Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized MICROGRAPHICS Report No: 12285 Type: PCR Doaumst of Tue World Bank FOR OMJCIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COaPL TION REPORT MADAGASCAR THRD RAILWAYS PROECT (CREDIT 1694-MAC) AUGUST 25, 1993 Infrastructure Operations Division South-Central and Indian Ocean Department Africa Region Reporm N 12285 ThiS document ha a restricd ditibu"o and may be used by recpients only in the perfomane off thir official duties. Its contens may not otherwbe be disdosed without World Ebnk autoriation.-
CURRENCYQSXEI xui (Average) Ma[Rtglv Fmc(h US$1.00 Equivalent 1985-662.5 1986 676.3 1987-1,V69.2 1988-1,407.1 1989-1,603.4 1990-1,494.1 1991-1,835.4 1992-1,866.4 WEIGHIS AND MEASU 1 meter (m) = 3.28 feet (ft) 1 cubic meter (mn) = 35.29 cubic feet (cu.ft) 1 kilometer (km) = 0.62 mile (mi) 1 square kilometer (bn9) = 0.386 square mile (sq.mi) 1 hectare (ba) = 2.47 acre (ac) 1 klogram (kg) = 2.2 pounds (lb) 1 metric ton (m ton) = 2,204 pounds (lbs) 1 liter (1) = 0.26 US gallons (gal) ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CCCE - Caisse Centrale de Coopdration Economique (now Caisse - Francaise de Developpement, CFD) RNCFM Reseau National des Chemins de Fer Malagasy (Madagascar National Railway) SEPT - Societe d'exploiation du Port de ToaliasIna - (The Toamasina Port Authority) ERR - Economic Rate of Return Railway Lines: TCE - Atananrivo - Cote Est Line MLA - Moramanga - Lac Alaotra Line TA - Antananarivo - Antsirabe Line FCE - Fianarantsoa - C8te Est Line FISCAL YEAR OF THE BORROWER January 1 - December 31
FOR OFFICILX USE ONLY. THE WORLD BANK Washingtoni DC 20433 U.S.A. Office of Dtrector4General Operations waluaruoa August 259 1993 MEMORANDUM TO TRE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND ME PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Madagascar Third Railway Prote t (Credit 1694-HAG) Attached is the "Project Completion Report on Madagascar -- Third Railway Project (Credit 1694-MAG)" prepared by the Africa Region. Part I! contains the Borrower's comments. Credit 1694-MAG (SDR10.4 million of May 1986) was to help ensure that Madagascar's Northern railway system would operat efficiently over a 5-10 year period. This would be accomplished through investments for line rehabilitation; bridge reconstruction; and procurement of spare parts and maintenance equipment. Institutional strengthening would be pursued through staff training overseas; teebnical assistance; and studies to improve productivity. The French Government provided financing for locomotives and passenger rolling stock. Implementation of physical components was largely problem-free and (excepting one and a half year's delay in line rehabilitation and bridge reconstruction), largely on schedule and as buadgeted. Nevertheless, operational objectiveset at appraisal were not met. Traffic fell short of forecasted levels; staff productivity declined almost by half between 1988 and 1992; the railway has not covered its costs since 1987; financial management has been unsatisfactory; and financial covenants were not met. The devaluation of the local currency imposed an increasing financial burden, as the railway company was bearing the exchange risk. Deleterious effect of Government intervention in railway operations; absence of user charge policies to encourage fair competition between rail and roae transport; dangers of overstaffing -- all these were issues that the Goverrment and the Bank knew to be important ever since 1974, when the First Railway Project was approved. By 1986, when the Third Project was approved, systematiconfrontation of these very issues had become imperative. But lessons from the two previous railway projects were not taken into account and neither the Government nor the Bank chose to act vigorously. Overall, the project is rated as unsatisfactory, its sustainability as unlikely, and its institutional impact as negligible. The PCR is comprehensive and summarizes adequately the experience gained. The project may be audited together with the Second Railway Project. This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without Uortd Dank authorization.
MADAGAL..R FOR OFCIAL USE ONLY TMmAxXZQX- 64m PROJEG 0MPLLQE=REPQ Preface... EvIuation Summary... I ii PARTI:PROJECTREVIEW FROM BANK'SPERSPEfITVE... I 1. Project Identity..... I 2. Backgound... 1 3. ProjectObjectives and Deslption.. 2 Projectobjectives.. 2 Projectdescription...... 2 4. Project Design and Organization...... 2 5. Project Iplementation... 3 6. Project Results -Operations...... 3 Management Resuts...5 EconomicResuts..... 7. ProjetSustainbility....... 6 8. BankPerformance... 6 9. Borrower Performance... 7 10. ProjectRelationship... 7 11. ConsultantServices... 8 12.ProjectDocumentationandData... 8 PART H:PRO& CTRE Bfy FROM BORROWER'S PERSPEClTVE... 9 PART m: STASCALI.... 13 1. Related BankCredits:... 13 This document has a restricte distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without Worl Dank authorization.
2. Pnoject Timetable:.... 14 3. Credit Disbursemesu... 15 4. Project Implementaion... 16 5. ProjectCot adfncing......... 17 6. ProjectRsut...... 19 7. Staus oflegalcovenuts..... 26 8. Use of Bank Resources... 27 msions..... 28 MAP: tbrd13645r,.....*.... * * * * * * * * * * * *. 29
i MAGASCAR THIRD RAILWAY PROJECT (Credit 1694M PROJEC COMPLE NORT PREEACX 1. This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the TIrbd Railway Project in Madagasca for which Credit 1694-MAG in the amount of SDR 10.4 million was approwved on May 8, 1986. The Credit was closed on December 31, 1992 one and a half yeas behind schedule. It was fully disbursed and the last disbursement was on March 31, 1993. 2. The PCR was prepared jointly by the Infrastructure Division, South-Central and Indian Ocean Department, Africa Region (Preface, Evaluation Summay, Parts I and O) and by the Borrwer (Pr U). 3. Preparation of the PCR was stated during the Bank's fimal supervisionmsi In November 1992, and is based, inter i_n, on the Staff Appraisa Report and the Credit and Project Agreements; supervision reports; correspondence between IDA and the Borrower; and intemal Bank memoranda.
