Chapter 15: Pricing and the Revenue Management. utdallas.edu/~metin

Similar documents
Yield Management. Serguei Netessine 1 The Wharton School University of Pennsylvania

Internet Based Supply Chain Strategies

Yield Management. Chapter 12

36106 Managerial Decision Modeling Revenue Management

Terry College of Business - ECON 4950

Price Discrimination. It is important to stress that charging different prices for similar goods is not pure price discrimination.

Supply Chain Coordination using contracts

The lead-time gap. Planning Demand and Supply

Chapter 11. Pricing with Market Power. Capturing Consumer Surplus

Aggregate Planning and S&OP

Supply Chain Coordination using contracts

Managing Capacity and Demand

SERVICE PRICING & REVENUE MANAGEMENT

SHA541 Transcripts. Transcript: Course Introduction. SHA541: Price and Inventory Controls School of Hotel Administration, Cornell University

Lecture 12. Monopoly

Flow Model: Focus on Inventory

Pricing with Perfect Competition. Advanced Pricing Strategies. Markup Pricing. Pricing with Market Power

Lecture 7 Pricing with Market Power

Chapter 10: Monopoly

Chapter 1 Introduction to Pricing Techniques

Presentation Outline. Direct to Consumer (DTC)

OPTIMIZATION OF AIRLINE USING GENETIC ALGORITHM

Pricing Concepts. Essentials of 6 Marketing Lamb, Hair, McDaniel CHAPTER 19. Designed by Eric Brengle B-books, Ltd.

Differential Analysis: Relevant Costs the Key to Decision Making

Chapter 6 Setting Prices and Implementing Revenue Management

Aggregate Planning (session 1,2)

What is DPRM? INSEAD Ioana Popescu DPRM 6. Professor Ioana Popescu OPTIMIZE PROFITS DYNAMIC PRICING & REVENUE MANAGEMENT. A systematic approach to

EconS 301 Intermediate Microeconomics Review Session #9 Chapter 12: Capturing Surplus

Price Discrimination: Part 1

Managerial Economics

Managerial Economics

Lecture 6 Pricing with Market Power

7.1 Prices are economic stop lights. They direct buying and selling. When prices become sticky: The market is less efficient in allocating resources.

Pricing Concepts. Essentials of 6 Marketing Lamb, Hair, McDaniel CHAPTER 19. Designed by Eric Brengle B-books, Ltd.

PRICING. Quantity demanded is the number of the firm s product customers wish to purchase. What affects the quantity demanded?

Airline Seat Allocation and Overbooking

Service Operations Management

MONOPOLY SOLUTIONS TO TEXT PROBLEMS: Quick Quizzes

Introduction to Supply Chain and Logistical Management

Chapter 13. Microeconomics. Monopolistic Competition: The Competitive Model in a More Realistic Setting

SHA544: Displacement and Negotiated Pricing

OPERATİONS & LOGİSTİCS MANAGEMENT İN AİR TRANSPORTATİON

Relevant Costs for Decision Making

Price Discrimination

Inventory Management at Big Bazaar

Front Office Management 6 th SEM, Chapter 1 YIELD MANAGEMENT Includes

Contracts to Coordinate. utdallas.edu/~metin

MODELING VALUE AT RISK (VAR) POLICIES FOR TWO PARALLEL FLIGHTS OWNED BY THE SAME AIRLINE

EARN $100 INTRODUCING DYNAMIC PACKAGING AT YOUR FINGERTIPS!

Price discrimination by a monopolist

Global Savings Plan (GSP) Manual

AC : TEACHING REVENUE MANAGEMENT IN AN ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

NEWSVENDOR & REVENUE MANAGEMENT

David Simchi-Levi M.I.T. November 2000

Economics Lecture notes- Semester 1:

Deadweight Loss of Monopoly

Intro to Computation and Transportation

ECON 115. Industrial Organization

Dynamic Pricing and Revenue Management Final Exam. Fall Name: ID: Score:

Chapter 15. Supply Chain and Channel Management

Chapter 13 Notes Page 1. The key part of this analysis is to consider only the information that is relevant to the decision being made.

