Post Doctoral Fellow, (Dec 2004 March 2006) INRIA Lorraine, France.

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Kameshwaran S Contact Information Centre for Global Logistics & Mfg. Strategies Phone: (91) 40-23187193 Indian School of Business Mobile: (91) 99851 24818 Hyderabad 500032 Fax: (91) 40-23007099 India e-mail: Kameshwaran S@isb.edu kamesh.iisc@gmail.com Date of Birth February 07, 1975 Nationality Research Interests Indian Algorithmic Operations Research Mathematical Optimization Algorithms Large Scale Mixed Integer Programming Game Theory and Auction Design Multiattribute Decision Analysis (AHP) & Multicriteria Optimization (GP) Employment Researcher, (May 2006 - Present) Indian School of Business, India. Post Doctoral Fellow, (Dec 2004 March 2006) INRIA Lorraine, France. Research Engineer, (Aug 2004 - Nov 2004) The Logistics Institute - Asia Pacific, Singapore. Education Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, India Ph.D, Computer Science and Automation, (August 2004) Thesis: Algorithms for Piecewise Linear Knapsack Problems with Applications in Electronic Commerce Supervisor: Prof. Y Narahari NERIST, Itanagar, India M.Tech., Information Technology, May, 1998 Adhiyamaan College of Engg., Hosur, India B.E., Electronics and Communication Engg., August, 1996 Awards & Recognitions IBM Research Fellowship, from January 2001 to August 2004, by IBM India Research Laboratories, New Delhi. Distinction in M.Tech. with the highest CGPA, 1998. Industry Interactions Member of EEL Research Team on General Motors Research Project IMPROVE: Innovative Marketplace for Procurement from Vendors, 2002-2003. Member of EEL Research Team on Intel Research Project IDEAS: Intelligent Digital Economy Algorithms, 2003.

Computer Skills Algorithms Designed & Implemented Research Summary Optimization Packages: ILOG CPLEX, LpSOLVE, ExpertChoice Languages: Java, C++, C Internet Technologies: XML, PHP, MySQL All the following algorithms were implemented in Java. Concert Technology of CPLEX was used for solving the MILP/LP models and for deriving cuts (wherever applicable). 1. Branch-on-Supply and Branch-on-price algorithms for winner determination in discount auctions. 2. Branch-and-bound algorithm (using DP as lower bounding technique) for winner determination in combinatorial auctions with interval bids. 3. Exact algorithms based on branch-and-bound and dynamic programming for 4. Fully polynomial time approximation scheme and 2-approximation algorithm for 5. Heuristics based on linear programing relaxation and Lagrangian relaxation for 6. Heuristic based on Lagrangian relaxation for solving the bid evaluation problem in multi-unit e-procurement. 7. Heuristic based on column generation and dynamic programming for solving the bid evaluation in multi-item, multi-unit e-procurement. Discount Auctions for Procuring Heterogeneous Goods An auction mechanism called as discount auctions was proposed for buying heterogeneous items in a single auction. It is useful in common procurement scenarios where the seller has positive costs for each of the items and there are no synergies in selling a subset or package of items. However, to promote sales, the seller offers discount which is function of number of the items bought. A discount bid consists of two parts: individual costs for each of the items and a discount function over the number of items. The size of the bid is linear, in contrast to combinatorial auctions with exponential number of bids. Despite its simplicity, its winner determination problem is N P-hard. However, it has an embedded network structure which was exploited to develop heuristics and an exact branch-and-bound algorithm. Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions with Interval Bids The winner determination in combinatorial auctions is N P-hard. However, with certain bid structures and bidding languages, the problem is tractable. One such bid structure is the interval bids which allows only combinations consisting of consecutive items. The winner determination problem or this bid structure with the OR bidding language is known to be solvable in polynomial time using dynamic programming. However, with the XOR bidding language (at most one winning bid for a bidder), the problem is N P-hard. We developed a branch-and-bound framework that uses the dynamic programming algorithm for the OR version as the bounding technique.

