013. 15

The market for wholesale fixed call origination does not include the construction of alternative access facilities, or leased network connections; The market does not include WBA; The market includes fixed call origination on current and next generation access networks; The market includes self-supply; The geographic scope of the market is Gibraltar. Wholesale fixed call termination There is a market for wholesale fixed call termination on an individual public telephone network; The geographical scope of the market is Gibraltar. Q1: Do you agree with the proposed definitions of markets susceptible to ex ante regulation? If not, why not? Please give reasons for your answer. Views of respondents Gibtelecom accepted the Authority s proposed definitions of the wholesale fixed call origination and call termination markets susceptible to ex-ante regulation, and noted that they were largely in line with those put forward in previous market reviews in 2007 and 2011. Gibtelecom expressed a view that a local loop unbundling product, such as that set out in the Company s reference offer, could serve as a workable and sustainable alternative to another operator purchasing call origination services. Gibtelecom noted that it has had an LLU reference offer available since 2006, and that an operator had signed onto the offer a number of years ago but had not progressed with it. Gibtelecom proposed that the Authority should take account of Sapphire Networks as an SMP operator on its own network, and should consider the prospect of other fixed line operators, such as Gibfibrespeed entering the market within the lifetime of this review. The Authority s position The Authority acknowledges Gibtelecom s agreement with the proposed definitions of markets susceptible to ex-ante regulation as stipulated in public consultation 07/14. The Authority notes Gibtelecom s point on the existence of a reference offer for unbundled local loops. The Authority agrees with Gibtelecom that, should an operator choose to develop a retail fixed calls service based on unbundled local loops, this may be an alternative to the purchase of wholesale inputs, depending on the nature, scale and scope of the infrastructure investment. However, as the Authority understands that no operator is currently considering such an investment, 16

the Authority believes that it is unlikely that such an alternative is likely to emerge within the lifetime of this review. With reference to Gibtelecom s points regarding other operators, the Authority notes that a third operator, Sapphire Networks, was licensed in late 2004. It currently has an agreement with Gibtelecom which enables it to access its customers for the provision of ADSL/VDSL services, or direct Ethernet connection to Sapphire s own network, where the customers are within physical reach. At the time of writing this consultation, Sapphire Networks does not provide any public fixed voice services. The Authority has received no evidence of any other operators which are currently active, or have plans to become active, in the relevant markets. However, the Authority will closely monitor the market should any new product or service be offered by an alternative operator. 17

3. Market Analysis 3.1 Methodology Having defined the scope of the relevant product and geographic markets, the Authority must assess the level of competition within each market. An undertaking will be deemed to have SMP if it is in a position of economic strength affording it the power to behave independently to an appreciable extent of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers. The Communications Act 2006 notes that SMP is equivalent to dominance, as construed in accordance with European Community competition law 35. Having proposed preliminary market definitions, the Authority must now assess the current and prospective level of competition within each of these markets: wholesale fixed call origination on the public telephone network; wholesale fixed call termination on an individual public telephone network. The market analysis begins by considering market share. In the SMP Guidelines, it is clear that, although a high market share alone is not sufficient to establish the possession of SMP, it is unlikely that a firm will be dominant without a large market share. The SMP Guidelines note that: very large market shares in excess of 50% - are in themselves, save in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the existence of a dominant position 36. It is important to consider the changes to market shares over time, as this will indicate trends in the market and will contribute to an assessment of whether or not the market may tend towards effective competition over the period of this review. While market shares and trends in market share provide an important indication of how competitive a market is, they are not determinative on their own, particularly in signalling the level of future competition. The Authority has therefore taken into account a number of other relevant criteria which may constitute barriers to entry and/or expansion in coming to its proposed finding. In telecommunications markets, barriers to entry can be significant and are often associated with large-scale investment in infrastructure over a long time, with consequent sunk costs, and could also entail an operator s need to achieve economies of scale, scope and density. Another barrier to entry could arise where an SMP operator is vertically integrated; that is where the operator offers a wholesale and a retail service. In this case, an entrant to the market may find it difficult to compete if the SMP operator s retail arm benefits from preferential treatment from its parent company, particularly if the market entrant is dependent on purchasing a wholesale input from the SMP operator, or if the business/offering is structured in such a way that the wholesale part of the business is able to support or cross-subsidise the retail part of the business. The competition assessment takes into account other factors that could dilute market power, such as countervailing 35 Section 38(1) and (2). 36 At paragraph 75. 18

