CMD 18-H2.8 File / dossier : 6.01.07 Date: 2017-12-08 Edocs: 5414218 Oral presentation Submission from the Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County and Area Exposé oral Mémoire de Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County and Area In the Matter of the À l égard des Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Les Laboratoires Nucléaires Canadiens Application for the renewal of the Nuclear Research and Test Establishment Operating Licence for the Chalk River Laboratories Demande de renouvellement du permis d exploitation d établissement de recherche et d essais nucléaires pour les Laboratoires de Chalk River Commission Public Hearing Audience publique de la Commission January 23-25, 2018 23-25 janvier 2018
The proposed Canadian Nuclear Laboratories site license renewal at Chalk River: an analysis of selected issues. Submission from Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County and Area for the January 2018 CNSC hearing December 8, 2017 1
The proposed Canadian Nuclear Laboratories site license renewal at Chalk River: an analysis of selected issues. Table of Contents Executive Summary...3 Proposed Changes to Licence and Licence Conditions Handbook - OVERVIEW...3 Detailed Review of Licence Changes of Concern and their Implications...6 1. Licence Period...6 2. Licenced Activities...7 3. Interpretation...7 4. General Conditions...7 5. Management System...8 6. Human Performance Program...10 7. Operating Performance...11 8. Safety Analysis...14 9. Physical Design...16 10. Fitness for Service...17 11. Radiation Protection...19 12. Conventional Health and Safety...19 13. Environmental Protection...20 14. Emergency Management...23 15. Fire Protection...25 16. Waste Management...27 17. Decommissioning...30 Decommissioning and Waste Management Priorities and Challenges...33 The relationship between the NSDF and the Proposed Licence...36 The Decommissioning Plan...37 Regulating the Waste Owner...38 Small Modular Reactors (SMRs)...39 Recommendations...40 References...43 Appendix A: Notes on CSA Standards...44 2
Executive Summary Concerned Citizens of Renfrew County and Area is a non-governmental, volunteer organization that has been working for the clean-up and prevention of radioactive pollution from the nuclear industry in the Ottawa Valley for 40+ years. Our main current focus is nuclear waste. We have intervened at CRL site licence hearings held by the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), and previously by the Atomic Energy Control Board, for over 20 years. This submission addresses concerns about the renewal of the CRL site licence in the context of the January 2018 CNSC hearing on the application by Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) for a renewal of the CRL site licence. While some of our comments below cover more than a narrow focus on waste, all the issues covered in this submission have the potential to impact the issue of nuclear waste at the CRL site, be it directly or indirectly. We discuss the following matters: Why do the proposed CRL licence and license condition handbook contain sweeping changes that would reduce regulatory oversight, and why do CNSC staff provide no information about these changes, or their implications? Why is so little information available to the public about decommissioning priorities at CRL, associated costs, and how they will be paid for? Is the owner of the CRL waste being regulated in accordance with the Government of Canada s radioactive waste policy framework? How can a 10-year licence term (until 2028) be justified, when the current GoCo contract for operating CRL will be up for review in 2021? How did CNSC staff determine that building and operating a small modular reactor (SMR) at CRL is out of scope of the licence hearing despite CNL s active pursuit of this goal? Proposed Changes to Licence and Licence Conditions Handbook - OVERVIEW CMD 18-H2 is the Commission Member Document prepared by the staff of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC 2017) for the January 2018 hearing on the application from Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL 2017a) to renew the site licence for the Chalk River Laboratories (CRL). The Summary of CMD 18-H2 indicates that the following items are attached: The proposed licence, NRTEOL- 01.00/2028; The draft Licence Conditions Handbook; The current licence, NRTEOL-01.00/2018; and The environmental assessment report [a CNSC staff review of the current status of the CRL site]. 3
However, the current licence is missing from CMD 18-H2. We recommend that this omission be corrected in a revised CMD 18-H2. We also recommend that the Proposed Licence Changes section be expanded to fully document and explain the licence changes proposed by CNSC staff. The Proposed Licence Changes section on page 117 of CMD 18-H2 refers to development of standard licence conditions and standard format for Class I nuclear facilities licences and states that The proposed licence uses the standard format and incorporates the standard licence conditions applicable to CRL (CNSC 2017). CMD 18-H2 fails to describe/reference the standard format and standard licence conditions for Class 1 nuclear facilities. Nor does CMD 18-H2 explain the process through which these were developed. We recommend that a revised version of CMD 18-H2 provide this information. Standard licence conditions cannot be applied to a site that is anything but standard. A one-size-fits-all approach for class 1 nuclear facilities cannot provide adequate protection of health, safety and the environment when applied to a complex site such as CRL. Yet this is what is proposed in CMD 18-H2. CNSC staff propose to delete half of the current 56 licence conditions. These include 2.2 Management of Safety, 3.4 Minimum Staffing Requirements, 4.4 Nuclear Facilities Undergoing Decommissioning Activities, 4.7 Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Management, 4.15 Reporting of Unplanned Situations or Events, 7.5 Environmental Qualification, 10.2 Release of Radioactive Substances, 10.3 Release of Hazardous Substances, and 12.3 Nuclear Legacy Liabilities. Retained licence conditions often lack important details found in the existing licence conditions. For example, compare the existing condition 2.1 Management System with the proposed new condition 1.1: 2.1 The licensee shall implement and maintain a management system, including a written safety policy which places safety paramount within the management system, overriding all other demands, for activities carried out under this licence; 1.1 The licensee shall implement and maintain a management system. Or compare the existing condition 6.1 Physical Design with the proposed new condition 5.1: 6.1 The licensee shall ensure that the defence-in-depth principle is applied in the design of new or modified nuclear facility at the CRL site in order to prevent, or if prevention fails, to mitigate the consequences resulting from radioactive releases; 5.1 The licensee shall implement and maintain a design program. Or compare the existing conditions 10.1 Environmental Management System and 10.4 Action Levels for Environmental Releases with the proposed new condition 9.1: 10.1 The licensee shall implement and maintain an environmental management system, including an integrated environmental monitoring program that includes site-wide groundwater monitoring. 