GABON, NATIONWIDE WATER & POWER. Case Study (Water and Power) Project Summary:

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GABON, NATIONWIDE WATER & POWER Case Study (Water and Power) Project Summary: In July 1997, the government of Gabon signed a twenty-year concession contract with a private French consortium to operate water and electricity services throughout the country. The contract endeavored to expand water and electrical service to unconnected areas. This contract was executed following institutional reform of the water and electricity sectors. The public entity, Societe d'energie et d'eau du Gabon' (SEEG), provides both water and electricity services in partnership with the private concessionaire, each holding a 49% and 51% share respectively. The venture has been successful, often exceeding targets in existing service areas, however less progress has been made in more isolated areas of the country, where the population is extremely dispersed. This performance-driven contract defines quality requirements and coverage targets as the main drivers of private investment, and has proven extremely successful. A unique feature of the project is a cross-subsidy provision, by which electricity revenues are used to fund investment in the water sector. The multi-utility service provision has brought several benefits to Gabon by allowing cost reductions through the sharing of resources, particularly evident at the headquarters and regional levels. It has also allowed the creation of an integrated investment planning and coordination platform with important stakeholders and placed SEEG in a stronger position to negotiate prices in the local markets, allowing it to reduce contracting costs by about 30 percent. Strong government commitment, consistent improvements in service quality and reduced tariffs have been largely responsible for the success of the partnership,. The clear understanding between the public and private partners has allowed both to meet their objectives. The private sector has been gradually expanding services in small towns and rural areas, and the government has paid its bills consistently after some irregularity during the first two years of the contract. Nov-12 1

Project Objectives: Approximately 40% of the population of Gabon is concentrated in the capital city, Libreville. Since the population outside Libreville is extraordinarily scattered, the primary objectives of the government in utilizing a private partner to assist the SEEG were to expand the water and electricity networks to the poorly-served rural areas, raise service standards, reduce service prices, and make the required investments for the development of Gabon's water and electricity sectors. After a financial crisis hit Gabon in 1986 and 1987, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) called for a public sector review, which revealed the need for tariff reform in both the water and electricity sectors. Tariff reform combined with the restructuring of water and electricity provision through a public-private partnership were expected to improve efficiency in investment planning, operations, and financial services A more efficient distribution system that would reach out to the population, by sharing resources and economies of scale, was an important objective of the partnership. Additionally, the project aimed to minimize governmental management and investment in the sectors, as well as to improve SEEG's financial position. Finally, the project sought to establish a clear obligation for the Gabonese government to pay for its use of water and electricity. The government also hoped to attract international investors and maintain the existing workforce to the greatest extent possible. The multi-sector structure of the partnership was designed to "cross-subsidize" the two services, with the more easily-distributed electricity subsidizing water connections in rural areas. Project Description: 1. Partners SEEG was created in 1963 through the merger and nationalization of two private municipal companies that provided water and electricity services in the two main urban centers in the country. After nationalization, SEEG expanded operations rapidly and, over time, the State acquired 64% of SEEG's capital and gave SEEG a monopoly for electricity and water distribution over the national territory. Once the government decided to create a public-private partnership to manage and operate the two sectors, the Corporate Advisory arm of the International Finance Corporation (IFC) advised the government through the process. Nov-12 2

The initial partnership was formed between the Government and a group of three operators who had previously provided technical assistance to SEEG for several years. The operators were tasked with providing training services, improving debt collection in the water sector and assisting in the preparation for several large electricity sector projects. The private strategic partner was selected through an open, transparent bidding process. The IFC advisors also limited the ability of incumbent companies to bid as part of a consortium. Bids were solicited from approximately sixty companies, of which fourteen expressed interest, and four companies (two French, one Irish and one Belgian) were pre-selected to participate in the final selection process. The pre-selection process focused on corporate experience and financial integrity. A major French firm eventually won the contract. 2. Implementation Environment - Legislative and Administrative The Government first considered the idea of a partnership in 1986 and, in 1987, launched a lengthy preparation process, which ultimately allowed Gabon to carry out important reforms such as defining a legal framework, raising tariffs to levels reflecting actual costs, and reducing staffing. Once the administrative and legislative arrangement had been established, the transaction was conducted in a transparent manner and proceeded smoothly. The 1988 audit of SEEG, called for by the IMF, highlighted a number of institutional issues, including the lack of an overall legal structure for the sector. The audit also emphasized the need for tariff reform since the tariff structure was extremely complicated, with many different tariffs for specific client categories. Based on the results of the audit, Gabon signed a three-year convention with SEEG, with both sides obliged to try and improve the condition of the water and electricity sectors. The country committed to not interfering in the company's management, passing appropriate legislation, and paying its bills. In exchange, SEEG committed to reducing its cost base, carrying out a tariff study and increasing collection rates. As a result of this agreement, a set of three laws passed in 1993 established the legal framework for the sectors; although, the main implementing decrees were not adopted until 1997, just prior to creation of the partnership. The laws established a government monopoly over the generation, transportation and distribution services of water and electricity and the power to delegate the provision of these services to one or more operators via concession contracts. The laws also established special sector funds and supporting taxes. In turn, those funds would be used to finance water and electricity consumption by municipalities and investment in public provision equipment. Nov-12 3

