Second Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference PLUTONIUM UTILIZATION IN REACTOR FUEL A. Zrodnikov Director General State Scientific Center of the Russian Federation Institute for Physics and Power Engineering September 18-20, 2003
RUSSIA S NUCLEAR POWER AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21st CENTURY Operating nuclear power plants - RBMK-1000 (11) - VVER- 440 (6) - VVER-1000 (7+1) - EGP-6 (4) - BN-600 (1) Transport power systems Research reactors Nuclear fuel cycle infrastructure
NUCLEAR POWER STRATEGY Maintenance of safe and efficient functioning of operating NPPs and fuel infrastructure. Progressive replacement of operating NPPs with 3-rd generation traditional power units, a moderate increase of generating capacity in the first quarter of the 21st century; expanding the export potential. Development and introduction of innovative economically competitive reactor and nuclear fuel cycle technologies.
LARGE SCALE NUCLEAR POWER FOR THE 21st CENTURY Liquid-metal cooled fast reactors of inherent safety Proliferation-resistant closed fuel cycle Reduce the volume and long-term toxicity of nuclear wastes and radiation-balanced r disposal of radwastes Technological support for non-proliferation Economic competitiveness
SMALL AND MEDIUM REACTORS No on-site refueling and sophisticated nuclear infrastructure, long-lived core lasting 10 20 years Completely sealed reactor, transportable to and from the site 50 to 150 MWe class, fuel enrichment < 20% Simplified design, high level of passive safety Cost comparable to the cost of competitive systems
SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: CURRENT STATUS Short - term storage in cooling ponds Accumulation and interim wet storage for subsequent placement in long-term centralized dry storage Radiochemical reprocessing with U and Pu separation followed by their involvement in the fuel cycle
GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE USE OF PLUTONIUM STOCKS Plutonium, as a nuclear material, has a unique energy potential, it is a national asset, and it can be put to maximum effective use under Russia s national energy strategy The ultimate strategic goal is to make full use of plutonium s energy potential, with the waste converted to a state, that makes it unusable for subsequent weapons-production and ensures their secure ecological isolation Once approved, plans for plutonium utilization must be implemented in a manner which ensures that it is stored, transported and handled in accordance with the highest national and international standards in terms of nuclear safety, ecology, physical protection, accounting and control
PLUTONIUM CONTAINED IN SPENT FUEL Totals for the country Plutonium contained in spent fuel at civil reactor sites Plutonium contained in spent fuel at reprocessing plants Plutonium contained in spent fuel kept elsewhere As of December 31, 1999 47 000kg 4 000kg 20 000kg
CIVIL UNIRRADIATED PLUTONIUM As of December 31, 1999 Unirradiated separated plutonium in product storage facilities at reprocessing plants 30 900kg Unirradiated separated plutonium in manufacturing or fabrication and the plutonium contained in unirradiated products at fuel fabrication or other plants or elsewhere - Plutonium in unirradiated MOX fuel or other fabricated products at reactor sites or elsewhere Unirradiated separated plutonium kept elsewhere 200kg 900kg The quantities of Pu withdrawn from the military sphere will be declared when placed in storage at PA Mayak
EX-WEAPONS PLUTONIUM MANAGEMENT CONCEPT Reliable and controllable interim storage In-pile transformation, including MOX-forms, into spent fuel with subsequent utilization in the proliferation-resistant closed fuel cycle
BN-800 (1992, design) HISTORY BR-5 (1959); BR-10; Obninsk BOR-60 (1966); Dimitrovgrad BN-350 (1972); Kazakhstan BN-600 (1980); Urals
120 REACTOR/YEARS EXPERIENCE: BR-10, BOR-60, BN-350, BN-600 Major technological problems have been already solved 5000 MOX fuel rods have been irradiated Closed fuel cycle is realized for BOR-60 Pyrochemical technology and vibro-compacted MOX can significantly decrease cost and terms Advanced design of BN-800 is available
BN-600 NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR Electricity to the consumer Control rods Steam generator Turbine Generator Transformer Cooling water pond Condenser Circulation pump Fuel Main coolant pump of the primary circuit Main coolant pump of the secondary circuit Feedwater pump
BN-800 REACTOR 1 - primary pump 2 - large rotating plug 3 - refueling mechanism 4 - small rotating plug 5 - central rotating column with control and scram system mechanism 6 - upper stationary shield 7 - reactor vessel 8 - guard vessel 9 - heat exchanger 10 - core
BN-600: CURRENT STATUS Hybrid core as the first stage, 280 kg Pu/year 100% MOX fueled core, 1250 kg Pu/year Some features of MOX fuel
BN-600: CURRENT STATUS (cont.) Radiation characteristics of fuels Neutron radiation rate, Gamma radiation rate, Fuel n/s SA γ/s SA fresh irrad. fresh irrad. UO 2 4.8 х 10 2 1.2 х 10 5 2.9 х 10 9 4.5 х 10 14 MOX (wpu) 6.7 х 10 5 1.3 х 10 6 1.1 х 10 12 5.2 х 10 12
SCENARIOS OF THE EX-WEAPON PU STOCK-PILE REDUCTION IN RUSSIA
PLUTONIUM NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES Storage and management Reliable security measures Safeguards and control Minimum personnel with authorized access Minimum handling operations Minimum transportation Minimum sites with plutonium handling Conversion into spent fuel Dilution in MOX fuel Cladding and assembling Irradiation in nuclear reactors
PLUTONIUM NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES (cont.) Unified models for non-proliferation analysis: ISTC project and bilateral collaboration Is closed cycle potentially less protected to proliferation than open one? How does BN-800 minimize the proliferation risk? Development of an internationally recognized methodology for the quantitative assessment of the proliferation risk
CLOSED NUCLEAR CENTER CONCEPT Russian specific features - rather large territory - many sparsely populated regions MAYAK site in South Urals - RT-1 reprocessing plant, in operation now - 30 t of civil Pu are stored Complex-300 MOX fuel fabrication plant BN-800 fast reactor
OPTIONS FOR TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE OF MOX FUEL
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION Russian - US cooperation Russian - French - German Research Program Russian - Canadian collaboration Russian - Japanese cooperation
Conclusions The use of existing fast BN-600 reactor and, subsequently, fast BN-800 reactor (to be constructed) makes it possible to consume 50MT of weapons plutonium by the year 2020 and to reduce the cost of the Russian Ex-W Pu disposition Program. Dual-use BN-800 reactor (Ex-W Pu utilization and the new electricity production) opens opportunities for potential investment options. There are no proliferation concerns with the fast reactor technology at the stage of final disposal; elimination of the breeding zones in both BN-600 and BN-800 could be the first step to a more self-protected fast reactor technology. Closed nuclear centers are the best way to ensure the non-proliferation of fissile materials, especially ex-weapons plutonium in Russia.