ii TR.tD RAUL AY PROJECT (CQreit SMEMO) ERQm0fEiNm EVALAN BE= SUMMARY Objectives 1. ITe main objective of the Third Railway Project was to ensure that Madagascar's Northerm railways syste.n would operate at a reasonable level of efficiency over the immediate 5-10 year period. This was paticuarly importa for hauling bulk commodities (fuel, grains and chrome ore) and containers and for Improving conditions for trade between the chromite mine and rice growing area and the main port The invesment program Included the following components: rehabilitation of the Moramang-Lac Alaotra (MLA) line; reconstruction of a major bridge and cemnu plat tminal on the Anananarivo-Antsirabe CrA) line; spare parts for locomotives and wagons; and equipment for track maintenance, cargo and container handling. Overseas fellowshlps, technical assistance and studies to improve productivity were also included, as were cyclone damage repairs after an umnsually fierce cyclone in 1986 had hit the main Northern line and the port of Toamasina. The French Agency CCCE agreed to provide financing for locomotives and pasenger rolling stock. 2. While the proje%t was a contuation of ear er programs, it was innovative in two areas, one was in container handling by speciized equipment, the other in improved telom by low-cost radio links. Since a couple of years prior to project preparation Wi important financial and institutioal restrturing had taken place, providing more managerial freedom for the railway, the roles of the institutions implemrenting the project were clearly defined, but possibly not fully understood. Jrnplement80n 3. Most of the project was implemented as foreseen and largely on time (i.e. by 1989/90). The main exceptions were completion of the MLA rehabilitation and the bridge on the TA line. For the MLA line, this was due to the fact that the scope of the project increased. Instead of 60 kn, a total of 83 km had been relaid by 1990 and rail and steel sleepers procured for an additional 13 km of line. This allowed for the recentdy procured heavier AD)16 locomotives to have access to this line, something which had not been foreseen initally. The bridge was delayed; the bridge access was also done by contract, and not by the railway as originally planned. The only project component not carried out was the road access improvement to the cement plant since this plant never went on full scale operation. A more radical change occurred for the CCCE component. Intead of procurement of locomotives and some passengerolling stock, funds were in the end reallocated for a total of 5 more powerful ADl16 locomotives. 4. These changes in the end were intended to minimize the adverse effects of changed market or operating conditions. Four risk factors were identified at the time of appraisal: proijet execution leading to higher cost or implementation delays, traffic levels different from expected levels, rail/road modal distribution different from expectations and affecting the underlying traffic forecast and unforeseen operaial disruptions. Project execution, with some cost increases, but also due to a larger scope of the project, has been as foreseen, but the other factors have had a
greater IM on the project Trade libealizadon made possible the Importation of haavy second-hand trudck and other vehicles, but user charges such as fuel and vehicle taxes etc., were not incresed, which caused more road competition than anticipated In the rall/road modal distribution. Polical development In 1991 and 1992 (with strkes for several months and cut of the main line by sabotage) also caused serious operational difficulties. Resulb S. Ite objectve of mi== of an efficient northern ilway system has largely beeo achieved, In particula by Imroved condition of the MLA line. Availability of main line looomotives has been considerably higher ha in the absence of the prect, and not far frm expectations. At the same time, staff productivity, due to lower traffic (in particular in 1991-92), but also to staff increases, has declined since 1988. Productivity fell from about 95,000 traffc units per enployee in 1988 to 51,000 in 1992. 6. The raiway "ndrwent its first financial restuctuing in 1982, without sustined success. The restucturing failed to create a long term balance between the firm's sources of funds and its Instments, a prerequisite for sustainable financial viability. At the 1989 review of the finncial situadon, RNCPM had accmulated losses of more tm thres quarters of its capital and, with repeatedly negative resuts, stockholder's equity had disappeared and became negative. Since then, an artific balanc has been sustained through an accumulaten of arrears by RNCFM towards debt service to the Government To reestablish original equity, the railway needed a total of about FMG 63 billion (or about S times the capital), as of 12-31-92. Given the deteriorating fncial situation at RNCFM, the only means of realistically and more permanently correcting the sitaton is through an immediate and significant redesign of the intiti and its conditions of operation. Even then, the network can only sustain acceptable operag conditions by eliminating ll unprofitable activities. Coverage of total costs by revenues for the whole rilway did not occur since 1987, with annual losses of approximatly FMG 21 and 14 billion In 1991 and 1992. 7. results have been u ory as reflected in the financial performamce above. Overseascholaships and TA or study contacts have resulted in technically competent staff at various levels. Unfortunately high-level management has been constrained either by external or internal forces. During 1989-90 the relations between the manager and the Board of Directors were strained. In 1991 and part of 1992, there were considerable difficulties between the manager (not of railway origin) and the main unions. Ihis coincided with a period of much labor unrest in Madagascar which led to considerable time lost to strikes. 8. While the financa performance and sustanability of project improvements have bmn poor, the direct ecomic results of the IDA supported project have been satisfactory. Overatl, using the same metho&alogy as at appraisal, the recalculated ERR, despite the traffic results in 1991-92, is about 12 %. The only marginal project component, with an ERR of 8%, was the PK2 bridge on the TA line, due to the reduced traffic on this line in 1992. Sustalnability 9. While during the early part of project implementation, the railway performed as expected, the financial restructuring of 1982 began to lose its positive impact after 1986. The managerial difficulties of 1989 and the political situation of Madagascar in 1991-92 negatively affected the railway. At the same time, the debt service burden, after several devaluations in the 1980s,
iv increased far beyond the financial capacity of RNCFM. Some staff reductions took place in the early part of project Implementation, but staff actually increased later when a furher deease would have been needed. 10. Despite financial and managerial shortcomings, the impact of the project physical improvement is susinable, but on condition that serious efforts are made by RNCFM and Government to adapt the company to its changed transport market roles, as already stared with a reduction of passenger sevices. The IDA financed project has essentially ensured that the railway retains its competitive advantage for freight transport of grains and chromite ore. The simultaneous French investment in new locomotives has provided the essential means for transport of other bulk commodities such as petroleum products. Thndings and Lessons Learned 11. A main lesson to be drawn concerning project design is to confirm that initiatives taken in other transpot modes can have a significant effect on the viability of railways. Thus, though the relationship with other government entitles (Transport, i7inace) was overall good, more attention should have been given to ensure that libelization within the transport sector was carried out in a more coordinated manner, to avoid the creation of an uneven playing field among transport modes. This failure to compensate liberalization of road transport (and vehicle imports) with a needed increase in user charges, only now being implemented, created a situation of unfair competition for road versus rail transport. 12. From the standpoint of satisfaction of technical objectives, the project design was appropriate. However, the definition of financial arrangements, in which RNCFM was responsible for absorbing variations in foreign exchange value, proved to be onerous for a public entity tha. at the same time had to service IDA funds on Bank lending terms as well as CCCE credits. This was a heavy burden, which would have re,:2ired strong backing from Government and forceful interventions at an early stage in order t. '-e borne successfully. In the event, neither the Govermment nor the Bank exerted this strong external pressure. Actions on essentw financial restructuring took over three years, which led to fiuther financial deterioration. lhe Bank did not take prompt action concerning adherence to financial covenants. 13. As with other projects dealing with transport public enterprises, experience in this project shows how little can be expected from a public enterprise when basic issues, such as too much Government intervention, have not been addressed. Institutional development in the project met with considerable difficulties, due in part to the political situation external to the railway, which eventually led to poor operating performance. An important example is overstffing, which was tolerted if not promoted in the context of the time. The overstaffing issue should have been dealt with much more vigorously, but instead continued to play a major role in the financial decline of the railway.
