Strengthening the barriers between peaceful and military uses of nuclear energy in a disarming world Frank von Hippel Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University and International Panel on Fissile Materials <fissilematerials.org> International Conference on Nuclear Energy São Paolo, Brazil, 26 May 2011
Outline of Talk Nuclear growth projections Reactor safety improvements that should be made in the light of the Fukushima disaster. The International Panel on Fissile Materials and its reports Nuclear-weapon materials today -- How much? -- In which countries? -- For what uses? Disarmament must include elimination of excess stocks and minimization of non-weapon uses.
The Uncertain Future of Nuclear Energy: IAEA Capacity Projections in 2010 (before Fukushima) (Latin America: from 4 GWe today to 15-60 GWe in 2050) Projection for U.S. In 1974 Projections Increase in East Asia from 78 to 220-450.
Global nuclear capacity is aging (mostly more than 20 years old). It produces low-cost electric power because the capital cost has been paid off. But it must be made safer or be shut down. 35 30 25 40 years old 30 years old 20 years old 10 years old GWe 20 15 10 5 0 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Two simple recommendations for improving the safety of existing nuclear power plants: 1) Install filtered vents on containments I GENERAL ARRANGEMENT OF APWR FILTERED VENT SYSTEM EXHAUST STACK FOR FILTERED GASES UNDERGROUND CHPRCOAL FILTERS If the pressure inside the containment climbed to dangerous levels, the isolation valves could be opened and some of the containment gas released through sand and activated charcoal filters. Jan Beyea and Frank von Hippel, Containment of a reactor meltdown, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August/Sept. 1982.
2. Take spent fuel over 5 years old out of the spent fuel pools Figure 7: Open and dense-pack PWR spent-fuel racks (Sources: Left: NUREG/CR-0649, SAND77-1371, 1979; right: authors). Robert Alvarez, Jan Beyea, Klaus Janberg, Jungmin Kang, Ed Lyman, Allison Macfarlane, Gordon Thompson, Frank N. von Hippel, Reducing the Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Reactor Fuel in the United States, Science and Global Security, Vol. 11 (2003), pp. 1 51.
The International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) Established in Jan 2006 with a 5-year grant from the MacArthur Foundation. Recently renewed for 3 more years. 24 members from 17 countries Mission to help develop the technical basis for cooperative international policy initiatives to reduce: Stocks of HEU and separated Pu, and The number of locations where they can be found. Original co-chairs Jose Goldemberg Frank von Hippel 7
IPFM Reports Global Fissile Material Reports (GFMRs) 2006 and 2007 GFMR 2008: Scope and Verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty GFMR 2009: A Path to Nuclear Disarmament GFMR 2010: Balancing the Books: Production and Stocks (with companion volumes of country perspectives) Draft Fissile-Materials Cutoff Treaty with article-by-article explanations Research Reports #1. Fissile Materials in South Asia: Implications of the US-India Nuclear Deal (2006) #2. Japan's Spent Fuel and Plutonium Management Challenges (2006) #3. Managing Spent Fuel in the United States: The Illogic of Reprocessing (2007) #4. Spent Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing in France (2008) #5. The Legacy of Reprocessing in the United Kingdom (2008) #6. Safeguards at Reprocessing Plants under an FM(C)T (2009) #7. Consolidating Fissile Materials in Russia's Nuclear Complex (2009) #8. Fast Breeder Reactor Programs: History and Status (2010) #9. The Uncertain Future of Nuclear Energy Available for download at www.fissilematerials.org
Fissile materials: Uranium-235 and plutonium-239 can be used either as explosive or fuel materials. Challenge is to make the barriers to weapons use as high as possible. It starts with two isotopes U-235 (--0.7%) will sustain an explosive fission chain reaction if separated in highly enriched uranium U-238 (99.3%) turns into chain-reacting plutonium-239 after it absorbs a neutron. Plutonium will sustain an explosive fission chain reaction if separated from the irradiated uranium. 9
Gas centrifuge enrichment Iran has 5000 first-generation centrifuges (1 SWU/year each). They are producing 3.5% enriched reactor fuel but they could produce 25 kg of 90% enriched (weapon-grade uranium) per year.. 350 m/sec U-235: 0.8% 0.7% UF 6 Aluminum tube 0.6% Scoop 10
Iranian 164-machine cascade for producing low-enriched uranium. If the LEU were put through two more cascades, weapon-grade uranium would be produced. Alexander Glaser, Characteristics of the Gas Centrifuge for Uranium Enrichment and Their Relevance for Nuclear Weapon proliferation, Science and Global Security, Vol. 16 (2008). p. 1. Depleted U 0.44% Natural U 0.7% 3.4% enriched U 11
Centrifuges in Natanz Pilot Plant, Iran 12
Explosive fission chain reaction using 90% enriched uranium. Fission product F.P. 235 U neutron F.P. 200 million electron Volts (MeV) of energy released 10-8 seconds/generation F.P. 235 U F.P. F.P. 235 U F.P. 80 generations = 10-6 sec 2 81 = 2.5x10 24 = number of U atoms in 1 kilogram (kg) Fissioning of 1kg of 235 U releases energy equivalent to 16 million kg. of chemical explosive--approximate yield of Hiroshima bomb
Mass Surrounding the fissile material with neutron reflecting material can reduce critical mass (from 17 to 7.6 kg for δ-phase plutonium surrounded by 2 inches of beryllium) Each fission causes, on average, less than one fission. Each fission causes, on average, more than one fission.
