A Convex Primal Formulation for Convex Hull Pricing

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A Convex Primal Formulation for Convex Hull Pricing Bowen Hua and Ross Baldick May 11, 2016

Outline 1 Motivation 2 Convex Hull Pricing 3 A Primal Formulation for CHP 4 Results 5 Conclusions 6 Reference Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 2 / 36

Motivation Outline 1 Motivation 2 Convex Hull Pricing 3 A Primal Formulation for CHP 4 Results 5 Conclusions 6 Reference Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 3 / 36

Motivation Markets with unit commitment Day-ahead and some real-time markets in the US are based on a mixed-integer unit commitment and economic dispatch (UCED) problem solved by the Independent System Operator (ISO). The ISO: welfare-maximizing decision maker who sends prices and target quantity instructions to each generator. Individual generators can be idealized as price-taking and profit-maximizing. Ideally, energy prices: in the short term: decentralize the ISO s decision by aligning the decision of profit-maximizing market participants with the ISO s welfare-maximizing decision, in the long term: incentivize investments in new generation (based on anticipation of future energy prices) at the right place and time. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 4 / 36

Motivation Non-convexity and uplift payments If the market model is convex (e.g., the economic dispatch problem): prices based on marginal costs align individual profit-maximizing decisions with the ISO s decision; prices support a welfare-maximizing decision. Because the UCED problem is non-convex, sales of energy at LMPs may not cover start-up and no-load costs (e.g., block-loaded units); in general, there does not exist a set of uniform prices that support a welfare-maximizing decision. Uplift payments are: side-payments that give incentives for the units to follow the ISO s decision, non-anonymous. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 5 / 36

Motivation Convex Hull Pricing Intuition: Raising the energy price slightly above the marginal cost may reduce uplift payments. Convex hull pricing (CHP) [Ring, 1995, Gribik et al., 2007] produces uniform prices that minimize certain uplift payments. The Lagrangian dual problem of the UCED problem has been used to determine CHP: Convex hull prices are the dual maximizers. A convex but non-smooth problem. Existing methods do not guarantee polynomial-time solution. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 6 / 36

Motivation Efficient computation of CHP is challenging Obtaining the exact dual maximizers of the Lagrangian dual problem is computationally expensive [Hogan, 2014, Wang et al., 2016]. Midcontinent ISO (MISO) implemented an approximation that is a single-period integer relaxation of the UCED problem [Wang et al., 2016]. We propose a polynomially-solvable primal formulation of the Lagrangian dual problem, in which we explicitly characterize: convex hulls of individual units feasible sets (based, in part, on previous literature), and convex envelopes of their cost functions. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 7 / 36

Convex Hull Pricing Outline 1 Motivation 2 Convex Hull Pricing 3 A Primal Formulation for CHP 4 Results 5 Conclusions 6 Reference Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 8 / 36

Convex Hull Pricing The UCED problem Consider a T -period problem with G units C g (p g, x g, u g ) (1) min p g,x g,u g,g G s.t. g G p g = d (2) g G (p g, x g, u g ) X g, g G. (3) A basic model, extensions considered later, where: p g R T + dispatch levels, x g {0, 1} T on/off, u g {0, 1} T startup. The offer cost function C g is (piecewise) linear or quadratic in p g. System-wide constraints: only demand constraints. Private constraints that define X g : generation limits, minimum up/down time, but not (yet) ramping constraints. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 9 / 36

Convex Hull Pricing Profit maximization of market participants Individual unit s problem, given specified price vector π: max p g,x g,u g π p g C g (p g, x g, u g ) (4) s.t. (p g, x g, u g ) X g. (5) Assume that unit g is a price-taker in the economics sense that it cannot affect prices. Denote its value function by w g (π), which gives the maximum profit under price π. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 10 / 36

Convex Hull Pricing Uplift payment for lost opportunity costs Profit made by following the ISO s decision Let the ISO s solution to the UCED problem be (p, x, u ). Profit made by following the ISO: π p g C g (p g, x g, u g). Uplift Payment Because of the non-convexity of the UCED problem, the maximum profit w g (π) may be strictly larger than profit made by following the ISO. There is a lost opportunity cost (LOC) of following the ISO. We define the amount of uplift payment for LOC to be U g (π, p, x, u ) = w g (π) (π p g C g (p g, x g, u g)), (6) which is non-negative by definition. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 11 / 36

Convex Hull Pricing CHPs as dual maximizers The gap between the UCED problem, g G C g(p g, x g, u g), and its dual: The Lagrangian dual function q(π) = ( g G min (p g,x g,u g) X g C g (p g, x g, u g ) π p g ) π d, (7) is exactly the total lost opportunity cost g G U g(π, p, x, u ). The convex hull prices are the dual maximizers that solves The Lagrangian dual problem max π q(π). (8) Convex hull prices minimize this duality gap. This is a non-smooth problem that is difficult to solve. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 12 / 36

