Situación Global del Mercado de Petróleo Quintas Jornadas Comerciales Instituto Petroquímico Argentino Buenos Aires, Septiembre 22 del 2015
Los Titulares 2
Ciertamente, predecir el futuro de los precios de petróleo no ha sido nada fácil Y es precisamente a lo que vengo hoy! 140 Brent Price, US$/bbl 120 100 80 60 40 20 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Source: History - Argus 3
Agenda 1. Outlook for 2015/2016 2. Long term oil dynamics 3. Long Term price outlook 4
Agenda 1. Outlook for 2015/2016 2. Long term oil dynamics 3. Long Term price outlook 5
Market fundamentals are different now to the 2008 price crash Index (peak cru ude oil price = 100) 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Comparison of relative price declines 0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 275 300 Source: Argus Days from price peak 2008 crash 2014 crash Annual change in demand (million b/d) GDP and oil demand changes 3,5 3,0 2,5 2,0 1,5 1,0 0,5 0,0-0,5-1,0-1,5 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Source: Wood Mackenzie Demand change GDP 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 0% -1% -2% -3% Annual GDP change % 6
A considered review of 2014 shows oil demand growth weakness and Saudi behaviour have been the key changes Change in oil supply/demand forecast for 2014 Year-on-year growth in oil demand for 2014 was 40% less than was forecast in September 2013. This is due to milder than normal winter weather in early 2014 in Europe and a downward shift in China s diesel demand. The initial plunge in oil prices was mostly due to rising concerns about economic weakness, in the near future. US tight oil production growth in 2014 remained strong, as expected, with a modest upside adjustment late in the year The change in OPEC behaviour (market share Vs. price management) was critical to the pricing collapse Source: Wood Mackenzie 7
Demand: 2014 was a year of low global oil demand (comparable to 2011), with modest recovery projected for 2015 and 2016 Annual growth in global oil demand (mil b/d) China Europe Japan US Other Total YoY Change 2,0 1,5 million b/d 1,0 0,5 - (0,5) forecast (1,0) Source: IEA, EIA (history), WoodMackenzie (forecast) 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 8
Supply: Company capital expenditure cuts over $140 billion (end July 2015), with potentially more coming Share of Capita Spending Cuts by Operator Share of Capital Spending Cut by Development Type Change in year-on-year capex gu uidance (US$ billion) - -5-10 -15-20 -25-30 -35-40 -45 Mid/Small- Cap Large-Cap NOC MLP Major 7% 29% 1% 8% 2% 22% 10% 21% Offshore Oil Sands Tight/Shale Conventional LNG Midstream Refining Chemicals Source: Wood Mackenzie, company reports 9
Result: Non-OPEC supply growth slows as low oil price trims US momentum and accelerates declines in other areas Year-on-year change and total non-opec supply 3,0 56 Million b/d 2,5 2,0 1,5 1,0 0,5 0,0-0,5-1,0-1,5 Q1 2011 Q2 2011 Q3 2011 Q4 2011 Q1 2012 Q2 2012 Q3 2012 Q4 2012 Q1 2013 Q2 2013 Q3 2013 Q4 2013 Q1 2014 Q2 2014 Q3 2014 Q4 2014 Q1 2015 Q2 2015 Q3 2015 Q4 2015 Q1 2016 Q2 2016 Q3 2016 Q4 2016 54 52 50 48 46 44 Total non-opec producti ion (million b/d) Source: Wood Mackenzie Other non-opec Mexico North Sea Brazil Russia Canada Oil Sands United States Total non-opec (right axis) 10
OPEC crude oil production remains strong OPEC crude oil supply 32 31 million b/d 30 29 2013 2014 2015 28 ene feb mar abr may jun jul ago sep oct nov dic 11 Source: Wood Mackenzie
Supply growth slows while demand is stronger shifting the fundamentals Total world oil demand and supply - Annual change in million b/d 2014 2015 2016 0,00 0,50 1,00 1,50 2,00 2,50 Demand Supply Source: Wood Mackenzie 12
Result: Global implied stocks shifts from build to draw by mid-2016 Million b/d 2,6 2,2 1,8 1,4 1,0 0,6 0,2-0,2-0,6 Quarterly stock change Source: Wood Mackenzie 13
Our price forecast is for moderate price recovery in second half of 2015 and 2016 Brent price history and forecast to 2016, US$/bbl 140 120 Weaker than expected global economic growth Lower than expected oil price floor for US tight oil Supply outages ease 100 80 Forecast 60 40 20 OPEC policy decision to cut Oil market anticipates supply response Stronger oil demand recovery 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Source: History - Argus; Forecast - Wood Mackenzie 14
Agenda 1. Outlook for 2015/2016 2. Long term oil dynamics 3. Long Term price outlook 15
