Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized ocument of The World Bank FOR OmCAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT REPUBLIC OF GHANA PORT REHABILITATION PROJECT (CREDIT 1674-GH) JUNE 14, 1994 Infrastructure Operations Division Western Africa Department Africa Regional Office Rqort No. 13149 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.
CURRENCY EOUIVALENTS Currency Unit=cedi (C) US$ 1.0 (1986)=90 cedis (SAR). (1987)= 154 cedis (1988)=203 cedis (1989)= 270 cedis (1990)=326 cedis (1991)=367 cedis (1992)=437 cedis FISCAL YEAR January 1 - December 31 SYSTEM OF WEIGHTS AND MEASURES: METRIC ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CHCL - Container Handling Company Limited EEC - European Economic Community EDF - Economic Development Fund of EEC ERP - Economic Recovery Program ERR - Economic Rate of Return ERTAP - Export Rehabilitation and Technical Assistance Project GPA - Ghana Ports Authority GPHA - Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority IDA - International Development Association MIS - Management Information System MOTC - Ministry of Transport and Communications OECF - Overseas/Economic Cooperation Fund, Japan PCU - Project Coordination Unit PPF - Project Preparation Facility of IDA RRMP - Road Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project SF - Saudi Fund TA - Technical Assistance TEU - Twenty-foot equivalent units (containers) UNDP - United Nations Development Fund WFP - World Food Programme
THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.SA - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Office of Director-General Opera-tons Evaluation June 14, 1994 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Ghana Ports Rehabilitation Project (Credit 1674-GM Attached is the t Project Completion Report on Ghana - Ports Rehabilitation Project (Credit 1674-GH)", prepared by the Africa Regional Office. The report includes a borrower contribution (Part I). The project was an essential component of the government's Economic Recovery Program launched in the mid-eighties. Its basic objective was to provide sufficient physical ports capacity to handle projected import and export traffic and to raise efficiency of the ports system. Inadequate maintenance, poor organization and management had markedly reduced port performance. The project had physical and institutional components. Implementation, which relied on a large contingent of technical assistance (TA) staff and benefitted from close Bank supervision, went very well overall After some initial delays, the physical items were completed ahead of schedule. Primarily on account of an extension of TA, to deepen the institutional impact, the project was implemented some one and three-quarters years after the scheduled date. Actual project costs exceeded estimated costs by about 20% due largely to increased purchases of ports equipment. The project achieved the intended impact: physical port capacity was restored, efficiency was raised and port institutions were strengthened. The finances of the ports system became sound. The reestimated economic rate of return on investment (ERR) is 43%, as compared to the 28% estimated at appraisal; a higher than expected increase in port productivity was the main cause for the ERR rise. Strong government commitment, good compliance with credit covenants and determined IDA support were key factors in project success. Project outcome was satisfactory, and institutional development input was substantial Sustainability is likely. The PCR was of good quality. No performance audit is planned. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipienta only in the performance of I their official dutiesc Its contents may not othervise be disclosed vithout World Bank authorization.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY REPUBLIC OF GHANA PORTS REHABILITATION PROJECT TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. PREFACE... i EVALUATION SUMMARY... ii PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM IDA'S PERSPECTIVE...... 1 A. Project Identification... 1... B. Project Background.... 1 C. Project Objectives and Description... 2 D. Project Design and Organization... 3 E. Project Implementation... 6 F. Major Results of the Project...... 9 G. Project Sustainability... 11 H. Association Performance... 11 I. Borrower Performance...... 12 J. Project Relationships...... 12 K. Consulting and Contracting Services...... 12 L Project Documentation...... 13 PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE... 14 PART HI. STATISTICAL INFORMATION...... 17 A. Related Bank Loans and Credits...... 17 B. Project Timetable...... 17 C. Credit Data... 18 D. Project Costs... 19 E Results of the Project...... 21 F. Use of Bank Resources...... 24 G. Compliance with Credit and Project Agreement Covenants...... 26 H. Revaluation of the Economic Rate and Return...... 27 This document has a restrictedistribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their L official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.
REPUBLIC OF GHANA PORTS REHABILITATION PROJECT CREDIT 1674-GH PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PREFACE i. This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Ports Rehabilitation Project for which Credit 1674-GH in the amount of SDR 22.4 million (US$24.5 million equivalent) was approved on March 27, 1986. The final disbursement was made on April 20, 1993. The remaining funds in the credit account amounting to SDRs 2,346.1 were canceled. ii. The Preface, Evaluation Summary, Parts I and III of the PCR were prepared by the Infrastructure Operations Division of the Western Africa Department. Preparation of the PCR is based on the Staff Appraisal Report, the Credit and Project Agreements, the correspondence files, supervision reports and discussions with Bank staff. In addition, the reports of two consultants, one on the privatization of Container Handling dated April 1992, and the other on Project Completion dated January 31, 1993 provided useful and current data for the PCR. The Borrower completed Part II of the report and made minor comments on Part I. Mark Makanda (Financial Analyst, Infrastructure Division) was the Task Manager of this PCR and Mr. James Wright and Mr. Edwin Lim are the Managing Division Chief and Departmental Director, respectively for the operation. iii. Co-financiers included the Japanese Government, the Saudi Fund and the European Economic Community through its Economic Development Fund. The World Food Program contributed food which was used as an incentive for port workers. GPHA contributed funds and the Government of Ghana provided a loan to GPHA by deferring payment of customs duties on imported items.
- ii- REPUBLIC OF GHANA PORTS REHABILITATION PROJECT CREDIT 1674-GH PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT EVALUATION SUMMARY Objectives i. The main project objectives were: (a) to rehabilitate the substantially run-down port facilities in Tema and Takoradi, to enable them to handle efficiently the country's export and import needs during the immediate and medium term; and (b) to help strengthen and reorganize port management and port institutions in Ghana, in order to increase the efficiency of the country's ports. Implementation Experience ii. The knowledge of ports gained by IDA staff in preparing the export rehabilitation projects contributed greatly to project identification, preparation and implementation (para. 20). iii. The civil and other works were successfully completed several months before the appraisal schedule, a successful achievement, especially given the chaotic condition of the ports at the time of project identification. Technical assistance was extended by one year to the end of March 1993 (para. 33). Results iv. The reevaluated ERR of the project is 43% as compared to 28% estimated at appraisal (para. 39). v. The project has more than achieved most of the financial covenants in the Project Agreement (paras. 40-45). Sustainabil ity vi. As GPHA is now fully operational, its staff well trained; and its finances sound, its viability should be sustainable (para. 44). Findings and Lessons Learned vii. The use of food aid as an incentive for port workers and staff was an innovative feature of the project (para. 11).
iii viii. The earlier export rehabilitation credits assisted the ports in carrying out emergency repairs and in assessing the major institutional problems facing the ports. This provided a sound basis for project preparation, especially for the institutional aspects (paras. 11-17). ix. 18). Other innovative features included steps to accelerate project processing by IDA (para. x. On a project in which the feasibility consultant has performed well, it makes sense to use the same firm, in some cases, on the design and supervision phases, as indicated in the Bank Guidelines for Consultant Selection (para. 33). xi. The chaotic condition of the ports when the project was first identified, the use of fast disbursing export credit and a PPF to accelerate preparation, the successful reorganization of the Ports Authority, and the expeditious implementation of a complex and difficult project would justify the use of this project as a textbook case for training Bank staff (para. 36). xii. The successful execution of the project is credited to its thorough preparation, close supervision, and careful coordination with the other major donors by IDA staff (paras. 46-48) and to the close cooperation of the Government (para.(a)). xiii. With one important exception, the Borrower, and its executing agency GPHA, performed well in achieving the objectives of the project (para. 49). xiv. The TA team performed well and contributed substantially to the progress made in rehabilitating the ports and training local personnel. The advantage of using firms to supply a large number of expert personnel rather than employing them on an individual basis was well illustrated under this project (para. 51).
REPUBLIC OF GHANA PORTS REHABILITATION PROJECT CREDIT 1674-GH PROJECT COMPLhTON REPO A. Poect Identification PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM IDA'S PERSPECTIVE Project Name: Credit No.: RVP Unit: Country: Sector: Ports Rehabilitation Project 1674-GH Infrastructure Operation Division, Western Africa Department Republic of Ghana Transportation B. Project Background" 1. In the early 1980's, inadequate port facilities were a severe handicap for Ghana, on top of a severe drought. The constraint in port capacity was adversely affecting the country's vital export traffic and its imports of food grains, spare parts and other essential goods. Even food ships arriving with supplies for drought relief often had to wait for about a month to get a berth, and many had to spend another 40 days to discharge a ship-load of 20,000 tons of food grains. Due to such delays and inefficiencies, Ghana incurred high shipping costs, freight surcharges and demurrage payments. 2. Ghana's two main ports of Tema and Takoradi were under the responsibility of the Ministry of Transport and Communication (MOTC). The Ghana Ports Authority (GPA) which, according to its enabling legislation, should have been in charge of overall port operations and management, had inadequate management and could not exercise control over the ports. Further, GPA's authority was often ignored by the two government-owned stevedoring agencies which had equal access to Government. 3. The three port agencies operated with overlapping jurisdictions and without effective coordination. Moreover, the agencies suffered from poor management because of a shortage of qualified and experienced staff and an ill-defined management structure, particularly regarding the division of responsibilities between the two ports. This caused continuous conflicts, delays to shipping, pilferage and damage to cargo. Training facilities for the ports' Source: Initiating Project Brief dated September 7, 1984 and the SAR for the Ports Rehabilitation Project dated March 3, 1986.
-2- personnel were particularly inadequate. During 1982-85, GPA was run by an Interim Management Committee which consisted of GPA officials and worker representatives; however, port users were not represented. 4. During the early 1980's, the capacity of virtually all transport modes in Ghana was inadequate to meet even the reduced level of demand, and the transport system had nearly broken down. The Government, with IDA assistance, had started to initiate an Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in 1983 which was designed, in part, to help restore the transport sector. 5. IDA's initial contribution to the ERP included two fast disbursing export rehabilitation credits: (Credit 1435-GH, Export Rehabilitation Project and Credit 1436-GH, Export Rehabilitation Technical Assistance Project (ERTAP), see Part IH, Table A). These credits provided emergency spare parts and equipment, and technical assistance for the ports of Tema and Takoradi. The purpose of these credits was to keep the ports operating, provide training and management support, and initiate key studies of actions needed to strengthen port management and operations. This assistance provided the time to carry out adequate engineering, traffic and economic investigations.y In 1985, IDA approved a Project Preparation Facility (PPF) for USS 1.0 million to carry out preliminary and detailed engineering. 6. The Government's transport strategy emphasized maintenance and rehabilitation of the existing infrastructure. The proposed project formed one of the core projects included in Ghana's 1986-88 investment program, which was prepared in consultation with IDA. The project reinforced IDA's ongoing assistance to Ghana's ERP by: (a) removing physical bottlenecks to expanding exports and imports; (b) supporting suitable institution building goals in the subsector; and (c) attracting the attention and financing of other international aid agencies towards these important objectives, while directing the flow of external funds to the ports' essential needs. C. Project Objectives and Description 7. Obiectives. F The main project objectives were: (a) to rehabilitate the port facilities in Tema and Takoradi in order to enable them to handle the country's export and import needs efficiently during the immediate and medium term; and (b) to strengthen and reorganize port management and port institutions in order to increase the efficiency of the ports. 8. prject Descrigtion.1 To assist in fulfilling the objectives, the project provided financial assistance for the ports of Tema and Takoradi, as summarized below: Memorandum dated September 17, 1984. SAR, para. 3.02. i SAR, para. 3.05.