Why do monopolies charge different prices to different customers: price discrimination: eg mobile phone tariffs)

The Economics of E-commerce and Technology. Dynamic Pricing

Topic 10: Price Discrimination

Marketing Audit Guide

At the Heart of Maximizing Ancillary Revenues

Chapter 9 Balancing Demand and Productive Capacity

10-1. Learning Objective. Identify relevant and irrelevant costs and benefits in a decision.

Operations Management - II Post Graduate Program Session 7. Vinay Kumar Kalakbandi Assistant Professor Operations & Systems Area

Managerial Economics ECO404 SUPPLY ANALYSIS

Class Presentation for March 29 & 31, Chapter #25

Explicit Price Discrimination

Chapter 10 Lecture Notes

Chapter 6: Sellers and Incentives

Monopoly Behavior or Price Discrimination Chapter 25

New Paradigms in Travel Distribution THE EASTMAN GROUP,, INC.

Revenue management under demand uncertainty: the case for a robust optimization approach

APPLICATION OF REVENUE MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES IN WAREHOUSING OF A THIRD PARTY LOGISTICS FIRM. A Thesis by. Prakash Venkitachalam

EQ: What is Income Elasticity of Demand?

WHY PRICING DOES NOT EQUAL REVENUE MANAGEMENT FOR HOTELS

CWT ViewPoint: CWT ViewPoint The Impact of Oil Prices and Fuel Surcharges on Corporate Travel. Perspective on industry-shaping developments

Unit 6 Retailing Key Vocabulary

BUSINESS PLAN COMPETITION 2011

Service Strategy. Service Strategies Strategies and Operations Service Package Role of Information. Review: Nature of Service

Module 12: Managing Service Delivery Lesson 30: Managing Demand and Capacity

Technical Line FASB final guidance

Chapter 22 Making Consumer Decisions

Perfect price discrimination (PPD) 1 Graph. Monopolist sells product with downward-sloping demand curve Each consumer demands one unit: demand curve

ECON 115. Industrial Organization

ECON 202 2/13/2009. Pure Monopoly Characteristics. Chapter 22 Pure Monopoly

Monopoly. Chapter 15

New Paradigms in Corporate Travel Buying

Demand- how much of a product consumers are willing and able to buy at a given price during a given period.

Questions You Need To Answer Before Starting a Business. Presented by Burt Wallerstein

Forecasting, Overbooking and Dynamic Pricing

INFORMS Transactions on Education

Role of Inventory in the Supply Chain. Inventory categories. Inventory management

Chapter 12 Managing Relationships and Building Loyalty

Manage Pricing Decisions

Introduction. Learning Objectives. What Is Operations Management? PMBA8155 Operations Management

Transcription:

Chapter 15: Pricing and the Revenue Management 1

Outline The Role of RM (Revenue Management) in the SCs RM for Multiple Customer Segments RM for Perishable Assets RM for Seasonable Demand RM for Bulk and Spot Customers Using RM in Practice Summary of Learning Objectives 2

The Role of RM in SCs Revenue management is the use of pricing to increase the profit generated from a limited supply of supply chain assets SCs are about matching demand and capacity Prices affect demands Yield management similar to RM but deals more with quantities rather than prices Supply assets exist in two forms Capacity: expiring Inventory: often preserved Revenue management may also be defined as offering different prices based on customer segment, time of use and product or capacity availability to increase supply chain profits Most commonly known example is probably in airline ticket pricing Pricing according to customer segmentation at any time Pricing according to reading days for any customer segment» Reading days: Number of days until departure 3

Conditions for RM to Work The value of the product varies in different market segments Airline seats: Leisure vs. Business travel Films: Movie theater goers, DVD buyers, Cheap movie theater goers, TV watchers. The product is highly perishable or product waste occurs Fashion and seasonal apparel High tech products Demand has seasonal and other peaks Products ordered at Amazon.com, peaking in December Supply Chain textbook orders peaking in August and January. The product is sold both in bulk and on the spot market Owner of warehouse who can decide whether to lease the entire warehouse through long-term contracts or save a portion of the warehouse for use in the spot market Truck capacities for a transportation company 4

