December 2014 John Dalton

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ISO-New England Forward Capacity Auction #9 Summary Price Forecast December 2014 John Dalton 978-369-2465 jdalton@poweradvisoryllc.com

ISO-New England s upcoming Forward Capacity Auction prices are likely to be in the range of $8 to 11/kW-month ISO-NE s ninth Forward Capacity Auction, or FCA #9, will be held on Feb. 2, 2015, for the June 1, 2018 May 31, 2019 Capacity Commitment Period. Auction clearing prices in most of the ISO-NE market are likely to be in the range of $8-11/kW-month. The most significant factors affecting the price will be how much new Demand Response (DR) participates in the auction, and at what prices. Prices in SEMA-RI are likely to be considerably higher. This is due to limited supply compared to capacity requirements in that zone. In NEMA-Boston, the Capacity Carry Forward Rule is expected to apply again, resulting in prices somewhat higher than the ROP price. The price is likely to be lower than the ISO-NE Net CONE value of $11.08/kW-month. 2

Auction Ending Price ($/kw-month) The previous FCA (FCA #8) broke the pattern of very low prices FCA #1 7 all ended at the floor prices, between $2.95 and $4.50/kW-month. The one exception was the NEMA/Boston zone in FCA #7 which cleared at $15/kWmonth. Because the auction cleared at the floor, with more capacity accepted than required, the effective prices realized by suppliers typically were even lower than the Auction Ending Prices. FCA #8 resulted in a mix of prices, mostly $7 and $15/kW-month. The capacity clearing price was set at $15/kW-month, but because there was insufficient supply, most existing supply outside of NEMA/Boston was paid the administrative cap of $7.025/kW-month. $16 $14 $12 $10 $8 $6 $4 $2 $0 Boston/NEMA Rest of Pool 3

FCA #9 has attracted unprecedented interest from suppliers 8,998 MW of new capacity is likely to ultimately qualify to participate in the auction ISO-NE initially announced that 8,547 MW of new capacity had qualified to participate in the auction. In addition to this, one of the plants that was not qualified, Hawkes Meadow (451 MW), filed a waiver request regarding specific qualification deadlines with FERC. ISO-NE effectively supported Hawkes Meadow s waiver request; however FERC has not yet ruled on whether they will be qualified for FCA #9. Price impact would likely be minimal. Of this new supply, approximately 4,170 MW is likely to be gas-fired plants (mostly new plants but also expansions of existing plants), and approximately 100 MW is likely to be new renewables, as discussed below. This leaves approximately 4,700 MW as new demand response (DR) and imports. How much of this new supply consists of DR, and at what prices it will be offered, are the big unknowns in the upcoming auction. 4

$/kw/month One very important change in FCA #9 is the use of a sloped demand curve All previous auctions were based on procuring a fixed amount, the Net Installed Capacity Requirement (NICR), which for FCA #9 is 34,189 MW. Sloped demand curves are expected to reduce price volatility and the potential for the exercise of market power. However, a sloped demand curve results in greater stability to the market and in a market which is relatively tight the sloped demand curve limits the range of plausible prices at which the market will clear. $20 $18 $16 $14 $12 $10 $8 $6 $4 $2 $0 MW Demand Curve NICR Low Supply High Supply 5

A second important change in FCA #9 is Pay for Performance Capacity revenues to be linked to performance during reserve deficiencies by establishing a Capacity Performance Payment. A resource that clears in the FCA takes on a forward position, meaning that it acquires both a physical obligation to offer the MW amount of its Capacity Supply Obligation into the energy market, as well as a financial obligation to cover the resource s share of the system s total energy and reserve requirements during Capacity Scarcity Conditions, i.e., whenever the real-time energy price includes a Reserve Constraint Penalty Factor. The Capacity Performance Payment is determined for each resource by measuring its performance against its forward position (i.e., its share of the system s requirements at the time of each Capacity Scarcity Condition). If a resource provides more than its share of energy and reserves, it will receive a positive Capacity Performance Payment; if it provides less than its share, it will receive a negative Capacity Performance Payment. The Capacity Performance Payment is calculated using the Capacity Performance Payment Rate, which is initially set at $2,000/MWh and increases to $5,455/MWh by June 1, 2024. The second aspect to determining the Capacity Performance Payment is based on the resource s Capacity Performance Score, for each five-minute interval in which a Capacity Scarcity Condition exists in the Capacity Zone in which the resource is located. It equals the resource s Actual Capacity Provided during the interval minus the product of the resource s Capacity Supply Obligation and the applicable Capacity Balancing Ratio, which considers the severity of system conditions (e.g., current load versus anticipated peak load). 6

