Introduction to political accountability

Introduction to political accountability Introduction Hello. Welcome to the first topic of the Learning Alliance on horizontal accountability. This Learning Alliance is part of the ELLA Programme and will be led by OSSREA and CIPPEC. In this topic, the concept of accountability will be introduced. We will then go over the dimensions of accountability: vertical and horizontal accountability. Next, we will focus on the two connotations of horizontal accountability, the distinction between answerability and enforceability. A brief account of the main accountability mechanisms in the world will be given. To foster the discussion, we will post some trigger questions. We encourage you to contribute! Origins of the concept According to authors such as Ugalde (2002), accountability first became an issue with the appearance of representative democracy, in which the people delegate power to their representatives. With the appearance of representative democracy, accountability mechanisms as we know them today began to take shape. One of its first manifestations is in system of checks and balances included in the Constitution of the United States. In that context took place one of the earliest debates concerning accountability between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists. As Borowiak (2007) states, The Federalist vision emphasized the importance of concentrating governmental power and of keeping citizens at some distance from government both for the sake of well-managed government and so that accountability mechanisms might be effective. In contrast, the other, Anti-Federalist, vision highlighted the dangers of concentrated power and pointed to how republican accountability depends upon the active and meaningful participation of citizens, a type of participation that would be undermined if government were to grow distant. Borowiak (2007, 999). Ugalde (2002) states that previous political systems such as the Greek direct democracy lacked this type of mechanisms of accountability. However, following Elster (1999), the author states that Athenian democracy contained embryonic accountability components aimed to controlling the exercise of power. The Athenian political system featured, for example, a mechanism to exercise a vote of confidence, known as ostracism (which was also the procedure to choose between two policies in the Assembly) and a mechanism to revise the management of public funds by public officials at the end of their terms (euthinay). Eisangelia and aphofasis were designed to sanction political crimes. Accountability today Democracy has become the only game in town in Latin America. Nevertheless, several weaknesses remain that affect the quality of institutions. This is part of what is called a qualitative democracy (O Donnell et al, 1986) or the effective functioning of the democratic system and its coexistence with a wider democratization in the economic, social and cultural

dimensions. As stated by Mainwaring & Welna, "one of the important emerging challenges for improving the quality of democracy revolves around how to build more effective accountability mechanisms" (Mainwaring & Welna 2003, 4). According to Mainwaring (2003), a tension may arise between building effective mechanisms of accountability and government effectiveness. While the author states that oversight mechanisms may cause a stalemate immobilizing governments that are in consequence deemed ineffective, he also highlights that powerful mechanisms of accountability make it easier to block governments from implementing disastrous policies (Mainwaring 2003, 5). But, what are we talking about when we talk about accountability? To make matters simpler, we are only going to deal with political accountability. Mainwaring defines political accountability as a formalized relationship of oversight and/or sanctions of public officials by other actors (Mainwaring 2003, 7). This implies, on the one hand an obligation of certain public officials to answer as well as the right of other actors to impose sanctions on said public officials (Mainwaring 2003). Following O Donnell (1999), accountability has two dimensions: vertical and horizontal. Vertical accountability is linked to the control, support and censorship carried out by the electorate through the popular vote. It is also related to certain actions that civil society can perform to limit the actions of elected officials. In this way, O Donnell includes new agents of accountability to Mainwaring s (2003) definition. In line with O Donnell, Smulovitz and Peruzzotti (2000, 152) state control can be exercised by societal accountability: "(...) by exposing and denouncing wrongdoing ( ). Second, societal mechanisms control because they can activate the operation of horizontal mechanisms. Social mobilization around particular demands, media coverage and investigations, and the initiation of proceedings in oversight or judicial agencies put corrupt politicians at risk of losing their reputations or even of being taken into court (...)". Horizontal accountability, as defined by O'Donnell (1999, 38) implies: "The existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered, and factually willing and able, to take action that span from routine oversight to criminal sanctions or impeachment in relation to actions or omissions by other agents or agencies of the state that may be qualified as unlawful." These institutions prevent, cancel, repair or punish actions by other government institutions. O Donnell (2003) divides these institutions into those of balance accountability, if it involves one of the three branches of the State, or mandated, such as National Audit Offices, comptrollers, ombudsmen, among others. During this Learning Alliance, we will deal exclusively with the issue of horizontal accountability. As stated by Schedler (1999), horizontal accountability entails two main connotations: answerability, understood as the obligation of public officials to report on what they are doing; and enforceability, or the ability of controlling institutions to impose sanctions on those who have defaulted on their obligations. While it is widely recognized that the performance of horizontal accountability is weak in many democracies in Latin America and Africa, there is a debate about what lies behind this situation. Understanding the determinants of low performance is key to designing stronger accountability mechanisms.