RM for Multiple Customer Segments If a supplier serves multiple customer segments with a fixed asset, the supplier can improve revenues by setting different prices for each segment Must figure out customer segments Prices must be set with barriers such that the segment willing to pay more is not able to pay the lower price Barriers: Time, location, prestige, inconvenience, extra service In the case of time barrier, The amount of the asset reserved for the higher price segment is such that quantities below are equal» the expected marginal revenue from the higher priced segment» the price of the lower price segment 5

Barrier: Extra service Price P 0 =1200 What is the targeted demand? What is the Revenue? Could we do better? Money left on the table =160,000 Revenue=480,000 C=400 P=2000-2Q No. seats 6

Customer Segmentation by extra service Example: Cruise ship A cruise ship with C=400 identical cabins What is the price to maximize revenue? 2000 Price P=2000-2Q Demand Curve 1000 No. Seats 7

Example: Cruise ship Price Offer additional services to differentiate products and pricing P 2 =1600 P 1 =1200 Revenue=1600(200) + 1200(400-200)=560,000 Increase revenue more? Q 2 =200 Q 1 =400 No. seats 8

Example Price P 3 =1800 P 2 =1600 P 1 =1200 Revenue=1800(100) + 1600(200-100) + 1200(400-200)=580,000 How to allocate capacity for each product/service optimally? Q 3 =100 Q 2 =200 Q 1 =400 No. seats 9

Barrier: Time which implies Customer Segment RM for Multiple Customer Segments p L = the price charged to the lower price segment p H = the price charged to the higher price segment D H = mean demand for the higher price segment s H = standard deviation of demand for the higher price segment C H = capacity reserved for the higher price segment R H (C H ) = expected marginal revenue from reserving more capacity = Prob(Demand from higher price segment > C H ) x p H Optimality by equivalance of marginal revenues: R H (C H ) = p L which leads to Prob(Demand from higher price segment > C H ) = p L / p H C H = F -1 (1- p L /p H, D H,s H ) = Norminv(1- p L /p H, D H,s H ) 10

Example 15.1: ToFrom Trucking Revenue from segment A = p A = $3.50 per cubic ft Revenue from segment B = p B = $2.00 per cubic ft Mean demand for segment A = D A = 3,000 cubic ft Std dev of segment A demand = s A = 1,000 cubic ft C A = Norminv(1- p B /p A, D A,s A ) = Norminv(1- (2.00/3.50), 3000, 1000) = 2,820 cubic ft If p A increases to $5.00 per cubic foot, then C A = Norminv(1- p B /p A, D A,s A ) = Norminv(1- (2.00/5.00), 3000, 1000) = 3,253 cubic ft 11

Two questions: What happens to the capacity reserved for the high paying segment, when the high paying segment starts paying about the low paying segment? How much does the high paying segment value quick service? We never consider the distribution of the demand for low paying segment when computing the reserved capacity for the high paying segment. Can this be correct, why? 12

RM in the Service Industries Airline Industry uses RM the most. Evidence of airline revenue increases of 4 to 6 percent: With effectively no increase in flight operating costs RM allows for tactical matching of demand vs. supply: Booking limits can direct low-fare demand to empty flights Protect seats for highest fare passengers on forecast full flights Hotel, Restaurant, Car rental, Overseas shipping, Cruise travel, Transportation capacity providers, Computation capacity providers (computer farms) and sometimes Health care industries show similarities to airline industry in using RM. 13

What are the barriers among customer segments in the airline industry? Sensitivity to Duration Sensitivity to Flexibility Low Leisure No Travelers Demand No Business High High Offer Travelers Low Sensitivity to Price 14

A RM Model Expected Revenue = Expected Revenue from Business Class + Expected Revenue from Leisure Class Assume demand distribution for the business class is known and the demand for leisure class is C r B revenue/bu siness passenger, r R( Q) r B Q 0 xf L ( x) dx Q Q f ( x) dx ( C Q) r dr( Q) rb [1 F( Q)] rl 0 dq Marginal revenue of business class = Marginal revenue of leisure class F( Q revenue/le isure passenger, C Airplane capacity ) r r r * B L SL: Service Level B L 15