-3 - (a) Port Rehabilitation and Modernization (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) repair and rehabilitation of existing infrastructure and facilities; removal of sunken vessels and other wrecks; provision of container and roll-on/roll-off facilities at Tema; provision of cargo handling equipment, communications and office equipment, and floating craft; and repair of salvageable equipment. (b) Institutional Strengthening (i) (ii) (iii) technical assistance to strengthen management in the GPHA, including GPHA headquarters and port management at Tema and Takoradi; training program for port managers, staff and skilled workers; and project supervision and coordination. D. Prect Design and Or'anization F 9. The project was identified in May 1984 by an IDA mission which outlined in an Aide- Memoire 1' the steps to be taken for project preparation. These included the emergency purchase of spare parts and equipment to keep the ports running and technical assistance to prepare lists of parts and equipment needed, to develop procurement procedures and for studies. The latter included a study to restructure the port organization and prepare an action plan, a study to establish a new container company to operate a new container yard to be built under the project, and a study to streamline container and ports documentation procedures. The mission also prepared an application for PPF financing to prepare an investment program which was approved on October 22, 1984. 10. Both Tema and Takoradi had been built with ample capacity, but their effective capacity was severely limited. Many factors had contributed to the deterioration in the efficiency of Ghana's ports from their excellent condition in the sixties, when cocoa ships used to be loaded at a rate of 2,400 tons per day compared to about 280 tons in 1984, and when there were no penalties on ocean freight to or from Ghana. The main causes were the following: (a) Lack of preventive and regular maintenance. Due to the shortage of foreign exchange and resulting unavailability of spare parts, most of the port facilities and equipment had had no regular maintenance for about 10 years. Initiating Project Brief dated September 7, 1984 and the SAR for Ports Rehabilitation Project dated March 3, 1986. Aide Memoire dated June 5, 1984.
-4 - (b) (c) (d) Silation. Due to the poor condition of the dredgers, maintenance dredging had been neglected for years, and there was considerable accumulation of silt in the ports, reducing permissible drafts. Rough readings available showed that some of the deep water berths in Tema had about 1.0 m of silt. Port Management Problems. Due to frequent personnel changes under changing Governments, and the unclear demarcation of responsibilities and authority between the three Government agencies running port activities, port efficiency had suffered considerably. Other Factors. Other factors which inhibited port productivity were: nearabsence of night operations in the port, due to lack of lighting in the port area, lack of transport for dock workers, and curfew restrictions. Another major inhibiting factor had been the lack of food, which had resulted in high absenteeism and low productivity. 11. By early 1986, some recovery of the ports had already taken place with assistance from IDA and other lending agencies. The port agencies have benefitted from the purchase of emergency spare parts and some limited equipment and crafts financed under the ERP, and also from essential technical assistance provided through the ERTAP. Concurrently, port labor productivity had been stabilized and improved since 1984 when the World Food Programme (WFP), working in cooperation with IDA, launched a three-year program to supply imported food items as an incentive to the workers and staff of the port agencies. Since 1983, Government had allowed the port agencies to levy port charges on foreign ships in foreign exchange, and to retain 20% of the foreign exchange receipts in their own accounts to buy spare parts and other essential goods. 12. The diagnostic study by port management consultants financed under ERTAP was completed in November 1984. Based on the study's findings, Government agreed, during project appraisal in May 1985 to implement a reorganization plan on the following lines: (a) establish the Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority (GPHA) under a Board of Directors with adequate user representation, and orient GPHA's operations on commercial principles; (b) make the two ports of Tema and Takoradi semi-autonomous, and competitive with each other on the basis of service efficiency, while the GPHA Head Office would coordinate general policy, overall financing, investment planning, training and other areas of common interest; (c) reinforce the present role of the existing government-owned stevedoring companies at Takoradi with provision for future increases in the private sector share; and (d) establish a new container handling company with majority participation of the private sector (51%) and with private sector management, with the objective of ensuring efficient management. 13. According to the timetable for reorganization agreed between Government and IDA, the Govermnent undertook to reorganize the port agencies by enacting the GPHA Law and establishing GPHA in early 1986, before the proposed Credit was presented to IDA's Board. An action plan and timetable for strengthening GPHA management and operations had also been agreed. Government had further agreed that the new container company would be incorporated by June 1986 which was a condition of credit effectiveness. It was also agreed
-5 - that the new company would start operations, within 12 months of its incorporation, on a temporary container yard to be provided by GPHA, pending completion of a full container yard under the proposed project. 14. In addition to the Board Chairman, GPHA had a Director General as chief executive, and a Director for each port. The two port directors were members of the Board to ensure their independent status. GPHA and Government had agreed to prepare port regulations under the GPHA Law, to ensure that GPHA would operate on sound commercial principles and that the GPHA Head Office would not interfere in the day-to-day operations of the individual ports which will be semi-autonomous. GPHA would have rate making authority subject to the general guidance of the Government. Key positions in the GPHA were filled; arrangements for matching personnel to agreed job descriptions, prepared by Consultants were substantially completed by end of June 1986. The project provided for substantial expatriate expertise to strengthen GPHA management and to fill key positions. 15. By early 1986, to strengthen port management, steps had already been taken to: (a) appoint a highly competent director in charge of GPHA and appoint selected experienced managers to key positions in GPHA; (b) engage individual consultants for repairing equipment and civil works maintenance, procure equipment, and to reorganize port accounts; (c) include in the rehabilitation project a technical assistance program aimed at bringing expatriate experts to assist management of key departments on a temporary basis, and at developing a recruitment and training program; and (d) appoint port management consultants, as a followup of earlier studies, to recommend (i) a detailed management structure for the reorganized GPHA, (ii) a staff distribution and manning levels under the new organization, (iii) a uniform tariff and billing system, and (iv) organizational arrangements to be followed by the proposed new container company. Based on a review of the study's interim findings, an action plan was agreed during credit negotiations, including a timetable of main actions to be implemented to strengthen management. The action plan included operational targets for improved port productivity, and target dates for completing the restructuring of GPA management, introducing incentive wage systems, studying and proposing tariff reforms, preparing future investment plans, and taking other necessary steps. 16. To increase private participation and competition, the Government and GPHA agreed to the following measures: (a) maintain, as a minimum, the present share of 25% of stevedore operations by the two private stevedoring companies operating in Tema and Takoradi up to end-1989, and provide them with adequate foreign exchange retention and access to the training program under the project; (b) complete a study, before March 31, 1989, on measures for further increasing the role of private sector firms in port handling operations, with emphasis on competition; and (c) in light of review of the above study, agree with IDA, before June 30, 1989, on a plan for implementing an enhanced role for the private sector in port handling operations from January 1990. 17. Another action needed to improve Ghana's port subsector was to streamline customs and port documentation procedures which were very complex and caused undue delays. GPHA had agreed to engage consultants, financed by ERTAP, to study this problem and to suggest improvements. By early 1986, an interim study had been completed and the final study was to be undertaken. The Government and GPHA agreed, during negotiations, to: (a)
-6 - have this study completed before December 31, 1986; and (b) prepare, before June 30, 1987, an implementation program and timetable acceptable to the Association, in light of the study findings, and to implement it accordingly. 18. The project was appraised in May 1985, by which time most issues had already been settled and the cofinancing identified. The credit was negotiated in January 1986 in three days with only one change of substance in the Loan Committee package. This change, involving a postponement in the establishment of the container company, turned out to be the only part of the project that was not implemented (para. 29). E. Prolect Implementation 19. Credit Effectiveness. The Credit was approved on March 27, 1986, signed on April 4, 1986 and became effective on November 4, 1986. A loan agreement between the Overseas Economic Cooperative Fund (OECF) of Japan and the Government of Ghana for equipment was signed on October 25, 1985. OECF closely coordinated its loan with IDA's Credit 1435- GH (para 5) and the new project. mementation 20. The knowledge of the problems of Ghana ports gained by IDA staff in preparing and supervising the Export Rehabilitation Project and the ERTAP (para 5) contributed greatly to project identification and preparation. Thus, within about 18 months after identification, major remedial measures to strengthen port institutions had already been taken. 21. The civil works were divided into four lots, one each to be financed by IDA and the Saudi Fund at Tema, and one each by IDA and the Economic Development Fund (EDF) of the European Economic Community (EEC) at Takoradi. The procurement guidelines of each financing agency had to be taken into account in the bid documentation. IDA also financed the removal of sunken vessels and other wrecks and the entire TA program, including consulting services. The OECF and IDA financed cargo handling and port equipment. 22. Prgject Start-. The first supervision visit was made in March/April 1986, at about the time of credit signing. The mission found some confusion at the ports as the GPHA law under which they were to operate had not yet been passed. However, by the end of 1986, the merger between GPA and the two private stevedoring agencies had been completed, GPHA had been established and officials appointed to the top positions at both ports. Lower level positions were still being filled. GPHA had started preparing an action plan to strengthen port management and improve operations. Also a Project Coordination Unit (PCU) had been established. 23. A contract for wreck removal was awarded on October 10, 1986. Work was started in November 1986, and by February 1987, 39 wrecks had been removed at Takoradi including 12 extra lighters and a moving buoy. 2 ' The removal of the wrecks at Tema was ZL Letter from GPHA dated February 12, 1987.