Convex Hull Pricing Both units must be committed since demand is above 100 MW, and optimal dispatch is to operate unit 2 at full output since it has the lower marginal cost. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 13 / 36 A single-period example from [MISO, 2010] Table: Units in Example 1 Unit No-load Energy p g p g $ $/MWh MW MW 1 0 60 0 100 2 600 56 0 100 Table: Optimal Commitment and Dispatch for Example 1 d t t x 1,t p 1,t x 2,t p 2,t MW MW MW 1 170 1 70 1 100

Convex Hull Pricing Example from [MISO, 2010], cont d Table: Comparison of Different Pricing Schemes for Example 1 Pricing Scheme π U 1 U 2 $/MWh $ $ LMP 60 0 200 CHP 62 60 0 Under LMP, price is equal to unit 1 s energy offer, and unit 2 would have a negative profit, necessitating uplift to unit 2. Under CHP, price is equal to unit 2 s average cost, and unit 1 has an incentive to generate more than the ISO s dispatch, necessitating uplift to unit 1. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 14 / 36

A Primal Formulation for CHP Outline 1 Motivation 2 Convex Hull Pricing 3 A Primal Formulation for CHP 4 Results 5 Conclusions 6 Reference Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 15 / 36

A Primal Formulation for CHP The Lagrangian dual problem in primal space Structures Compact but nonconvex X g. Quadratic or piecewise linear cost functions C g (p g, x g, u g ). Linear system-wide constraints. Separable across g absent of the system-wide constraints. Notations conv( ) denotes the convex hull of a set. Cg,X g ( ) is the convex envelope of C g ( ) taken over X g : the largest convex function on conv(x g ) that is an under-estimator of C g on X g, the epigraph of Cg,X g ( ) is the convex hull of the epigraph of C g ( ) taken over X g. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 16 / 36

A Primal Formulation for CHP The Lagrangian dual problem Theorem 1. The optimal objective function value of the Lagrangian dual problem (8) is equal to that of the following problem: Cg,X g (p g, x g, u g ) (9) min p g,x g,u g,g G s.t. g G p g = d (10) g G (p g, x g, u g ) conv(x g ), g G. (11) An optimal dual vector associated with (10) is an optimal solution to problem (8). This is an application of a theorem in [Falk, 1969]. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 17 / 36

A Primal Formulation for CHP Getting CHPs using the primal formulation Convex hull prices are the optimal dual variables associated with the system-wide constraints. To use this primal formulation, we need: Explicit characterization of conv(x g ): Exponential number of valid inequalities needed for a general mixed-integer linear feasible set [Cornuéjols, 2007]. Polyhedral studies of X g exploit special structure to find compact characterization [Rajan and Takriti, 2005, Damc-Kurt et al., 2015, Pan and Guan, 2015]. First consider convex hull of binary commitment decisions and then include dispatch decisions. Explicit characterization of C g,x g (p g, x g, u g ): In general difficult because of the non-convexity of X g. Usually the cost functions are piecewise linear or quadratic. If C g (p g, x g, u g ) is affine then its convex envelope is itself. We exhibit convex envelopes for piecewise linear and for quadratic cost functions. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 18 / 36

A Primal Formulation for CHP Convex hulls for binary decisions First consider the set of feasible commitment and start-up decisions. State-transition constraints Min up/down time constraints u gt x gt x g,t 1, t [1, T ]. (12) t i=t L g+1 t i=t l g+1 u gi x gt, t [L g, T ], (13) u gi 1 x gt, t [l g, T ], (14) where L g and l g are respectively the minimum up and minimum down times of unit g. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 19 / 36

A Primal Formulation for CHP Convex hulls for binary decisions The set of feasible commitment and start-up decisions is D g = {x g {0, 1} T, u g {0, 1} T (12) (14)}. (15) Trivial inequality u gt 0, t [2, T ]. (16) [Rajan and Takriti, 2005] show that the convex hull of the feasible binary decisions alone is conv(d g ) = {x g R T, u g R T (12) (14), (16)}. (17) The number of these facet-defining inequalities is polynomial in T. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 20 / 36

A Primal Formulation for CHP Convex hull for commitment and dispatch decisions The dispatch variables are constrained by: x gt p g p gt x gt p g, t [1, T ], (18) Theorem 2. If minimum up/down time and generation limits are considered for each unit, then the polyhedron C g = {p g R T, x g R T, u g R T (12) (14), (16), (18)} describes the convex hull of X g. a a For T = 2 and T = 3, a more general X g in which ramping constraints are included is considered in [Damc-Kurt et al., 2015] and [Pan and Guan, 2015]. The result here holds for an arbitrary T. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 21 / 36