10.4 The licensee shall notify the Commission within seven calendar days of becoming aware that an action level for environmental releases has been reached, and shall submit a detailed report to the Commission within 60 calendar days of becoming aware of the matter. 4
9.1 The licensee shall implement and maintain an environmental protection program, which includes a set of action levels. When the licensee becomes aware that an action level has been reached, the licensee shall notify the Commission within seven days. These changes only represent the tip of the iceberg. Prior to the introduction of the Licence Conditions Handbook early CNSC licences were long and detailed. Once these Handbooks came into use, many substantive licence conditions (e.g., compliance verification activities, reporting requirements) were moved from the actual licence into the Handbook. For example, the current CRL Handbook contains 486 Compliance Verification Criteria (CNSC 2016). These criteria are used in onsite inspections and reports to verify that CNL is conducting its activities in accordance with the Nuclear Safety and Control Act (NSCA), NSCA regulations, and the current 56 CRL site licence conditions. CNSC staff now propose to delete the vast majority of these Compliance Verification Criteria and replace them with references to CSA standards and internal CNL documents. CSA standards are not easily accessed by the public as they require signing a non-commercial use agreement. Furthermore, CCRCA were denied access to the internal CNL documents in preparing for this hearing. Relying on documents that are either difficult or impossible for the public to access will result in a major loss of transparency and accountability and will create risks of severe adverse consequences for safety, health and the environment. Detailed criteria under the headings Safety Policy, Safety Culture, Management of Safety, Sufficiency and Competency of Staff, and Safety Analysis are all proposed for deletion. Even with the coming shutdown of the NRU reactor, there remains an enormous inventory of radioactive substances at CRL (including high-level wastes) that must be handled with great care. The implications of removal of these safety criteria are even more troubling in the context of CNL s intent to build and operate a small modular reactor demonstration facility at the CRL site (see below). Here is an example of a safety criterion that would be deleted: Criterion 4.12(7): The licensee shall require and encourage licensee s personnel to internally report abnormal events and near misses relevant to the safety of CRL facilities. Major changes to requirements in the current CRL Handbook related to decommissioning activities are also proposed, e.g., the proposed deletion of Criteria 4.4(1)(c), 4.4(2), 4.4(4), 4.4(5), 4.4(7) and 4.4(11). These changes will be discussed in detail later. CNSC staff propose deletion of Criteria 10.1(6), 10.2(a-d), and 10.3(4): Criterion 10.1(6): The licensee shall continue to (a) monitor, mitigate and remediate the lands that have been contaminated by radioactive or hazardous substances; and (b) monitor the underground plumes in terms of their spatial distribution and loadings of radioactive and hazardous substances. Criterion 10.2(1): The licensee shall (a) only discharge radioactive substances to the environment by means of the release paths identified in Appendix I to the CRL Handbook and such other release paths as the Commission or a person authorized by the Commission may approve in writing; (b) use best practicable means to exclude all entrained solids, gases and non-aqueous liquids from radioactive liquid effluents prior to discharge to the environment; 5
(c) use the best practicable means to minimize the activity of gaseous and liquid radioactive substances that are released to the environment; (d) keep records that describe fully and accurately the amount and type of nuclear substances released from CRL into the environment; Criterion 10.3(4): The licensee shall keep records that describe fully and accurately the amount and type of hazardous substances released from CRL into the environment. These changes would have significant negative implications for health, safety and environmental protection. They are also described in greater detail in the next section. Detailed Review of Licence Changes of Concern and their Implications 1. Licence Period In September 2015 the federal Crown Corporation Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) transferred ownership of its subsidiary, Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Limited (CNL) to a consortium of five multinational companies. The CRL site is now managed under a Government owned-contractor operated (GoCo) business model: On September 13, 2017 AECL and CNL signed a Site Operating Company [SOC] Agreement for operation of the Chalk River Laboratories, with a 6-year term, renewable for two, 2-year terms. AECL retains ownership of the land and facilities at Chalk River, and retains responsibility for decommissioning and waste management liabilities. As explained in a recent Independent Audit Report Special Examination, AECL received $969 million in federal funding in fiscal year 2016 17 for AECL s own operations and CNL s operating expenses. Approximately $866 million of this was paid or payable by AECL to CNL. The funding included $530 million for decommissioning and waste management, intended to deal with the results of decades of nuclear