-7 - completed on April 20, 1987. Procurement of equipment and floating craft got underway early in 1986. Procurement of equipment posed a considerable amount of work for the TA managers and advisors, as the lists of equipment and spare parts had to be updated in the light of more detailed knowledge of the poor condition of existing equipment. 24. Project Execution. Prequalification for the civil works contracts was completed early in 1986 with as many as 50 contractors approved. Contracts were not signed until October 1987 because of delays in securing the approval for awards from the Government's Public Agreement Board. Despite the potential loss of some savings by combining contracts, GPHA did benefit by the timely performance of the four civil works contractors. This was particularly important as considerable additional work was awarded as execution progressed (para. 28). 25. A supervision report dated October 30, 1987 noted that start-up of civil works was delayed by about 14 months after the date foreseen in the SAR. However, construction time had been set at 36 months rather than the 48 months assumed at appraisal. The civil works contracts were completed well ahead of the scheduled project completion date of September 30, 1991. Takoradi Port was commissioned on September 14, 1990 while Tema Port was commissioned less than a year later on May 17, 1991. 26. Capacity Building. The TA team consisted of 11 experts. Eight were supplied by a German firm, consisting of a project coordinator and operational and mechanical personnel. Three financial experts were supplied by a UK firm to install a Management Information System (MIS). The experts were placed in line positions with responsibility to train Ghanian counterpart personnel to take over from them. A large number of Ghanian staff at all levels were sent abroad for training in port operations. 27. An IDA supervision mission in March 1990, noted that GPHA and the MOTC were reluctant to extend the TA contracts regardless of the extent to which the technological transfer of expertise had been attained because of growing concern that there were too many expatriates occupying key positions in Ghana. 28. Additional Works. The Saudi Fund agreed to allow the remaining balance of its credit of about US$4 million for additional paving of container storage areas at Tema. The EDF financed additional civil works which were outside its original commitment. These included (i) reinforcement of a quay structure and a wharf and the rehabilitation of a wooden shed at Takoradi for US$12 million; and (ii) maintenance dredging works at Tema and Takoradi for US$4 million. IDA approved the use of some of its surplus funds for the survey and design of these additional works. 29. Container Handline Company Limited (CHCL). The establishment of this company at Tema is the single major project item on which little progress has been made to date. MOTC and GPHA have not acted to establish this company, despite a clear commitment in the Credit Agreement to do so. GPHA finally carried out a feasibility study in 1991 on privatization and how the profits would be shared between GPHA and CHCL. The study showed that
-8 - privatization was feasible and proposed a profit sharing scheme.r A second study carried out by the a Bank consultant in April 1992 recommended that the immediate start up of CHCL would lead to a tariff reduction of about 10%. The consultant also recommended that a second container handling company be established in 1994 to provide a better basis for competition. To date, the Government has not acted to establish a CHCL because of concerns including the reaction of the labor force. 30. Project Completion. Overall, the completion of works was ahead of schedule. The rehabilitation of cargo handling and port equipment, the strengthening of the management of the ports by the technical assistance team, and the development of the MIS were most successful achievements, especially given the chaotic state of the ports at the time of project identification. The failure to establish the CHCL is the one major commitment of the Government on which little progress has been made, although the issue has been thoroughly discussed (para. 29). 31. Procurement. The project called for a large volume of procurement including floating vessels, a contract for the removal of wrecks in both harbors, four large civil work contracts, and substantial amount of technical assistance. As the GPHA was relatively inexperienced in procurement, the project provided consultants to prepare the documentation, evaluate bids, and recommended awards. GPHA's board, management and tender committee oversaw this work and participated in the procurement process. The files indicate that procurement was generally well handled and led to only a few minor issues which were resolved. GPHA generally had no reservation about contracting for technical personnel through specialized companies to provide technical assistance, but they objected to engaging a procurement officer they had sought through the Crown Agents, and tried to hire the candidate directly. He refused to accept GPHA's offer, and GPHA awarded a contract to another firm. 32. GPHA extended the contract of its consultant for supervision in line with Bank Guidelines because of the firm's experience gained on the design work and its satisfactory performance. GPHA also reduced the supervision costs by a further US$1 million, in addition to the 12% discount from the firm, and signed the contract without any additional delay ahead of start of construction works. 33. Disbursements. The credit account was almost fully disbursed. On April 20, 1993 the remaining SDRs 2,346.11 were canceled. The closing date was extended by one year to March 31, 1993 to permit further consideration of the establishment of CHCL. 34. Project Costs. The project was completed for total cost of US$115.0 million as compared to the appraisal cost of US$95.8 million, the difference being attributable to import taxes which were not provided for during the appraisal stage. The Government of Ghana Memorandum by a consultant, dated September 30, 1991. Report on Privatization of Container Handling Tema Port, Ghana; April 1992 by a Bank Consultant.
- 9 - contributed about US$17.0 in deferred payment of import taxes. The appraisal and final cost estimates are shown in Table D(i). The co-financing plan is given in Table D(ii). F. Major Results of the Project 35. Traffic.. In 1975 the combined traffic of the ports of Tema and Takoradi was 4.7 million tons. Following the successful implementation of the country's economic recovery program, and the substantial completion of the project, traffic recovered to 5.0 million tons in 1990, 5.3 million tons in 1991, and an estimated 5.7 million tons in 1992. The 1990 figure represents an increase of 16.4% over that projected in the SAR. 36. A considerable variation in the flow of main commodities on a year to year basis was noted by the consultants at both ports (Tables E(i) and (ii)). In 1992 imports at Tema of velcro and cement were up substantially while liquid bulk imports declined. On the export side, large increases were noted for cocoa, general cargo and liquid bulk. In Takoradi, solid bulk exports and bauxite exports were up thanks to the improved performance of the railways, but general cargo imports were off. Port productivity has increased with the drop of ship turn around time from 3.5 days to 1.8 days in Tema and to 2.4 days in Takoradi. 37. The most striking development is the rapid growth of container traffic at Tema (Table E(iii)). The 1992 estimate of 84,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU) exceeds the figure of 69,400 projected in the SAR for 1995. On the other hand, the Takoradi container throughput in 1991 was only 9100 TEU and is expected to decline further in 1992. This is a result of the commodity mix at each port and the tendency of the major shipping lines to concealrate container traffic on a limited number of ports of call. 38. Operational Performance. The Bank's consultant concluded that the daily output rates prevailing in Tema in 1991 and 1992 were generally satisfactory and an improvement over the target outputs in the SAR. This result has been made possible by the implementation of the Ports Project and the upgrading of the ports infrastructure and equipment. The three risk factors which could jeopardize the ports output performance in the coming years would be a fiurther increase in traffic levels, a relaxation of operational discipline and a reduction in the quality of equipment maintenance. On the other hand, the cargo-handling performance at Takoradi for 1992 was no better than in 1985, and was rated as disappointing. This is because the traditional traffic at Takoradi is either stagnating or declining, and container traffic is increasingly being concentrated at Tema. 39. Economic Performance. The recalculated economic rate of return (ERR) based on the project's cost and benefit flows are 49% for Tema and 36% for Takoradi. The combined ERR for the project is 43 % and compares very favorably with the SAR's estimate of 27% for Tema, 29% for Takoradi or a combined ERR of 28% (See Annex for details). The good project results are based on reduction of port congestion and an improvement of handling productivity. An additional benefit, not quantified, is that due to the dredging at Tema, the port can accommodate larger bulk carriers and thus a savings in the number of voyages required. a Source: Report on Project Completion by a Bank Consultant, dated January 31, 1993
- 10-40. Financial Performance. Annexes E(iv) to (vi) present a comparison between actual and projected financial results over the years 1986 to 1992. GPHA has met most of the financial covenants in the project agreement. GPHA was required to ensure adequate tariff increases in order to cover all operating expenses and interest costs. As evidenced in the Annexes, GPHA's financial performance in the period 1986 to 1992 exceeded the set targets in the SAR. GPHA's actual revenue growth averaged about 224% per year compared to 10% in the forecasts over the period 1986 to 1992. This was attributable mainly to: (a) the increases in tariffs; (b) the persistent devaluation of the Cedi against the major currencies in this period (50% of GPHA's revenue is in convertible currency); and (c) the upsurge in cargo volume noted in paragraphs 35-36. The major operating revenue item contributors to this growth were stevedoring and shorehandling which contributed 31% and 23% respectively over the period 1986 to 1992. 41. Operating costs fell by 175% between 1986 and 1987 and by 27% between 1990 and 1992. This has been mainly due to the decrease in payroll costs which, before and during project implementation, constituted the highest operating cost item of the operating costs. The fall in payroll costs from 81% to 40% of total operating costs between 1986 and 1992, was due to staff retrenchment from 7800 in 1985 to 2885 in 1991 following the reorganization of GPHA. 42. During period 1987 to 1991, GPHA was financially self-sufficient as evidenced by financing of the replacement capital assets through internally generally cash (Annex E(vi)). GPHA did not undertake any additional borrowing as required by the debt limitation covenant. 43. GPHA's profitability during the period 1986 to 1992 surpassed the forecasts. The annual average operating and working ratios for this period were 82% and 88% respectively and the average return on net fixed assets in operation was 60% during the project implementation period from 1986 to 1991 based on historical cost figures, but falls to 48% in 1992, after fixed assets revaluation in 1992. 44. During the period, the average current and liquidity ratios were 4.7 and 4.4, respectively and this highlights GPHA's solid financial condition. This compares with the average forecast of 2 and 1 for the current and liquidity ratios, respectively for the period of 1986 to 1992. Since reorganization, GPHA has operated on a commercial basis with management operating on a semi-autonomous basis. 45. Receivables UI are in a somewhat worse situation than the limit set in the SAR. This is due to domestic debtors who are facing financial problems. In addition, GPHA had been lax in enforcing a tighter debt recovery policy during the period of project implementation. In order to redress this adverse position, the management is implementing the following policies: (a) advance payments by clients for any shorehandling; (b) charging interest on accrued balances; and (c) lifting the corporate veil and commit directors to honor some of their corporate debts. lk Receivables percentage is total receivables divided by the total operating revenues.
- I1 - GPHA - Summary of Receivables Position 0 1986 19872m j 198 I 1199 i1 11 Limits per SAR(%) 1 60 50 33 25 25 20 Actual Result (%) 126.5 I 33.8 67.5 57 I 61 I 55 G. Project Sustainability 46. GPHA is now fully operational with its facilities completely restored under the project, and its staff adequately trained in all aspects of port administration (see para. 50). GPHA is financially sound and is playing an essential role in the country's import and export activities. In the light of the above, GPHA's viability should be sustainable. GPHA pointed out in its draft PCR I2 that the major factor in its continued success will be influenced by the privatization policies of the Government and GPHA (para. 29). H. Association Performance 47. The most important aspect of the Association's performance was the thorough nature of the preparation of the project. By the time the project was presented to IDA's Board, a long list of preparatory steps had been taken which enabled project execution to start quickly with relatively smooth implementation. This process was facilitated by the earlier ERP and ERTAP. 48. The supervision coverage was generally good with visits averaging three times a year during the busiest execution period as shown in Table H (ii). Most supervision reports were adequate except that no detailed cost data were included. Form 590's are missing for three visits. In one case, no supervision report was prepared, however, a letter was written to GPHA highlighting the findings of the mission. IDA also played a key role in the selection of the TA experts and frequently assessed the performance of each individual team member which contributed greatly to the success of the project. IDA carefully coordinated with the co-donors who also played an important role in the execution of the project. The Association was flexible in amending the lists of equipment and parts to be purchased, and in adjusting the allocations of the credit proceeds to meet current needs. I. Borrower Performance 49. The Borrower generally performed well and cooperated fully in achieving the objectives of the project with the exceptions noted in paras 27 and 29. It took the appropriate legal action in establishing the GPHA (para 2). Adequate local funding was provided, and the Ministry of Finance and Economy assisted GPHA in facilitating its contracts with co-donors whenever it was requested to do so. The Government appointed a strong and experienced Iv GPHA draft PCR, page 13.