A Primal Formulation for CHP Convex envelopes for piecewise linear cost functions Suppose the interval [p g, p g ] is partitioned into K intervals: [p g, p g ] = k K I k. (19) Suppose, when the unit is on, the single-period cost function for p gt I k is Let the start-up cost of this unit be h g. Theorem 3. C gt (p gt, 1, 0) = b gk p gt + c gk. (20) The convex envelope of the piecewise linear cost function taken over X g is C g,x g (p g, x g, u g ) = T t=1 {b gk p gt + c gk x gt + h g u gt, if p gt I k }. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 22 / 36

A Primal Formulation for CHP Convex envelopes for quadratic cost functions Suppose the cost functions are given in the form of where C g (p g, x g, u g ) = T C gt (p gt, x gt, u gt ), (21) t=1 C gt (p gt, x gt, u gt ) = a g p 2 gt + b g p gt + c g x gt + h g u gt (22) is a single-period cost function that includes start-up cost h g and no-load cost c g. Observation The convex envelope of a nonlinear convex function taken over a nonconvex domain may not be itself. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 23 / 36

A Primal Formulation for CHP A single-period example of convex envelope of quadratic cost function The convex envelope of the bi-variate single-period cost function 0.2p 2 gt + p gt + 4x gt taken over {x gt {0, 1}, p gt R x gt p gt 5x gt }. 14 10 Cgt 5 0 1 0.5 x gt 0 0 2 p gt 4 5 The graph of the convex envelope of this bi-variate function at (p gt, x gt ) with x gt (0, 1) is determined by the line connecting (0, 0, 0) and ( pgt x gt, 1, C gt ( pgt x gt, 1, 0)). Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 24 / 36

A Primal Formulation for CHP Generalization to multi-period case for quadratic cost function Theorem 4. The convex envelope of the quadratic cost function (21) taken over X g is C g,x g (p g, x g, u g ) = T t=1 { p a 2 gt g x gt + b g p gt + c g x gt + h g u gt, x gt > 0, 0, x gt = 0. Min up/down time constraints complicate X g. However, they do not change the convex envelope. Convex envelope is continuously differentiable on conv(x g ), but not so on the whole Euclidean space. Non-linearity comes from the quadratic-over-linear terms. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 25 / 36

A Primal Formulation for CHP Casting the problem as a second-order cone program Moving the nonlinear terms from the objective to the constraints Define an additional decision variable s gt R + for each quadratic-over-linear term. New constraint: s gt x gt a g p 2 gt. (23) Reformulation For x gt 0 and s gt 0, constraint (23) is equivalent to (2 a g p gt, x gt s gt ) 2 x gt + s gt, (24) which is a second-order cone constraint [Lobo et al., 1998]. Our primal formulation becomes an SOCP, since all other constraints are linear. Off-the-shelf interior-point solvers available. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 26 / 36

A Primal Formulation for CHP Extensions Transmission constraints Theorem 1 still holds. Any linear system-wide constraints can be included. Ramping constraints Exponential number of valid inequalities needed to describe the convex hulls [Damc-Kurt et al., 2015]. Convex hulls for T = 2 and T = 3 have been explicitly described [Pan and Guan, 2015]. We use valid inequalities for T = 2 and T = 3 to strengthen our formulation, resulting in a tractable approximation of the convex hulls. Convex envelopes will not change because ramping constraints define a convex feasible set. The convex envelope of a convex function taken over a convex domain is itself. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 27 / 36

Results Outline 1 Motivation 2 Convex Hull Pricing 3 A Primal Formulation for CHP 4 Results 5 Conclusions 6 Reference Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 28 / 36

Results Example from [MISO, 2010] with three periods Table: Units in Example 1 Unit No-load Energy p g p g Ramp Rate $ $/MWh MW MW MW/hr 1 0 60 0 100 120 2 600 56 0 100 60 Table: Optimal Commitment and Dispatch for Example 1 t d t x 1,t p 1,t x 2,t p 2,t MW MW MW 1 70 1 70 0 0 2 100 1 40 1 60 3 170 1 70 1 100 Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 29 / 36

Results Example from [MISO, 2010], cont d Table: Comparison of Different Pricing Schemes for Example 1 Pricing Scheme π 1 π 2 π 3 U 1 U 2 $/MWh $/MWh $/MWh $ $ LMP 60 60 60 0 560 achp1 60 60 64 120 160 achp2 60 60 65.6 168 0 CHP 60 60 65.6 168 0 We use the primal formulation to obtain CHPs. achp1: only ramping constraints themselves. achp2: valid inequalities that describe conv(x g ) for T = 2. CHP: valid inequalities that describe conv(x g ) for T = 3. Uplift under CHP is smaller than under LMP. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 30 / 36

