RELAP 5 ANALYSIS OF PACTEL PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY LEAKAGE EXPERIMENT PSL-07

Similar documents
VALIDATION OF RELAP5/MOD3.3 AGAINST THE PACTEL SBL-50 BENCHMARK TRANSIENT ABSTRACT

RELAP5/MOD3.2 ASSESSMENT STUDIES BASED ON THE PACTEL AND PMK-2 LOSS OF FEED WATER TESTS

RELAP5/MOD3.2 INVESTIGATION OF A VVER-440 STEAM GENERATOR HEADER COVER LIFTING

nuclear science and technology

Station Blackout Analysis for a 3-Loop Westinghouse PWR Reactor Using TRACE

VVER-440/213 - The reactor core

Simulation of thermal hydraulics accidental transients: evaluation of MAAP5.02 versus CATHAREv2.5

Technical University of Sofia, Department of Thermal and Nuclear Power Engineering, 8 Kliment Ohridski Blvd., 1000 Sofia, Bulgaria

nuclear science and technology

AP1000 European 15. Accident Analysis Design Control Document

LOCA analysis of high temperature reactor cooled and moderated by supercritical light water

Keywords: Thermalhydraulics, VVER-440, safety, strainer, clogging, downstream effects, fuel element, sump, risk.

Verification of the MELCOR Code Against SCDAP/RELAP5 for Severe Accident Analysis

NSSS Design (Ex: PWR) Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

EPR: Steam Generator Tube Rupture analysis in Finland and in France

Research Article Evaluation of Heat Removal from RBMK-1500 Core Using Control Rods Cooling Circuit

ANALYSIS ON NON-UNIFORM FLOW IN STEAM GENERATOR DURING STEADY STATE NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLING

Research Article PMK-2, the First Integral Thermal-Hydraulics Tests for the Safety Evaluation of VVER-440/213 Nuclear Power Plants

Joint ICTP-IAEA Course on Natural Circulation Phenomena and Passive Safety Systems in Advanced Water Cooled Reactors

Module 05 WWER/ VVER (Russian designed Pressurized Water Reactors)

Supporting Deterministic T-H Analyses for Level 1 PSA

NPP Simulators Workshop for Education - Passive PWR NPP & Simulator Overview

EVALUATION OF RELAP5/MOD3.2 FOR AP1000 PASSIVE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM

Safety Analysis Results of Representative DEC Accidental Transients for the ALFRED Reactor

ANALYSES OF AN UNMITIGATED STATION BLACKOUT TRANSIENT WITH ASTEC, MAAP AND MELCOR CODE

Justification of the Ignalina NPP Model on the Basis of Verification and Validation

INVESTIGATION OF CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION INTEGRITY IN CASE OF STEAM LINE BREAK ACCIDENT FOR VVER 1000/V320

Research Article Assessment of Severe Accident Depressurization Valve Activation Strategy for Chinese Improved 1000 MWe PWR

Westinghouse Small Modular Reactor. Passive Safety System Response to Postulated Events

Deterministic Safety Analyses for Human Reliability Analysis

ESA Enhancement of Safety Evaluation tools

EXPERIMENTS ON THE PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY OF THE PASSIVE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM OF AN ADVANCED INTEGRAL TYPE REACTOR

BEMUSE PHASE II: COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS REV. 1

SMR/1848-T21b. Course on Natural Circulation Phenomena and Modelling in Water-Cooled Nuclear Reactors June 2007

Influence of Coolant Phase Separation on Event Timing During a Severe Core Damage Accident in a Generic CANDU 6 Plant

LBLOCA Analyses with APROS to Improve Safety and Performance of Loviisa NPP

Analysis of Unprotected Transients in the Lead-Cooled ALFRED Reactor

Available online at ScienceDirect. Procedia Engineering 157 (2016 )

Research Article Investigation of TASS/SMR Capability to Predict a Natural Circulation in the Test Facility for an Integral Reactor

The Analysis of TRACE/FRAPTRAN in the Fuel Rods of Maanshan PWR for LBLOCA

BARC BARC PASSIVE SYSTEMS RELIABILITY ANALYSIS USING THE METHODOLOGY APSRA. A.K. Nayak, PhD

Profile SFR-52 SWAT JAPAN. Japan Atomic Energy Agency, 4002 Narita, Oarai-machi, Ibaraki, Japan.