- 12 - administrator to head up GPHA. Upon his transfer to another organization in March 1988, he was replaced by a senior Government official who also cooperated closely with IDA. 50. The GPHA was generally soundly managed and cooperated closely with IDA. It accepted expatriate technical assistance up to about 1990 (para 27). GPHA sent key staff overseas for specialized training as recommended by advisors and on completion of training, they have returned to their positions at GPHA. The one major omission of the Government and GPHA to-date has been the failure to establish the CHCL (para 29). This step may eventually be taken since GPHA is not against privatization in principle, but is concerned about upsetting its relations with its labor force. 51. Both Part I (para. 23) and Part H (para. 3) of the PCR note the confusion at the time of the reorganization of the GPHA. Given the magnitude of the task, this would appear to have been a normal transition. The remarkable aspect is that the transition period was so short, and that the newly established GPHA took hold as quickly and effectively as it did. J. Project Relationships 52. Relations between the Government, GPHA and IDA were generally close. GPHA kept IDA well informed on progress of the work and of any difficulties that arose. Good relations also seem to have generally prevailed between GPHA, its civil works consultants, and the TA team. The GPHA noted in its draft PCR that 'a very close relationship between GPHA management and staff on one side; and consultants, contractors as well as suppliers on the other side resulted in good transfer of knowledge in all aspects of the project". K. Consulting and Contracting Services 53. The impression gained from a review of the project is that the civil works supervision consultant performed well. While there was the occasional criticism that this consultant should have uncovered earlier some of the technical problems which arose during construction, particularly with regard to the electrical system, the civil works mainly involved rehabilitation of existing structures and utilities. Under these circumstances, problems cannot always be foreseen until the works have been finished and the condition of the structures and the utilities can be more accurately assessed. 54. The TA team provided by two separate firms also performed well and contributed substantially to the progress made in rehabilitating the ports and training local personnel. The advantage of using firms to supply a large number of expert personnel, rather than employing them on an individual basis, was well illustrated under this project. Non-performing, unsuitable or ill TA staff can be replaced, and without the time consuming involvement of IDA or GPHA staff to identify replacements. The civil works contractors, the contractor for the removal of wrecks, and the equipment suppliers generally performed satisfactorily. L. Project Documentation 55. The credit and project agreements were adequate and appropriate for achieving project objectives, and the appraisal report provided a useful framework for implementation. The
- 13 - correspondence files are complete. They contain about one dozen misfiled documents related to other projects. Some of the earlier cables and telexes are so faint that they are difficult to read.
- 14 - REPUBLIC OF GHANA PORTS REHABILITATION PROJECT CREDITI 674GH PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE 1. We would like to reflect and assess on the implementation of the agreements and covenants contained in the Bank's Staff Appraisal Report vis-a-vis the Bank's own guidelines and procedures and its impact on the project. The comments are as brief as possible and do not cover implementation details since all necessary information can be recalled from the quarterly project reports submitted to the Bank. 2. The Statistical Information, given in Part Ill of the PCR, tally with the data of our MIS, MAS and Finance Departments and are, therefore, accepted by GPHA. 3. On the whole, we are in harmony, with the analysis contained in Part I of our report but would like to comment on some subjects as follows: (a) One of the major problems right at the beginning of the project was the necessity to merge the three operating companies at the same time as the start up of the project was due. A minimum of 9-12 months in between these two main steps, incorporated into the project time-frame, would have allowed for consolidation of the new authority and avoided most of the managerial and personnel problems which hampered the smooth take off of the rehabilitation project. GPHA believes that it should be possible to amend the staff appraisal report with the Bank if so required.1-' Possible reasons are: (i) (ii) Changes in Government Policies (i.e. Ban on Log Export); Dynamic nature of the port industry, changes in the industrial environment (i.e. containerization of traditional export goods, like cocoa, sawn timber & veneer; development of new ships and cargo handling equipment). The SAR was well prepared during appraisal but it is, today, questionable in connection with some of the assumptions made. See Part I, para. 47.
- 15 - (b) Although, GPHA considered the working relationship between the consultants and their counterparts very successful, it has to be mentioned that a tougher approach in selection procedures for consultants and counterparts and financially-motivated counterparts could have led to better and faster results for both parties involved. The Bank should strongly support at Governmental level the approach that better qualifications, and man-month rates or salaries do not automatically mean higher costs at the end of the project. In short, more emphasis should be put on quality and standards. (c) Especially in developing countries like Ghana, it is an absolute must to allow for standardization of technical equipment. Under the current purchase regulations of the funding agencies, it is believed that because of the high weighing given to price, this is nearly automatically excluded and thus resulting in unnecessary maintenance and operation costs after project completion. Once again, what looks reasonable at the beginning could turn out as the most expensive solution at the end. (d) One item which helped to make the project a real success was the introduction of the project implementation committee. The involvement of all levels of departments as well as the union assisted greatly in smooth implementation of the project goals. Also, at times very energy-absorbing, it was worth the effort and should be part of all complex projects like the port rehabilitation. 4. During the take off period of the project, GPHA had great difficulties in getting started. As already mentioned under item 3, the main reason was the need to undertake two major operations at the same time with insufficient time for consolidation of the reshuffled management. 5. After the first nine months, the project became an integrated part of the daily routine of GPHA, the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Finance. Because the authorities involved respected each others requirements and problems, the project was completed successfully. 6. Throughout the project, a very close and effective relationship between the Bank's Washington office and the Borrower was kept. The Bank also helped to establish and keep good contacts with the other funding agencies and assisted whenever necessary, even outside their responsibility, to keep the project going. 7. At the very beginning of the project, it would have been appreciated if a stronger Bank support at the ministerial level in connection with political decisions required had been put in place.
- 16-8. The project, supported by three co-financiers, was in the position to honor all contractual obligations with the exception of the contract financed by the Saudi Fund. During the project years, not a single invoice by that funding agency was paid within the contractual time limits. In order to avoid payments covering interest due to the contractor, GPHA was forced to undergo complicated prepayment procedures from its own funds. Without GPHAowned foreign funds available, the situation could have brought the Tema project to a complete standstill. 9. The EEC Delegation in Ghana was always in very close contact with the Authorities and the good cooperation played a major role in the successful completion of the project. 10. Financing the largest part of the rehabilitation and not represented in Ghana, OECF handled all activities very efficiently and allowed for smooth cooperation over the full length of their part of the project. OECF's requirement to tender in bulk led to the problem of being forced to buy via a trading company and not from the manufacturer. Thus, this resulted in extra cost not only during the project period but also during the life span of the equipment.
- 17 - A. Related Bank Loans and Credits PART m. STATISTICAL INFORMATION Year of Loan/Credit Title Purpose Approval Status Credit 1435-GH Provided, among other items, 1984 Completed Export Rehabilitation Project. emergency spare parts, equipment and floating craft for the ports. Credit 1436-GH Included essential technical 1984 Completed Export Rehabilitation Technical assistance to help prepare the Assistance Project ports project. B. Project Timegabl Item Planned Date Revised or Credit A/ Amended Date Actual Date k/ Identification 05/84 Pre-Appraisal 02/85 canceled Appraisal 05/85 05/85 Negotiations 11/85 01/21-24/86 Board Approval 01/86 03/27/86 Signature 04/04/86 Effectiveness Date 11/04/86 Closing Date 03/31/92 3/31/92 03/31/93 Completion Date 09/30/91 fl 06/30/93 a/ Source: Initiating Project Brief dated September 7, 1984. b/ Source: Correspondence Files. _l Source: Credit Agreement.
- 18 - C. Credit Data (i) Credit Disbursements Disbursements (in US$ Million) Bank Fiscal Year and Quarter Estimated Cumulative / Actual Cumulative _/ Actual % of Estimated 1987 1 0.5 0 0 2 3.0 3.2 106 3 3.5 4.2 120 4 4.1 4.8 117 1988 1 5.5 5.9 107 2 7.6 7.4 97 3 10.0 9.6 96 4 12.1 10.5 105 1989 1 14.7 11.4 78 2 17.5 12.4 71 3 19.0 17.0 89 4 19.7 19.2 97 1990 1 20.4 22.2 111 2 21.1 22.9 109 3 22.0 24.2 110 4 23.8 25.4 107 1991 1 23.5 27.7 118 2 23.9 28.2 117 3 24.1 28.3 117 4 24.3 28.3 116 1992 1 24.5 28.3 116 2 28.3 116 3 28.7 117 4 28.8 118 1993 1 29.1 119 2 29.3 120 3 29.3 120 4 29.4 120 b/ Source: Statements of Development Credits c/ Source: Differential between actual and estimated disbursements attributed to currency variations between US dollar and SD' in which credit was denominated
- 19 - D. Proiect CoCts (i) proiect Costs ^ (in USS million) At Appraisal b/ Actual c/ Category Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total A. Works 1. Port of Tema 3.24 20.14 23.38 2. Port of Takoradi 1.97 12.39 14.36 5.67 dy 35.29 d/ 40.96 _/ 3. Wreck Removal 001.75 Q75 2.37 2.37 B. Equipment 1. Port of Tema 0.10 17.47 17.57 5.21 34.89 40.10 5.67 37.66 43.33 2. Port of Takoradi 0.03 15.22 15.25 g/.4 45.00 d/ 45.00 d/ 0.13 32.69 32.82 C. Technical Assistance 0.52 1.55 2.07 D. Training Program 0.22 0.99 1.21 E. Project Supervision 39 1.19 1.58.76 S/ 8.12 e/ 8.88 e/ F. Repayment of PPF 1.00 1.00 0.78.78 0. Import Taxes 17.01-17.01 17.01 0 17.01 TOTAL 23.49 72.31 95.80 23.44 91.56 115.00 _./ Excluding taxes _/ Source: SAR - Annex 3-5 q/ Source: GPHA (local and foreign currency breakdown reconstructed from GPHA data) _/ Covers Port of Tema and Port Takoradi _/ Figures include items C, D and E. Notes: i) Credit was made in SDRs Figures rounded ii) Appraisal and actual costs are not strictly comparable because the latter, as noted in para. 34), includes uimport taxes.