Hiroshima was destroyed by about 60 kilograms of 80% enriched HEU assembled in a gun barrel Propellant Subcritical HEU target Subcritical HEU bullet Weighed 4 tons, 3 meters long. Design simple enough for terrorists. It is essential to minimize number of locations where HEU can be obtained.
HEU Stockpiles, 2010: Legacy of the Cold War Used for weapons and naval and research-reactor fuel. 10,000 warheads Excess being blended down to LEU Naval: irradiated Fresh Weapons stock
Excess highly enriched uranium is being disposed by blend-down to low-enriched uranium for power-reactor fuel 1995-2013: 1/2 of U.S. nuclear power fueled by excess weapon U How Russia s excess weapon-grade uranium is blended down to fuel US power reactors.
'!" &!" %!" $!" #!"!" US and Soviet Atoms for Peace programs provided HEU-fueled research reactors to the non-weapon states. Now these reactors are being converted to low-enriched uranium. Atoms for Peace Speech Brazil, Canada, Columbia, Japan; Czechoslovakia Germany, Spain Hungary, Yugoslavia Austria, Denmark, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland Belgium, Greece, Taiwan; Bulgaria Australia, South Korea, Portugal, S. Africa Netherlands, Philippines; Vietnam Iran; Iraq Argentina, Mexico Chile; Poland Soviet Union and Yugoslavia break up, Iraq denuclearized Thailand Romania Turkey; Libya #)'!" #)(!" #)*!" #)+!" #))!" $!!!" $!#!" Jamaica Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Slovenia - Iraq Ghana Syria - Columbia -Spain -Georgia -Brazil, Philippines, Slovenia, Thailand Nigeria -Greece - South Korea - Denmark, Portugal, Romania, Sweden; Bulgaria, Latvia -Taiwan; Hungary, Libya, Romania -Chile, Turkey
Russia has been slow to embrace the goal of conversion or shutdown for its domestic HEU-fueled research reactors. Ole Reistad and Styrkaar Hustveit HEU Fuel Cycle Inventories and Progress on Global Minimization, Nonproliferation Review, July 2008
HEU stocks for naval reactors could destabilize a disarming world US, Russia, UK and India should switch their naval reactors to LEU as France (5% enriched) has done. (Brazil plans to use LEU.) 10,000 warhead equivalents
Making plutonium in a nuclear reactor. neutron F.P. 235 U F.P. F.P. 235 U F.P. 238 U 239 U 92 24 min e - ν e - ν 239 Np 93 2.4 days 239 Pu 94 24,000 yrs
Fresh low-enriched uranium fuel Plutonium in spent fuel Spent Fuel 95.6 % U- 238 92.6% U- 238 & U- 236 4 meters 4.4% U-235 0.8% U-235 1.2% plutonium 5.4% fission products & misc. radioisotopes 20 cm
In France spent fuel is reprocessed and the plutonium is recycled once in mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel. No advantage for disposal but gets the spent fuel off the reactor sites. Brazil, US France LEU Fuel MOX Fuel fabrication plant MOX Fuel plutonium Water-cooled reactors Spent MOX fuel storage Reprocessing Plant Spent MOX Fuel Spent LEU fuel storage Spent LEU Fuel Separated Plutonium Radioactive waste
Reprocessing facilitates nuclear-weapon proliferation Plutonium in spent fuel assembly Plutonium separated by protected by fission products. reprocessing is handled easily. (450 kg 5 kg plutonium) 1 m. 50 years after discharge, radiation from fuel assembly lethal ( 8 Sieverts/hour). Need remote processing behind thick walls to recover plutonium 2.5 kg plutonium in light-weight container. Can be processed in a glove box, enough in 3 containers for Nagasaki-type bomb. (Mayak Reprocessing Plant, 1994)
In the U.S., after the cooling ponds are full, older spent fuel is stored in massive air-cooled dry casks 2 casks contain 20 tons of uranium in spent fuel, about the annual discharge from a 1000- megawaj- electric light- water reactor
Japan built a $20 billion + $1.5 billion/yr reprocessing plant. 40-year throughput could be stored in dry casks for $4 billion. Area that would be required for interim dry cask storage of design lifetime throughput of plant: 32,000 tons of spent fuel.