Example: Airline seat classes There are only two price classes Leisure: (f2) $100 per ticket Business: (f1) $250 per ticket Total available capacity= 80 seats Distribution of demand for business class is known Assume enough demand for the leisure class How many seats to allocate to the business class to maximize expected revenue? 16

Probability Business Class Demand Distribution 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Probability cdf Probability 5% 11% 28% 22% 18% 10% 6% cdf 5% 16% 44% 66% 84% 94% 100 Business Class Seat Allocation 17

Probability Identifying Optimal Allocation SL= 0.60 Note: r B : 250, r L : 100 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Probability cdf SL = (r B - r L )/ r B = (250-100)/250 = 60% Probability 5% 11% 28% 22% 18% 10% 6% cdf 5% 16% 44% 66% 84% 94% 100 Business Class Seat Allocation Optimal Allocation Quantity = 15 18

Expected Revenue Expected Revenue 9600 9400 9200 9000 8800 8600 8400 8200 8000 7800 9438 9363 9238 9063 8688 8638 8000 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Business Class 19

Optimality Condition Optimality Condition: Choose the number of seats for the business class such that marginal revenue from business class is the same as the marginal revenue from the leisure class. 250 Marginal Revenue Business 200 Marginal Revenue Leisure 150 100 50 0 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 20

RM for Perishable Assets Any asset that loses value over time is perishable Examples: high-tech products such as computers and cell phones, high fashion apparel, underutilized capacity, fruits and vegetables Two basic approaches: Dynamic Pricing: Vary price over time to maximize expected revenue Overbooking: Overbook sales of the asset to account for cancellations» Airlines use the overbooking most» Passengers are offloaded to other routes» Offloaded passengers are given flight coupons» This practice is legal Dynamic pricing belongs to RM while overbooking can be said to more within the domain of Yield management.» But concepts are more important than the names! 21

RM for Perishable Assets Overbooking or overselling of a supply chain asset is valuable if order cancellations occur and the asset is perishable The level of overbooking is based on the trade-off between the cost of wasting the asset if too many cancellations lead to unused assets (spoilage) and the cost of arranging a backup (offload) if too few cancellations lead to committed orders being larger than the available capacity Spoilage and offload are actually terms used in the airline industry 22

RM for Perishable Assets p = price at which each unit of the asset is sold c = cost of using or producing each unit of the asset b = cost per unit at which a backup can be used in the case of shortage C w = p c = marginal cost of wasted capacity = Overage cost C s = b c = marginal cost of a capacity shortage = Underage cost O* = optimal overbooking level P(Demand<Capacity)= C u / (C u + C o ) P(Demand>=Capacity)= C o / (C u + C o ) P(Order cancellations< O*) = C o / (C u + C o ) s* := Probability(order cancellations < O*) = C w / (C w + C s ) Beware: This is the newsvendor formula in disguise. 23

RM for Perishable Assets If the distribution of cancellations is known to be normal with mean m c and standard deviation s c then O* = F -1 (s*, m c, s c ) = Norminv(s*, m c, s c ) If the distribution of cancellations is known only as a function of the booking level (capacity L + overbooking O) to have a mean of m(l+o) and std deviation of s(l+o), the optimal overbooking level is the solution to the following equation: O * = F -1 (s*,m(l+o),s(l+o)) = Norminv(s*,m(L+O),s(L+O)) 24

Example 15.2 Cost of wasted capacity = C w = $10 per dress Cost of capacity shortage = C s = $5 per dress s* = C w / (C w + C s ) = 10/(10+5) = 0.667 m c = 800; s c = 400 O* = Norminv(s*, m c,s c ) = Norminv(0.667,800,400) = 973 If the mean is 15% of the booking level and the coefficient of variation is 0.5, then the optimal overbooking level is the solution of the following equation: O * = Norminv(0.667,0.15(5000+O * ),0.075(5000+O * )) Using Excel Solver, O* = 1,115 25

RM for Seasonal Demand Seasonal peaks of demand are common in many SCs\ Most retailers achieve a large portion of total annual demand in December» Amazon.com Off-peak discounting can shift demand from peak to nonpeak periods Charge higher price during peak periods and a lower price during off-peak periods Read Section 9.3: Managing Demand [with discounts] of the textbook. 26