I.AP-AGASCAR THIRD RAILWAY PROJECT (CREDIT 1694-MAG) PART l: POJECrT REVIEW FROM BANK'S PERSMEUM 1. Project Identity Name: Credit Number: RVP Unit: Sector: Subsector: Country: Executing Agencies: Railways m 1694-MAG Africa Region InfastrucAre Trsport Madagascar Rdseau NationO des Chemins de Fer Malagasy (RNCFM) SocitE d'exploitation du Port do Toamasina (SEPT) 2. Background 2.01 Madagascar is the fourth largest island In the world, covering an area of about 590,000 sq.km, with about 12 million inhitants. It has a natural endowment in the agridculur sector, Covering various ecological zones, with rice as the main food crop and widespread catle rasn. -he topography is generally rugged and a central mountain rne traveres the country fom north to south. The climate is may marine tropical with cyclones and heavy rainfll particularly frequent on the east coasl Most exports, of which cofree, cloves, vaia and shrimp are the most important, are of agricultural origin though some mieras, mainly grphite, chr(mite and mica are also exported. 2.02 The transport sector in Madagascar accounted for about 14% of GDP and about 26% of total government expenditures in 1989. Railway and road transport consttut the main modes of transport both of passengers and freight within the island. Maritime transport is also Important for freight (cabotage) and air transport, although limited in votlmue, is vital for passenger access to many parts of the country. For externa transport, the largest volume of freight is handled by maritime transport and virtually all passengers move by air services. 2.03 Tne combination of topography, sparse population and heavy rainll over much of the isand makes tramsport cosly and difficult. The main concentration of population is in the central highlands (1,300 meters altitude), where about half the inhabitants occupies a quarter of this large island, and along the east coast, which has virtually no natura harbors. These tors have shaped the present transport system, and are also a cause of present constraints, as resources continue to be very limited. 2.04 A main current government objective for the sector is to permit improved interchange of production, thus contributing to improved food security, particularly in isolated parts of the country, and enhanced export competitiveness, as well as economic diversification. Difficult economic conditions many of the years in the last decade have had serious consequences for the upkeep of large parts of the infrastructure. During the latter part of the 1980's road trsport and import of vehicles were liberalized. TSis, the economic recovery unti 1990, and some
2 improved main roads, led to increase in road traffic. In contrast, transport by rail by that time had only recovered to the level of 1980, and coastal shipping had declined for freightrnport. The transport system now provides access for most urban population (25% of total) and a majority of the most densely setled rural areas, either by road or by sea. An Important weakness is that only some 15% of the total territory is covered by some 7,000 km of all-weatheroads in medium to good condition and by 800 km of rail line. 3. Project Objectives and Description 3.01 Pie The main objective of the Third Raflway Project was to ensure that Madagascar's Northern railways system would operate at a reasonable level of efficiency over the immediate S-10 year period. This was particularly important for hauling bulk commodities (fuel, grains and chrome ore) and containers and for improving conditions for trade between the chromite mine, main rice growing area and the main port. Therefore, In order to enable RNCFM to maintain service and capacity at leveis prevailing at the time of appraisal in 1985, the rehabilitation program initiated with the Second Railways project (Cr. 903, approved In 1979) aimed at continuing with emphasis on selected Investments for track rehabilitation, maintac, of and investment in rolling stock including locomotives, training of key staff and technical assistance for institution building. 3.02 oectdescdon: 1 Theprojectwas intendedto coverthe 198s6-1988 investmentprogram with the following components: Permanent ay rehabilitation of about 60 km of track on the Moramanga-Lac Alaotra (MLA) line (and a low cost telecommunications system for this line), reconstruction of a major bridge on the Antananarivo-Antsirabe CrA) line, and construction of ancillary facilities for a cement plant near Antsirabe. Rolling Stck: Provision of spare parts for locomotive and wagons, and of five gang trolleys for track maintenance. In co-financing this part of the project the French Agency Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique (CCCE now CFD) agreed in 1985 to provide financing for locomotives and passengerolling stock. EmIuent: Shop machinery, tools and equipment for cargo and container handling. Trainingand tchnical assislane: Provision of overseas fellowships and technical assistance and studies to improve productivity. Cyclone damage repairs: In March 1986 an unusually fierce cyclone hit the main Northern line and the port of Toamasina. The project included funds for immediate damage repair of both the railway and the port. 4. Project Design and Organization 4.01 The continued vital role of the railway in the corridor between the high plateau, the Lac Alaotra area and the main port Toamasina, despite the opening of a paved road between Moramang and the coast, was clearly understood and agreed among the Govermnent, the railway, IDA and its main cofinancing partner CCCE. The project was mostly a continuation of earlier programs, but was innovative in two areas, one in container handling by specialized equipment, the other in improved telecommunicatiorts by low-cost radio links. For a railway with a limited and not rapidly growing market the overall scope of the project was approprlate, but as it later turned out still too large for continued financial viability of the enterprise. The preparation and timing of the project were also appropriate. Since a couple of years prior to project preparation an important financial and institutional restructuring had taken place, providing more managerial freedom for the railway, the roles of the institutions implementing the project were clearly defined, but possibly not fully understood at all levels of the Government. 4.02 Project design was successful meeting almost all technical objectives, and in some cases achieving more th planned. At the same time, in combination with an adverse political situation, the scope of project investments incurred a very serious financial degradation of the ralway, m turn resulting in shortfall of some of the operational objectives. As required at the
3 tme, RNCFM was responsible for exchange rate losses, and for servicig IDA-fd Bank lendlng terms and CCCE-funds towards the Government, but could not sustain a program of this scope under those conditions. S. Project Implementation 5.01 Most of the project was Implemented as foreseen and largely on time (i.e. by 1989/90). The main exceptions were completion of the MLA rehabilitation and the bridge on the TA in. For the XALA line this was due to the fact that the scope of the p.roject increased. Instead of 60 kn a total of 83 man had been relaid by 1990 and rail and steel sleepers procured fc an additional 13 km of line. This was included to allow the heavier Alsthom AD16 locomotlves access to tbis line, and was not initially foreseen. The bridge works were delayed because the bridge access was done by contract, not as originally foreseen. The only prject compcnent not carried out was the road access improvement to the cement plant. Since this plant never went on full scale operation, only some cargo handling equipment was bought (a font-end loader and a tuck) which were later redeployed for the railway quarry operation. A more radical chage occurred for the CCCE component. Instead of procurement of locomotives and some passengerolling stock, fud were reallocated for a total of 5 more powerfil AD16 locomoties. This considerably improved the locomotive situation for the railway. 5.02 It would probably have been difficulto foresee these changes, which in the end were intended to minimize the adverse effects of changed market or opraing conditions. Four risk factors were identified at the time of appraisal: proect execut leading to higher cost or implementation delays, traffic levels different from expected levels, LWal/ad mod dlsiibuiim different from expectations and affecting the underlying traffic forecast, and unforeseen gglrtionaa disruptions. Since project execution, with some cost increases, mainly due to a larger scope of the project, has been as foreseen, the other factors have been more important for the project. Libaalization made possible the importation of heavy second-hand trucks and other vehicles. Without a needed increase in user charges such as fuel taxes, vehicle taxes etc., this caused much more competition than anticipated in the rail/road modal distrbution. ITis in tum reduced the scope for tariff increases by the railway, and for most years aft 1988 a serious cash flow problem for the railway, and operational cor.