- 20 - D. Project Costs (continued) (ii) project Finan a/ (in US$ million) Appraisal Estimate Actual Local Foreign Total Total _/ IDA 3.00 21.50 24.50 28.84 Japan (OECF) - 29.20 29.20 45.00 Saudi Fund - 13.15 13.15 8.45 EDF 1.20 7.43 8.63 10.94 GPHA 2.28 1.03 3.31 4.76 Total 648 723 78.79 2922 Gov. of Ghana b/ 17.01 17.01 17.01 TOTAL 23.49 72.31 1 95.80 115.00 A/ Source: SAR, page iii h/ Loan to GPHA covering deferred payment of import taxes c/ Source: GPHA Notes: i) Credit was made in SDRs Figures rounded ii) Appraisal and actual costs are not strictly comparable because the latter are noted in Para. 34, includes import taxes.
- 21 - E. Results of the Project E(i) Port of Temna: Comparison of Forecasted and Actual Throughput by Commodity (in 000 tons) FORECAST FORECAST ACTUAL ESTIMATE IMPORTS 1990 199S 1991 1992 Liquid Bulk 900 1100 1092 866 Valcro - - 45 60 Other dry bulk - - 109 119 Grain 100 100 408 381 Aluminum 270 270 366 332 Cement clinker 240 290 470 618 Transit 10 100 n.a. n.a. General cargoes 480 530 578 659 TOTAL IMPORTS 2000 2390 3068 3035 EXPORTS FORECAST FORECAST ACTUAL ESTIMATE 1990 1995 1991 1992 Liquid Bulk 250 159 197 355 Aluminum 100 110 177 79 Timber 120 150-143 Cacao beans 145 150 75 53 General Cargo 80 90 129 186 TOTAL EXPORTS 695 695 578 816 GRAND TOTAL 2695 3085 3646 3851 VAR. ACTUAL + 18.2% + 24.8% FORECAST 1995 Source: GPHA data from Mission Bank Consultant.
- 22 - Efii) Port of Takoradi: Comparison of Actual to Forecasted Cargo Throughputs fin 000 tons) FORECAST FORECAST ACTUAL ESTIMATE IMPORTS 1990 1995 1991 1992 Liquid Bulk 100 120 92 107 Grain 50 50 61 59 Cement Clinker 200 200 324 495 General Cargo 90 120 72 53 TOTAL IMPORTS 440 490 549 714 EXPORTS FORECAST FORECAST ACTUAL ESTIMATE 1990 1995 1991 1992 Liquid Bulk - - 4 Bauxite 350 350 324 443 Manganese Ore 400 450 320 298 Logs and timber 280 300 281 260 Cocoa and products 100 140 110 104 General Cargo 30 40 55 53 TOTAL EXPORTS 1160 1280 1090 1162 GRAND TOTAL 1600 1770 1639 1876 VAR. ACTUAL -7.4% -5.6% FORECAST 1995 Source: GPHA data from Mission Report by Bank Consultant.
- 23 - E(iii) Ports of Tema and Takoradi Comparison of Actual to Projected Container Throughputs (in TEU containers) TEMA FORECAST FORECAST ACTUAL ESTIMATE 1990 1995 1991 1992 Loaded Cont. 35000 45000 37150 44128 Mt. Cont. 9800 10200 24874 29236 Total Cont. 44800 55200 62024 73364 TAKORADI FORECAST FORECAST ACTUAL ESTIMATE 1990 1995 1991 1992 Loaded Cont. 5000 10000 5462 5000 Mt. Cont. 2000 4200 3650 3200 Total Cont. 7000 14200 9112 8200 GRAND TOTAL 51800 69400 71,136 81,564
E(iv) 01W4 POR1 *43 HMOLR3 MAUrOF 94M STATEftTS 1905- # ls in 19ui7 1967 ins ins TIkirid Tm Tolnt Tdtwrd TeNm Tdot * Tdia Ten Told Tdcrd Ten Tol Tdkomd Twn Toe Tdak td Tana Tldn Vws.1 SerA* FPkorW dtup 117 S32 41t 14.4 481 6ZS 11.7 82 44.9 a65 15ot 2117 17 94.2 4(1 1112 20c9 927.2 B.wodwskv 57.3 2a4 2s7 129.7 21S1 044.6 611 216.6 2717 4791 a.5 1316.6 6S.0 225.3 294.3 624.2 1442.7 1966.9 %Ww wwgun*y 1.0 Z0 to e19 6. I 0 1.0 o 0 a0 61 16.3 224 1.0 Zo ao 21.C us5 61. Vesed F.c1k Ui*iIDune ao0 165 IlS 5S 220 27.2 a1o 19.5 is. 219 7.6 91.7 eo its 19.5 S4.9 C4.9 I1.1 bt.bo, R.r4ndht orn 12.7 431 516 137 24.6 4a3 1I7 419 sa6 74.7 1295 204.2 IS7 46.9 6O6 s3a 225.5 319.8 O.nmftldDies 213 10Ls 131.S 1o 2U6 S ga6 Z2 1112 144.4 64.6 291s 46al 311 121.0 156.1 4.9S 9665. 9114 Chip Servis: Ught g. 3ses a10 gas 14.9 o10 14.9 232 eo 12 sa6 ssho#4ww& a 0 S sa o 9 (0 S9 569 712 3A4.7 2615 *37.7 S74.7 764 1612 241.6 6ao 261.1 S44.1 894.0 64(2 1011.0 90.3 291.4 SM1.7 S74. 912S 136.1 Y&*Aa Des V27.3 9S7 12110 Ss6 26S 7274 312 126S 15117 246.49 32 5921 94.2 107.4 141.6 a816 5467 9295 9ois9*0_s 'hwil"9 97.6 IOI.S 1.1 5S6 56S a9 97.6 101.5 115 2591 27m6 39 97.6 101.6 6SS 734.9 77M SnU.y Chw 9. 6.7 16.2 110 10 14.4 45.7 110o 110 1t5 60t &wnmkyinoon. 11.0 lao 29.0 1o 110 11o 12I0 1a0 Sa0 11o 1O C1O 110 19.0 a10 1o 1o1 co TOTAL 257.7 694.3 1152.0 s17 804.5 110.3 2Bao 6S 1209.6 138.3 2in.0 4229.2 3013 964.3 2731. 2015.0 6133.9 71174 TRWF t4naese TOTAL REVDILES 257.7 894.3 1152.0 3217 904.6 110.2 2U10 83S 1209.6 1390.8 299.0 4Z2.2 SOL 964.8 IM.1 2 2015.0 61839 7117.4 -- -- -- -- -- - --- -- -- - P.n, Cogs ISZ2 9#6.S 549.1 al1 5191 1171.2 169.5 Fud. 3".4 PFwr nd 5639 %Ww 1290.0 16I1.4 9102.2 1l13 1526 24.0 I3Il 34.3 521.7 145 1645.0 1062 2073.3 12117 211.3 1Q1 24.0 ts. 6 lt..no.ndtki 4.5 219.4 2sa9 11.5 25.4 3ao 269 426 914 756 l16o 2e65 256.4 39A 597 554 61.6 117.2 O OP."qCo.a phe 107.S 59.2 167.1 612 11.4 Sa2 21.7 S1.4 al 1012 17 2970 16 405.2 13 120 2ns5 Atnkikr.6v*. 34.5 tp.rue 12 1.6 1.S 126 16.3 230 212 38.6 545 Iao 11.1 a30 292 lao 403 16.3 s2 D.d -nddmkjotis 54S 31.5 3ao 64.5 16.3 54 a2 S19 54.5 24.3 477 13.2 750 1.5 1217 14.7 6.0 208 26.0 27.6 1761 20a9 6.5 2n6 211 34.9 V s2 65aI WInhtCode 266 5023 77S9 7122 697.7 14099 27.0 614.5 91.5 1522.7 2300.7 2623.4 297.7 s31. 629.2 2209.2 2964.5 6173.7 DspfOchionanUdMan.41on 121.2 269. 391.3 11.4 27.1 615 1314 271 4100 316 105.6 143 14(S 2M.5 451O 2026 32.a 527.6 7OCA C'LT N1i3 COST ass6o M7 O 1161.9 72a60 724.30 1448.4 42140 7S110 1211. 1562.50 2406.20 s9667 44(20 833oo0 I0.2 2411.70 2269.60 670.6 NeCi O.ldhgfRtwnuw> -13210 12220-190 -99S.90 72.70-34310 -14a40 141.53-1.90-17120 49O160 26e5-137.40 131.20-110 -28917101694.10 1415.90 Op-dbgR.r-_weelf) _n- 6.S0 1120 17.0 se4 253w 8314 114 16 210 3so t.cplorml -36 en. 31.4 10 I110 610 11 1912 110 3917 110o 593O 11o 110 110 11o Lmni.twom 110 11o 11o 110 1o 6s 11o 72 110 las 1o 19 Q0 4.4 1o1 183 10 41.1 44.5 65.6 Nei koom4.o.) 11o 7.9 elrmbltw 7.9 1O0. 1235-131.6 3o0 1252 10-14 6.4-2a64 64 a3-58, -174.1 1116-61.5-137.2 431.2 204.0-2314.9 25.8-2081 -214 zia7.4 2002.5 sigrakernt Rao - ------------ rhkb_go 1.0 1s a17 22 119 1.3 1.0 11 17 1.1 opc _ti1frgb 116 1 1.o 11 17 1.5 1.1 19 1s 1.0 117 12 1s 1.3 1.5 as 1.0 1.1 116 Tlnee kiwod s 1.4 OLD _wod by 1.0 1.2 116 118 ea.".mhbg A -21.0 17.0-117 -7.1 1R -1a7 -I&6 Th_ DOM Al SW%*. -1o CtWod -4.9 by -1369 3ao -11.4 7.2-1o -11 4.7 221.2 CmhO. idiwuope _lons 2e12 11o R.een on No Fhd 4.8 Am.b In Lb() 61.4 1.3 oa07 Aooewls R9cd%bWCpwvdtr 17 Rs.r(S) as 126.5 sao 67.5