RM for Bulk and Spot Customers Most consumers of production, warehousing, and transportation assets in a supply chain face the problem of constructing a portfolio of long-term bulk contracts and short-term spot market contracts Long-term contracts for low cost Short-term contracts for flexibility The basic decision is the size of the bulk contract The fundamental trade-off is between wasting a portion of the lowcost bulk contract and paying more for the asset on the spot market 27

RM for Bulk and Spot Customers For the simple case where the spot market price is known but demand is uncertain, a formula can be used c B = bulk rate c S = spot market price Q* = optimal amount of the asset to be purchased in bulk p* = probability that the demand for the asset does not exceed Q* Marginal cost of purchasing another unit in bulk is c B. The expected marginal cost of not purchasing another unit in bulk and then purchasing it in the spot market is (1-p*)c S. 28

Revenue Management for Bulk and Spot Customers If the optimal amount of the asset is purchased in bulk, the marginal cost of the bulk purchase should equal the expected marginal cost of the spot market purchase, or c B = (1-p*)c S Solving for p* yields p* = (c S c B ) / c S If demand is normal with mean m and std deviation s, the optimal amount Q* to be purchased in bulk is Q* = F -1 (p*,m,s) = Norminv(p*,m,s) 29

Example 15.3: Buying transportation capacity to bring goods from China Bulk contract cost = c B = $10,000 per million units Spot market cost = c S = $12,500 per million units Demand for transportation: m = 10 million units s = 4 million units p* = (c S c B ) / c S = (12,500 10,000) / 12,500 = 0.2 Q* = Norminv(p*,m,s) = Norminv(0.2,10,4) = 6.63 The manufacturer should sign a long-term bulk contract for 6.63 million units per month and purchase any transportation capacity beyond that on the spot market If the demand is exactly 10 million units without any variability, how much long-term bulk contract with the transporter? 30

Using RM in Practice Evaluate your market carefully Understand customer requirements for services and products Price, flexibility (time, specs), value-added services, etc. Based on requirements identify customer segments (groups) Differentiate products/services and their pricing according to customer segments» Dell:» Same product is sold at a different price to different consumers (private/small or large business/government/academia/health care)» Price of the same product for the same industry varies 31

Using RM in Practice Quantify the benefits of revenue management Implement a forecasting process Apply optimization to obtain the revenue management decision Involve both sales and operations Understand and inform the customer Integrate supply planning with revenue management 32

Summary of Learning Objectives What is the role of revenue management in a supply chain? Under what conditions are revenue management tactics effective? What are the trade-offs that must be considered when making revenue management decisions? 33

Smart Pricing Through Rebates 34

Rebate Examples Nikon Coolpix digital camera is sold either on-line or in stores for $600. the manufacturer provides a rebate of $100 independently of where the camera is purchased. Sharp VL-WD255U digital camcorder is sold for about $500 at retail or virtual stores. Sharp provides a rebate to the customer of $100 independently of where the product is purchased. 35

36

37

Mail-in-Rebate What is the manufacturer trying to achieve with the rebate? Why the manufacturer and not the retailer? Should the manufacturer reduce the wholesale price instead of the rebate? Are there other strategies that can be used to achieve the same effect? 38

Example A Retailer and a manufacturer. Retailer faces customer demand. Retailer orders from manufacturer. 10000 Demand P=2000-0.22Q Demand Curve 2000 Price Variable Production Cost=$200 Selling Price=? Retailer Manufacturer Wholesale Price=$900 39

Example Retailer profit=(p R -P M )(1/0.22)(2,000 - P R ) Manufacturer profit=(p M -CM) (1/0.22)(2,000 - P R ) Retailer takes P M =$900 Sets P R =$1450 to maximize (P R -900) (1/0.22)(2,000 - P R ) Q = (1/0.22)(2,000 1,450) = 2,500 units Retailer Profit = (1,450-900) 2,500 = $1,375,000 Manufacturer takes CM=variable cost Manufacturer profit=(900-200) 2,500 = $1,750,000 40