activities at the Corporation s sites and with the cleanup of waste at orphan sites for which the federal government has assumed responsibility. The decommissioning and waste management total cost was estimated at over $7.9 billion as of 31 March 2016 (Auditor General of Canada 2017). CMD 18-H2 lacks an assessment of the success of the GoCo model, even though it has been in place for the entire current 17-month licence period. According to the federal Minister of Natural Resources: There is a recognition that the transition to the Government-owned, Contractor-operated model like any large transformation takes time. It is therefore too early to quantitatively assess the success of the model since the results of changes today will only become measurable years from now. (Carr 2017) CNSC is now proposing a 10-year licence period: Licence Period: This licence is valid from April 1, 2018, to March 31, 2028 unless suspended in whole or in part, amended, revoked or replaced. Given that funding in the 2016-17 and 2017-18 federal budgets to accelerate work that will reduce risks and discharge Canadaʼs radioactive waste liabilities faster exceeded a billion dollars (CCRCA and CELA 2017a), it is clearly in the interests of Canadian taxpayers that a quantitative assessment of the success 6
of the GoCo model take place prior to September 2021 when the SOC Agreement will be up for review. We recommend that the CRL licence be renewed for a maximum of three years and that the next licence hearing examine the success of the GoCo model in reducing federal nuclear liabilities. 2. Licenced Activities Section III (Licenced Activities) of the proposed new licence is similar to Section IV (Licenced Activities) of the current licence, with the exception of the addition of the phrase prepare a site for a nuclear facility. We recommend that the Commission clarify the rationale for the addition of this phrase. 3. Interpretation Section V (Interpretation) of the current licence has four conditions that are proposed for deletion: (a) Where in the conditions set out in this licence the Commission requires any matter to be approved, the Commission may (i) modify, revise or withdraw either wholly or in part any such approval; (ii) approve, either wholly or in part, any modification or revision or any proposed modification or revision to any matter for the time being approved; (iii) delegate the approval authority for (a) and/or (b) to a person or to an authority identified by the Commission for that purpose. (b) In the conditions set out in this licence any reference to any approval, consent, notification or any formal communication between the Commission or CNSC staff and the licensee (and vice versa) shall be deemed to be a reference to a written document. (e) The appendix attached to this licence forms part of the licence. [NOTE that the proposed new licence lacks this appendix, i.e. the Release Limits for Radioactive Nuclear Substances to the Environment from Chalk River Laboratories. ] (f) The licensee may use a graded approach to compliance with the licence. We strongly urge the Commission to consider the legal implications of these changes. Deletion of subsection (a) could be construed as constraining the Commission s powers with regard to approval of changes to activities or facilities at CRL. Deletion of subsection (b) could lead to a loss of clarity with regard to communications between the Commission and the licensee. Deletion of subsection (c) could mean that the Release Limits for Radioactive Nuclear Substances to the Environment from Chalk River Laboratories (the current Appendix A) no longer form part of the licence. Unless CNSC staff can provide a strong and clear rationale for the deletion of these clauses, we recommend that they be retained in the new licence. 4. General Conditions The following condition in the current licence is proposed for deletion: 1.5 Resolution of Conflicts or Inconsistencies The licensee shall, in the event of any conflict or inconsistency between licence conditions, codes or standards or regulatory documents used as compliance verification criteria in the CRL 7
Handbook, direct the conflict or inconsistency to the Commission or to a person authorized by the Commission for resolution. Given the large number of major changes proposed in the new licence, and the recent transition from AECL to CNL as the licensee, we strongly recommend that this licence condition be retained. 5. Management System As noted above, it is proposed that the wording of current licence condition 2.1 be modified to remove language referring to a written safety policy which places safety paramount within the management system, overriding all other demands, for activities carried out under this licence. Furthermore, the two subsequent conditions in the current licence are proposed for deletion: 2.2 Management of Safety The licensee shall monitor the safety performance of the CRL facilities and upgrade them when substantial risk factors not recognized earlier appear during operation, or through research findings, or revised safety analyses. 2.3 Licensee Organization The licensee shall have an operating organization adequate to support safety and an appropriate response in emergencies. These changes would be accompanied by major changes to the CRL Handbook. Compliance verification criteria proposed for deletion under condition 2.1 include: Management System Requirements Criterion 2.1(2): The licensee shall ensure that adequate and appropriate resources are allocated to each activity based on its nuclear safety significance and complexity, on the hazard and magnitude of its potential impact, and on its possible consequences if it is carried out incorrectly. Criterion 2.1(6): The licensee shall ensure that (a) sufficient resources and processes are established and maintained to define, achieve, analyze, and preserve the quality of items that are important to safety, and to take timely and effective corrective or preventive actions to respond to deviations from required specifications; (b) procured items and services meet established requirements and perform as specified and that selected suppliers continue to provide acceptable items and services during the fulfillment of their procurement obligations; (c) if the licensee delegates any activities to other organizations, the licensee remains responsible for the overall effectiveness of those activities; (d) designs, documents, tools, materials, parts, processes, services, and practices that do not conform to specified requirements are identified, corrected and reported to an appropriate level of management within the organization; (e) the safety implications of any non-conformance are evaluated, mitigation actions are taken for any safety deteriorations, and the actions taken are recorded; (f) work that is important to safety is controlled and performed using easily understood, approved current instructions, procedures, drawings, or other means, that have been appropriately validated before first use and are periodically reviewed to ensure adequacy and effectiveness; and 8