MAJOR FINDINGS OF PMK-2 TEST RESULTS AND VALIDATION OF THERMOHYDRAULIC SYSTEM CODES FOR VVER SAFETY STUDIES

Heat exchanger equipment of TPPs & NPPs

NUMERICAL STUDY OF IN-VESSEL CORIUM RETENTION IN BWR REACTOR

ANALYSIS OF NATURAL CIRCULATION TESTS IN THE EXPERIMENTAL FAST REACTOR JOYO

A. Kaliatka, S. Rimkevicius, E. Uspuras Lithuanian Energy Institute (LEI) Safety Assessment of Shutdown Reactors at the Ignalina NPP

Oregon State University s Small Modular Nuclear Reactor Experimental Program

RELAP5 Analysis of Krško Nuclear Power Plant Abnormal Event from 2011

FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI BWR REACTOR SPRAY AND FEED WATER SYSTEMS EVALUATION FOR EARLY FAILURE Dean Wilkie

Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis of Single and Multiple Steam Generator Tube Ruptures in a Typical 3-Loop PWR

Research Article The Investigation of Nonavailability of Passive Safety Systems Effects on Small Break LOCA Sequence in AP1000 Using RELAP5 MOD 4.

Thermal and Stability Analyses on Supercritical Water-cooled Fast Reactor during Power-Raising Phase of Plant Startup

System Analysis of Pb-Bi Cooled Fast Reactor PEACER

TOPIC: KNOWLEDGE: K1.01 [2.5/2.5]

The ESBWR an advanced Passive LWR

Passive Cooldown Performance of Integral Pressurized Water Reactor

Workgroup Thermohydraulics. The thermohydraulic laboratory

In Vessel Retention Strategy VVER 1000/320 VVER 2013 Conference

Lecture 7 Heat Removal &

ACR Safety Systems Safety Support Systems Safety Assessment

UKEPR Issue 05

LFW-SG ACCIDENT SEQUENCE IN A PWR 900: CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING RECENT MELCOR / CALCULATIONS

Elena Dinca CNCAN Daniel Dupleac - UPB Ilie Prisecaru UPB. Politehnica University of Bucharest, Romania (UPB)

SELECTED VALIDATION CASES RELATED TO NUCLEAR SAFETY ANALYSES

Research Article Relap5 Analysis of Processes in Reactor Cooling Circuit and Reactor Cavity in Case of Station Blackout in RBMK-1500

Design and Safety Aspect of Lead and Lead-Bismuth Cooled Long-Life Small Safe Fast Reactors for Various Core Configurations

Deploying Experiments to Support Internal Hazard Management

Findings from the latest analyses using MAAP5

Evaluation of Two Phase Natural Circulation Flow in the Reactor Cavity under IVR-ERVC for Different Thermal Power Reactors

NUCLEAR HEATING REACTOR AND ITS APPLICATION

Application of COMSOL Pipe Flow Module to Develop a High Flux Isotope Reactor System Loop Model

Analysis of a Station Black-Out transient in SMR by using the TRACE and RELAP5 code

Application of MELCOR at GRS Regarding Spent Fuel Pool Analyses and Assessment of SAMG Procedures

Irradiation Facilities at the Advanced Test Reactor International Topical Meeting on Research Reactor Fuel Management Lyon, France