E (iv) F..g~~~~.sI ~~Ac2.,AcedF.m6IActd"76 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~04010f "TS2 AND 141*6U011202 OW VICOUG SIA?1M7N26 I62-03 Acmil ltobeudt&.. od 1.b.d Isms idi?dinud Temm lak IA'""iko 'aws, T.ow Tab""i lws item Iduied lamme vood Idues I.s.O 1d Td.id 1mA lowd 7264 VW 'FOP IS.? 28.1 416s 164.1 M60. 366 IL? Sol 406 266.4 4647 60.2 1t., *02 60.6 2446 all., 02.16 1.7 26.1 62.4 12" MA. 2240.0 2Ndu 2g 74.8 141.2 360 4566. 24411.4 M10&* 80.6 24oo 224 f002.0 242.0 424)6 80.4 21064 227.0 121660 20667. 634.7 26.4 361.2 547.1 26011 60061 06263 WON5s"WOm7.s ti 10 61.6 Ill.6 226.4 0.6 2.2 Is6 21.6 2it1 1371 10 2.6 t0 21.0 226.4 MA2 2.0.6 326 21.4 l&0 224.2 LIVO Dma 0.0~~~~~~~W 10.6 20.6 452 142i1267.4 0.0 62 32.5 61.2 261. 24. VIA32 22. 26.I2 214 211 MA.t. Its4 6.4 NO1 3602 MIA. #4e.bemftmdwsdWg.s2,g 2~~4.6 4.6. We6 021 1610. 2612 24.6.0 m.a4. I26. 33413 36.6 I4ts 02.? 2.1 220.6 4122. 624.4 14.6 0.7 617.2 246.6 614.2 6242 Gw. dpm Dow. 012I 1220. 16. 42.6 721. 7661 42.6 167.6 la"3 t.o 126 12171 42.6 1AILS 16.41 11.1 2461. "me1 "A. 141.4 *16.2 44.6 one1 2616.6 Luguawgs 010 6.6 26~~~~~~~~~8.0.04 6.0 426.6 40.0 6.6 40.0, 26.? 0.0 1216.7 40.61 0.6 406 2800. t.6 20.7 261 0.6 26.6 247.4 so 247.4 6*0m6,*eg 602~~~~~~e 6.2 406 612.2 MIll 26 206A 2217 416 2626.4 22014 4666. 2127 22.4 46. 1 1212.7 25206 27617.3 21614 804.2 420.7 2062. 3232.2 46215 wissb,. DUNs 27. 1261 162.2 6M6. 622.4 1366.6 42.6 222.0 266.6 722 2664.j 2626. 42.6 227. 2in.6 620. 66 60.6 42.6 122.7 17.6. l667.7 o0 son.? 20m0 C2sm,. to ioa *02. 466 6041 267. 2.0 07.6 202.6 202. 2lo0.11 22141 2.0 676 202.6 637.6 742.1 12276. 2.6 67.6 261. 231.4 1201.6 Ian16 Sr.MyCIwg.. ~~~ ~~~~06 00 12.0 236.4 00 00 6.0 262.6 60. 0.0 64. 443.2 0.0 0.6 0W0 0.6 14.0 20.0 24.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 26.0 22.0 26.0 47.7 0.0 47.7 12.0 22.0 200 60 0.6 0.6 ll 22.0626 2.6 20116 804.0 12226 IOTAL 8022 1004.4 2227. 26136.2 7462.4 61002 26221 20442 24W7.) 226.5 1222.2 24264.0 274.6 207.2 2420.2 46722 11262. 262614.6 262A 1261. 2460. 0IN.1 I6076. 2122602 lawf6p60a2 3-0 76.4 100.4 642 26669 211.1 26.4 264.6 266.) 63 3619 0.0 00 0.0 - TOTAL PIEIEU 3541 10706 1426.0 6776. 4262 1206.1 216A4 241604.6 474.3226112634.5 N. 266644.6 M&6 2400. 2662. 621 26076.0 21260.2 W P.M.wsMwC4,64m 2M2. 226. 627.6 636 I22A22 24766 2760 232. 622.2 20666 212610 2226A 276.0 224.0 226 I 226643 22172 2 U67.4 1626 MA6 620.2 M soil2 022 46476 Vad Ps.dW den 22.2 20.0 a6 all "is6 me1 I26 "5 266 246.6 324.6 44046 226 27.0 me6 22261 46.7 M806 22.6 27. 266 2004 722.6 I0202 1.1,4mwsWAsUd.I141 160. 670 2177.0 2420 277I '274 1262i 22613 3026 a 2722 30:2 72404 227.0 I 261 212 22 2672 22it72 I2722 2222 t2642 16727 20667 2762.4 OthOpete"A"I, 23.2 " 23. 26 2?0 St 726 1369 2421 371 2"2 2060 402 2)7i 246a MI2 10 4660 lost 227 2 346 26 712 30) 2034 ASkub.bb6o,xp 7 w6s 262 23 58 4.6 046 460a 11 a22 262 262 241 2262 1346 274.2 26. 2632 242S I"?7 2"2t A2i2 202 22 146 I 2262 2663 627.6 Steel 0d DeqD0.6 71F 24.4 32.4 104.6 ales 1217.2 1.1 262 236 225 223. -4626 a6 273 3223 4002 2066 o22.? 62 21.7 27.0 666 6472 Ust2. 36.6 6416 266. 276A 21801 46.2 AMA 61 612.6 676.2 2602. 3224.0 207.6 36.2 646.2 2034.5 24.270 4226.8 OK66. 431.6 66.6 2074.6 47214 2676.2 1226.0 0.p.wcbln WAusAMMa 207. 20419 40 2607 642. 226. 2601 322.6 472.6 M4.4 02111 2767.7 260.6 3211. O7LD 1222.2 0216 3606 l01 224A 471A 12220.2 700. 2626 I0IALOPINAT64COIT 426.3 004111 1327.2 222.0 e 0.30 6262. 526.00 626.20. 2422.1 2626.2 4226.60 2666. 6416o 021.76 2606. 2747.0060210.600726. 66.2 66276 2262. 60212 766.60 220 "MdPm Opurk.6m.41.. -20160 M2.40 220. 21330 23126 8426.20-112.70 271.00.43.60 2.0 1 12713 707160-74.60 402.6-26.26 1222510627.2 7266.00-26.2 426.260-02.26-622.6 6464.00 766220 tin. 2296622wse42.64 I i4 26.0 20.6 642.2 62.19 627.2 2MD I60 26.0 420.6.2401 95.0 22.6 26.6 20.0 3766 4M60. M60 its 1W. 30.6 00 06 60. F,g, b.s mom. 6. 0.0 0.6-766 01-6 0. 6 6.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 t 10 a 0.0 0.0 06. 0.0 6.6 6.6 6. 2.0 2 260.6VIO 26724 Leee.bDAO 161.6 206. ~SK 0.6 0.0 0.6 M 26. 042.0 4322. o6 16 0.6 2642 237.2 432.6 0.6 6.6 6f 276. 224.6 402. 61 00 t6 M" b.awojqloe9 a uikws -226.4 42.3-227.1 266.6 4231.2 43412. :*6061 64.2-442.6 2606L7 722.1 64a7-25667 262.2-736 2491.4 707. "M.Y. -2401 211.4-26.2-36.6 202146 6666 WO^tA~~~ %db 6..6 14 1 0.7 6.4 as6 A1 6.6 11 0.6 to 169 2.6 t0 6.7 06 0.4 6.4 2.2 0.6 417 66 6.4 01 DP.." adb 1~~.4 6L1 21. w0 60 10.7 21. 6.0 IA ay? 6.4 as 2.6 0L0 2.0 06 1.4 6.0 1A 910 21. 21 6as 0.0 16.4. hftogged mad by "Ms Opewr6gelpesweeA -0A 22.7 as as6 53 6.7-61 154 -to2 2.7 4.2 14.1 416 20.4 -. I to0 MA4 U -7.2. 63. -61 6. 1 OLD TIwiee Dows. UwhC~".e by CeS.b0weemmdoompummerm 2.6 *.e 2.0 g.e 1.2 50 21. 6.S F.Sem Am No noddsa.asa tloqq 6.26 US 6.06 6.76 60 co.041 6.06 A-Asss Reemebblaftpeemue R.s----s 26.0 67.6 51.11 6121 600 MA. 26.6 47.6 S~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
NET TOTALASOETh 3041.2 820. 2215009 26767 Se22.7 6727 1326.0 20087 75656 3083 30624 723"7 75113 70110 05267 144.22.7 E Cv) 79HA)0 FOAT 470 I1120JS AJTH1060 Is"0 2094157 1900 to"6 I05lS" low ASSE29 OMURDED T~.k. 1.23 T.40 70k.2. 1*. T.W 7.52.3 16 T T~ " T... -~..3 T.W &.d T..3 T002 T".0..3 I T.W T00.2. 765 T.W Tk0.2., T-n Th5 7 9 5 4 66*6p214 I 46361216W.6 261.3 372 31 23200 3520. 602 1620. 24430 27687, toiz An.4.hd4q31).6.2 30616 io7a 66306a 6250MU04GM 0= low 444 866 2237 253 021 6. 21469 290.3 05636 3401 M 50 79713 65210 1203 WIT? 22040 mm d- S.-& ~00a 60 a 44640 22.7 206 070.2 0A0 45220 233.7 377.3 022.0 36080 1521 13201 2008 30s8002 608 ft.o6 50120 22446 6338 450.0 6066 12080d 1110 OW4(lOldDf 30.0 la,s 36.6 40.3 30,0 177 so6 766' 3600 6 473 30.6 la's 30. 40as 6.13050 6~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~1486 2330 362 6210 tw44 2314 423 m 600 72300 isms6 2014 23053 75020 53050 27T4 640082 66.006 ~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~236 40.3 et.0 230 3 AG6.0 665 2.6 332. 200 2M'S 511.1 6344 230.0 402.4 4040 0.3.0.0000. 6104 4000 6233 s 23005 4~~~~~~~~~ 4300 ~~~~~~ 00o. ~~~~~~ 2420.4 C.A-d2.56.06b. ~~~~240 422.0 I371 25113 3.441 40013 331 2044 2400 300.6 16646 37006 ass. 63046 20is6 1256 24421 4056 42.6 264.7 2206 023. 1613 2211 41224 (2JF2NT L006U280 629a 503.7 I061I 2070 6252 500.2 13406 20040 6270 20302. 32012 40IS 03 2327.0 4412 60326 22.325 12226 2293 175. 30501 t60.0 I202 34. 0 720 3226: 307.A BO6 25.40 2352o 0436 6T76 Il.dU. T.. L-.n 210 25240 22 206022 222. 300 0 2620 1262 3200 6 265 3205 T..0oo 0.0 3 0. 530 56 00 0 06 06 006g0o0. 5030 2076 2247 32268 460a 12206 4000 3076 472.6 32120 6302 702.6 '0.0 233a 602.0 MN NO( CUJA012A4ST 4911 603 2956 6100 22542 442 7 420.3 6006 2507.2 455 6 2637 4 25426 42004 442 3 3254 3706.2 003om5 ODEfEDUA0LJl5(lE 06 -I2I4. -6D80-2222.0 0.0-20002 -2624.6-33002 060-75020 -2623S -6003 6 0-26637 -22164-4106.1 642(0-062JPOALAN6ES 0.0-66.7-67.4-267,2 00a 25A. 242.0 2304 00-2205.6 14602-27317 0 0-60303 26086-36011.3 2TaAL NET L20012J2E 64121-658 04.5-60_0 5022.17-73&2 3300-20alk2 75616-637.2 27062 260,6 76323-6420 72283 6473 P.30o.d E.o0206..n-.5202-6387? 043-6022 44727-7353 5s0.0-2603 47601-63103 2768 20686 423762 _8o22 2220.30 647821 0 0 00 5370.2-6513 04.5-002.0 60 45087-7342 0366-2002 4940-657.2 27982 2600 4.53-0420 72283 0077.3 L.q2-062.4L-. 272.0.0 5.6 122020 6.0 A 0.0 0 6.6 27456 6.6 0.6 0.0 52710 6a 6.f es TOWU.006 00 0.0 50412-65n6 04. -01.0 "it?7-7342 536. -262 o.f 73686-632.2 37982 26020 76323-041.6 22280 64,71. 64 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - -- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - D4002(yi~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0.00 6.66 6.66 0.60 026 0.60 a.00 0.00 637 0.6 6a" 6.8 6.70 660 2 6.030