Retailer Expected Profit Retailer Expected Profit (No Rebate) 1,6 0 0,0 0 0 1,4 0 0,0 0 0 $1,375,000 1,2 0 0,0 0 0 1,0 0 0,0 0 0 8 0 0,0 0 0 6 0 0,0 0 0 4 0 0,0 0 0 2 0 0,0 0 0 0 500 1,0 0 0 1,5 0 0 2,0 0 0 2,5 0 0 3,0 0 0 3,5 0 0 3,6 5 4 4,1 1 0 4,5 6 7 4,5 4 7 Order 41

Manufacturer Profit Manufacturer Profit (No Rebate) 6,000,000 5,000,000 4,000,000 3,000,000 2,000,000 $1,750,000 1,000,000 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 3,654 4,110 4,567 4,547 4,961 5,374 5,788 6,201 6,614 7,028 7,441 7,855 Order 42

Example: Customer Mail-in Rebate What happens with $100 customer mail-in rebate? Note that it is a discount for the customer so the demand should go up!!!» Q = (1/0.22) [2,000 (P R -Rebate)] = (1/0.22) [2,000 (1450-100)] = 2954 Retailer Profit = (1,450-900) 2,955 = $1,625,250 Manufacturer profit=(900-200-100) 2,955 = $1,773,000 43

Retailer Expected Profit Retailer Expected Profit ($100 Rebate) 1,800,000 $1,625,250 1,600,000 1,400,000 1,200,000 1,000,000 800,000 600,000 400,000 200,000 0 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000 4,110 4,567 4,547 4,961 Order 44

Manufacturer Profit Manufacturer Profit ($100 Rebate) 6,000,000 5,000,000 4,000,000 3,000,000 2,000,000 $1,773,000 1,000,000 0 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000 4,110 4,567 4,547 4,961 5,374 5,788 6,201 6,614 7,028 7,441 7,855 8,268 Order 45

Example: Wholesale discount What happens with $100 wholesale discount to retailer? Retailer takes P M =$800 Sets P R =$1400 to maximize (P R -800) (1/0.22)(2,000 - P R ) Q = (1/0.22)(2,000 1,400) = 2,727 units Retailer Profit = (1,400-800) 2,727 = $1,499,850 Manufacturer takes P R =$800 and CM=variable cost Manufacturer profit=(800-200) 2,727 = $1,499,850 46

Example: Global Optimization What happens if manufacturer sells directly or optimizes for the whole system globally? Manufacturer sets P R =$1,100 to maximize (P M -200) (1/0.22)(2,000 - P M ) Q = (1/0.22)(2,000 1,100) = 4,091 units Manufacturer profit=(1100-200) 4,091 = $3,681,900 47

Strategy Comparison Strategy Retailer Manufacturer Total No Rebate 1,370,096 1,750,000 3,120,096 With Rebate ($100) 1,625,250 1,773,000 3,398,250 Reduce Wholesale P ($100) 1,499,850 1,499,850 2,999,700 Global Optimization 3,681,900 48

Managerial Insights Mail in Rebate allows supply chain partners to move away from sequential strategies toward global optimization Provides retailers with upside incentive Mail in Rebate outperforms wholesale price discount for manufacturer Other advantages of rebates: Not all customers will remember to mail them in Gives manufacturer better control of pricing 49

Smart Pricing Customized Pricing Revenue Management Techniques» Distinguish between customers according to their price sensitivity Influence retailer pricing strategies Move supply chain partners toward global optimization Dynamic Pricing Changing prices over time without necessarily distinguishing between different customers Find the optimal trade-off between high price and low demand versus low price and high demand 50

When does Dynamic Pricing Provide Significant Profit Benefit? Limited Capacity Demand Variability Seasonality in Demand Pattern Short Planning Horizon 51

The Internet makes Smart Pricing Possible Low Menu Cost Low Buyer Search Cost Visibility To the back-end of the supply chain allows to coordinate pricing, production and distribution Customer Segmentation Difficult in conventional stores and easier on the Internet Testing Capability 52

A Word of Caution Amazon.com experimented with dynamic pricing customers responded negatively Coca-Cola distributors rebelled against a seasonal pricing scheme Opaque fares (priceline.com, hotwire.com) Determining the correct mix of opaque and regular fares is difficult. 53