Ontario Power Generation Questions and Answers Natural Disasters Could a similar earthquake or tsunami happen in Ontario? No. Ontario s reactors are at two sites on Lake Ontario and one site on Lake Huron where major earthquakes are not expected. Similarly, the Great Lakes are highly unlikely to produce a tsunami that would damage the operations of our nuclear units. They are in a geologically-stable region with a geologically-stable shoreline. Could OPG facilities withstand an earthquake? Yes. The Ontario fleet is built to resist earthquakes stronger than those that seismic studies say are likely in Ontario in one in 1,000 years. All OPG nuclear power plants have been designed to withstand potential earthquakes. Both the actual structures that form containment and the systems important to safety have been seismically qualified. That is they are designed and built or refurbished to meet seismic standards. CNSC has reviewed and inspected these installations to confirm their robustness with regards to potential earthquakes. Similarly, waste management facilities are designed to withstand seismic events (as defined under the National Building Code). Isn t there a major fault line near OPG s facilities? No. The Seismic Hazard Resolution Project (1998 2001) confirmed that the features in the Rouge River valley sediments occurred as a result of glacial processes and are not from deep earthquake producing structures; There are no active or proven faults under either the Pickering Nuclear Generating Station or Darlington. 1
Emergency Preparedness Does OPG have an emergency response plan for its nuclear generating stations? Yes. OPG, Emergency Management Office (EMO) and our regional and local governments all work together to protect the public. Each organization has responsibility for a distinct area of the emergency response, and our emergency response personnel are available 24/7 to respond to an emergency. OPG s robust training schedule ensures that our responses to emergency scenarios are tested on a regular basis, and include a successful test of our response to an earthquake scenario. In the event of a nuclear emergency, what measures are in place to maintain the safety of the public? The EMO has extensive emergency preparedness plans ready for a variety of scenarios, including the very unlikely event of a nuclear emergency. As do the Region of Durham, our municipalities, and Ontario Power Generation. These plans are regularly practiced and reviewed by regulators. Durham Region has installed an outdoor public alerting system in Pickering, Ajax and Clarington to alert residents of any emergency through sirens. Upon hearing the sirens, residents are asked to go inside and await further instructions by radio or television. Of course if the emergency involved OPG, we would issue regular updates as part of our demonstrated commitment to transparency. Emergency Backup and Cooling Is there a back-up power supply at OPG s nuclear facilities? Yes. In the event of an earthquake or other worse-case scenarios, OPG s nuclear emergency power system is designed to provide electrical power to certain nuclear safety-related systems that support the capability to control reactor power, cool the fuel and contain radioactive fission products. There is also a passive cooling system in place. Our emergency power generators are seismically qualified and have sufficient supply of fuel to enable restoration of an alternate source of power to the site, or the procurement of additional fuel. In addition to the seismically qualified emergency power 2
generators, each site also has standby generators. These standby generators are not seismically qualified and are not formally credited to operate in a seismic event. However, they are built and maintained to high standards and depending on the magnitude of the earthquake, there is a reasonable probability some of them will survive a seismic event, or could be made available shortly after a seismic event. At Darlington, there are four standby generators, only one of which is required to support the site; at Pickering, there are three standby generators for each unit pair, only one of which is required for each unit pair. In addition to the above auxiliary power sources, Pickering also has two auxiliary power generators, each of which is capable of supplying the needs of the site. Similar to the standby generators, these auxiliary power generators are also not credited to operate following a seismic event, but may be available. Since the 2003 blackout, OPG has upgraded its backup generation system at Pickering. What are the Emergency Power Safety Systems in Ontario Reactors? Ontario s CANDU reactors have considerable redundancy in back-up power supplies. Across the nuclear fleet there is a mix of standby generators, emergency power generators (EPG), and auxiliary generators with varying degrees of seismic qualification (back up to the back up). Following the Loss of Bulk Electricity System event in 2003, we installed an Auxiliary Power System at Pickering consisting of two auxiliary power generators to enable the rapid restoration of site power following a loss of the electrical grid. In addition, in 2010, we installed a third seismically qualified EPG to enable the overhauls to the existing two EPGs. Over the last several years OPG has invested in upgrades to these systems and our fire suppression systems. Significant investment in fire protection programs, response, and systems have been made by OPG over several years. Our overall system is robust and industry leading. In the event of an earthquake or other worse-case scenarios, OPG s nuclear emergency power system is designed to provide electrical power to certain nuclear safety-related systems that support the capability to control reactor power, cool the fuel and contain radioactive fission products. 3
OPG s emergency power and standby generators are seismically qualified and have sufficient fuel stores until such time as the grid, or other source of power, is restored. What would happen in the event of an extended power failure at an OPG nuclear facility? Emergency planning also considers extraordinary events such as those where power is not available for an extended period. Redundant design features of safety systems allow for provisions to provide cooling water supply from many means including external supplies so that sufficient cooling to the nuclear fuel is ensured in such an unlikely event. The containment for every reactor is linked to a vacuum building, the large circular structure that is the most visible feature of each of the Candu stations. This building is kept at a near vacuum. If steam builds up in a reactor s containment, it flows to the vacuum building. A massive pool of water at the top of the building is then sprayed onto the steam to cool it. Each reactor has two shutdown systems that can be operated manually or that are triggered automatically if there is a problem. In one of the shutdown systems, the unit has rods made of cadmium that, in an emergency, would drop rapidly into the reactor core and shut off the reaction by absorbing neutrons. Each of the stations also has a secondary means of stopping the fission reaction. Are OPG employees trained and equipped to deal with emergencies? The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) is the federal agency that regulates the use of nuclear energy and materials to protect the health, safety, and security of Canadians and the environment. CNSC staff is located on site at each of Canada s nuclear power plants and elsewhere across Canada to ensure that the facilities are safe and that facility operators are prepared in the event of an emergency. Canada has an exemplary nuclear track record with over 45 years of occupational and public health and safety, and is a leader in the industry worldwide. 4