A Research Reactor Simulator for Operators Training and Teaching. Abstract

LBLOCA AND DVI LINE BREAK TESTS WITH THE ATLAS INTEGRAL FACILITY

INTEGRAL EFFECT NON-LOCA TEST RESULTS FOR THE INTEGRAL TYPE REACTOR SMPART-P USING THE VISTA FACILITY

ANALYSIS OF THE VVER-1000 COOLANT TRANSIENT BENCHMARK PHASE 1 WITH RELAP5/PARCS

Basic Engineering Solutions in the VBER-500 Power Unit for Regional Power Systems

SELECTED VALIDATION CASES RELATED TO NUCLEAR SAFETY ANALYSES

Shutdown and Cooldown of SEE-THRU Nuclear Power Plant for Student Performance. MP-SEE-THRU-02 Rev. 004

Examination into the reactor pressure increase after forced depressurization at Unit-2, using a thermal-hydraulic code

4.2 DEVELOPMENT OF FUEL TEST LOOP IN HANARO

ACR-1000: ENHANCED RESPONSE TO SEVERE ACCIDENTS

Advanced Sodium Fast Reactor Power Unit Concept

CANDU Safety #6 - Heat Removal Dr. V.G. Snell Director Safety & Licensing

VESPA2012/SAFIR2014. SAFIR2014 Interim Seminar Hanasaari, Espoo. Niina Könönen (Mikko Patalainen, Kari Ikonen, Ilona Lindholm)

CANDU Safety #12: Large Loss of Coolant Accident F. J. Doria Atomic Energy of Canada Limited

STEAM GENERATOR LEAKAGE AT THE BN-350 DESALINATION PLANT

AP1000 European 6. Engineered Safety Features Design Control Document

ANALYSIS OF PROCESSES IN SPENT FUEL POOLS IN CASE OF LOSS OF HEAT REMOVAL DUE TO WATER LEAKAGE

Advanced Methods for BWR Transient and Stability Analysis. F.Wehle,S.Opel,R.Velten Framatome ANP GmbH P.O. BOX Erlangen Germany

Thermal-hydraulic model of the reactor facility with lead coolant in the ATHLET code

ABSTRACT DESING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF FORCED COOLING TOWERS FOR LOVIISA NPP SAFETY- AND RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) COOLING CIRCUITS

Severe Accident Progression Without Operator Action

NUCLEAR ENERGY MATERIALS AND REACTORS Vol. I - Pressurized Water Reactors - J. Pongpuak

Draft proposals for Test methods for close-coupled solar water heating systems - Reliability and safety

UK ABWR - NEW NPP DESIGN FOR UK

ELFR The European Lead Fast Reactor DESIGN, SAFETY APPROACH AND SAFETY CHARACTERISTICS. Alessandro Alemberti

Transcription:

Fifth International Seminar on Horizontal Steam Generators 22 March 21, Lappeenranta, Finland. 5 ANALYSIS OF PACTEL PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY LEAKAGE EXPERIMENT PSL-7 József Bánáti Lappeenranta University of Technology Finland David Danielyan Obninsk Institute for Nuclear Power Engineering Russia 1. INTRODUCTION Primary-to-secondary leaks form a significant class of the loss-of-coolant accidents. In a primary-tosecondary leak, the damage is at a place where the containment will be bypassed if the safety valve of the broken steam generator opens. Eventually that can lead to a release of radioactive coolant to the atmosphere. Also, the emergency core-cooling water can escape from the system, which can become a serious problem because it prevents ECC water recirculation. Primary-to-secondary leaks can be divided into three categories; small, medium, and large PRISE. Usually a rupture of a single U-tube (small PRISE) causes the incidents, but the possibility of multiple-tube ruptures (medium PRISE) cannot be ignored completely. The VVER-type reactors have horizontal steam generators where the primary collectors are inside the secondary pool. Construction like that makes also large PRISE's possible. Multiple-tube ruptures and collector breaks may cause the core to be uncovered if sufficient ECC water is unavailable. With certain operator intervention, the flow from the primary to the secondary side may reverse. In such a case, a plug of partially diluted or completely unborated water may be formed on the primary side. If the mixing on the primary side is poor the plug can reach the core and lead to a reactivity accident. Data from several experimental and analytical studies exist for both single- and multiple-tube ruptures. However, the published experiments have focused on the facilities modeling western-type reactors. For the VVER reactors the only published experiment is the SPE on the Hungarian PMK-NVH test facility. The first series of steam generator multiple-tube rupture experiments on PACTEL was carried out in June 1994. Those three experiments focused on a possibility of the leak flow reversal occurring as a consequence of operator intervention. The results showed that the reversal is possible under suitable conditions. In the first series, the facility included two steam generators and one accumulator. A new set of experiments was carried out in February 1996 with three steam generators and two accumulators. The main goal was to find the worst possible conditions during which the leak flow reversal can occur. 2. DESCRIPTION OF THE PACTEL FACILITY PACTEL is a volumetrically scaled (1:35) integral test facility modeling the VVER4 reactors used in Finland. The facility includes all the main components of the reference reactor (Fig.1). The reactor vessel is simulated by an U-tube construction consisting of separate core and downcomer sections. The core is comprised of 144 electrically heated fuel rod simulators. The geometry and the pitch of the rods are the same as in the reference reactor. The rods are divided into three roughly triangular-shaped parallel channels, which represent the intersection of the corners of three hexagonal VVER rod bundles. The maximum total core power is 1 MW or 22% of the scaled nominal power. The rods have a nine-step chopped-cosine axial power distribution. The maximum primary pressure is 8. MPa compared to 12.3 MPa of the reference reactor. The component heights and the relative elevations (Fig.2) correspond to those of the full-scale reactor to match the natural circulation pressure heads in the reference system. The hot and cold leg elevations of the power plant have been reproduced. This is particularly important for the correct simulation of loop seal behavior. Unlike other PWRs, there is a loop seal in the hot legs of a VVER4. This is a consequence of the steam generator location, which is almost at the same elevation as the hot leg connection to the upper plenum. The primary collector of the steam generator is connected to the hot leg at the bottom of the steam generator. A roughly U-shaped pipe is needed to complete the connection. The cold leg loop seal is formed by the elevation difference of the inlet and outlet of the reactor 227

Figure 1. The PACTEL facility Figure 2. Elevations of the components coolant pump. The number of loops has been reduced from the six of the reference system to three in PACTEL. Thus, one PACTEL steam generator corresponds to two in the power plant. The steam generators have vertical primary collectors and horizontal heat exchanging tubes. The 118 U-shaped heat exchanging tubes are arranged in 14 layers and 9 vertical columns. The average length of the tubes (2.8 m) is about one-third of that in the fullscale steam generator (9. m). The outer diameter of the tubes is 16 mm, which corresponds to the reference system. The inner diameter is 13 mm (in the power plant 13.2 mm). To have a higher tube bundle, the pitch in the vertical direction has been increased to 48 mm instead of the 24mm of the reference steam generator. The pitch in the horizontal direction has been maintained. The outer diameter of the shell is 1. m (in the power plant 3.34 m). Because of the higher vertical pitch, the secondary side is about three times larger than the scaled-down secondary volume. That distorts the time-scale of secondary side transients. Two compartments have been built on each side of the steam generator to decrease the mass of water directly involved in the primary-to-secondary heat transfer process. The compartments are not isolated totally from the rest of the secondary side. The coolant has several flow paths in and out of the compartments. A more detailed description of the facility is in the references. 3. EXPERIMENT PROCEDURE Three new experiments were carried out. The experiments were based on the current instructions for operator intervention during an emergency in the Loviisa nuclear power plant. The first experiment (PSL5) contained primary bleed-and-feed. The bleed-and-feed was realized by opening the pressurizer relief valve and using the HPIS. The second experiment (PSL6) was similar to the first one, but it included a total failure of the HPIS. In the last experiment (PSL7), neither the primary bleed-and-feed nor the HPIS was used. Each experiment had all three steam generators, two intact and one broken (Fig. 3). The main isolation valves were presumed to stick open. That prevented broken loop isolation. 228