(g) personnel are trained in the requirements of the management system, so that they are competent to perform their assigned work and understand the safety consequences of their activities. Safety Policy Criterion 2.1(8): The safety policy shall include a commitment to excellent performance in all activities important to safety, the establishment and perpetuation of a strong safety culture, and control and verification of activities important to safety. Criterion 2.1(9): The safety policy shall declare the licensee s objectives and the public commitment of licensee management to nuclear safety. Criterion 2.1(10): The safety policy shall (a) be clear about giving safety an overriding priority in all licensed activities; (b) include a commitment to continuously develop safety; (c) require directives for implementing the policy and monitoring safety performance; (d) require safety objectives and targets, clearly formulated in such a way that they can be easily monitored and followed up by the licensee s management; (e) require that an acceptable level of safety culture be achieved; (f) require clear accountability in safety matters; (g) require an independent internal management unit with responsibility for the ongoing proactive oversight and surveillance of nuclear safety activities and compliance with regulatory requirements; (h) require that adequate resources are devoted to safety; (i) require regular review of practices that contribute to facility safety; (j) be communicated to all CRL personnel with tasks important to safety, in such a way that the policy is understood and applied; and (k) be communicated to contractors, in such a way that licensee expectations are understood and applied in the contractors activities. Safety Culture Criterion 2.1(11): The licensee shall use the management system to promote and support a healthy safety culture by: (a) ensuring a common understanding of the key aspects of safety culture within the organization; (b) providing the means by which the organization supports individuals and teams in carrying out their tasks safely and successfully, taking into account the interaction between individuals, technology and the organization; (c) reinforcing a learning and questioning attitude at all levels of the organization; and (d) providing the means by which the organization continually seeks to develop and improve its safety culture. Compliance verification criteria proposed for deletion under condition 2.2 include: Management of Safety Criterion 2.2(1): The licensee shall maintain CRL facilities at an acceptable level of safety, and shall upgrade, as soon as reasonably practicable, facilities when substantial risk factors may appear. The licensee shall demonstrate that the level of safety of a facility after an upgrade is better or at least at the same level as before the upgrade. Criterion 2.2(2): The licensee shall ensure that 9
(a) CRL is operated in a safe manner and in accordance with all applicable legal and regulatory requirements; (b) decisions on safety matters are preceded by appropriate investigation and consultation so that all relevant safety aspects are considered; (c) safety issues are subjected to appropriate safety review by a suitably qualified review function; (d) CRL staff is provided with the necessary facilities and working conditions to carry out work in a safe manner; (e) safety performance is continuously monitored through an appropriate review system in order to ensure that safety is maintained and improved as needed; (f) relevant operating experience, international development of safety standards and new knowledge gained through research and development projects are analyzed in a systematic way and continuously used to improve the CRL and licensee activities; and (g) CRL activities and processes are controlled through a documented management system covering all activities, including relevant activities of vendors and contractors that could have a detrimental effect on the safe operation of CRL. Criterion 2.2(3): The licensee may delegate authority to carry out licensed activities on its behalf, but shall not delegate the licensee s prime responsibility for safety. The licensee holds the overall responsibility for safety of the CRL facilities; the licensee s responsibility for safety cannot be delegated. Unless CNSC staff can provide a strong and clear rationale for their proposed changes, we recommend that all licence conditions and compliance verification criteria related to management of safety, safety policy, and safety culture be retained in the new CRL site licence and CRL Handbook. 6. Human Performance Program It is proposed that the wording of current licence condition 3.2 (Training) be modified to remove language referring to an overall training policy and initial and continuing training programs on the basis of long-term qualifications and competencies required for performing a job, and training goals that acknowledge the critical role of safety. Furthermore, conditions 3.3 (Staffing and Certification NRU Reactor) and 3.4 (Minimum Staffing Requirements) in the current licence are proposed for deletion. Deletion of licence conditions related to the NRU Reactor can be justified in light of the scheduled March 31, 2018 shut-down of this facility (and the molybdenum-99 production facility). But additional justification is required for the proposed deletion of minimum staffing requirements: 3.4 Minimum Staffing Requirements The licensee shall have on site and at all times a sufficient number of qualified staff for both normal operation and to respond to accident and emergency conditions. This licence condition is currently applicable to the ZED-2 Reactor; the Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Facility B429; the B234 Universal Cells; the Tritium Laboratory; the Fuel and Materials Cells; the Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Facility B405; the CECEUD (Combined Electrolysis and Catalytic Exchange Upgrading and Detritiation Facility) ; the Health Physics Neutron Generator; the Recycle Fuel Fabrication Laboratory; the Gamma Beam Irradiation Facility (B524); the GC60 Gamma Irradiator (B513); the Van de Graaf Accelerator; and the Waste Management Areas. 10