buyer power, where a purchaser buys enough of the operator s services to be able to influence the pricing and market behaviour of the operator. The conclusion of the competition assessment for each market is a preliminary view as to whether any undertaking has SMP in the defined market. 3.2 Competiton assessment: wholesale fixed call origination/wholesale fixed call termination Existing competition Looking first at the downstream retail market, the number of retail narrowband access lines has declined slightly over the last 2 years, to just over 23,200 in June 2013 37. The Authority s review of the retail access and calls markets indicated that there was a decline of around 8.5% in overall call volumes over the last two years. However, data to end 2013 suggests that the volume of retail voice calls (measured in call minutes) has remained fairly constant through 2013, with a slight decrease in international calls, and in calls to mobiles. Gibtelecom is the only provider of wholesale fixed call origination, and so the market consists of Gibtelecom s self-supply. Gibtelecom has a market share of 100%. Gibtelecom is the only provider of wholesale fixed call termination, and so the market consists of Gibtelecom s self-supply on its own network. Gibtelecom has a market share of 100%. A second operator, Sapphire Networks, provides public electronic communications networks and services in Gibraltar. To date, its service offering includes provision of broadband DSL to residential customers and related services enabled via its connection and access agreement with Gibtelecom. It also provides direct connection by Ethernet to customers within a very limited network footprint. Potential competition The Authority has considered any barriers to entry which may affect potential market entry. Control of infrastructure not easily replicated Gibraltar is a very small market, in both physical and economic terms, with specific circumstances including high density of buildings in a very small space and the ground being rock in many parts. In business terms this equals relatively high cost of network construction (which will be sunk cost once invested) and relatively low potential revenue potential for a new entrant. Gibtelecom has the advantage of existing infrastructure, which is not easily replicated. The Authority notes that CTS (Gibraltar) exited the local access market recently. 37 Gibtelecom answers to data request. 19

Economies of scale and scope Generally, telecoms operators with greater network scale and scope will benefit from lower costs in supplying the retail market. Scale and scope economies may be achieved by the high proportion of fixed and common costs associated with the ownership of network infrastructure. Gibtelecom is likely to benefit from economies of scale and scope due to its ownership of an access network, and its ability to offer a range of products on that network. The Authority recognises that the level of this benefit is relative and is limited by the small size of the market. Vertical integration A vertically integrated supplier could achieve efficiencies due to its presence in the upstream and downstream markets. These efficiencies could be passed on to customers in the form of cheaper prices, saving on transaction or interconnection costs, or enhanced product quality. However, vertical integration can also constitute an entry barrier where the presence of a communications provider at multiple levels of the production or distribution chain raises the cost of new entry (for example, where new entrants perceive the need to enter multiple markets simultaneously) or where the vertically integrated communications provider is able to foreclose competition at one or more levels of the market. Gibtelecom is vertically integrated, which may restrict market entry, and which would offer the incentive and ability to leverage market power from the wholesale market to the retail markets. Countervailing buyer power The Authority has no evidence to suggest that any customer or group(s) of customers in Gibraltar are in a position to exercise countervailing buyer power in the wholesale market for fixed call origination or in the wholesale market for fixed call termination. 3.3 Preliminary conclusions and SMP designation if appropriate The Authority s preliminary conclusions as set out in the consultation were that Gibtelecom has 100% of the market for wholesale fixed call origination. Gibtelecom has 100% of the market for wholesale fixed call termination. The Authority has assessed prospective competition and has assessed factors which may qualify Gibtelecom s ability to price independently of any competitors. The conclusion is that Gibtelecom will remain dominant in these markets for the lifetime of this review. The Authority proposes that Gibtelecom should be designated with SMP in the market for wholesale call origination at a fixed location. The Authority proposes that Gibtelecom should be designated with SMP in the market for wholesale fixed call termination on its own network. 20

Q2: Do you agree with the market analysis and proposed SMP designation of the wholesale fixed call origination market? Please give reasons for your answer Q3: Do you agree with the market analysis and proposed SMP designation of the wholesale fixed call termination market? Please give reasons for your answer Views of respondents Gibtelecom accepted the Authority s positions in its market analysis and proposed SMP designation in the wholesale call origination market. Gibtelecom accepted the Authority s position in the market analysis and proposed SMP designation in the wholesale call termination market. Gibtelecom reiterated its point regarding the inclusion of other operators in the market. The Authority s position The Authority notes Gibtelecom s acceptance of the market analysis and the proposed SMP designation in the wholesale markets for call origination and call termination at a fixed location. The Authority has addressed Gibtelecom s points regarding other operators in its response under the market definiton above. 21