Japan s Atomic Energy Commission agrees: reprocessing more costly (JAEC Long-term nuclear energy program planning committee, 2004) 0.6 Yen/kWh, $80 billion for 40 years of operation of the plant South Korea is demanding the right to do the same as Japan. Hopefully Japan will reconsider.
Countries that reprocess their spent fuel and countries that do not Countries that reprocess or plan to (% of capacity) (GWe, [10 9 Watts]) Customer Countries that have quit or plan to quit (GWe) Countries that have not reprocessed (GWe) China (25%) 10.1 Armenia (in Russia) 0.4 Argentina 0.9 France (85%) 63.1 Belgium (France) 5.9 Brazil 1.9 India (!50%) 4.4 Bulgaria (Russia) 1.9 Canada 12.6 Japan (90% planned) 44.1 Czech Republic (Russia) 3.7 Mexico 1.3 Russia (12%) 22.7 Finland (Russia) 2.7 Pakistan 0.4 United Kingdom 10.1 Germany(France/UK) 20.5 Romania 1.3 Hungary (Russia) 1.9 Slovenia 0.7 Remaining customers Slovak Republic (Russia) 1.8 South Africa 1.8 Netherlands (in France) 0.5 Spain (France, UK) 7.5 South Korea 18.7 Ukraine (50% in Russia) 13.1 Sweden (France/UK) 9.3 Taiwan, China 4.9 Switzerland (France/UK) 3.3 U.S. (since 1972) 100.7 Total (70%) 168.1 Total 58.9 Total 145.2 Most customer countries did not renew because reprocessing countries send back the radioactive reprocessing waste, which is as difficult to dispose of as spent fuel.
Plutonium Stockpiles, 2010 Legacies of Cold War and dream of plutonium-fueled reactors 10,000 nuclear warhead equivalents
US excess weapon plutonium will be disposed in reactor fuel but resulting fuel will cost 4 times as much to produce as low-enriched uranium fuel.
Separated civilian plutonium could destabilize a disarming world 30,000 nuclearwarhead equivalents (IAEA)
Plutonium Some Recommendations France, India, Japan, Russia, UK should end their reprocessing and China and South Korea should not start. Highly enriched uranium Some countries especially Russia -- need to do more to convert their research reactors to low-enriched uranium.. The US, UK and Russia should convert to LEU naval-reactor fuel like Brazil, China and France. IAEA monitoring should be extended into the weapon states Civilian and excess weapons materials and naval stockpiles of HEU should be placed under IAEA monitoring. Enrichment plants should be placed under multinational control
National centrifuge enrichment plants (including under construction, millions of SWUs enrichment capacity) Enrichment correlates with nuclear weapons. Should we multi-nationalize? World Total = 51459.5 60, enough for about 500 GWe Unit. Kingd. UK: 4 5000 USA 11300 USA 9 Germany 2200 Germany: 4 Netherlands 4000 Netherlands: 4 Russia 15000 Russia: 29 France 10800 France: 7.5 China,cont'l 1900 China: 2 Japan 1250 Japan: 1.5 India: 0.1 (c) WISE Uranium Project Brazil:: 0.2 Enrichment plants are multinationalizing already Europe: Urenco is multinational (Germany, Netherlands & UK) China: two plants built by Russia, offered to IAEA safeguards France: New plant being built with Urenco centrifuges. Iran has offered to multinationalize as confidence-building measure Russia: Angarsk Plant (10% Kazakhstan, 10% Ukraine, 5% Armenia) US: one plant being built by Urenco, one by Areva (France)