Unless CNSC staff can provide a strong and clear rationale for their proposed changes, we recommend that the original language of licence condition 3.1 (Human Performance) be retained; that licence conditions 3.2 (Training) and 3.4 (Minimum Staffing Requirements) be retained; and that the compliance verification criteria related to these three licence conditions be retained in the new CRL Handbook (with appropriate changes to reflect shut-down of the NRU Reactor and molybdenum-99 production facility). 7. Operating Performance Operating performance licence conditions proposed for deletion are: 4.2 New Nuclear Facilities The licensee shall only carry out construction and/or operation activities of any new nuclear facility at the CRL site with the prior approval of the Commission. 4.3 Nuclear Facilities in Storage-with-Surveillance State The licensee shall undertake maintenance, monitoring and surveillance activities for nuclear facilities in storage-withsurveillance state in accordance with documented plans and procedures. 4.4 Nuclear Facilities Undergoing Decommissioning Activities The licensee shall only decommission a nuclear facility, or any part thereof, at the CRL site in accordance with documented decommissioning plan(s) and procedures, and with the prior approval of the Commission to proceed with the decommissioning. 4.5 Modifications to Existing Facilities and Processes The licensee shall ensure that permanent and temporary modifications to systems, structures, equipment, component and software important to safety are adequately designed, reviewed, controlled and implemented, including the compliance with relevant safety requirements. 4.7 Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Management The licensee shall develop, implement and maintain, where applicable, a comprehensive set of emergency operating procedures for design basis accidents and beyond design basis accidents, and guidelines for severe accident management. 4.11 Fire Protection The licensee shall implement and maintain a fire protection program to address fire protection and prevention at the CRL site. 4.12 Operational Experience Program The licensee shall develop, implement and maintain a program to collect, screen, analyze and document operating experience and events at the CRL site or reported by industry in a systematic way, and to apply the lessons learned to activities at the CRL site. 4.14 Chemistry Control The licensee shall implement and maintain a chemistry control program at the CRL site. 4.15 Reporting of Unplanned Situations or Events The licensee shall report to the Commission unplanned situations or events at the CRL site. Significant changes are proposed to the wording of other current licence conditions, e.g., compare the existing condition 4.16 with the proposed language in 3.2: 4.16 Reporting of Annual Compliance Monitoring and Operational Performance The licensee shall submit annual compliance monitoring and operational performance reports to the Commission. 11
3.2 Reporting Requirements The licensee shall implement and maintain a program for reporting to the Commission or a person authorized by the Commission. We recommend retaining the current language of licence condition 4.16, as this ensures that reports will be submitted to the Commission, and hence these reports should be publicly available. Along with the proposed deletion of nine licence conditions, changes to the CRL Handbook are proposed for most of the 16 operating performance licence conditions. We have already noted some of the changes to the compliance verification criteria related to decommissioning. Other changes include: Operations Criterion 4.1(2): The licensee shall not operate any CRL facility when (a) any problem or potential problem is discovered through research findings (including internal and external operating experience) or new or revised safety analyses that represents (i) a new hazard or potential hazard to the health and safety of persons, security or the environment; or (ii) a known hazard or potential hazard to the health and safety of persons, security or the environment that is different in nature, greater in probability, or greater in magnitude than was previously presented to the Commission in licensing documents; (b) the facility operates in a state that was not considered in the safety analysis reports; (c) an event of a type that was not considered in the safety analysis reports occurs; (d) an unexplained or unexpected behaviour of a reactor core (or a nuclear facility) or of a safety system occurs; or (e) a nuclear substance or a hazardous substance is released in a quantity or at a rate that is greater than that predicted in the bounding case analysed in the safety analysis reports. Design of New Nuclear Facilities Criterion 4.2(1): The design of any new facility shall follow a formal design process, which shall include consideration of human factors. Criterion 4.2(2): The design of any new facility shall meet the applicable criteria in subsection 6.1 of Part II of the CRL Handbook and shall be in compliance with applicable standards (including their referenced publications) specified in CRL Handbook. Construction of New Nuclear Facilities Criterion 4.2(3): The licensee shall submit the required documentation for review, and shall obtain the approval of the Commission or a person authorized by the Commission before proceeding with the construction. Criterion 4.2(4): A determination of the applicability of the CEAA must be made by CNSC staff. An environmental assessment under CEAA may or may not be required. Operation of New Nuclear Facilities Criterion 4.2(6): The licensee shall not operate any new nuclear facility (including any new Class II prescribed equipment) at CRL without the prior approval of the Commission or a person authorized by the Commission. Modifications Criterion 4.5(1): The licensee shall ensure that any modification to any CRL facility, irrespective of the reason for the modification, does not degrade the facility s ability to be operated safely. 12