In 1993, given the lack of success of the SEEG/State convention, the State decided to sign a service contract with private operators to further carry out restructuring. A contract was signed with a consortium of three operators who had all previously been involved in providing technical assistance services to SEEG for several years. The contract was not very successful, since it not only antagonized the local staff but also did not provide adequate incentives for the private operator to commit investment capital. However, it successfully streamlined the company and prepared it for the subsequent public-private partnership. The actual decision to create a partnership was formalized in the 1996 Privatization Law. Prior to 1997, SEEG had incorporated, so the only legal reform required was a decree allowing independent power producers (IPPs) and the sale of state-owned assets. Once the decision to create a partnership had been formalized, the entire process took about 18 months to complete, with the Government was once again being advised by the Corporate Advisory arm of the IFC. It was determined that a single, nationwide concession would be maintained for both water and electricity in order to continue to cross-subsidize operation and expansion of water services through electricity revenues. The government also reformed the tariff structure, eliminating all special tariffs previously awarded to various socio-economic categories. A 1997 decree also defined rules for the sector in more detailed terms, though it left the form of contract open, and specified that the Ministry of Mines, Energy, Oil and Water Resources would be responsible for both the water and electricity sectors. Within the Ministry, the Direction Generale de l'energie et des Ressources Hydrauliques (DGERH) department was directly in charge of controlling the contract and was to function similar to an independent regulatory body, even though it would be funded by the State budget. 3. Financial Agreement According to the financial agreement, the concessionaire pays an annual contribution to the DGERH, the Conceding Authority, to cover operation costs and the costs of commissioning external studies. This contribution is set at 0.2% of the previous year's turnover for a normal year and 0.5% in a year in which a five-year review occurs. The Concessionaire is also obliged to separately fund the costs of the study to establish the methodology for estimating coverage rates. Furthermore, the private operator is obliged to invest a minimum of US$135 million in rehabilitation, 60 percent of which is earmarked for water sector development. The private operator also made a commitment (not specified in the contract) to investing an additional Nov-12 4

US$130 million over the life of the contract, mainly dedicated to increasing network density and extending the service network. The tariff structure was simplified considerably in February 1997 prior to privatization, and the structure adopted in the contract was 17.5 percent lower than previous tariffs. In June 1997, the private firm acquired 51 percent of SEEG's capital for an estimated $14 million (convert to dollars) and signed a twenty-year concession contract with Gabon. The remaining 49% of the shares were sold through a public offer. The first of its kind in Gabon, the public offer was executed in December 1997 through a network of local banks and was oversubscribed. Employees were given the opportunity to buy up to five percent of the shares with a guaranteed return of 6.5 percent per year for the first two years. 4. Contract Provisions The contract is made up of several documents that outline the asset ownership regime, exclusive rights and obligations of the concessionaire, financial and accounting regimes, role of the Conceding Authority, and the rules for terminating the contract. The contract also sets up general public service principles for service delivery and defines the concession boundaries. In addition, the contract promulgates the rules for financing, controlling and valuing new works, service quality, and tariff setting principles. Finally, the agreement sets management requirements, as well as customer service requirements and service area targets. The concessionaire is obliged to deliver services to an increasing proportion of the population according to the provisions of the contract. To meet this objective, the concessionaire's efficiency is key; therefore it was not necessary to include further investment obligations or intermediary quality goals. The contract deviated from the common approach in that it specifies financial obligations in terms of renewal investments. It stipulates that the concessionaire must invest a significant amount of money in renewals throughout the life of the concession. The concessionaire announced that it would split the investment sixty/forty between electricity and water activities, although this is only a general operating standard and not a contractual provision. The contract also included a two-and-a-half-year, penalty-free, transition period within which the concessionaire was charged with defining and implementing an emergency repair plan and establishing the basis and the tools for contract enforcement. Nov-12 5