ORIFICE VALVE Figure 3. The break assembly in the broken SG Table 1. PSL5 PSL6 PSL7 Primary pressure 73.5 bar 75 bar 75 bar Core power 85 kw 85 kw 85 kw Primary mass flow rate 17 kg/s 17 kg/s 17 kg/s Pressurizer heating power 6 kw 6 kw 2 kw Secondary pressure 43 bar 43 bar 43 bar SG feed water mass flow rate 6.5 l/min 6.6 l/min 6.6 l/min SG feed water temperature ~5 o C ~4 o C ~4 o C HPI water temperature ~5 o C ~4 o C ~4 o C Accumulator pressure 53/55 bar 53/54 bar 53/55 bar Accumulator temperature (UP) 17 o C 18 o C 16 o C Accumulator temperature (DC) 18 o C 21 o C 24 o C SIGNAL t = s Lprz < 2.8 m Lprz < 2.3 m Lprz > 7.5 m LSG > 8 cm Lsec < 35 bar Lpri < 54 bar Lprz > 7.5 m ACTIONS Break valve opens Scram Table 2. Pressurizer heaters off, MCPs off, HPI on HPI off - Close MSIV and stop SGFW into broken SG - Open RV and increase SGFW into intact SG - Open pressurizer relief valve Start pressurizer spray Accumulator injection starts Interrupt pressurizer spray 229

Table 3. TIME EVENT REASON s Break opens 1 s Core power 15 kw Pressurizer level < 2.8 m 115 s Main circulation pumps stop Pressurizer heaters off Pressurizer level < 2.3 m 355 s Isolation of the broken steam generator Level of the broken steam generator > 8 cm 365 s Intact steam generator relief valve opens Feed of intact steam generators increase 575 s Accumulator injection starts Primary pressure < accumulator pressure 6 s Core power 1 kw 695 s Pressurizer spray on Intact steam generator pressure < 35 bar 134 s Pressurizer spray off Pressurizer level > 7.5 m 39 s eriment ends The experiments focused on finding the worst possible conditions during which a leak flow reversal can occur because of operator intervention. The transients began by the opening of a break (Fig. 3) in a heat-exchanging tube of the broken loop steam generator (steam generator III). The break size (2.5 mm) corresponded to a rupture of five tubes in a reference steam generator. The core power decreased when the collapsed-level in the pressurizer reached 2.8 m. The decay heat curve was followed by reducing the power first to 15 kw and later to 1 kw. When the pressurizer collapsed-level reached 2.3 m, the pressurizer heaters were switched off, and the main circulation pumps (MCPs) started to coast down. In the first experiment, the high-pressure injection (HPI) began from the low pressurizer level signal. Feed water injection into the broken steam generator stopped when the secondary side collapsed-level reached 8 cm. Simultaneously, operator intervention began. The main steam isolation valve (MSIV) of the broken steam generator was closed. The relief valve (RV) in an intact steam generator was opened, and the feed water flow (SGFW) into the intact steam generators was increased. In the PSL5 experiment the pressurizer relief valve was opened. The HPIS was used only in PSL5. The pressurizer spray (1.1 1/min) and the accumulators injected in all the experiments. The initial conditions and operator intervention in the experiments are summarized in Table 1 and 2, respectively. 4. THE EXPERIMENTAL AND CALCULATED RESULTS The general behavior of the experiments was similar at the beginning. When the break was opened in a heatexchanging tube of the broken loop steam generator, the primary pressure and the pressurizer collapsed-level began to decrease. The collapsed-level on the secondary side of the broken steam generator increased. Later, operator intervention and the different boundary conditions made some difference to the behaviour of the system. According to theory and the earlier experience from the old steam generator model, the flow reverses in the lowest tube layers of the steam generators when the facility works in the natural circulation mode. The new steam generators behave same way. The coolant flows in the normal direction at the top of the tube layer and reverses on the bottom. The new set of PRISE experiments shows that it occurs even in the broken steam generator. 4.1 PSL7 experiment Neither the primary bleed-and-feed nor the HPIS was used in this experiment (Fig. 4). As in the experiments PSL-6 and PSL-7, the core power reduced to 15 kw at 1 s. The pressurizer heaters were switched off, and the main circulation pumps began to coast down after 15 s. Then, the steam generation rate on the secondary side decreased, and the secondary side pressure dropped until the pressure control system totally closed the secondary side control valve. The pressurizer was empty at 25 s (Fig. 5). The primary side depressurized until the saturation conditions were reached on the hot side of the facility at 29 s. Then, the primary pressure stabilized at 57 bar (Fig. 6). 23