Criterion 4.5(2): The licensee shall not construct, install or modify any facility, building, structure, component or equipment if that construction, installation or modification would result in impact on health, safety or the environment that is different in nature or greater in magnitude or probability than that described in the licensing documents without prior approval of the Commission or a person authorized by the Commission. Criterion 4.5(3): The licensee shall not make modifications to, or deviate from the design, operating conditions, purposes, methods, procedures or limits described in the safety analysis reports and/or operational limits and conditions documents that would result in an impact on health, safety or the environment that is different in nature or greater in magnitude or probability than that described in those documents without prior approval of the Commission or a person authorized by the Commission. Criterion 4.5(4): A determination of the applicability of the CEAA must be made. An environmental assessment under CEAA may or may not be required. Removal of this language referring to prior approval of the Commission, and to determination of the applicability of the CEAA (the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act), appears significant, because modifications to activities and facilities (such as the waste management areas) at the CRL site could have potentially significant adverse impacts on the environment. The requirement to assess these impacts should be retained. Other significant deletions include compliance verification criteria related to Operational Limits and Conditions, Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Management, Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations, and Fire Protection. We have already noted the proposed deletion of criterion 4.12(7) under Operational Experience Program. The current CRL Handbook also currently includes the following criteria, which have been deleted in the proposed Handbook: Criterion 4.12(1): The licensee shall evaluate the operating experience at CRL to identify (a) any latent safety-relevant failures or potential precursors; (b) any possible adverse trends in safety performance; (c) any reduction in safety margins; (d) significant events using clearly-defined criteria based on impact on safety; (e) repeat events using trend analysis; (f) trends based on the causes, contributing factors and initiators of previous events. Criterion 4.12(2): The licensee shall ensure that significant and repeat events are investigated to their root causes to identify effective corrective actions. Criterion 4.12(3): Relevant operational experience and events reported by industry shall also be subject to a systematic process of collecting, screening, analyzing, and applying the lessons learned to activities at CRL. Criterion 4.12(4): The licensee shall designate staff for carrying out this program, for the dissemination of findings important to safety and, where appropriate, for recommendations on actions to be taken. Significant findings and trends shall be reported to the licensee s top management. Criterion 4.12(5): The licensee shall provide adequate training, resources and support to licensee s staff responsible for evaluation of operational experience and investigation of events. Criterion 4.12(6): The licensee shall ensure that results are obtained, conclusions are drawn, measures are taken, good practices are considered, and timely and appropriate corrective 13
actions are implemented to prevent recurrence of situations referred to in criterion 4.12(1) of the CRL Handbook, and to counteract developments adverse to safety. Criterion 4.12(8): The licensee shall ensure that information resulting from the operational experience is disseminated to relevant staff, lessons learned are applied where relevant, and that operating experience at CRL and other licensees is appropriately considered in training programs. Criterion 4.12(9): The licensee shall perform periodic reviews of the effectiveness of the system for investigation of events and operational experience feedback process based on performance criteria. We note in particular the importance of reviewing operational experience and events across the entire nuclear industry, given the status of CRL as Canada s national nuclear research laboratory. While some of the compliance verification criteria proposed for deletion may be addressed in Canadian Standards Association documents or in internal CNL documents, the public does not have ready access to these. To ensure accountability and transparency, we recommend that current operating performance licence conditions and compliance verification criteria be retained, unless CNSC staff can provide a strong and clear rationale for their deletion. 8. Safety Analysis Although CNSC staff propose to retain a licence condition on Safety Analysis, all compliance verification criteria would be deleted from the new CRL Handbook and replaced with references to internal documents and to CNSC REGDOC- 2.4.1. We note that REGDOC-2.4.1 is primarily intended for safety analysis of nuclear reactors and would not necessarily provide criteria for safety analysis of other CRL nuclear facilities. Thus, it would seem important to retain criteria such as the following: Criterion 5.1(1): The safety analysis shall identify: (a) radiological hazards related to production, possessing or processing licensed nuclear substances at the facility; (b) chemical hazards of licensed nuclear substances and hazardous chemicals produced from licensed material; (c) facility hazards that could affect the safety of licensed nuclear substances and thus present an increased radiological risk; (d) potential accident sequences caused by process deviations or other events internal to the facility and credible external events, including natural phenomena; (e) the consequence and the likelihood of occurrence of each potential accident sequence, and the methods used to determine the consequences and likelihoods; (f) each item relied on for safety, the characteristics of its preventive, mitigative, or other safety function, and the assumptions and conditions under which the item is relied upon to support compliance with the performance requirements; and (g) common-cause failures initiated by internal and/or external events. Criterion 5.1(2): The objectives of the safety analysis shall be to (a) confirm that the design of the nuclear facility meets its design and safety requirements; (b) derive or confirm operational limits and conditions which should be consistent with the design and safety requirements; 14