E (v) *HANAPOATS AM) Hmmoms AuTHoRrrY Bajm Shusia 1o6-U2 ASSETS EWDOV ------ - - FUtE ASSET8 Fmd A Fckl Aotz Fot Adtl logo 1o90 191 loc1 92 19ow TraI. Tm TOWl Takogl Ten Tla Tai.ga TTM Tota Takwi Twin TOTW Takoram Tol TTal Takor Tm TOWl Omm dqx*h met 1406U4 6010.1 0124.5 14134.0 14054.0 12600.4 91905 21tea6 151540 321170 21260.0 53377.0 DomffmhId dpmkton 80730 1056.7 2050.0 305.7 9445.0 320868 2974.4 0183.2 W22.0 151.0 6404.0 15045.0 NodBook%ki 5061.0 8073A 4065.5 101385 5509.0 9400.6 e 22s.1 15715.7 5232.0 220660 1470.0 377s2n WoVanPr*W_ SOO 100oo 50.0 OD OD 9WESTMENTS 35s 1^6 30 45A 35.0 103 30.3 40A 35.0 20D 405 60.0 slbw e61601 e02.0 4005.5 10167.5 5644. 0e005e B255A 15756.3 5317D 22e665 140606 3772.D OURRE ASSET SWIat 130A 14506 612.5 2263.3 150.0 1636.0 1530 330a6. 277A 1057. 1043.0 3OOD Receklee 4065 2S11.1 0160.0 9100.1 307.0 3W69. 4794.0 76S5 370D 2045.0 7210.0 10164.0 Ouh wvii*b.tarm 410.7 135.4 669e 725.0 436A 16e5 4472 565.7 160o 1065 7e0 164.0 CWFfERT WLvULME 961.7 4407.3 7501.1 12066.4 9555 5047s 677.0 127195 6275 470. 0 240.0 139465 c,cs 160.0 2166.1 514S 20605 200. 1524A 25930 4118.3 2505 11040 1766. 296O0 Me*,n TeM L 3356n 0D 0 0.0 30950 0se 05 0o o 2600 OD 0o 0 I0 T Vnlon 05 05 0.0 0.0 05 0.0 0oD 0.0 0.0 0on 0.0 0 D 5150 2106.1 5145 26600 6095 1524.4 2503a 411SS 510.0 1104.0 17660 2060.0 NFTCUtENT ASSETS 436.7 23312 707.3 9407s 440e 4423.1 4178.1 6o12 317A 35105 7464.0 10970D NETTOTAL ASSETS 6052.7 U23.2 111712 19505D 6090.6 13033.0 104335 243655 5634J 250025 22200e 467625 DEFUMAD UABUIIES 00 0D -27e6.7-2788.7 OD 0.0 0.0 0D 0D 0D OD 0D NTER-GROOP BALANCES 0D -747s5 0057.3-14302 O -11561.7 110651-510.7 OD -272575-11031D -391685 TOTAL NET LABIuTIES 652.7 035.7 14440A 15376A1 6095 23713 214845 23 A655 56345-7565 103205 9674D RB'AESENTED BY: ampiw 76.0 1.2 0o 1.2 785 1.2 05 1.2 75 3aD 05 35 R.Akd Ewr*i g 3202.7 0345 14440.4 153745 2507.6 2370.1 214845 23654A 24415-756D 103200 95715 Lorg-tumLoe ------------------------------ ----------------------------- ----------------------- 3370.7 035.7 14440.4 15370.1 267S5 23713 214845 2366J5 25195-7555 1032.0 95745 35s2D 5 D0 0D 0o 34150 00 OA OD 311i5 O 0on 0o Tota LLaa G952.7 035.7 14440A 15376.1 0905o 2371.3 214845 236556 5034. -7655 103290 95745 Cumt RaMo 1J 2.1 14.7 45 19 35 2J 3.1 1J A S 52 4.7 L4ukft l W* 1.0 25 135 42 1D 3S 2.4 3S 1.3 35 5.1 4* DebtXqa*y ISO 050 0.00 000 126 00J 0.00 5D0 124 050 05D0 OO
E(vi) GHAN PORTS AND HAMMROUlS AUThORlY Soisce and ApnOedlon of Fand cedis mcons) Forecast Atual Porc Actual Forecat Actual 1986 1986 1987 1987 1988 198S Takoradi Tcma Total Takoradi Tema Total Takoradi Tema Total Takoradi Tema Total Takoradi Tema Total Takoradi Tema Total SOURCES OF FUNDS Internal Geeration o Funds NelOpecalingRevenuel(loss) -1321 122.2-9.9-399.9 79.7-343.1-143.4 141.5-1.9-1722 492.8 260.5-137.4 131.3-6.1-396.7 1894.1 1415.9 Depreciation and Amrtization 121.2 269.8 391.0 11.4 27.1 38.5 139.4 270.6 410.0 39.8 105.5 145.3 148.5 301.5 450.0 202.5 325.3 527.8 Non-OperatingRevenue(net) 6.8 10.2 17.0 50.4 253.0 303.4 10.4 15.6 26.0 35.0-3.6 31.4 12.0 18.0 30.0 1933 399.7 593.0 Total -4.1 402.2 398.1-338.1 359.8-1.2 6.4 427.7 434.1-97.4 594.7 437.2 23.1 450.8 473.9-0.9 2619.1 2536.7 Borrowinsa Proposed IDW Credit 31.0 37.0 68.0 223.0 174.0 397.0 216.0 275.0 491.0 DECF - Japan 96.0 107.0 203.0 168.0 156.0 324.0 255.0 222.0 477.0 Saudi Fund 174.0 174.0 334.0 334.0 EEC 95.0 95.0 182.0 182.0 Governmcnt Loan 34.0 38.0 72.0 102.0 110.0 212.0 204.0 184.0 388.0 Total 161.0 182.0 343.0 588.0 614.0 1202.0 857.0 1015.0 1872.0 Total Fundo availabk 156.9 584.2 741.1-338.1 359.8-1.2 594.4 1041.7 1636.1-97.4 594.7 437.2 880.1 1465.8 2345.9-0.9 2619.1 2536.7 t-i APPU(CAlON OP FUNDS Proposed Project 160.0 182.0 342.0 604.0 635.0 1239D0 0.0 317.9 317.9 889.0 1054.0 1943.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Other Invetmcntr Debt Service Ctarges: Interest 6.3 7.2 13.5 13.9 4.4 18.3 41.1 44.5 85.6 0.0 7.9 7.9 109.5 123.5 233D 0.0 6.4 6.4 Repayment Increasc/lDccrase Working Capital Excluding Cash 200.0 0.0 200D 148.7 220.0 2437D0 Toald FPndt Applied 555.5 13.9 4.4 18.3 645.1 679.5 1524.6 474.5 2396D0 24414 Cash SurpLa (deficit for the year) 185.7 111. -16.5-20.8-37.3-50.2 233 69.1 92.4 Cash at bcgining of the yeaw 158.4 344.2 35.2 104. 140.0 455.7 IA6 125.6 144.2 Cash at ihe end of tbe Year 344.2 455.7 18.7 125.6 144.3 405.6 41.9 194.7 236.6
E (vi).n OU"HIV Fenascaen.l AAtsa Fg.scai F-t.l Aa-l.Actaul 196 1*9 1910 1990 11 11 1991 192 T.koudl T.-_ TT.g1 Takandl T.. Toul T.kac T. Teb1 Td oul Tkt.t Total T_k.ndI Tom Toel TakoA Tm. Toba1 T.kmdI Tom Tol Tskm*A T.= T96.I bssa1 0 nor d Fin WdO.1 oihaks B ) -I0CU 229.4 12I.9 133) 3633.1 34182-1107 27no 167.3 109L2 7173.12 707U -743 4021 3280 1122. 77 7165.0-45.1 421U -41. -S115 494.0 7482 D.p..hekod Ameelalods 157.1 3049 46e0 7M7 442.1 u2ns 201 311.) 472e 9084 U1.3 1787.7 I40 3113 472.0 1313.2 9153 22103 14Q-2 324.0 477.0 1201 70.4 19316 N-~ot..hg R.onlt (Vt) 12Q 2.0 300 241.1 480 977.1 12.0 18. 30. 412. 4ML 359.0 I22 20. 30.0 374.9 40. 09 I220 2. 30.0.0 0o 0.0 Tetal 04 2L3 *12t9 21t2. 49t1.2 S7381 61A 407.5 e9.) 2415.1 420 1022#3 900 72.0 MO0.0 2 A11 2.9 1517) I9. 151.1 44S.2 410. 904 tll7 F.opo.d lo Co. 82.0 112.0 199.0 39. 34.0 95.0 DE200- J1 124.0 113.0 2410 sa.odfod 229.0 229.0 73.0 71.0 EEC 45.0 41.0 390 390 Go.s L_ f2s. 73.0 2400 9.0 170 2Z40 Taal 341.0 4129 70U n8.0 144. 223.0 Tr.e.IPo.ihbb 4012 9713) 1312. 215J 49142 S718. 148.0 733.J 923 241S.1 8203.0 20215. 96o 712. 800 2821 799 I2U721 " 751.1 445.2 4122 90.4 96147 APPUlCATON KO FUNDS FPspd pr*d 3540 4470 740 212. 41SO9 4375J 93. 14.0 249.0 31 3127.6 5403.9 6338 11749A 12402. Ot.,. to 2.O 2n. 40 0 hi... 121.9 3420 340 GA 0. a 0o 129L2 241.9 432. 0.0 0.0 0A 394.2 237.3 431.5 8 8.0 0.0 37.17 224.9 401A.0 GA kgmyi S2A 14.1 1627 135.0 I"47 29.7 8 Le U lmaseai.c aaohk WeAm 23U.0 COpkal EAchdb 8 30k 20. 124. 442.1 210.0-30.0 200. U rt.mkdampjb 134.0 S532.3 911.0 9913.8 02 30.S 2002. 0.0 Cm& "Ws (&1k4fkc4kt.dwnr) n9.7 149.4 344 171.0-0.8-53.9 484 3122 219-214. -142.3-159.2 24. -28. tla 187 L CAA at bl.$ sdlgmb. - 4111A 41.9 4K7 234. 42U3. 292.3 221.1 424 41.7 135.4 389.) 724.9 438A6 133.4 7249 80 COsb St* db*....y., 425.) 292.3 221.1 412.4 416.7 133.4 59. 724.9 43. 28S.) 447.2 102.7 M2.8 100.7 10013 717.0
- 24 - F. Use of Bank Resources (i) Staff Inputs by Stage of Project Cycle in Staff Weeks Stage of Project Cycle Einal Through Appraisal 88.8 Appraisal through Board Approval 43.6 Supervision 107.6 Other TOTAL 240. Source: Summary of CAM Lending Operations.