59/591 583 585 39/391 582 785 381 382 58 SPRAY 85 852 38 555 855 355 525 526 526 45 5 52 56 515 56 51 56 55 56 455 51-7 595 597 415 41 51 561 46 412 4 42 1 15 ACCU ACCU 853 9 92 91 17 17 175 175 93 912 932 165 16 8 85 2 25 815 812 81 361 395 31 397 21 215 212 3 325 32 315 31 31 255 326 35 326-7 25 26 462 465 11 155 265 262 725 726 724 65 726 723 79/791 78 722 782 662 755 72 76 715 71 75-7 66 655 71 7 71 665 615 761 612 76 76 76 797 795 61 783 62 6 115 117 135 2 1 1 1-9 -9-9 -8-7 -7-7 14 2-8 145 2-8 13 125 122 15 12 5 NODALIZATION OF THE PACTEL FOR THE PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY LEAKAGE EXPERIMENTS HEAT STRUCTURE HEAT SOURCE Figure 4. 5 nodalization scheme of the PACTEL facility VALVES CHECK CLOSING CONTROL SAFETY LEVEL in Presuriser [m] 1 8 6 4 2 PACTEL PSL-7: Level in the PRZ PRESSURE [bar] 75 7 65 6 55 5 45 PACTEL PSL-7: Pressures in SG (broken) (pri) (pri) (sec) (sec) TEMPERATURE [C] 3 28 26 24 22 Fig.5. Pressurizer collapsed level PACTEL PSL-7: Temperatures at core outlet 2 Fig.7. Temperature in core inlet. TEMPERATURE [C] 4 35 Fig. 6. Primary and secondary pressures in SG3 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 PACTEL PSL-7: Temperatures at core inlet 2 Fig.8. Temperature in core outlet. 231

The main steam isolation valve of the broken steam generator was closed at 355 s. After 1 s, the relief valve in the intact steam generator was opened, and the feed water injection into the intact steam generator was increased. The pressure in the intact steam generator dropped, and the primary side cooled. Later, the pressure in the broken steam generator reached the opening pressure of the relief valve. After that, the cycling relief valve controlled the pressure. The accumulator injection started at 575 s. The core power was reduced again 25 s later. These actions effectively dropped the primary temperatures (Figs. 7 and 8). The pressurizer pressure decreased when the pressurizer spray was started at 695 s. To balance the pressure difference between the pressurizer and the rest of the facility, water flowed back into the pressurizer. The hot leg temperatures decreased below the secondary side temperature of the broken steam generator at 88 s. Then, the heat transfer between the primary side of the facility and the broken steam generator secondary side reversed, so the broken steam generator started to act as a heat source. The reversal did not occur in the intact steam generators. The primary pressure balanced with the broken steam generator pressure at 1135 s. Up to this moment, approximately 23 1 (2 1/min) of the primary coolant had flowed into the secondary side. 6 5 PACTEL PSL-7: Mass flow rates in the loop (intact) 6 5 PACTEL PSL-7: Mass flow rates in the loop (broken) MASS FLOW [kg/s] 4 3 2 MASS FLOW [kg/s] 4 3 2 1 1 Fig. 9. Mass flow rate in intact loop 2. Fig. 1. Mass flow rate in broken loop 3.2.15 PACTEL PSL-7: Break mass flow rate 15 1 PACTEL PSL-7: Collapsed level in the SG (broken) MASS FLOW [kg/s].1.5 -.5 COLLAPSED LEVEL [cm] 95 9 85 8 75 -.1 Fig. 11. Break mass flow rate 7 Fig.12. SG collapsed level The pressurizer level was approaching the top of the pressurizer, and the spray system was turned off at 134 s (Fig.5). Then, the flow stagnated in the broken loop, the core outlet temperatures increased, and the decreasing rate of primary pressure slowed significantly. During the rest of the experiment, the flow remained stagnated. By comparing the pressure histories, we see that between 1135 s and 139 s, the pressure difference between the primary and the secondary side of the broken steam generator was big enough for the break flow to reverse (Fig.1). During that time, only about 3 1 (2 1/min) of the coolant on the secondary side of the broken steam generator flowed back to the primary side. The pressures were almost equal during the rest of the experiment. By taking into account the accuracy of the pressure measurement, the pressure difference was too small for a reasonable estimation of the flow rate or 232