-.ints. While productivity objectives were met by 1988, and some staff was reduced by then, over-staffing became more and more an issue with declining traffic. Unforeseen political developments In 1991 and 1992 (with strikes for several months and cut of the main line by sabotage) also caused serious operational difficulties. 6. Project Results - Operations 6.01 The objecive of maintenance of an efficient northern ralway system has largely been achieved, in particular by improved condition of the MLA line. AvailabilityI of main line locomotives has been considerably higher than in the absence of the project, and close to expected performance. At the same time staff productivity has decreased since 1988, prtdy due to lower traffic (in particular in 1991-92), but mosdy due to staff increases whereas a reduction had been negotiated with RNCFM. This, in turn, has led to very poor operating results. 6.02 Traffic at the time of appraisal was expected to grow to about 282 million tonkn. and 193 million passengerkn for the Northern system by 1988 (in 1985: 224 nillion tonkm and 180 million passengerkin). In reality by 1988 freightraffic was 218 million tonkm., with 240 million passengerkm. (equal to 458 million traffic units). By 1990 freight traffic was 211 million tonkm. and passenger traffic (largely by eliminating loss-making suburban traffic) declined to 196 million passengerkm. (See Annex 6.) These declines were exacerbated by the political events in 1991 and 1992, so that by 1992 traffic units (freight tonkin. and passengerkin.) had dropped to about 260 million, including an alarmingly low level of about '60 nillion freight tonki./year.
4 his was also pardy due to a deliberate reduction In passenger services. Employee prductiviy fell from about 95,000 traffic units per employee in 1988 to 51,000 il 1992. As of October 31, 1992, there were a total of 4,900 RNCFM employees, while the Northem Network would require a maximum of some 1,500 employees to operate all-freightraffic on a profitable basis. Thus, the over-staffing, present already in 1987, did not decrease during the period considered. Flnandal results 6.03 With over 85% of operational earnings coming from the f*eightraffic on the Northern Network, various increases in tariffs were implemented to compensate for thbis drop in feight traffic. Despite these actions, the average turnover dropped 22% from 1990 to 1991/92. Duing this time, RNCFM also sustained a constant increase in Its fixed costs, mainly a large increase in the cost of personnel. Financial costs associated with RNCFM's long and medium term liabilities grew to equal more than 100% of the revenues from the railway's operation in 1991. On the basis of the 1991 figures, esdmated costs and returns are completely disproportionate, with the average tota cost per unit of traffic three times greater than the revenue. (See Annex 6.) Personnel costs in 1991 and 1992 absorbed 60% to 65% of the proceeds from railway operatons, in comparison to the figures from 1987 to 1990, where these costs represented only 40% of RNCFM's railway revenues. Coverage of total costs by revenues for the whole railway did not occur since 1986, with annual losses as important as approximatey FMO 21 and 14 billion by 1991 and 1992. The accumulated total losses over the period 1987-1992 represent approximately FMG 63 billion or about 5 times the capital of RNCFM. Ihe cumulative operating losses represented about 5 billion FMG by 1992. TIhisituadon, which intensified in 1992, resulted in precarious day by day management for RNCFM. 6.04 The first financial restructuring, 1982, failed to create a long term balance between the firm's sources of funds and its investments, a prerequisite for susainable financi viability. At the 1989 review of the financial situation, after increasing losses in 1987 and 1988, RNCFM had annual losses of more than three quarters of its capital equity (a condition of legal bankruptcy). And, with repeatedly negative results, stockholder's equity had disappeared completely and become negative in 1990. An artificial balance was being sustained through an accumulation of arears for RNCFM towards debt service and the Governme. Given the deteriorating financial situation at RNCFM, the only means of realistically and more permanendy correcting the situation would have been through a significant redesign of the institution and its conditions of operation. And, even then, the network could only sustain acceptable operating conditions by eliminating all unprofitable activities, such as most of the passenger traffic, to the extent feasible, and non-railway related activities (forestry, saw-mill, quarries). Today, the operating results from the freight operation of the Northern network (without accounting for depreciation and financial costs) can be estimated at 10% of the earnings from this business. The results from the operation of the Southernetwork (efore depreciation and financial costs), indicate a small loss. 6.05 Towards the end of the project, a restructuring plan agreed late in 1992 has begun to create normal and acceptable financial conditions for a reorganized and redesigned Northern network, while allowing it to sustain all provisional operations it can manage during the recovery period. The replenishment of capital funds was planned to be attained, in part, through the revaluation of assets, essential under the prevailing macro-economic situation, and the remainder through capitalization of the accumulated long-term debt. Permanent capital was scheduled to be generated from the consolidation of mid-term loans, denominated FMG from part of the arreas in repayment of the principal. 6.06 The railway could sustain its freight operation of the Northern network. As of the project completion, this operation had the potential to recover a positive balance and to improve its technical capability to compete with the road. During the last year of the project, it was agreed
5 that, following the closure or privatization of all unprofitable centers and the revitization of all the centers with profit potential, RNCFM was to cate a new finamcial and regulatory frmework and modify its tariff policy and commercial practices. In order to improve prc4uctivity, the company would be redesigned at the institutional and technicalevels to ensue greater balan between supply and demand of railway transport. A viable proposal would entail the drafting of a General Operations Plan, defined through a framework of financial restructuring, along with a Contract Plan for relations between the railway and the government. Management Results 6.07 Results have been mixed over time as reflected in the financial perfbrmance above. Throughout almosthe entire project period there has been a series of overseascholarships and visits from abroad under TA or study contracts. This has resulted in technically competent staff at various levels. Unforunely high-level management has been constrained either by exten or internal forces. During 1989-90, the relations between the manager and the Board of Directors were strained. In 1991, and part of 1992, there were considerable difficulties between the manager (not of railway origin) and the main unions. This coincided with a period of much labor unrest in Madagascar which led to considerable time lost to strikes. Now, with new management since early 1992 and a new Board of Directors since the middle of the year the sitadon has considerably improved. Enomic Regults 6.08 While the financial performance and sustainability of project improvements have been poor, the direct economic results of the IDA financed project components have been satisfactory. Overall, using the same methodology as at appraisal, the recalculated ERR, despite the traffic results in 1991-92, Is about 12 % compared to 16% expected. The ERR's for Individual project components vary from 8% to 19%. For the project component relating to the MLA line (line rehabilitation and telecommunications improvement) the ERR is 12%, for sp&c parts 19% and for container handling equipment 15% despite low traffic. The only marginal project component, with an ERR of 8%, was in retrospecthe PK2 bridge on the TA line, due to the drastic traffic reduction on this line during 1992. A return to the pre-1991 traffic levels would provide an acceptable return also for this component. No economic analysis has been made for the CCCE financing of locomotives, but since these 5 new units provide about a third of actual total motive power capacity on the Northem network their justification in tenns of otherwise lost traffic is strong. 7. Project Sustainability 7.01 While, during the early part of project implementation, the railway performed at expected, the financial restructuring of 1982 began to lose its positive impact after 1986. The managerial difficulties of 1989 and the political situation of Madagascar in 1991-92 negatively affected the railway. At the same time, the debt service burden, after several devaluations in the late 1980s, increased beyond the financial capacity of RNCFM. Some staff reductions took place in the early part of project implementation, but staff actually increased later, when a fiurher decrease would have been more appropriate. This becam especially critical in 1992, when after the 1991 strikes and civil unrest, substantial salary increases were granted to restore the 1987/88 purchasing power. 7.02 Physical improvements of the project are sustainable despite these financial and managerial sh3rtcomings, but on condition that serious efforts are made by the railway and the Government to adapt RNCFM to its changed role in the new transport market situation. This process has already started with a reduction of passenger services, initially of suburban services,
