NPP Simulators Workshop for Education - Passive PWR NPP & Simulator Overview

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NPP Simulators Workshop for Education - Passive PWR NPP & Simulator Overview Wilson Lam (wilson@cti-simulation.com) CTI Simulation International Corp. www.cti-simulation.com Sponsored by IAEA Modified for 2011 Presentation by Larry Foulke (Univ of Pittsburgh)

Learning Objectives Discuss the pros and cons of training with a desktop simulator versus a fullscale, replica simulator. Describe how the CTI desktop simulation of a AP1000 differs from an actual AP1000. Develop skill and familiarity with the CTI desktop simulation. Explain and interpret information provided on the CTI simulator screens Interpret the tracking of elapsed time on the CTI desktop simulation Change y-axis scales on trend plots of the CTI simulator. Understand the control strategy and control systems of the CTI desktop simulations. Describe the importance of monitoring the axial power distribution and relate how it is measured.

NPP Manpower Training Issue important for Nuclear Renaissance Manpower Training for NPP - challenging issues takes years to train competent NPP personnel, about the same time to build NPP. Traditional means of training through classroom and textbooks inadequate for reactor operator. Full scope training simulator often not completely in service until NPP in commercial operation. Is it cost effective to use full scope training simulator to train engineers and new recruits?

Scope of Simulator Types versus Training Items Replica Full Scope Simulators - Plant operation in a control room environment Procedure based, cognitive skill based, team work Classroom/Desktop Simulators - Configuration suited to classroom & self - learning tool as complement to textbooks and manuals. Provides knowledge of dynamic behavior Provides subsystem training, as well as overall plant training (startup, shutdown, malfunctions).

Role of Desktop Simulators Provides initial educational training to all NPP personnel before NPP is built & full scope simulator in service. Provides knowledge of system interfaces, integration and interactions. Complements training on a full scope, replica simulator.

Desktop Simulator Characteristics Relatively low cost and affordable. Can use highly portable, standard PC platforms. Math models are easily configurable and provide flexibility of use. Can use graphic icons, control pop-ups, time trends for user interfaces instead of hardwired panels.

Classroom Simulator Utilization - Education As educational training tool can provide a realistic interactive tool for educational study of NPP s dynamics, and accident scenarios. Can be integrated with multi-media tools to enhance learning and knowledge acquisition.

Pressurized Light Water Reactor Reactor heats water from 279 (534) to 315 deg. C (600 F) Pressurizer keeps coolant pressure 15.5 Mpa (2248 psi); boiling is not allowed. Thermal efficiency ~ 32 %. Use Gen III+ Passive PWR AP-1000 as example.

Passive PWR Simulator AP-1000 process design is used as a reference. Reactor Controls based on Korean Standardized 1000 MW PWR Design Mode K SG pressure control to maintain setpoint at 5.7 KPa Overall Unit Control allows Reactor-Leading or Turbine-Leading Mode Passive Systems modeled to demonstrate LOCA mitigation

Reactor Model SYSTEM SIMULATION SCOPE DISPLAY PAGES REACTOR SAFETY SYSTEM neutron flux levels over a range of 0.001 to 110% full power, 6 delayed neutron groups decay heat (3 groups) all reactivity control devices - dark rods; gray rods; boron control. Xenon/Iodine poison reactor power control system reactor shutdown system PWR power control PWR control rods & SD rods PWR trip parameters PWR passive core cooling OPERATOR CONTROLS reactor power and rate of change (input to control computer) manual control of reactivity devices - control rods and boron addition/removal reactor trip reactor setback reactor stepback MALFUNCTIONS reactor setback and stepback fail one bank of Dark control rods drop into the reactor core

7 8 1 4 2 5 3 6

Advanced PWR Reactor Control

Mode K Reactor Control Strategy Double closed loop control of (1) reactor coolant temp (2) axial power difference. Heavy-worth control rods bank dedicated to axial shape control. Light-worth control rods bank for controlling coolant temp at setpoint. Auto regulation of both the reactivity and power distribution - permits load-follow operations (frequency control) to respond to grid conditions, with minimum use of Boron.