Results ISO New England Example 1 Consider a 96-period 76-unit 8-bus example that is based on structural attributes and data from ISO New England [Krishnamurthy et al., 2016]: Start-up costs, no-load costs, minimum up/down time constraints, and ramping constraints, 12 transmission lines, quadratic cost functions, 2400 dual variables in the Lagrangian dual problem. We compare uplift payments resulting from: LMPs, CHP resulting from our primal formulation, CHP obtained from MISO s single-period approximation. (Start-up and no-load costs considered only for fast-start units. 18/76 units fall into this category.) 1 Optimization problems modeled in CVX and solved by GUROBI on a quad-core laptop. Valid inequalities that characterize conv(x g) are used when solving UCED. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 31 / 36

Results Results Case 1 (without transmission constraints) UCED solved in 64.81s. Optimal obj. $41 702 112. SOCP solved in 5.54 s. Optimal obj. $41 697 614. Case 2 (with transmission constraints) UCED solved in 67.89s. Optimal obj. $41 876 398. SOCP solved in 11.18s. Optimal obj. $41 847 556. Table: Total Uplift Payment ($) Under Different Pricing Schemes LMP Primal Formulation for MISO Single-Period CHP Approximation of CHP Case 1 149 105 22 291 89 758 Case 2 385 753 23 869 302 430 Uplift under CHP is much smaller than under LMP and MISO approximation. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 32 / 36

Conclusions Outline 1 Motivation 2 Convex Hull Pricing 3 A Primal Formulation for CHP 4 Results 5 Conclusions 6 Reference Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 33 / 36

Conclusions Conclusions A polynomially-solvable primal formulation for convex hull pricing. Exact when ramping constraints are not considered. Tractable approximation for the case with ramping constraints. Convex hulls and convex envelopes useful for solving UCED. Also useful for approximating results of UCED, which can be incorporated into generation and transmission expansion planning formulations. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 34 / 36

Conclusions Remaining issues This work provides a fast implementation of convex hull pricing. Significant issues remain: incentives for generators to reveal truthful start-up and no-load information are not well understood in both LMP with traditional uplift and convex hull pricing with uplift; under convex hull prices, profit maximizing generators have incentives to deviate from the ISO-determined dispatch instructions; and interaction of day-ahead and real-time markets is not well understood. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 35 / 36

Reference Outline 1 Motivation 2 Convex Hull Pricing 3 A Primal Formulation for CHP 4 Results 5 Conclusions 6 Reference Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 36 / 36

Reference Cornuéjols, G. (2007). Valid inequalities for mixed integer linear programs. Mathematical Programming, 112(1):3 44. Damc-Kurt, P., Küçükyavuz, S., Rajan, D., and Atamtürk, A. (2015). A polyhedral study of production ramping. Mathematical Programming. Falk, J. E. (1969). Lagrange Multipliers and Nonconvex Programs. SIAM Journal on Control, 7(4):534 545. Gribik, P., Hogan, W., and Pope, S. (2007). Market-Clearing Electricity Prices and Energy Uplift. Technical report, Harvard University. Hogan, W. (2014). Electricity Market Design and Efficient Pricing: Applications for New England and Beyond. Technical report, Harvard University. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 36 / 36

Reference Krishnamurthy, D., Li, W., and Tesfatsion, L. (2016). An 8-Zone Test System Based on ISO New England Data: Development and Application. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 31(1):234 246. Lobo, M. S., Vandenberghe, L., Boyd, S., and Lebret, H. (1998). Applications of second-order cone programming. Linear Algebra and its Applications, 284(1-3):193 228. MISO (2010). Convex Hull Workshop 3. Technical report. Pan, K. and Guan, Y. (2015). A Polyhedral Study of the Integrated Minimum-Up/-Down Time and Ramping Polytope. Technical report, University of Florida. Rajan, D. and Takriti, S. (2005). Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 36 / 36

Reference Minimum up/down polytopes of the unit commitment problem with start-up costs. Technical report, IBM Research Division. Ring, B. (1995). Dispatch based pricing in decentralised power systems. PhD thesis, University of Canterbury. Wang, C., Luh, P. B., Gribik, P., Peng, T., and Zhang, L. (2016). Commitment Cost Allocation of Fast-Start Units for Approximate Extended Locational Marginal Prices. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems. Hua and Baldick Primal Formulation for CHP May 11, 2016 36 / 36