(c) demonstrate that the management of the anticipated operational occurrences (AOO) and design basis accidents (DBA) is possible by automatic response of either the control systems or safety systems in combination with prescribed operator actions; (d) assist in establishing the progression of severe accidents for the purpose of severe accident management; (e) assist in demonstrating that the accident management program is capable of providing mitigation for beyond design basis accidents (BDBA), to the extent practicable; and (f) assist in demonstrating that safety goals, that may be established to limit the safety risks posed by the nuclear facility, are met. Even if certain safety analysis criteria are only applicable to nuclear reactors, we recommend that these also be retained, given that CNL aims to build and operate a small modular reactor demonstration facility, possibly within the proposed 10-year licence term proposed by CNSC staff (see below). Paragraph 6(c) of the Class I Nuclear Facilities Regulations requires that an application for a licence to operate a Class I nuclear facility contain a final safety analysis report demonstrating the adequacy of the design of the nuclear facility. The current CRL Handbook contains criteria for preparation of safety analysis reports that are specific to CRL. The proposed new CRL Handbook would delete these, and would instead refer to CNSC REGDOC- 2.4.1 and various internal documents. Current safety analysis criteria call for attention to interactions among the different facilities at the CRL site, a description of radioactive and hazardous waste management provisions, and a description of how relevant decommissioning and end-of-life aspects are taken into account during operation: Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports Criterion 5.1(20): The licensee shall establish and document the typical format and content of the safety analysis reports. Criterion 5.1(21): As a minimum, the safety analysis report shall (a) describe the facility and its interaction with other nuclear or non-nuclear facilities (buildings/structures) at CRL;) (b) identify applicable regulations, codes and standards; (c) describe the relevant aspects of the facility organization and the management of safety; (d) contain detailed descriptions of the safety functions, all SSCs important to safety, their design basis and functioning in all operational states, including shutdown and accident conditions; (e) describe the normal operation of the facility and demonstrate the facility is safe; (f) describe the emergency operation procedures and accident management guidelines, inspection and testing provisions, qualification and training of personnel, operational experience feedback program, and the management of aging; (g) outline the general design concept and the approach adopted to meet the fundamental safety objectives; (h) contain an evaluation of the safety aspects related to the facility and its interaction with the CRL site; (i) describe the safety analyses performed to assess the safety of the facility in response to postulated initiating events against safety criteria and radiological release limits; (j) contain the technical basis for the operational limits and conditions; (k) describe the policy, strategy, methods, and provisions for radiation protection; (l) describe the policy, strategy, methods, and provisions for environmental protection; 15
(m) describe the emergency preparedness arrangements and the liaison and co-ordination with onsite and offsite organizations in the response to an emergency; (n) describe the radioactive and hazardous waste management provisions; and (o) describe how the relevant decommissioning and end-of-life aspects are taken into account during operation. We recommend that all current safety analysis compliance verification criteria be retained unless CNSC staff can provide a strong and clear rationale for their deletion. 9. Physical Design As noted above, existing licence condition 6.1 (Physical Design) differs significantly from the proposed new condition 5.1 (Physical Design). Language referring to applying the defence-in-depth principle to the design of new or modified nuclear facility at the CRL site in order to prevent, or if prevention fails, to mitigate the consequences resulting from radioactive releases would be removed. In our view, this language is extremely important with regard to the design or modification of any waste management facility, or of any proposed small modular reactor demonstration facility. The current CRL Handbook contains physical design criteria that apply mainly to nuclear fission reactors, but adds that For other nuclear facilities at CRL, the criteria have to be adapted to the type of facility such that the intent of each criterion is achieved where applicable. CNSC staff propose to delete all 72 physical design criteria found in the current CRL Handbook, including the following: Criterion 6.1(1): The licensee shall make design provisions to ensure that potential radiation doses to the public and site personnel do not exceed prescribed limits and are as low as reasonably achievable. Criterion 6.1(2): The licensee shall ensure that all designs, including changes to the designs, meet all relevant safety, code, standard and regulatory requirements. Criterion 6.1(3): The design shall have as an objective the prevention or, if this fails, the mitigation of consequences resulting from anticipated operational occurrences and design basis accident conditions. Criterion 6.1(4): The licensee shall apply the defence-in-depth principle to prevent, or if prevention fails, to mitigate harmful effects of radioactive releases. Guidance 6.1(4): Defence in depth is the application of multiple levels of protection for all relevant safety activities, whether organizational, behavioural or equipment related. Application of the concept of defence in depth throughout the design and operation of a nuclear facility provides multilayer protection against a wide range of anticipated operational occurrences and accident conditions, including those resulting from equipment failure or human error within the facility, and from events that originate outside the facility. The strategy for defence in depth shall be twofold: first, to prevent accidents, and second, if prevention fails, to limit the potential radiological and associated chemical consequences and to prevent any evolution to more serious conditions. Criterion 6.1(5): The design shall provide multiple physical barriers to the uncontrolled release of radioactive substances to the environment, and an adequate protection of the barriers. Criterion 6.1(6): The design shall prevent as far as practicable 16