Before delving into the analysis of the Kenyan and Argentinean cases in the following topics, it is worth giving some context regarding the state of accountability mechanisms in the world. To this end, we will devote some time to describing the mechanisms in place in Brazil, Chile, Mexico, USA, UK and South Africa. In United Kingdom the bipartisan parliamentary system clearly defines the roles of government and opposition in the House of Commons. The first accountability activities are conducted in the plenary through different types of motions. There are predetermined days where the opposition sets the agenda and puts to the vote a series of motions that are often critical to the measures taken by the government. Also, for three days a year the plenary focuses on the control of public spending (Estimate Days). In addition, similar to what happens in some American presidential republics, once a year the King or Queen presents the government plan in the "Speech from the Throne", which is prepared by the cabinet. The main difference with what happens in American countries is that in the UK the government plan is specifically discussed by both Chambers for a week approximately. Question Time is a period within the week where the cabinet must answer questions from Parliament. Each minister should attend the debates at least once a month. But the most important players are the Departmental Parliamentary Committees that able to request information from large sectors of government and civil society and act as a real comptroller. This is one of the instruments preferred by lobbyists when questioning government actions, and is closely followed by the mass media and the public opinion (Sánchez de Dios, 2011). In addition, the Freedom of Information Act of 2000 allows any citizen who is interested in budgets or annual reports access to it, with few exceptions on national security issues. The authorities responsible for delivering information have a limit of 20 working days to deliver said information (AGI data, 2010). In the United States, the General Accountability Office (GAO) was created in 1921. It is an independent, nonpartisan agency that assists the Congress and investigates the expenditure of public funds by the federal government spends. Its director, US Comptroller General is elected for a term of 15 years. GAO works at the request of committees or subcommittees of Congress. It also provides recommendations to Congress and to agencies within the executive branch to make government more efficient, effective, ethical, and equitable. Also, the President gives the State of the Nation address every January, where he defends the administration and sets future lines of work (U.S. GAO, last access on May 17th 2016). As in the United Kingdom, the President makes a speech called the State of the Union, where the political orientation, policy priorities and goals achieved are stated. In Latin America, Brazil incorporated performance management tools in monitoring and performance evaluation in the annual budget process. The Constitution gives the Court of Auditors the prerogatives of the Union to establish fines and penalties and time limits to adhere to the obligations of the powers. The legislature also has four initiatives to control the executive: the request for information, the call for ministers, proposals for Supervision and Control and the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry, the last two being more complex mechanisms; the first works together with the Court of Accounts of the Union to exercise fiscal, financial and accounting control of public bodies, while the second investigates specific facts, has extensive legal powers and its recommendations can translate into political punishment as removing charge the crime of responsibility. Legislators are entitled to make requests for information to the executive. In Brazil this competition is contemplated in the Constitution and the days in the executive to respond (30). You can also petition the President when his/her accounts were not sent by the executive. As for the answerability component of horizontal accountability, the Constitution mandates that the president must deliver its plan of government to Congress annually, on the legislative opening session.