Owners of large portfolios may have an incentive to increase delist bids A supplier with a large enough portfolio could in theory benefit by withholding part of their supply, or bidding it in at a price above the expected auction clearing price even though its true cost was lower. For example, consider a supplier with a portfolio of 2,000 MW of existing supply, including an older 100-MW generation unit with fixed costs, risk premiums, and opportunity costs of $7/kW-month. If the auction-clearing price was at $7.50 and this older unit was bid in at $7 the plant would clear. If the supplier submitted a delist bid for this unit at $8 instead of $7, it would not clear, and based on Power Advisory s supply stack, the auction clearing price would increase by approximately $0.03/kW-month, to $7.53/kW-month. The price impact could conceivably be greater. We have assumed that there will be a number of import offers in this price range so that an increase in price is muted by additional supply. At the old price, the supplier would have netted $0.50/kW-month for the older unit (the difference between the auction clearing price and the cost of continuing to operate the unit), so by bidding higher, the supplier would lose $50,000/month on this unit. However, it would earn $0.03/kW-month more (the difference between the old price and the new price) on the remaining 1,900 MW in its portfolio a total of $57,000. Under our assumptions regarding the composition of the supply curve, the supplier thus has an incentive to increase its delist bid for this unit. This is why the ISO-NE IMM reviews delist bids. 7

About Power Advisory Leading North American management consulting firm specializing in electricity sector matters and solutions Advising generators, investors, financiers, marketers and traders, transmitters, distributors, regulators, and governments on a wide range of North American electricity sector matters Particular emphasis on Ontario, Northeast U.S., Maritimes, and Alberta Specializing in electricity market analysis, demand and supply forecasts, price and costs to customer forecasts, business strategy, market design, rate design, investment strategies, project acquisition, project development, project feasibility assessment, project due diligence, power procurement, and policy development Power Advisory has offices in Toronto and Boston and advises clients across North America To learn more about Power Advisory, including consultant bios, please go to http://www.poweradvisoryllc.com/ 8

Power Advisory Services Market Analysis and Forecasting Evaluated and analyzed virtually all competitive wholesale power markets across North America and have a detailed understanding of pivotal issues and solutions across North America Electricity price and costs to customer forecasts (including Global Adjustment in Ontario), supply and demand forecasting, natural gas price forecasting, wholesale market analysis, power contracting, rate design, and regulatory strategy Market Design and Policy Development Wholesale electricity market design, market structure assessment and design, regulatory frameworks and regulated markets, and contract markets Advised and acted for governments, government agencies, regulators, RTOs/ISOs on wholesale electricity market design, retail market design, and rate design in Ontario, Northeast U.S., New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Alberta, and Western Australia Provided detailed policy advice to governments, government agencies, regulators, RTOs/ISOs, and other stakeholders across North America 9

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Power Advisory Electricity Market Forecasting Capabilities Electricity Price and Costs to Customer Forecasting, and Demand and Supply Forecasting Wholesale spot price forecasts, including negative prices conveying potential for curtailment of energy production Demand and supply forecasts, including Surplus Baseload Generation Costs to customer forecasts, including Global Adjustment forecasts for Ontario, and default supply price arrangements (e.g., Regulated Price Plan in Ontario) Forecasts and projections of all components of costs to customers, including generation by fuel type, transmission and distribution, regulatory charges, and debt retirement charges for Ontario Power System Planning, including Assessment and Identification of Resource Needs Evaluation of power system needs, including timing of these needs, and recommended solutions to meet these needs (i.e., imports, generation, transmission, conservation and demand management including demandresponse, etc.), including strategies to deliver solutions 11

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