Design of Progressive Auctions for Procurement based on Lagrangian Relaxation Auction mechanisms have been found successful in implementing e-procurement, with the buyer as the auctioneer and the sellers as the bidders. Single round auctions are prevalently used in e- procurement, in which the suppliers submit sealed bids in response to the buyers request-for-quote. The bid evaluation problem faced by the buyer is an optimization problem that selects the winning bids to minimize the cost of procurement. Though these auction types are advantageous in many scenarios, progressive auctions (multiple round) are preferred in terms of information elicitation and bid preparation. This work demonstrates the design of progressive auctions, from their single-round counterparts, using Lagrangian relaxation. In particular, we show that an appropriate algorithm for a judiciously selected Lagrangian relaxation of the bid evaluation problem, can help in designing a progressive auction. The procurement of multiple units of a single item is considered with linear and piecewise linear supply curves. Bundling of Service with Product The Logistics Institute - Asia Pacific, Sinagpore. Integration of service with product is considered as one of the innovative supply chain initiatives of the next decade. Towards this end, offering product-service bundles would be attractive to both customers and manufacturers. The product and service are two different markets with various players. A product manufacturer who intends to enter the service market should take into account the strategic behavior of the players in both the markets. In particular, the manufacturer should make the following decisions: (1) should he enter the service market?, (2) if so, should he bundle it with the product?, and (3) what is the price of the offerings? The problem was analyzed in a representative setting of monopoly and duopoly product markets. The decision making in the monopoly market is an optimization problem. The duopoly market has strategic competitors and the decision making was modeled as a two stage non-cooperative sequential game. The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies was used as the solution concept. Algorithms for Piecewise Linear Knapsack Problems with Applications in E-Commerce Ph.D Thesis, Department of Computer Science & Automation, Indian Insitute of Science, Bangalore, India. This thesis considered a nonlinear resource allocation problem with non-convex and piecewise linear cost structure, called as the piecewise linear knapsack problem (PLKP). The cost structure was motivated and inspired by volume discount bids in electronic procurement. The thesis deals with the modeling and solving of the PLKP in detail, followed by the modeling and solving of the bid evaluation problem in three representative procurement settings. The thesis is divided into three parts. First part of the thesis presents different mixed integer linear programming formulations for the PLKP and the exploitable substructures of these formulations. Designing of algorithms for the PLKP was dealt with in detail in Part 2. The algorithms include heuristics based on greedy techniques, knapsack structure, linear programming relaxation, and Lagrangian relaxation; exact algorithms based on dynamic programming, branch-and-bound technique, and Benders decomposition; and a 2-approximation algorithm and a ful ly polynomial time approximation scheme. In Part 3, three different representative procurement scenarios, in which the PLKP is a subproblem, were considered. Modeling and solving of the bid evaluation problem in the three procurement scenarios were discussed using

the algorithms and approaches proposed in Part 2. e-procurement using Goal Programming General Motors Research Project, Indian Insitute of Science, Bangalore, India. An automotive company such as GM routinely procures high volumes of raw materials. All of these items have multiple attributes associated with them and the procurement process for such components should satisfy the following requirements: 1) the vendor selection decision should be based on various attributes of the item being procured (that is, decision should transcend beyond just cost considerations), 2) the process should make best use of the volume discounts offered by the suppliers, 3) the suppliers should be able to express their complementarities and quantity discount options across multiple attributes in a user friendly way, and 4) procurement decisions should take into account any business constraints of the buyer. The purpose of this work was to examine how the negotiations involved in the procurement of such components can be automated, so as to minimize the total cost of ownership for the buyer. An e- Procurement system that automates the procurement of multiple units of a single good and meets all of the above requirements was developed using goal programming as the multiple criteria optimization technique. Design of Electronic Exchanges Intel Research Project, Indian Insitute of Science, Bangalore, India. Electronic exchanges are double-sided marketplaces that allows multiple buyers to trade with multiple sellers, with aggregation of demand and supply across the bids to maximize the revenue in the market. Two important design issues in the exchanges are trade determination (determining the number of goods traded between any buyer-seller pair)and pricing. We studied the complexity of trade determination for multiattribute exchanges with configurable bids. Unlike the traditional techniques, we posed the pricing problem as payoff determination problem that distributes the total payoff fairly to all agents with budget-balance imposed as a constraint. We devised an arbitration scheme by axiomatic approach to solve the payoff determination problem using the added-value concept of game theory. Academic Activities 1. Organizing Committee Member, International Conference on Information Systems, Logistics, and Supply Chain, Lyon, France, May 15-17, 2006. 2. Program Committee Member, 2nd Indian International Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IICAI-05), Pune, December, 2005. 3. Steering Committee Member, Smart ebusiness Workshop at IICAI-2003, Hyderabad, December 20, 2003. 4. Student Organizing Committee Head, The International Workshop on IT- Enabled Manufacturing, Logistics, and Supply Chain Management, Bangalore, December 15 and 16, 2003. 5. PhD Representative of Computer Science and Automation Department Curriculum Committee at IISc, Bangalore from August 2002 August 2003. 6. Student Organizer, Inter Research Institute Student Seminar in Computer Science 2002, Bangalore, March 28 and 29, 2002. 7. Teaching Assistant for courses E-Commerce in 2002 and 2003, and Supply Chain Management in 2001.

References Prof. Y Narahari Prof. N Viswanadham Computer Science and Automation Executive Director, GLAMS Indian Institute of Science Indian School of Business Bangalore, India Hyderabad, India hari@csa.iisc.ernet.in N Viswanadham@isb.edu Prof. Xiaolan Xie Prof. John Debenham ENSM de Saint-Etienne Faculty of Information Technology 42023 Saint-Etienne University of Technology France Sydney, Australia xie@emse.fr debenham@it.uts.edu.au Dr. Lyés Benyoucef Research Staff Member INRIA Lorraine Metz, France lyes.benyoucef@loria.fr Dr. K. Ravikumar Senior Researcher General Motors India Science Labs Bangalore, India ravikumar.karumanchi@gm.com