The UK and nuclear reprocessing: beating a retreat Presentation given at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference Washington, DC, 26-27 June 2007 by William Walker University of St Andrews Scotland, UK
New nuclear power stations could make an important contribution to meeting [the UK s] needs for lower carbon electricity production and energy security The Government has concluded that any nuclear power stations that might be built in the UK should proceed on the basis that spent fuel will not be reprocessed. Energy White Paper 2007, Meeting the Energy Challenge, pp. 185 and 204
The UK s reprocessing facilities B205 (Magnox fuel). Due to close in 2012. THORP (foreign LWR fuel; domestic AGR fuel). Planned closure 2011; operation suspended 2005 following accident Spent fuels from the UK s LWRs (Sizewell B) have not been reprocessed: stored at reactor site
Performance of THORP and SMP THORP: Design capacity: 1200 THM/yr Average throughput, 1994-2007: 440 THM/yr Sellafield MOX Plant (SMP): Design capacity: 120 T/yr Average MOX throughput, 2002-07: 1 T/yr Plutonium & wastes have not yet been returned to countries of origin No MOX contracts yet with Japanese utilities (the main foreign customers)
Results of UK s engagement with reprocessing World s largest stock of civil separated plutonium: 105 tonnes, end 2005, incl. 27MT of foreign Pu No domestic recycling of plutonium, no disposition plan Exacerbation of waste problems: multiple waste streams & forms radioactive pollution of seas and coastline no agreed disposal sites for high activity wastes Heavy costs of clean-up & decommissioning Damaged prestige of nuclear industry
Policy reversal, 2002-07 UK s phased withdrawal from reprocessing by 2012 Why? Privatisation of electricity supply industry Plutonium fuels uncompetitive with uranium fuels; accumulation of unwanted plutonium stocks Disillusion with reprocessing & BNFL Government s desire to relaunch nuclear power Post-9/11 worries about terrorist sabotage (esp. untreated wastes) Conclusion of government & industry: focus on decommissioning, waste treatment & disposal: deal with the nuclear legacies adopt the simplest, most reliable fuel-cycle for the next phase of nuclear power investment
Institutional change Establishment of Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA), 2005 to ensure the safe, accelerated and affordable clean-up of the UK s civil nuclear legacy NDA becomes owner of civil nuclear sites, including Sellafield BNFL is dethroned: becomes operator under franchise
The UK s waste legacy Arising from: abandoned fast reactor programme closed power reactors, reprocessing & fuel fabrication facilities high volumes (NDA estimate 478,000 cu. m.) & many kinds of waste, treated and untreated NDA s current cost estimate, excluding plutonium disposition: $120bn undiscounted, $68bn discounted (Sellafield accounts for 63%) Equates to $8.2bn legacy cost per GWe installed (undiscounted, incl. R&D reactors) Funded mainly by the tax payer: heavy burden on public purse
Reasons for policy failure in the UK Wildly unrealistic forecasts of future needs & benefits BNFL s monopoly powers; reprocessing the quid pro quo for utilities transfer of spent fuel from reactor sites to Sellafield History of industrial & political mismanagement Embedded commitments (political, contractual, infrastructural, local employment): lock-in, technological entrapment, groupthink
Intrinsic, worldwide problems with reprocessing/recycling 1. Increases costs, risks & complexity of spent fuel management 2. Difficulty of technical, commercial & political coordination 3. State-industry nexus: resistance to effective public accountability & control, and to market forces 4. Policy inflexibility, weight of commitments 5. Linkage to nuclear weapons, proliferation 6. Cost & difficulty of safeguarding complex flows