5. Implementation Metrics Even though water is considered a more 'basic' need than electricity, there are usually more individual connections to electricity than to water. This is because electricity must precede water services in order to power the requisite pump and treatment facilities. Recognizing this trend, the Government used a multi-utility arrangement to cross-subsidize the weaker water sector with the more easily expandable electricity sector. This approach also allowed for cost reductions through the sharing of resources, particularly evident in centralized planning and operations at headquarters. Because the water sector receives 60 percent of investment funds, though it accounted for only 15 percent of SEEG's turnover at the outset of the project, water customers benefit greatly from both lower tariffs and increased investment. SEEG managed its water and electricity activities in an integrated and relatively decentralized manner, with no major restructuring required following the concession award. All corporate functions are concentrated in the capital Libreville, while operations are organized on a regional basis and personnel in regional centers now assume greater responsibility for technical and financial performance of their area. Because the water and electricity businesses continued to be managed in a highly integrated manner, substantial economies of scale prevail. All technical development and decision making is done at the central level, which improves planning, efficiency and provides a single point of contact for the government. The operations department follows integrated performance objectives for electricity and water and SEEG is attempting to utilize personnel who can service both the water and electricity businesses at the regional level. Due to tariff simplification, low voltage electricity tariffs and water tariffs are now uniform across the nation. Low voltage electricity customers (15kW and below) pay a standard rate for their electricity, based on the level of their capacity consumption, and are not subject to capacity charges. Users within a given tariff category incur the same tariff and there is no block structure though there is a distinction between peak and off-peak tariffs for medium voltage tariffs. Medium voltage electricity tariffs vary regionally based on generation costs. Tariffs in isolated areas are generally about 50 percent more than tariffs in networked areas. Medium voltage tariffs also vary according to annual usage and customers on pre-paid meters are charged a slightly lower rate. Social tariffs for both water and electricity are cross-subsidized by other customers. Nov-12 6

SEEG has also developed a simple but effective maintenance policy over the last few years. They have switched from a calendar-based maintenance program to one dictated by manufacturers guidelines and equipment usage, which has proven to be far more effective. Commentary: 1. Methods for Overcoming Impediments Some key characteristics of the legal and contractual framework were well-defined and crucial for the relatively smooth operations since the introduction of private sector participation. The legislative framework was well specified and the regulatory functions were entrusted to a Directorate within the Ministry, which acted as the Conceding Authority. Obligations were gradually phased in over a transition period and the operator was granted flexibility in achieving certain goals. The clear and comprehensive legal and contractual frameworks have fostered good relations between partners and the working relationship between the concessionaire and the Conceding Authority has encountered no major difficulties. A number of regulatory activities planned in the contract have been completed, although some remain incomplete and past due. While responsibility for these delays seems to be shared between both parties, the failure meet the terms of the contract has engendered some confusion as to the Conceding Authority's power to exert pressure to maximize efficiency. Some political leaders have suggested that a study to improve economic efficiency may be needed, but no specific actions have yet been taken. The Conceding Authority remains somewhat skeptical on the improvements in operating performance, but in the absence of regulatory, monitoring and quality enforcement tools, it is difficult to determine the potential for further improvements and the overall efficiency of the company. Installing monitoring systems with an analytical accounting system remains one of the main challenges for the Concessionaire. 2. Key Points for Success or Failure SEEG's overall performance in the initial years of operations has shown a substantial improvement in the quality of service, both in technical and commercial terms. Crucial investments have been carried out, and SEEG has met its coverage obligations in all areas except some of the more isolated areas. However, customers, on the whole, are more satisfied with the service and the financial performance has improved steadily. Nov-12 7

The transparent manner, in which the transaction was carried out, allowing time to build a consensus among stakeholders, was crucial to the success of the project. The partnership in Gabon demonstrated that in low-density population countries a national utility can be an effective way to organize the market to provide economies of scale, service continuity and crosssubsidization. The clear definition of investment obligations made it possible to attract private investors to carry out substantial investments in rural settings and the regional coverage obligations with significant penalties helped extend services in the more remote areas. In 2005, there was a test of the transparency and open approach to communications between the private and public sectors. The rapid population growth in Libreville had outstripped the ability to SEEG to keep pace with the targets for percentage of population served by the water system. In addition, allegations were raised at one point that the water was not meeting appropriate health standards. Through an open exchange between all sectors, these problems have been resolved, illustrating the strength of this partnership. The transition period at the beginning of the contract allowed both parties time to agree on a number of important documents, laying the foundation of the contract in more detail, while shielding SEEG from liability for failing to meet its obligations during the transition period. However, allowing more time to gather baseline information during the period leading up to the partnership might have been preferable, since it would have allowed both parties to agree on more realistic contract deadlines. The company has managed to become truly independent of potential political pressures. The Gabonese government, which was previously irregular in its payments, has negotiated a moratorium to settle its debts and is now paying its bills on a regular basis. The Gabon partnership also illustrates how, in a small country, a Ministerial department can adequately perform regulatory functions, provided it is shielded from political interference and has sufficient financial and human resources. The proactive stance taken by the Government led to this freedom of action for the public administrators. One example of this is their further study of the market structure at the time the partnership was created, with various options now being considered. The innovative cross-subsidy delivery mechanism provides an exciting model for other developing countries. Additionally, the output-based contract has proven to be extremely successful in both the water and electricity sectors. The sharing of resources, planning, and operations has reduced costs and provided a platform for integrated investment planning and Nov-12 8

coordination with other stakeholders. It has also helped the water sector to achieve parity with the electricity sector. Nov-12 9