In Chile, the control function is exercised by the Comptroller General of the Republic, a superior control body. It exercises oversight of the legality of the acts of the State Administration and acts independently of both the executive and legislative branches. The work of the Comptroller is eminently audit; legal, accounting and financial. The Comptroller is appointed by the president with the approval of the Senate and cannot be reelected for a next period. Constitutionally, the obligations include defining the legality or otherwise of Executive decrees and resolutions. He is responsible for the audit of expenses decrees that exceed the limit specified in the Constitution. The Constitution allows legislators requests information from the executive, who is bounded to respond within 30 days. The President addresses the Congress every May 21st to report on the state of the country s administrative and political state. In Mexico, a pioneer in evaluation issues, the creation in 2005 of the National Council for the Assessment of Social Policy (CONEVAL) consolidated an institutional and autonomous perspective, identified with strong capabilities of answerability. On the side of the legislative, the Chamber of Deputies is responsible for reviewing the budget. Times to do it are constitutionally specified, which is not usual in other Latin American countries. The Superior Audit Office examines discrepancies between income and expenses of public finances and determines responsibilities; its powers are established in the Constitution. On the other hand, institutions subject to monitoring are required to specify improvements made, the actions undertaken and to justify any improprieties identified in the audit. As with Brazil and Chile, legislators are entitled by the Constitution to make requests for information. As is the case in Chile, the Constitution sets a deadline (15 days) for the executive to respond to the requests for information. As for the answerability component of horizontal accountability, although there is no Constitutional mechanism to force the President to report before Congress on the State of the Nation, Secretaries must report to Congress on the state of their respective cabinets. On the other hand, by ¼ of the chamber of deputies and ½ of senators a commission investigating the functioning of decentralized agencies and state-owned companies can be created. In South Africa, that has a parliamentary system of government, the South African Constitution provides that the National Assembly establish the mechanisms to ensure that the executive bodies are held accountable. The President and Ministers are responsible for the exercise of their powers and accountable to Parliament. On the other hand, all public institutions that deal with the strengthening of constitutional democracy are accountable to the National Assembly and required to submit a report at least once a year. These institutions include: the Public Protector, the South African Human Rights Commission, the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities, the Commission for Gender Equality, the Auditor-General and the Electoral Commission. The main control function is carried out by the Auditor-General, who audits and reports on the national, provincial and municipal accounts. In Ghana, accountability is one of the five principles of its Constitution. The Constitution gives a special role to the mass media regarding this issue: they are responsible for upholding the accountability of the government to the people. Parliamentarian committees have the capability to investigate the executive through the budget and request information. These activities are usually absorbed by the Finance Committee and are most effective regarding State enterprises. In addition, a Public Accounts Committee is in charge of revising public expenditure but its recommendations are non-binding. An Auditor General is constitutionally mandated to exert oversight over a range of institutions: public accounts of Ghana and of all public offices, including the courts, the central and local government administrations, of the Universities and public institutions of like nature, of any public corporation or other body or organization established by an Act of Parliament.

Finally, the Ugandan Constitution stablishes accountability as the 26th objective; all public officers and persons placed in positions of leadership and responsibility shall be held in trust for the people. Ministers are accountable to the President individually for their ministries and collectively for the Cabinet. Regarding horizontal accountability, as article 164 states, The Permanent Secretary or the accounting officer of a Ministry or department shall be accountable to Parliament for the funds in that Ministry or department. An auditor general elected by the President and approved by the Parliament is in charge of auditing and reporting the public accounts of Uganda. An annual report shall be considered by the Parliament and taken action. The Parliament also monitors all expenditure of public funds. This activity is developed by the Public Accounts Committee. Moreover, particular committees or Commissions of Inquiry may be created to request information or explanations from public officers. The Constitution states that the Parliament shall make laws prescribing measures for local governments promoting accountability. The Ugandan parliament has capacity for budget review backed by the Constitution by its Article 155 and is able to participate during the budget negotiation, which includes citizen participation as well. Nonetheless, its capability to amend or modify the budget is restricted to informal negotiations. Regarding further oversight, investigative powers over budgetary issues and spending exist but are not regularly used, except of the spending by State enterprises. Powers to request and receive response do exist buy there are no mechanisms for making follow-ups and the recommendations are not binding resolutions (API, 2011). Despite the depth of the conceptual and factual development of horizontal accountability, it is necessary to highlight that the incumbent Ugandan president holds office since 1986. This shows that strong accountability mechanisms are a necessary but not sufficient condition for the quality of democracy.

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