- 25 - F. Use of Bank ResQurc (continued) (ii) Mission Data Stage of No. of Days in Specialization Performance Date of Project Cycle Month/Year Persons Field Represented / Rating Status Reports Identification 05/84 3 12 PE, ec, PA - 06105/84 Preparation 1 07/84 1 4 PE - 10/12/84 b/ Preparation 2 07/84 1 6 PE - 10/12/84 Appraisal 05/85 4 17 PE, EC, FA - 06/27/85 j/ Post-Appraisal 10/85 2 10 PE, FA - 10/25/85 Supervision 1 3-4/86 3 na PE, EC, FA 1,2,1,2 05/28/86 Supervision 2 10-11186 3 13 PE, EC, PA 1,1,1,1 01/06/87 Supervision 3 04/87 2 20 PE, FA 1,1,1,1 05/05/87 Supervision 4 09/87 2 17 PE, FA 2,1,1,1 10/30/87 Supervision 5 01/88 1 6 PE 2,1,1,1 02/05/88 Supervision 6 02/88 1 2 FA 2,1,1,1 03/23/88 Supervision 7 06/88 2 6 FA, EC 07/22/88 Supervision 8 01/89 1 9 2 PE(C), FA _,1,1,1 03/10/89 Supervision 9 06/89 2 na EC, DC _ 07/28/89 d/ Supervision 10 10/89 1 8 PE, FA 1,1,2,1,1 12/04/89 Supervision 11 03/90 1 7 PE 1,1,2,1,1 04/02/90 Supervision 12 11/90 2 5 PE, FA 1,1,2,1,1 11/21/90 Supervision 13 04/91 1 na EC 06/24/91 Supervision 14 07/91 1 na EC 1,1,2,1,1 07/18/91 Supervision 15 12/91 2 na EC, FA 1,1,12,1,1 01/21/92 Supervision 16 02192 1 1 PE 04115/92 Supervision 17 07/92 1 na EC 09/08/92 Supervision 18 12192 1 10 C 01/31/93 n/ PE = Ports Engineer EC = Economist FA = Financial Analyst DC = Division Chief PA = Procurement Advisor C = Consultant b/ Meeting in Consultant's European office. g/ Combined Issues Paper/Decision Memorandum dated June 27, 1985. d/ Lter to GPHA; no report on file.
- 26 - G. Comvliance with Credit and Proiect Aereement Covenants Credit Agreement Section Description of Covenant Status 3.01 (b) Relending clause met 4.01 (a) Mor ta 20% of ports' and stevedoring companies' fomign currncy eaming mcd will be retained to cover maintenance and rehabilitation cost. 4. 01(b)(i) The Borrower and Association will review the percentage of retention in and met decide on a proper percentage. 4.02(a) The Borrower shall cause to be incorporated a limited liability company to met handle containers at Tema Port. 4.02(b)(i) The Borrower shall permit private stevedoring firms to maintain until met December 31, 1989 at least 25% of stevedoring operations at Tema and Takoradi, 4.02(b)(ii) The Borrower shall carry out a study of ways to increase private sector met participation in port handling operations. 4.02(b)(iii) The Borrower shau propose a plan providing for an increase in private sector mdt participation in cargo handling operation. 4.02(b)(iv) Thc Borrower shall commence the implementation of said plan. not met 4.03 The agreement to defer the payment of import duties on project goods. met 4.04 The Borrower shall assist GPHA (A) in carrying out the customs and port A - met documentation study (B) in preparing the program for carrying out the B - met recommendations and finding of said study. 4.05 Thc directors of Tema and Takoradi are to be giver autonomy in order to met administrate their ports on sound commercial lincs. Project Agreement 2.02 Establish a project coordinating unit (PCU). met 2.03(a)(i) Assign capable Ghanaian counterparts to work with all the consultants to be partiauy met employed. 2.03(a)(ii) Shall at least six months before the end of employment of the consultant, met appoint capable Ghanaians to assume the responsibility of said position 2.03(b) GPHA shall prepare and fumish the Association the terms of reference of a met container operation expert who shall be employed and assigned to the new container handling company. 2.04 Follow IDA procurement guidelines, met 2.07(a) GPHA shall exchange views with the Association with regard to the progress mdt of the project, the performance of its obligation under the agreement and the Subsidiary Loan Agreement, and other matters rel Lrg to the purposes of the Credit. 2.07(b) GPHA shall promptly inform the Association of any condition which t interferes or threatens to interfere with the progrs of the project, the accomplishment of the purpose of the Credit, or the performance by GPHA of its obligations under this agreement and under the Subsidiary Loan Agreement.
- 27-3.01 GPHA shall prepare and carry out an action plan utisfactory to the met Association to strengthen its port management and improve its port operations. 3.02 GPHA shall at all times opemte and maintain its plant, machinery, equipment generally met and other property 3.03 GPHA shall take out and maintain insurance with responsible insurer. 3.04(i) GPHA shall carry out and complete the report of a study on customs and port met documentation. 3.04(u) GPHA shall prepare a program for carrying out the study's recommendations met and findings. 3.04(iii) GPHA shall carry out such parts of the program as related to GPA met 4.0(a) GPHA shall maintain separate records and accounts adequate to reflect its met operations and financial condition. 4.01(b)(i) GPHA shall have the accounts and financial statements and the special account met audited by independent auditors. 4.01(b)(ii) Furnish to IDA not later than five months after the end of each year certified met copies of the statements and the auditor's reports. 4.02 GPHA shall adjust its rates to generate revenues to cover its expenditures. met 4.05 GPHA shall not renew any debts other than to finance the costs of the project. met met
- 23 - H (i) RZVALUATION OF THE ECONOMIC RATE OF RETUR 1/ 1. Based on the actual traffic (throughput) handled by the ports of Tema and Takoradi in 1991 and 1992, the projected Economic Rate of Return (E.R.R.) has been recalculated, following the same methodology as used in the SAR, and applying the UNCTAD queueing tables for port projects to estimate the expected waiting times. Compared to the initial calculation of the E.R.R. some crucial parameters have significantly changed. These are briefly discussed in the following paragraphs. (i) In the SAR, the total investment cost of the Ports Rehabilitation Project was estimated at 78.590 million US dollars (exclusive of taxes and customs duties). By the end of 1992, the total cost of the project amounted to 95.326 million US dollars (again exclusive of taxes and customs duties). This figure includes the cost of all the project activities funded by IBRD/IDA, the cofinancing institutions and GPHA. Of this total investment, 58 percent was spent on Tema's rehabilitation, 42 percent on Takoradi's. Table E 1 summarizes the project's disbursements for the period 1986 to 1992. (ii) The traffic volumes assumed in the SAR for Tema and Takoradi were respectively: 2.604 million tons in 1985 3.500 million tons in 1988 4.295 million tons in 1990 4.855 million tons in 1995 The actual traffic development has been more favorable than forecasted in 1985, with following throughput results recorded by GPHA: 4.454 million tons in 1988 4.808 million tons in 1989 5.037 million tons in 1990 5.286 million tons in 1991 5.727 million tons in 1992 However, these total throughput volumes include the tonnages handled at specialized and private berth. In the E.R.R. recalculation, the cargoes that were loaded or discharged at the multi-purpose berths (11 in Tema and 3 in Takoradi) have been included, whilst also the bulk cargoes handled at the specialized berths in Takoradi have been taken into account because of the positive impact of the rehabilitation scheme on the performance of these berths. The cargoes handled at the GPHA multi-purpose berths are: I/ by Bank Consultant.
- 29 - H (i) 1.769 million tons in Tema and 0.237 million tons in Takoradi in 1991 2.159 million tons in Tema and 0.210 million tons in Takoradi in 1992, and compare with the following values retained in the SAR: 1.175 million tons in Tema and 0.246 million tons in Takoradi in 1990 1.410 million tons in Tema and 0.298 million tons in Takoradi in 1995 1.600 million tons in Tema and 0.350 million tons in Takoradi in 2000 From these traffic data, it is obvious that in Tema the throughput of the GPHA berths in 1992 was already well in excess of the projected value for 2000. In contrast the 1992 throughput of the GPHA berths in Takoradi lagged behind the forecasted throughput for 1990. In the recalculation of the E.R.R. the throughput levels of 1992 have been assumed to peak, i.e. these are used as the projected throughput for 1995 and 2000. For Tema, the logic behind this choice is that the throughput realized in 1992 already exceeds the maximum expected for the project by 35 percent, and hence that any further increase would logically require additional facilities. For Takoradi, the situation is very different. The expected throughput levels at GPHA's multi-purpose facilities have not been attained because the cargoes, which constitute the port's traditional mix are either stagnating or declining. Moreover no new traffic flows have been gained and the handling of the container traffic is increasingly being concentrated on Tema. It would therefore be unrealistic, unless a major policy change were introduced by the Government, to expect ttie throughput figures to improve beyond the 1992 level. As for the bulk cargoes in Takoradi, the throughput values of 1992 have been mainatined up to the year 2000. For Takoradi, the assumptions used in the SAR calculation of the E.R.R. with regard to the handling of cocoa, logs and timber at the multi-purpose berths (namely that 20 percent of the total traffic of these cargoes in the port will be handled at GPHA berths) has been retained in the absence of reliable data with respect to the actual tonnages handled. However, this assumption is validated by the low occupancy levels (30 to 40 percent) which have been recorded for the GPHA multi-purpose berths in 1991 and 1992 and which tally with a relatively minor traffic of these three commodities across the multi-purpose