even a direction of the flow. The secondary side collapsed-level of the broken steam generator did not give any sign of the flow reversal either. The experiment was terminated at 39 s when the primary pressure was about 4 bar. The main events of the experiment are summarized in Table 3. 5. CONCLUSIONS The first series of PACTEL steam generator multiple-tube rupture experiments showed that the leak flow reversal is possible in suitable conditions. Because the first series was made with the old configuration of the facility, a new set of experiments was carried out in February 1996. The main goal was to find the worst possible conditions during which the leak flow reversal can occur because of operator intervention. Then, the risk of a partially diluted or completely unborated water plug forming on the primary side exists. The experiments were based on the current instructions for operator intervention during an emergency in the Loviisa nuclear power plant. Leak flow reversal was obvious in the first two experiments where a primary bleed was used. In these two experiments, the average reversed volumetric flow was almost constant. The pressurizer spray and the primary side cooling by the intact steam generators were not enough to reverse the leak flow significantly in the last experiment. The only difference between the first two experiments was the use of the HPIS. By comparing these two experiments, we see that the HPI cools the primary side, but it also slows the rate of decrease of the primary pressure. The accumulator injection has the same effect. The secondary side temperature distribution showed that temperatures are stratified strongly. The coolant was subcooled at the bottom of the steam generator. At the surface, there was a layer of saturated coolant. Hot coolant flowed into the secondary side at the beginning of the transient. Later, the primary coolant was colder than the coolant on the secondary side. However, the secondary side temperature distributions on the broken steam generator did not show any significant mixing of the primary coolant with the original content of the secondary side. The distribution was similar everywhere in the steam generator. So the lower the leakage locates, the longer unborated secondary side water might flow back to the primary side if the flow reverses. The collapsed-level measurements presume the phases are separate. The level measurements of the steam generators showed, however, that the average void fraction on the secondary side was 2 %. That causes errors in the collapsed-level. As it was mentioned earlier the main goal of these calculations was to find out if there would be some reverse flow from secondary to primary side in SG. And the calculations proved that the leak flow reversal is possible in suitable conditions. This shows that the leak flow is significant only when the primary side was actively depressurized. From one hand to minimize the leakage through the SG safety valve, primary pressure must drop as fast as possible. But from the other hand the fast depressurization reverses the leak flow and that way allows a partially diluted or completely unborated water plug to form on the primary side. So, there is a contradiction. Minimizing leakage to the atmosphere and avoiding an ECC water shortage can create conditions that can lead to another accident, which can be really severe. 6. REFERENCES [1] Vesa Riikonen: Steam Generator Multiple-Tube Rupture eriments on the PACTEL Facility with the New Steam Generators. TEKOJA 8/96. December 96. [2] Jari Tuunanen, Heikki Purhonen : General description of the PACTEL test facility. VTT Research Notes. Espoo 1998. 233