Reference Paper for Mode K Reactor Controls Korean Standardized 1000 MW PWR Design - YGN-3 NSSS Design Paper - Automatic Reactor Power Control for a Pressurized Water Reactor by Jung- In Choi et al, Kyungwon University, Korea (August 27, 1992) - Nuclear Technology, Volume 102, May 1993, p.277

Limit control diagram. Designating Flux Tilt error as FT (%) Average Coolant Temperature error as DT (deg. C) Region A: FT > 4; -0.5 < DT < 0.5 Region C: FT < -4; -0.5 < DT < 0.5 Region B: -4 < FT < 4; DT < -0.5 Region D: -4 < FT < 4; DT > 0.5 Region E: the four corners FT > 4; DT < -0.5; FT > 4; DT > 0.5; FT < -4; DT < -0.5; FT < -4; DT > 0.5 Mode K Reactor Control Scheme

Reactor Power (%) Average Gray Rods Position (average of the rod positions for the individual four banks) 0 10 % 93 % - 87 % in core 10 20 % 87 % - 83 % in core 20 30 % 83 % - 70 % in core 30 40% 70 % - 60 % in core 40 50 % 60 % - 53 % in core 50 60 % 53 % - 48 % in core 60 70 % 48 % - 44 % in core 70 80% 44 % - 40 % in core 80 90 % 40 % - 35 % in core 90 100 % 35 % - 30 % in core Boron will be used if Gray rods limiting position has been reached

Reactor Coolant System 2 heat transfer circuits, or 2 loops. Each loop has one Steam Generator, one hot leg(31-inch inside diameter), and two cold legs (22-inch inside diameter) for circulating reactor coolant for primary heat transport. One Pressurizer in one of the loops

Reactor Coolant Pump Two canned motor pumps mounted directly in the channel head of each Steam Generator. No seals - cannot cause seal failure LOCA. Allows pumps and SG to use the same structural support; eliminates the crossover leg of coolant loop piping; reduces loop pressure drop; eliminates a potential of core uncovery due to loop seal venting during small LOCA.

Impeller Reactor Coolant Pump (canned motor) Journal Bearing Stator winding motor

Pressurizer Standard Westinghouse Design used in existing PWRs. 1600 cubic feet; 30 % larger - increases transient margin and eliminates the need for relief valve actuation - eliminates one possible source of RCS leakage and maintenance.

Pressurizer

Reactor Coolant Model SYSTEM SIMULATION SCOPE DISPLAY PAGES REACTOR COOLANT main circuit coolant loop with four pumps, two steam generators, four equivalent lumped reactor coolant channels pressure and inventory control which includes pressurizer, coolant letdown condenser, charge & letdown control, and pressure relief operating range is from zero power hot to full power PWR reactor coolant system PWR coolant inventory & pressurizer PWR inventory control PWR pressure control OPERATOR CONTROLS reactor coolant pumps coolant makeup pumps pressurizer pressure control: heaters; spray; pressure relief valve pressurizer level control by regulating coolant feed & bleed flow isolation valves for: coolant feed and bleed MALFUNCTIONS Pressurizer pressure relief valve fails open charging (feed) valve fails open letdown (bleed) valve fails open pressurizer heaters #2 to # 6 turned "ON" by malfunction reactor header break

Steam Generators Based on standard Westinghouse Model F technology. U-tube SG design, using Inconel 690 for tube material - enhanced reliability - Westinghouse claims less than 1 tube plugged per SG per four years of operation.

Steam Generator

Steam & Feedwater SYSTEM SIMULATION SCOPE DISPLAY PAGES STEAM & FEEDWATER boiler dynamics, including shrink and swell effects steam supply to turbine and reheater turbine by-pass to condenser extraction steam to feed heating steam generator pressure control steam generator level control boiler feed system PWR feedwater & extraction steam OPERATOR CONTROLS feed pump on/off operation boiler level controller mode: Auto or manual level control setpoint during Auto operation level control valve opening during manual operation extraction steam valves opening MALFUNCTIONS all level control isolation valves fail closed one level control valve fails open one level control valve fails closed all feed pumps trip all steam safety valves open steam header break steam flow transmitter fails

PWR Characteristics with constant SG pressure This Simulator Typical PWR Characteristics 300 7 Temo (Deg. C) 295 290 285 280 275 6 5 4 3 2 1 Boiler Pressure (MPa) Sat Liquid Temp (C) Coolant Temp Boiler Pressure (Mpa) 270 0 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% Pow er (%)

German PWR Design German PWR Characteristics 300 6.8 Temp (deg. C) 295 290 285 280 275 6.6 6.4 6.2 6 5.8 Boiler Pressure (MPa) Sat Liquid Temp (C) Coolant Temp (C) Boiler Pressure (Mpa) 270 5.6 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% Power (%) Reference: Features of KWU Type NPPs and their Leittechnik System - IAEA Technical Reports Series 387, 1999

Response Curves Constant Tav Program Advantages: Least amount of external control Preferred by reactor Small pressurizer (minimum expansion of coolant volume as power changes) Disadvantages Drop off of steam temperature and pressure Poor turbine efficiency From Schultz Control of Nuclear Reactors and Power Plants (1961)