(a) challenges to the integrity of the barriers; (b) failure of a barrier when challenged; and (c) failure of a barrier as consequence of failure of another barrier. Criterion 6.1(12): The following types of natural and human-induced external events shall be taken into account in the design of the facility, as a minimum: (a) extreme wind loading (definition of extreme shall be based on historical weather data for the site); (b) extreme outside temperatures; (c) extreme rainfall, snow conditions or site flooding; (d) extreme cooling water temperature and icing; (e) earthquake; (f) airplane crash; (g) nearby transportation, industrial activities or other conditions that reasonably can cause fires, explosions or other threats to the safety of nuclear facilities at CRL; and (h) electromagnetic interferences. Criterion 6.1(60): High pressure core melt scenarios shall be prevented. Criterion 6.1(61): Containment degradation by molten fuel shall be prevented or mitigated as far as reasonably practicable. Criterion 6.1(62): The SSCs [structures, systems and components] important to safety shall be designed to be tested, maintained, repaired and inspected or monitored periodically to maintain integrity and functional capability over their lifetime, without undue risk to workers or significant reduction in their availability. Where such provisions cannot be attained, the licensee shall specify proven alternative or indirect methods and shall take adequate safety precautions to compensate for potential undiscovered degradation. We recommend that current physical design licence condition and compliance verification criteria be retained unless CNSC staff can provide a strong and clear rationale for their deletion. 10. Fitness for Service CNSC staff propose to subsume five current Fitness for Service licence conditions (7.1 Maintenance, In- Service Inspection and Functional Testing; 7.2 Frequency of Calibration of Radiation Detection Instruments; 7.3 Control of Measuring and Test Equipment; 7.4 Aging Management; and 7.5 Environmental Qualification) under a single condition: 6.1 Fitness for Service Program The licensee shall implement and maintain a fitness for service program. Staff also propose deletion of 41 fitness for service compliance verification criteria currently found in the CRL Handbook, including: General Criterion 7.1(1): The licensee shall develop, implement and maintain documented programs of maintenance, testing, surveillance, and inspection of SSCs [structures, systems and components] important to safety to ensure that their availability, reliability, and functionality remain effective in accordance with the design over the lifetime of the facility. These programs shall take into account operational limits and conditions. 17
Criterion 7.1(2): The licensee shall review the programs for maintenance, testing, surveillance, and inspection of SSCs important to safety periodically in light of operating experience, safety analysis and other requirements. The licensee shall assess any proposed changes to the program to analyze their effect on system availability, their impact on safety, and their conformance with applicable requirements. Criterion 7.1(3): The licensee shall determine the extent and frequency of preventive maintenance, testing, surveillance, and inspection of SSCs through a systematic approach, following operating experience and best industry practices, taking into account as a minimum (a) their importance to safety; (b) their inherent reliability; (c) their potential for degradation (based on operational and other relevant experience, research and vendor recommendations); (d) the consequences of failure; (e) results of condition monitoring; and (f) the deterministic and probabilistic safety analysis. Criterion 7.1(4): The licensee shall establish, review, and validate procedures for maintenance, testing, surveillance, and inspections. Criterion 7.1(5): The licensee shall establish and implement a comprehensive work planning and control system to ensure that maintenance, testing, surveillance and inspections are properly authorized, carried out, and results documented, according to procedures and in the scheduled time window. Criterion 7.1(8): Following any abnormal event due to which the safety functions and functional integrity of any structure, system or component may have been challenged, the licensee shall identify and revalidate the safety functions and carry out any necessary remedial actions, including inspection, testing, maintenance, and repair, as appropriate. System Health Monitoring Criterion 7.1(22): The licensee shall develop a system health monitoring program for nuclear systems important to safety. Frequency of Calibration of Radiation Detection Instruments Criterion 7.2(1): The licensee shall maintain an accurate inventory of monitoring instruments and associated/related equipment, both in use and in storage, used to make radiation protection and environmental protection measurements such as radiation dose, dose rate, activity, or radionuclide concentration. Each instrument shall have assigned a calibration frequency (or no calibration required as appropriate). Criterion 7.2(2): The licensee shall ensure that all monitoring instruments referred to in criterion 7.2(1) that require calibration are calibrated when first taken into use; after any damage to, or servicing of the instrument (excluding battery changes); at any time the instrument s response is suspected of being incorrect; and within 12-month intervals thereafter for radiation survey meters, and as specified by the manufacturer for all other instruments. Environmental Qualification Criterion 7.5(1): The licensee shall ensure that all required systems, equipment and components in the nuclear facility are qualified to perform their safety functions under the environmental conditions defined by the nuclear facility s design basis accident. 18