6 but now also of much of the long-distance services where alternative transport means exist. The IDA financed project has essentially ensured that the railway reins Its competitive advantage for freight tranwort of the Northern network and specifically for transport of grains and chromite ore. The simultaneous Frelch investment in new locomotives has provided the essential means for transport of other bulk commodities such as petroleum products. Some of these expensive, foreign borrowed resources were also used for spare parts. Cash generation should have been adequate fbr this kind of operating expense by a railway. 8. Bank Perfomce 8.01 Overall performance has been satisfactory with regard to technical implementation of the project, and particularly in respect of cost limits and timnjg. The project has also been modified to take into account changed requirements and circumstances as they emerged in the period 1988-90. Savings by tot carrying out the link between the rail terminal close to Antsirabe and the cement plant were instead used to increase the IDA participation in the MLA line improvement and the TA line PK2 bridge. This also allowed releasing more funds for much needed spare parts when It became clear that locomotive upkeep was a serious problem. 8.02 The early stages of the prcject cycle went well, with preparation sufficiently advanced to permit the pre-appraisal mission to be converted to an appraisal. The appraisal process also went smoothly, including close collaboration with the main co-donor: CCCE. This allowed a processing time of less than two years from identification to Board approval. Iniily, the project was intended as a combined port and railway project. However, since preparation for the port component was taldng longer than anticipated, It was decided to advance the railway as a separate project Despite this, most of the supervision of the two projects has been combined in order to economize staff time. 8.03 TechnIcal implementation was adequately supervised. Nevertheless lack of continuity of Bank staff has been a problem, with only one staff member following the project tiroughout implementation. In particular, four engineers and four financial analysts have been involved with supervision during the project cycle. This was less critical for the technical supervision, where procurement problems were adequately resolved, than for financial supervision where more timely action would have been needed. At the same time as physical implementation made good progress, the financial and managerial situation deteriorated as explained above. In retrospect the Bank should have been more forceful during implementation to ensure adherence to financial covenants and better managerial performance. 8.04 A main lesson concerning Bank performance is that design of the project did not adequately recognize the limits of likely financial performance of a parastatal, when account is taken of exchange rate variations. Other structural problemsuch as overstaffing and government interference were not well recognized. Another lesson is the need for prompt action concerning adherence to financial covenants. More forceful intervention at an early stage, when reasonable performance as reflected in financial covenants was lacking, would have been justified. 9. Borrower and RNC1FM Performance 9.01 As with Bank staff, performance by the Borrower and RNCFM was good concerning implementation of physical project components. At the same time the institutional development met considerable difficulties, and, in part due to the political situation external to the railway: this led to disastrous financial and eventually to poor operating performance. Finally in 1992, a new manager and a new board of directors were selected, which showed considerable promise of Improvements. The strucural problem of overstaffing in particular, was only dealt with to a minor degree in the beginning, and loss-making passenger services only curtailed in 1992.
7 9.02 In general, however, project management and deployment of staff and consultant resources for the project has gone well. Over time RNCFM has become more convinced about the merits of contracting out services which are not directly related to railway cperations. An example is the PK2 railway bridge which Initily was supposed to be a steel bridge delivered under contract, but with supervision and bridge access provided by the railway. In the end, bridge access was provided by the contractor, and works supervision by outside consulta. One of the results was that the overall cost was less than half of the original estimate, even if account is taken of some pending contractor's claims. 9.03 RNCFM has also made good use of other outside services. Consultants and contractors from several firms and at least half a dozen different nationalities have been used in the project, not only resulting in competitive prices but also in generally good performance. 'he main lesson for the performance of RNCFM is that the process of taking remedial action after managerial difficulties and performance was much too slow. Effective action concerning essential financial restructring took over three years. 10. Project Relationship 10.01 'rhe relationships between the Bank, RNCFM and main co-donor agency were very good throughout the project. Most supervision was done jointly with the CCCE and the dialogue with RNCFM was fraik and largely constructive. In general supervision was instrumenl in correctly modifying the project according to changed circumstances. The only exception as indicated above is that the two main lenders should have been more forceful in using available remedies to enforce financial covenants. This would have had immediate detrimental effects on the physical implementation (leading to cost increases) and delays but would have set a stronger base for sustainable development of RNCFM. 10.02 The relationships with other government entities have also been good during the project. Nevertheless, as in this case, the government ministries immediately concerned Crransport, Finance) ought to have taken more radical and rapid action concerning the management situation of the railway. More attention should have been given to ensure that liberalization within the transport sector was carried out in a more coordinated manner, to avoid the creation of an uneven playing field among transport modes. This liberalization became more far-reaching than anticipated in the highly regulated market of 1985. This failure to compensate liberalization of road transport (and vehicle imports) with a needed increase in user charges such as fuel taxes and vehicle taxes etc. which are only now implemented, created a situation of unfair competition for road versus railway transport. This contributed to the financial problems of the railway. 11. Consultant Services 11.01 The project made significant, but not excessive, use of consultants for the project. Initially the borrower was more interested in technical assistance for training and studies, but later as indicated also began using consultants for contract supervision. The consultants for the PK2 bridge were a local firm, which was accepted by the Bank, provided that the firm had an established relationship with a foreign firm to back them up in case of any special difficulties. This worked well but unfortunately could not prevent the construction company from suffering cost overrun, for which it has made a claim. 11.02 The Bank, through the use of consultants from several countries, both in the preparation phase and implementation, has had a positive effect in providing varied services and points of view. International competitive bidding has also clearly resulted in better prices than overwise,vould have been the case. Thus the PK2 bridge, by allowing an alternative design (using
8 concrte rather than steel construction) resulted In final cost of less than half of orginal estimates, and a supplementary bid for track material was won by non-traditional suppliers for the railway. 12. Project Documentation and Data 12.01 The legal documen were clear enough to avoid any complications or misunderstandings during implementation. As required by the Bank policy at the time, the legal framework as reflected in the Credit/Project Agreements was totally unsound. It was not realistic for the railway to carry the burden of currency exchange variations as well as the onlending of funds on Bank rather than IDA terms for a parastatal under free and open road competitionot supporting its infrastructure costs. The staff appraisal report, translated into French, was useful for negotiations, but a revised version of the final buff cover should also have been prepared and made more widely available. 12.02 Most data for the PCR was available through supervision reports and/or a very good monthly "Tableau de Bord" prepared by the railway. Despite this, some of the statistical data for certain years was contradictory or not completely reliable. A modenization of data processing, by more widespread use of microcomputers, would have been useful.