Medium term pace of global economic growth to be largely determined by US and China Real GDP Index Real GDP Growth 170 United States Forecast 15% China India GDP Index (2007 = 100) 160 150 140 130 120 110 Japan Germany United Kingdom Italy Spain Real GDP gr rowth, yr-on-yr 10% 5% 0% -5% Russia Brazil 100 90-10% Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream, Wood Mackenzie Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream, Wood Mackenzie 16 Wood Mackenzie
US Oil Demand Outlook is effectively stable, with chemical feedstocks replacing projected declines in gasoline US oil demand by product Change in US demand Source: Wood Mackenzie 17
Longer term, the oil market depends on non-oced demand growth, which continues despite declining oil intensity Global Oil Demand by Region Oil intensity by region (bbl/$000s GDP in 2005 prices) Source: IEA; Forecast: Wood Mackenzie 18
Pre-sanction projects are being deferred in uncertain price environment Pre-sanction projects by breakeven band Pre-sanction offshore project delays 7 6 5 >$90 $80-$90 $70-$80 $60-$70 $50-$60 2H 2014 Russia UK Nigeria /d Million b/ 4 3 $40-$50 <$40 US (GOM) Angola 2H 2014 2 Norway 1H 2015 1 Brazil 0 2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 Source: Wood Mackenzie Oil Supply Tool Data run at 15% IRR and shown in Brent terms 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Source: Wood Mackenzie Oil Supply Tool Bubble size reflects relative volumes. The largest is Brazil 2H 2014 at 12.1 million b/d 19
Non-OPEC supply growth is limited, with the growth primarily from US tight oil Non-OPEC supply, million bpd US tight oil supply, million bpd 30 25 2015 2020 2025 8 7 Tight Oil Bakken/Three Forks Tight Oil Eagle Ford Tight Oil Other US lion b/d Mill 20 15 10 illion b/d Mi 6 5 4 3 5 2 1 0 North America Source: Wood Mackenzie Europe Russia & Caspian Asia Latin America Middle East Africa 0 Source: Wood Mackenzie 20
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This weaker non-opec supply outlook requires growth in OPEC capacity and so materially reduces OPEC s spare capacity Only a modest growth in OPEC spare capacity is now forecast from current levels Non-OPEC supply and OPEC capacity growth Revisions to OPEC spare capacity forecast Non-OPEC Supply Growth OPEC Capacity Growth H1 2015 H2 2014 3,0 Total 8,0 2,5 2,0 6,0 1,5 million bpd 1,0 0,5 million bp pd 4,0 0,0-0,5 2,0-1,0-1,5 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 0,0 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 Source: Wood Mackenzie Source: Wood Mackenzie 22
OPEC capacity growth in the long term driven by Iraq and Iran; but huge uncertainty exists OPEC countries crude capacity for 2015, 2020 and 2025 7 6 5 2015 2020 2025 12 10 8 Millio on b/d 4 3 6 4 2 2 1 0 0 Algeria Angola Ecuador Iran Iraq Kuwait Libya Nigeria Qatar UAE Venezuela NGL & cond* Saudi Arabia Source: Wood Mackenzie Oil Supply Tool 23
Agenda 1. Outlook for 2015/2016 2. Long term oil dynamics 3. Long Term price outlook 24
Supply gap reaches 20 million b/d by 2025 Half from projects with US$70/bbl or above break even Supply gap 2014 to 2025, million bpd 105 100 25 20 95 Millio on b/d 90 85 80 75 70 Million b/d 15 10 5 65 60 0 Supply gap Pre-FID projects + new Tight Oil drilling <$50 Pre-FID projects + new Tight Oil drilling <$70 Pre-FID projects + new Tight Oil drilling <$90 Non-OPEC Reserves Growth + YTF Call on OPEC 25
Crude prices strengthen sharply in 2017 and 2018 due to lower investments in the short term Oil demand growth resumes and OPEC spare capacity narrows OPEC spare capacity widens and North American production increases strongly 120 100 80 /bbl US$/ 60 40 20 0 Economic problems result in delays to investment in production capacity Low prices necessary to reduce investments and limit output growth Supply/demand balance tightens. Higher cost of developing new supply to meet growing demand Source: History - Argus, Forecast - Wood Mackenzie Brent real - H2 2014 Brent real - H1 2015 26
Conclusiones Estamos en el medio de un proceso de rebalanceo del mercado petrolero El cambio de la política de la OPEP, con un enfoque en cuotas de mercado, precipito la caída de los precios de petróleo Esta caída esta resultando en una reducción importante en las inversiones, lo cual afectara el suministro y eventualmente resultara en una recuperación de precios En el largo plazo, esta reducción en las inversiones resulta en una reducción de la capacidad en exceso del mercado, tanto dentro de la OPEP como fuera A medida que el crecimiento de la demanda tiene lugar, los proyectos que deben desarrollarse para poder suplir esta demanda requieren precios mayores para su desarrollo; esta es una de las razones principales por las cuales creemos que los precios de petróleo al largo plazo van a recuperarse de los niveles actuales 27
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