Nuclear operators and personnel are carefully selected, highly trained and qualified, and authorized by the CNSC. Over a five year period, certified workers complete about 30 continuing training sessions, including training and testing on simulators that replicate the control room and are capable of simulating normal and emergency operating conditions to ensure that their skills are up to date and they can operate the nuclear power plant safely. Canadian operators have well-planned and practiced emergency responses in place. These are coordinated with provincial and local emergency agencies and responders and are practiced regularly. Cooperation with and Lessons from Japan How will the lessons learned from Japan be applied to OPG s nuclear operations? While it's premature for OPG to comment on what exactly transpired in Japan and why, OPG fully expects that in-depth assessments will be conducted, and the results shared within the international nuclear community. OPG works closely with the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), which was established in 1989 following the events at Chernobyl. WANO shares information with nuclear operators worldwide, and we have been receiving regular communications from them since the earthquake and Tsunami began. Any lessons learned will be analyzed for their application to OPG s nuclear facilities, and any actions recommended to improve the safety of our operations will be taken. How is OPG assisting efforts in Japan? OPG s senior management team, including Chief Executive Officer and President Tom Mitchell (a former chief nuclear officer, Site Vice President and Nuclear Engineer), Wayne Robbins, OPG s Chief Nuclear Officer as well as other senior nuclear managers are working with other senior level officials from nuclear stations around the world through international industry organizations such as the World Association of Nuclear Operators. Organizations like WANO have in-house technical expertise and call upon the expertise of station operators like OPG to provide their operating experience to assist in the management of crisis like Japan is experiencing. 5
In addition, OPG is assisting with public communications through organizations like the Canadian Nuclear Association and the Nuclear Energy Institute in the United States to help provide the public an accurate understanding of the events and answer questions arising related to other nuclear stations worldwide. Darlington New Nuclear - Environmental Assessment Why is Ontario doing a Federal EA and not a Provincial EA? Nuclear power plants are regulated by the federal government and therefore the federal EA not provincial process applies. The Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency and the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission determined that a Joint Review Panel, the highest level of Federal EA, would be required for the Darlington Nuclear New Build Project. The EA for a new nuclear power plant would be a comprehensive study. The majority of federal projects are assessed through a screening; however, some projects require a comprehensive study. These projects tend to be large projects having the potential for significant adverse environmental effects. They may also generate public concerns. A comprehensive EA study includes, at a minimum: A description of the project The effects of the project on the environment The significant of any environmental effects Public comments on the EA Mitigation measures The purpose of the project Alternative means of carrying out the project A follow-up program; and The effects on renewable resources The EA must demonstrate that the project is not likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects considering available mitigation measures. If the EA cannot demonstrate the above, the project will not proceed to the licensing decision. 6
What has OPG done to prepare for the EA hearings? On September 30, 2009 OPG submitted the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the OPG New Nuclear at Darlington Project. More than 14,000 pages of studies and conclusions documents the work done since the fall of 2006 to methodically assess the wide range of potential Project-environment interactions identified at the beginning of the process, to a narrower range of residual adverse effects (those remaining after mitigation) identified as likely at the end of the process, and to evaluate their significance. The EA studies were undertaken by a team of over twenty technical experts, and were subject to independent expert peer reviews prior to being finalized. OPG also sought to ensure that the study approach was grounded in the perspectives, views and values of the community within which the OPG New Nuclear at Darlington Project would be operating. Significant public consultation was undertaken as part of the study over more than a three-year period. OPG used a variety of communications and outreach tools including notices and update letters to everyone on our Project mailing list, which was updated regularly. We did ten direct mail-outs to 95,000 homes and businesses in Clarington and Oshawa and placed over 130 newspaper ads in local and regional newspapers. We had an information website, presentations to local councils, and 37 community information sessions across the 50 km regional study area, just to name some of the outreach activities. Further, OPG sought to ensure that the Project did not have any adverse effects on the interests of First Nations, Métis or other Aboriginal communities who may have an interest in the area. OPG s conclusions, based on the results of this assessment and taking into account proposed design and mitigation measures, are that the OPG New Nuclear at Darlington Project will not result in any significant adverse environmental effects. Most importantly no significant adverse effects on the health and safety of workers, the public or nonhuman biota are anticipated. Furthermore, the Project is expected to result in a number of beneficial socio-economic effects. March 18 7