9 MADAGASCAR THIRD RAILWAY PROEC (CED 1694MAG PROJECT COBRLED EPR PART U: PROJECr REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERPEI 1. Project Objective: The project objective set at appraisal has not been met. By and large, traffic levels fell far short of the esdmated levels, despite the positive performance posted in 1988 (458 million T.U. - passenger km + freight ton km). The effects of the sociopolitical crisis that hit the country In 1991 considerably blunted the results achieved in 1991 and 1992. However, it proved to be technically and financially necessary to implement the project in order to avoid further worsening the situation of the railway network. The planned operations, in which the needs had been satisfactorily identified, were almost all implemented. The only component abandoned was construction of a road linking Antsirabe to the lbity cement plant. In the end, the following components were effectively implemented: - track rehabilitation; - construction of a new PK2 bridge on the TA line; - replacement of the telecommunications system on the MLA line; - procurement of locomotives and spare parts; - procurement of various items of infrastructure material and equipment; - procurement of equipment for the workshops; and - provision of technical assistance and implementation of a training program. 2. Project Implementation The RNCFM strove to implement the project su -sfully. At the beginning of the period the RNCFM made vigorous efforts to implement the asures envisaged in the finacial recovery program formulated since 1982, which augured well for proper start-up of the project. The financial situation improved, and the RNCFM was in a position to itself defray the expenses that would be incurred by its participation in the various potential investment operations. nis favorable situation lasted until 1987, the year in which the Malagasy currency was heavily devalued. Project implementation was as follows:
10 Track Equipment The invitation to bid for the supply of metal sleepers ane fastenings was issued in September 1986. The contract was eventually awarded to the supplier in 1987 owing to a problem that arose at the time of the award. The Bank originally expressed reservations about the choice of supplier but withdrew them after some months of discussion. Delivery was therefore made only in 1988. Construction of the PK2 bridge on the TA line The RNCFM was lissatlsfied with the allocation for construction of the PK2 bridge on the TA line, which included the bridge access, if the metal bridge option was selected. For this reason, at the time of the first invitation to bid the RNCFM included construction of the actual bridge in its package and planned to use its own funds for the work on the bridge access. In 1987, the RNCFM and the Bank studied and later approved the technical studies prepared by the foreign consultants for preparation of the bidding documents. Contrary to the plans, there was advance preselection of candidates in 1988 in order to speed up the analysis and selection of bids, thus prolonging the consultation phase. Approval of the bidding documents also required several extra months. In fact, the dossier had to be drawn up on the basis of two successive proposals because of the absence of the Bank's standard documents. Awarded in 1990, the works using the reinforced concrete option only got off the ground in April 1991, at the start of the dry season, and were completed only in June 1992. As a resut of the bidding referred to above, and given its lack of funds, the RNCFM sought Bank financing for construction of the bridge access. The invitation to bid was issued late in 1990. The contracted was awarded in 1991, but only reported in December 1991 because of political events and the contractor's insistence that a price-review clamse be included In the contract; the RNCFM refused to include such a clause. The works were completed In late 1992. Spare Parts The supply of spare parts for maintaining the rolling stock proceeded without major obstacles. Most of the parts were delivered in 1987 and 1988. By reallocating part of the remaining credit it was possible to procure a sizeable lot of extra spare parts in 1991, greatly alleviating pressure on finances and rolling-stock maintenance alike. Equipment and Materials Supply of materis for maintaining the railway line, including the five locomotives as well as tools, plus equipment for workshops, posed no problem and proceeded on schedule. The same is true of supply of the container handling equipment. Telecommudications on the MLA ne The study resulted in the choice of a system, which proceeded in accordance with the established schedule. The invitation to bid was issued in 1987 and culminated in notification of the award in 1988.
11 The installation of the new system on the MLA line did, however, encounter problems linked to the failure of certain components that had to be replaced with parts dispatched from the supplier's factories. The supplier's technicians also had to intervene on several occasions after the provisional delivery announced in 1990. Study and Technical Assistance All in all, the activities planned were conducted satisfactorily. Additional services for monltoring the construction work on the PK2 bridge and for preparatory studies (transport of chrome ore, infrastructure diagnosis and long-term plan for reform and modernization) were financed out of the loan with the Bank's agreement. Human-resource management has not been pursued. Trainig In addition to the consultants' training of instructors, several of the supervisory staff received inservice training in a more developed railway network. 3. Financial Situation During the Period of the Project From 1987, the year in which the Malagasy currency suffered a significant devaluation, the RNCFM was no longer able to meet its obligations, particularly with regard to debt service. TIen came 1988 which saw the addition of other obligations, including social and fiscal debts. In view of the accumulation of arrears and considerable cumulative losses, the RNCFM is no longer able to entertai normal or viable long-term line-haul without some profound restructuring. Indeed, the RNCFM posted annual losses ranging from 2.6 to 21.7 billion FMG between 1987 and 1991, and losses in the region of 13.8 billion FMG are expected in 1992. 4. Restructuring Measures In order to redress the firm's situation, the RNCFM and the State have undertaken to make every effort to implement the following recommendations made by the Bank: a) Freezing of debts at December 31, 1992; accounting reconciliation; and decision on the final amounts to be restructured; b) Inclusion of the State's financial operations in the 1993 Finance Law; c) Reevaluation of the RNCFM's assets; d) Establishment of a regulatory framework for rail/road competition; e) Closing down of the Northern network's passenger transport service, limiting it o the MLA line (Autorail); separate accounting; f) Restoration of the locomotive power selected on the Northern freight network; g) Total separation of the CIBA-CARRIERE SOUTHER NETWORK Into subsidiaries ("filialisation");
12 h) Personnel regime: common law; i) Streamining the work force through systematic retirement, appropriate application of the pre-retirement system, generalized incentives for retirement following 15 yea of service, and establishment of a social plan in which contract employees, temporary workers and jobbers, are separated. Creation of a pool of service providers; j) Change in the status of the SEIRNCFM and creation of a stock company and one or several line-haul companies; k) FinancW restructuring; 1) Creation of an emergency decision-making committee; m) Restoring financial balance by the end of 1993. 5. Cooperation Between the RNCFM and the Bank There has been excellent cooperation between the Bank and the RNCFM in implementing the project. The Bank consultants provided constant assistance throughout the project period, making a significant contribution in terms of advice and recommendations. Al In all, the RNCFM is satisfied with the Bank's activities.