Turbine Generator SYSTEM SIMULATION SCOPE DISPLAY PAGES TURBINE- GENERATO R simple turbine model mechanical power and generator output are proportional to steam flow speeder gear and governor valve allow synchronized and non-synchronized operation PWR turbine generator OPERATOR CONTROLS turbine trip turbine run-back turbine run-up and synchronization condenser steam discharge valves MALFUNCTIONS turbine spurious trip turbine spurious run-back

Overall Unit SYSTEM SIMULATION SCOPE DISPLAY PAGES OVERALL UNIT fully dynamic interaction between all simulated systems overall unit power control with reactor leading mode; or turbine leading mode unit annunciation & time trends computer control of all major system functions PWR plant overview PWR control loops PWR MW demand SP & SGPC OPERATOR CONTROLS MALFUNCTIONS

Reactor Lead Control

Reactor Lead Power Change Demonstrate power change using reactor lead

Turbine Lead Power Change Demonstrate power change using turbine lead

Passive Safety Systems Requires no operator actions to mitigate design basis accidents. Rely on natural forces - gravity, natural circulation, compressed gas; no pumps, fans diesels, chillers used. Only few simple valves, supported by reliable power sources

Passive Core Cooling (PXS) The PXS uses three sources of water to maintain core cooling: Core Makeup Tanks (CMTs) Accumulators In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) These injection sources are all connected to two nozzles on the reactor vessel.

In-containment refuelling water storage tank Injection Sources

Passive Core Cooling System

High Pressure Safety Injection with CMTs Two Core Makeup Tanks (CMTs), filled with borated water, located above the RCS loop piping. Make up for small leaks following transients or whenever the normal makeup system is unavailable. Designed for full RCS pressure using gravity. Poised to be in-service when water level in the pressurizer reaches a low-low level: reactor scrammed; the reactor coolant pumps tripped; the CMT discharge isolation valves open automatically. The relative elevations of the CMTs and the pressurizer are such that if RCS level continued to decrease, the water in the CMTs would drain into the reactor vessel.

Medium Pressure Safety Injection with Accumulators Accumulators for large LOCAs - for higher initial makeup flows to rapidly refill the reactor vessel lower plenum and downcomer following RCS blowdown. The gas pressure forces open check valves that normally isolate the accumulators from the RCS. Accumulators sized to respond to complete severance of the largest RCS pipe. The accumulators continue delivery to assist the CMTs in rapidly reflooding the core.

In-containment refuelling water storage tank Injection Sources

Low Pressure Reactor Coolant Makeup from the IRWST - long Term Injection In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) for longterm injection water located in the containment just above the RCS loops. IRWST normally isolated from the RCS by self-actuating check valves. This tank is designed for atmospheric pressure. The RCS must be depressurized before injection. The automatic depressurization system (ADS) made up of four stages of valves to permit a relatively slow, controlled RCS pressure reduction to 10 psig. The ADS stages are actuated by CMT level. The first three stages are connected to the pressurizer and discharge through spargers into the IRWST. The fourth stage is connected to a hot leg and discharges through redundant isolation valves to the containment.

In-containment refuelling water storage tank Injection Sources

Passive Core Cooling System - Residual Heat Removal Passive residual heat removal (PRHR) subsystem protects the plant against transients that upset the normal steam generator feedwater and steam systems - loss of feedwater, feedwater line breaks, and steam line breaks with a single failure.

Passive Residual Heat Removal System Enough water to absorb decay heat > 1 hour before water begins to boil. Steam passes to containment, and condenses on steel containment vessel, and drains back to IRWST

AP1000 Operating Characteristics Withstand the following operations without reactor scram or actuation of safeguard systems - From 15 % - 100 % FP, +/- 5 % /minute ramp load change; From 15 % - 100 %, +/- 10 % step load change 100 % load rejection Daily load following Grid frequency changes 10 % peak-to-peak, at 2 % per minute rate 20 % power step increase or decrease in 10 minutes loss of single feedwater pump.

PWR Simulator Run the PWR Simulator View all the Simulator Screens

Answer to PWR Response to Boiler Press Changes Question At steady state: SG Q = Core Q SG Q = UA (Tav -Ts); Tav = (To+Ti)/2 Ts - Sat Steam Temp.; To, Ti - coolant T s SG P Ts Q --> SG Q > Core Q Prim Coolant T SG P Ts Q Prim Coolant T --> positive reactivity feedback --> SG Q < Core Q --> negative reactivity feedback