S. Reyes. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. ARIES Meeting April 22-23, 2002 U. Wisconsin, Madison

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Transcription:

S. Reyes Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory ARIES Meeting April 22-23, 2002 U. Wisconsin, Madison Work performed under the auspices of the U. S. Department of Energy by University of California Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory under Contract W-7405-Eng-48

Outline Overview of HYLIFE-II Overview of accident analyses Waste management options Alternative materials for thick liquid wall 2

HYLIFE-II II IFE design has attractive S&E characteristics HYLIFE-II IFE concept is based on thick liquid wall chamber, heavy ion driver and double sided illumination (96 beams per side) of indirect drive targets S&E characteristics have been given strong emphasis since the original design Flibe (Li 2 BeF 4 ) oscillating and steady jets inside target chamber protect FSW and breed tritium fuel HYLIFE-II Two more flibe circuits contained in blanket for cooling and shielding 3

We have performed updated accident analysis for HYLIFE-II II Updated computer codes and methodologies used to calculate heat transfer, thermal-hydraulics, and fusion product release and transport Simulated loss-of-coolant and lossof-flow accidents (LOCA, LOFA) with simultaneous loss of confinement Temperatures (C) 1000 800 600 400 200 SS304 tubes First wall Blanket structure Vacuum vessel Inner concrete shield Containment building Radioactive afterheat low enough to allow cooling of structures during transient FSW temperature far below melting point (T melt 1400 ºC) 0 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 Time (days) Temperature evolution of HYLIFE-II structures during LOCA accident 4

Tritium retained in structures dominates accident dose 3 radioactivity sources are available for mobilization in accident scenario FLIBE inside chamber and in blanket structures 10 kg of vaporized flibe form last reactor shot 140 tonnes of liquid flibe present in the chamber at any given time SS304 corrosion and oxidation products 8.3 kg of corrosion products in flibe inventory (1 m/y maintained at 1-y supply in a 1040m 2 area) 0.5 kg mobilized by steam oxidation at accident temperatures (INEEL experimental data) only 5% flibe in chamber at any time, gives a total 0.5 kg of SS304 Tritium: 140 g trapped in chamber, blanket and piping, giving 1 kg of HTO Results show that tritium dominates the off-site dose Accident dose ~ 5 rem assuming conservative weather conditions 5

Alternatives for waste management in HYLIFE-II II have been considered Previous IFE studies have traditionally used the WDR to evaluate if activated material qualifies for shallow land burial (WDR < 1) Shallow land burial may not be the best option for waste disposal: space limitations negative public perception of large volumes of waste The IAEA has proposed clearance levels of radionuclides below which traditional regulation may be relinquished on the grounds that the associated radiation hazards are trivial Here, we have updated the waste assessment for HYLIFE-II: implemented calculation of Clearance Indexes (CIs) in the activation code obtained WDRs and CIs for the different components to determine waste management options for the different power plant components 6

We have analyzed waste management options for HYLIFE-II II First, using the results from neutron transport and activation calculations, we calculated the WDRs for the different components in HYLIFE-II WDRs and life-cycle waste volumes (LCWVs) for the different components of the HYLIFE-II design It can be observed that all of the structures would qualify for shallow land burial (WDR < 1) The total life-cycle waste volume is dominated by the 5300 m 3 of concrete from the building. 7

Second, we calculated the CIs for the different structures in HYLIFE-II II 1.0E+12 1.0E+10 1.0E+08 In the cases of SS structures, flibe and inner shielding, best option would still be shallow land burial CI 1.0E+06 1.0E+04 1.0E+02 1.0E+00 1.0E-02 1.0E-04 1.0E-06 First wall 2nd SS shell 3rd SS shell 4th SS shell flibe shielding building 1.0E+00 1.0E+02 1.0E+04 1.0E+06 1.0E+08 1.0E+10 Time (s) Clearance indexes for the different power plant components as a function of the cooling time after shutdown The confinement building, however, reaches clearance level after about one year of cooling Concrete building dominates the total life-cycle waste volume of the power plant Also, required cooling time for building to reach clearance level ( 1 year) is quite short compared to the plant decommissioning time 8

Alternative materials have been considered for thick liquid wall concepts We have considered five potential materials for a thick liquid wall in a HYLIFE-II type chamber: flibe, flinabe, Li, LiPb and LiSn 3 assessments have been performed for each of the liquids: Safety and environmental characteristics Pumping power required TBR For the S&E assessment we have estimated radioactive afterheat contact dose rate WDR The pumping power calculation includes head velocity friction losses required lift power 9

Safety assessment addresses activation after 30 FPY operation Flibe, flinabe and LiPb have similar afterheat at t = 1 week, values for Li and LiSn are almost two orders of magnitude higher From the contact dose rate point of view, LiPb and flibe present the lowest values, LiSn is the highest in the long term All liquids have WDR < 1 (qualify for shallow land burial) Radioactive afterheat as a function of cooling time after shutdown Contact dose rate as a function of cooling time after shutdown 1.0E+09 1.0E+07 Afterheat (watts) 1.0E+08 1.0E+07 1.0E+06 1.0E+05 1.0E+04 flibe flinabe1 flinabe2 li lipb lisn Contact dose rate (Sv/hr) 1.0E+06 1.0E+05 1.0E+04 1.0E+03 1.0E+02 1.0E+01 flibe flinabe1 flinabe2 li lipb lisn 1.0E+03 1.0E+00 1.0E+02 1.0E+04 1.0E+06 1.0E+08 1.0E+10 1.0E+00 1.0E+00 1.0E+02 1.0E+04 1.0E+06 1.0E+08 1.0E+10 Time (s) Time (s) 10

Required pumping power has been addressed for the various candidates Liquid Composition Pocket thickness (m) Total pumping power (MW) Pumping power 80% eff. (MW) TBR Flibe BeF 2 (34%) LiF(66%) 0.56 48.46 60.57 1.25 Flinabe 1 BeF 2 (33.4%) LiF(33.3%) NaF(33.3%) 0.62 55.26 69.07 1.07 Flinabe 2 BeF 2 (37.5%) LiF(31.5%) NaF(31%) 0.62 63.23 79.04 1.07 LiPb Li (17%) Pb(83%) 1.03 681.76 852.21 1.61 Li Li(100%) 1.25 65.01 81.27 1.80 LiSn Li(50%) Sn(50%) 0.59 158.91 198.64 1.15 The thickness of the liquid pocket is such that FW damage is limited to 100 dpa after 30 FPY operation LiPb and LiSn pumping power requirements may be excessive Li has a large tritium inventory and poses fire hazards From this we can conclude the flibe and flinabe stand as the best options 11

Conclusions (I) Accident analyses for the HYLIFE-II design show that tritium trapped in structures dominates accident doses For waste disposal management, shallow land burial may not be the best option in case of large volumes of waste We have calculated CIs to determine if any of the components of HYLIFE- II could qualify for clearance Results show that in the case of the confinement building, which dominates the total waste volume, clearance would be possible in ~ 1 yr of cooling Required cooling time for building to reach clearance level is quite short compared to the plant decommissioning time 12

Conclusions (II) We have addressed safety characteristics, required pumping power and TBR of 6 different candidates for thick liquid wall material in a HYLIFE-II type design Regarding S&E characteristics, flibe, LiPb and flinabe stand as the most attractive options Required pumping power for LiPb and LiSn maybe too high From the assessments one can conclude that flibe and flinabe stand as the most attractive candidates for a HYLIFE-II type, thick liquid wall concept 13