- 13 - MA-AGSCAR MllD RlAILWAY 1ERQ(= -(CREDIT1 PROD= COMELfflQN EPO EART ESEQR 111: M 1. Relatd Bank Credits: Cr. 488-M)A 6 milon dollam would be spe 972 Closd Thre ye au tn aci Railwa I over$ Iba.yearperid for tnak te prjct ld t be ali ewal, prca of roling dok dowawued beue of ad provs oofcomuwas u sevik g c<c a dmr i tola mp_mageopertonal eepe Flusnelal ad and inac polce and pracei_ese poor. lbe ematd taof rum was lm than 10%. Cr. 90g-M 43.7 mlo dollrs would be t 1979 Cloe d Due to i b_e Raiwas a owra fve.yearpe sod t elowewi f =d imm"auncim. upbat a woe mde w aid few boi_"6pcwehma 0 a r, equinptd" ft_ moawf faktwasm 41m W- ftqw _i en ; sepie bhowv the need fw tabig ad wodchop eqpkmentimprove sausn to RN(CP' fincial anaganel Wut aufficiamy tae hino Alo" with Railway UI. t P*the mos - crca keqpaing opralos vaen o "A h ldkeanspw tonnfttfue bland
-14-2. Project timetable: item Date planed Revised data at apprasal Actual date Identification - July 24, 1984 (Project Briet) Preparation. Sept- Oct 1984 Appraisal. Feb 1985 Credit negotiations - Mar 17-21, 1986 Board approval Dec 1985. May 8, 1986 Credit signature May 20, 1986 Credit effectiveness Mar 1986. Oct 16, 86 Credit closing Dec 31, 1989 Jun 30, 1991 Dec 31, 92 Credit completion Dec 31, 1990 Dec 31, 1991 Jun 30, 93
- 15-3. CREDIT DISBURSEMENTS Cumulative disbursements Quarter Appraiia RiviW Aci Actual/appmis- A estimate estimate estimate (%) estimate (%) (Us$ million) ($ miu Lo (Us$ minion) 31-Dec-86 0.7 0 0.18 25.71 NA 30-Jun-87 2.1 0.65 0.68 32.38 104.62 31-Dec-87 3.1 2.86 1.94 62.58 67.83 30-Jun-88 4.5 5.5 6.03 134.00 109.64 31-Dec-88 5.9 7.77 7.47 126.61 96.14 30-Jun-89 7.5 7.77 7.78 103.73 100.13 31-Dec-89 9.3 8.9 8.9 95.70 loo.00 30-Jun-90 10.9 9.13 8.9 81.65 97.48 31-Dec-90 12 9.66 9.66 80.50 100.00 30-Jun-91 12 10.27 10.26 85.50 99.90 31-Dec-91 12 10.65 10.64 88.67 99.91 30-Jun-92 12 12.87 12.86 107.17 99.92 31-Dec-92 12 14.07 14.03 116.92 99.72 15 13 12 -E 11 10 9 B - 7-6 S 4 3 2- I 31-Dec-8 31 -Dcc.7831-Dec-90 I 31-De~c-92 31-Dec-87 31-Dec-89 31-Dec-91 0 Appraisal estimate + Revised esdmate Actual Date of final disbursement: March 31, 1993
- 16-4. Project Implementation Actual and c~ete hvaical comi,ltoxn M44cr co~e _. f_uhe ofoompletloo of wuo compnoai DM olu of eow n MCKSO Trck rnomwatl 83 km 60km MO_99 _99_ Numbert ofdep_ 50,000 10.000 19_ Junc 1986 Wo&oon PC bg8e l50 m l50. m _ Bad 1988 Rail mu ai_ cam S 5 19 u_19869 EQUIP NTAID TOOLS CoAiw eh.andlingdevloe 2 2 189 Aum1987 Cod olailng davoe. I 1 1988 Jun.1981 Dialidose_ 0 1 lum 1987 T sck nt_me.9 Jun. 1987 1 ---- TeeomKn. MLA, I eysam I syaw. Octobe 1990 Jun 1986 $SpS paro I la Int 198748 Apzl987 lblty mml..u. 1989 CYCLONE DAMAGE. 198849 1987 RWPARt _ I TECHWICAL ASSWFANC QuArry etpmlokabo 53 Man-muatha 6 Manm-moas 1986 T. amp m psuz 323S man-months 8 man-aouhf. 1989 1986 Wordkhoptsnai48 2 nun-wmouhs 8 man-mouhs 1987 Track aints e.75 mn-uontha 8 man-monbs. 1987 Trani_ 48 man-movnth 1997 PIC2 bridge (avpemuono S2 numnmonths 18 mnoths 1992 1987 STDf I w s Seepr production 3.3 nwn-moths 12 nu-monsths 1989 1986 Teecom. b)ai 3.8 mau"unmuhs 8 maow-month. 1986 Ibhy tonnigj 6 musamonths - 1986 1986 'AAW*OWX AJl WO C4t in IMW 13UG see SW copi,: 47 I t rf a
- 17 - S. PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING Project costs Categwoy ltmatadcosm ( SDR t ) I Ar(DR'M l I.. Lacal Foreign Total Loal ForTs otal tu INFRASIRUCnIUR Tracks (MIA line) 939 2941 380 1940 3501 541 140 Bridge PK2 (TA line) 976 2430 3406 13 1450 1463 43 Ancillaiy faciities (Ibity) 359 264 623 0 0 0 0 Tunnel 0 0 0 92 698 790 NA Otherwo*s 0 0 0 794 0 794 NA Total 2274 5635 7909 2838 5650 8488 107 ROLLING STOCK LTcomotnies 0 3331 3331 1242 6379 7621 229 Passenger equipment 0 3136 3136 0 0 0 0 }e oy"t equiprnent 0 652 652 0 0 0 0 Total 0 7119m 7119 1242 6379 7621 107 TELECOMMUNICA7TlONS Switchboard 23 397 420 7 106 114 27 Radio swtem MIA 177 600 777 134 649 783 101 Totl 200 997 1197 142 7S5 897 75 CONTAIDNR EQUIPMENT 30 470 500 28 476 504 101 MAINTENANCEQUIPMENT Toos 111 2135 2246 724 2247 2971 132 Sparn pars 41 1611 1651 0 2778 2778 168 Rai mainteuano cam 24 150 174 41 431 472 271 ToWa 176 3895 4071 765 5456 6222 153 CYCLONE DAMAGE 308 1720 2028 6 1456 1519 75 MISC trainin studies, techim auisl 691 2418 3109 336 2952 3288 106 ~CODPTINOE3NCI3S 1W 1646 7 0 0A- 0 l TOTAL 1 48171 o9o1 287181 S4131 23126w 285391 99 Tho exchnge rates used for the estmated o e those of Marc 1, 1986 (appras IUSS$' 631 FPM; IUSS - 6.831 7 P; 1SDR - l055 US$ Tbe exchange rates used fr the actual Cs an those of Februay 18,1993 : 1USS 186.38 FMG; 1US$ *5.0S FP; ISDR - 137229 US$
Projec SDRancinh - Planned cf (l96) Pm 2 ma al 2 Fina ( 1. Wozs undtrpat A of thepmject 2000 19. 1450 13. SOO 5.1 5'139 S.4_ 889 27. 2297 16. 2.Trackmatoiial 1900 1& 2660 25. 700 7.6 6434 6.i 625 19. 4960 35. 3. Spae pos for rollig stoc and mote ppor 1300 12. 2605 2S. 180 19. 21801 22. 117 3.6 1957 14. 4 Eqipmet and toos (a) 1470 14. 1125 10. 700, 0 811 0 153 4.7 434 3.1 S. daoswtane srvianos ip8 NO860 8.2 1066 10 10000 10. 14418 14. 460 14. 859 6.2 6. Woks and m uiab fr pat H oftbe proje 860 82 602 5.8 0 0 0 0 205 6.3 160 1.1 7.Wo*s-anmdmielsforpart I of thptect 860 &854 82 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 S.R.fbndiogofProjsctPPparatioa Adnc 170 1.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9.UaLlocaed 980 9.4 0 0 4800 4.8 0 0 78 23. 00 _ 10. Otber b) 0 0 00 513005 2. 48766 49. 0 O 3175 22. IT(TAL I 10400110_0 1036211001 980001 h1 97570 _100 320711001 138421100 -In the Ciedit Aeemnt Part A: zhablitation of tracks, _.Oz3 t ofidgts, C0_tuctM of acnilay fciites Pat H: Rpaim neenitated byt hw amags caed by zeet qcdoks on faclities of RNCFM Pant Repaii neenduid by the damages caued by noecydnesat facilities of S5ff (a) Equimnt and tools ae for woibops. materi handling. track maintenamce, and taining (b) Paned fin g om CCCE idude: Locomot 24,00 - Pamn epm t 22,600 - Fesight eqient 4.700 Fins fiacig fiom CCE ad inonduds lommos. financig km RNCFM nddes locumotbm b
-19-6. PROJECT RESULTS Dlrect benefits II.98 1:98S. 1. :t 198.... 1989 ;9.87~*990 1f9. 1 199.::2]fw...t d. :'.cua.i{ ActUal ^ AoU* At?l PASSENGERTRAIC Nb of passengers: North 2012500 2409100 2260200 2358700 1922800 197:W 1970600 1012806 754853 South 275000 415700 484100 499500 473500 4.0_ 324500 179854 2S07 Total 2287500 2824800 2744300 2858200 239-S63002-- 2295100 1192660 1035628 Passengers-kru ('000t): - _ Pnorthr 157000 176000 179000 214000 178000 170000K 178000 84608 8085 South 280 23000 26000 26000 23000 23660 18000 10164 _1834 Total 1750001 199000 205000 240000 201000 193C00 196000 9472 9888 Evolution asge 100 in 1986) 87.9 100.0 103.0 120.6 101.0 97.0 98.5 47.6 49.7 FREIGTTRAIC(a) Nb of toans: Rice 99614 84481 60864 59380 41153 ILVM 25346 14714 18044 Wheat 56298 61103 59067 69278 36542 5X 39428 24251 16461 Chromite 100549 104781 86152 128183 144985 1300XO 1S3235 110982 112602 Hydrmcabon 134518 132948 131585 125713 125979 153CW 144818 111448 128729 Containers 24638 23101 19517 31878 29443 24060 41209 18646 11042 Other 229794 234026 238796 214362 200083 247000 199513 162200 164470 Total 645411 640440 595981 628794 578185 754000 603551 442241 451348 Tons-kin ('000):i Rice 32783 27071 18343 18052 12511.53 7350 5753 5661 WReat 21822 228S 23597 27780 14627 27() 20226 12489 8501 Chrorifte 39415 41074 33913 50248 56834 5400 59915 43283 44046 Hydrocaron 49319 48659 48393 48022 51502 61000 56479 43576 50006 Containers 9510 8839 8062 12050 12861 9000 15329 6583 4130 Other 76411 73505 68616 61804 56941 78000 51996 45622 48297 Total 229260~~~---- 221953 2094 2179561 205282 2821% 211295 157306 160641 (base 100 in 1986) 103.3 100.0 90.5 982 92.5 127.1 95.2 70.9 72.4 Evolution ITOTAL Eolution (base 100 i 1986) 961 100.0 96.4 l 108.81 96.5 112.81 96.8 59.91 61.7 Year of appraisal, during which the 1990 forecast was made. UNTS OF TRAFFIC i404260 4209531 4059241 4579561 4062821 4 73CWJI 4072951 2S207Sf 259526 (a) - From 1985 to 1989. the figures of traffic by categoty refer to the whole networlk - For the years 1990 to 1992, the figures only refer to the Northern network. Othere hence includes other traffic for the Northem network and the traffic of the Southern network (except for forecast 1990, for which ootbee refers only to the Northem network - The Northern network is by far the most important one as the Southem network only amounts to an average of 7% of the Northem one in terms of tonnage and to 2.4% in tenus of tonnage-km. - The actual totals can be compared for the full range of yea as they al refer to the whole network. Hovmver. the forecastotal of 1990 refers only to the Northeem network.