Florida. Difference-in-Difference Models 8/23/2016

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Florida Difference-in-Difference Models Bill Evans Health Economics 8/25/1997, State of Florida settles out of court in their suits against tobacco manufacturers Awarded $13 billion over 25 years Use $200m to run anti-smoking campaign aimed at kids Florida Tobacco Pilot Program (FTPP) Precursor to the national truth campaign 1 1 2 Florida's edgy Truth" advertising campaign continues to have a significant impact in reducing teen smoking, a team of researchers concluded from a new study that examines the impact of the state's anti-tobacco advertising. in 1998, when surveillance began for tobacco use among Florida youth, 27.4 percent of high school students were current cigarette smokers. by 2000, this rates had declined to 22.6 among high school students. 4.8 percentage point decline or a 17.5% reduction in teen smoking 3 4 1

30% Smoking Rates Among High Schoolers 35% 25% 30% Florida 20% 25% Rest of US 15% 1998 1998 2000 2001 Year Florida Rest of US 20% 6 30% Smoking Rates Among High Schoolers 35% Nationwide 25% 30% Teen smoking rates fell from 36.5 to 31.4% Florida Rest of US A 5.1 percentage point decline or roughly 14% 20% 25% 15% 1998 1998 2000 2001 Year 20% Rates in Florida fell by 4.8 percentage points similar to what was happening in the nation as a whole Florida Rest of US 8 2

Difference in difference models Maybe the most popular identification strategy in applied statistical work in economics Attempts to mimic random assignment with treatment and comparison sample Simple problem set up One group is treated with intervention Have pre & post treatment data for group receiving intervention Can examine time-series changes but, Unsure how much of the change is due to secular changes 9 10 Y Estimated effect = Y t2 -Y t1 If the outcome of interest is trending over time, before/after comparisons will provide a biased estimate of the law Look at this graphically Y t2 Y b Y a True effect = Y b -Y a Y t1 t 1 t i t 2 time 11 12 3

Difference in difference models Intervention occurs at time period t 1 True effect of law Y b Y a Only have data at t 1 and t 2 If using time series, estimate of the effectiveness of the law is Y t1 Y t2 Solution? Pool cross-sectional and time series data Use time series of untreated group to establish trends What would have occurred in the treatment states in the absence of the intervention? 13 14 Difference in Difference Motor Voter Example Group 1 (Treat) Group 2 (Control) Difference Before Change After Change Difference Y t1 Y t2 ΔY t = Y t2 -Y t1 Y c1 Y c2 ΔY c =Y c2 -Y c1 ΔΔY ΔY t ΔY c Data in two years 1992 Presidential (before MV) 1996 Presidential (after) Two groups of states Treated group (states that got MV through federal law in 1993) Control group (states that had MV laws already) 15 16 4

Y Y c2 Y t2 Y c1 Y t1 control treatment Estimated Treatment effect= (Y t2 -Y t1 ) (Y c2 -Y c1 ) Key Assumption Control group identifies the time path of outcomes that would have happened in the absence of the treatment In this example, Y falls by Y c2 -Y c1 even without the intervention Note that underlying levels of outcomes are not important (return to this in the regression equation) t 1 t 2 time 17 18 Y Y c2 Y c1 Y t2 Y t1 control treatment Estimated Treatment effect= (Y t2 -Y t1 ) (Y c2 -Y c1 ) In contrast, what is key is that the time trends in the absence of the intervention are the same in both groups If the intervention occurs in an area with a different trend, will under/over state the treatment effect In this example, suppose intervention occurs in area with faster falling Y t 1 t 2 time 19 20 5

Y Y c2 control Basic Econometric Model Y c1 Y t2 Y t1 treatment Estimated Treatment effect= (Y t2 -Y t1 ) (Y c2 -Y c1 ) Data varies by state (i) time (t) Outcome is Y it Only two periods Intervention will occur in a group of observations (e.g. states, firms, etc.) t 1 t 2 time True effect 21 22 Y it = β 0 + β 1 T it + β 2 A it + β 3 T it A it + ε it Three key variables T it =1 if obs i belongs in the state that will eventually be treated A it =1 in the periods when treatment occurs T it A it -- interaction term, treatment states after the intervention Y it = β 0 + β 1 T it + β 2 A it + β 3 T it A it + ε it Group 1 (Treat) Group 2 (Control) Before Change After Change Difference β 0 + β 1 β 0 + β 1 + β 2 + β 3 ΔY t = β 2 + β 3 β 0 β 0 + β 2 ΔY c = β 2 Difference ΔΔY = β 3 23 24 6

Meyer et al. Workers compensation State run insurance program Compensate workers for medical expenses and lost work due to on the job accident Premiums Paid by firms Function of previous claims and wages paid Benefits -- % of income w/ cap Typical benefits schedule Min(pY,C) p=percent replacement Y = earnings C = cap e.g., 65% of earnings up to $400/week So if you earn >$616, only get $400/week 25 26 Concern: Moral hazard. Benefits will discourage return to work Empirical question: duration/benefits gradient Previous estimates Y i = β 0 +X i β 1 + R i β 2 + ε i Y (duration) R (replacement rate) X (represents some other controls) Expect β 2 > 0 Problem: Does realization of ε i convey any information about R? Higher income workers, when injured, have much longer durations (ε i >0) They also have lower replacement rates (R i <average) Cov(R i, ε i )<0 β 2 is biased down 27 28 7

Solution Quasi experiment in KY and MI Increased the earnings cap Increased benefit for high-wage workers (Treatment) Did nothing to those already below original cap (comparison) Compare change in duration of spell before and after change for these two groups 29 30 Data from Meyer et al. Data set kentucky.dta Key variables durat (duration) highearn (a high earning worker (treatment)) afchnge (after the law change). * generate log duration. gen ldurat=ln(durat).. * sort the data by highearn and afchnge. sort highearn afchnge.. * gets means of ldurat for. * 2x2 table. by highearn afchnge: sum ldurat 31 32 8

------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -> highearn = 0, afchnge = 0 Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max -------------+-------------------------------------------------------- ldurat 1652 1.123241 1.227601-1.386294 5.204007 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -> highearn = 0, afchnge = 1 Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max -------------+-------------------------------------------------------- ldurat 1464 1.137382 1.273859-1.386294 5.204007 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -> highearn = 1, afchnge = 0 Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max -------------+-------------------------------------------------------- ldurat 1128 1.35583 1.254325-1.386294 5.204007 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -> highearn = 1, afchnge = 1 Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max -------------+-------------------------------------------------------- ldurat 1103 1.599077 1.302141-1.386294 5.204007 High earn (Treat) Low earn (Control) Difference in Difference Mean average ln(duration) Before change After change Difference 1.356 1.599 0.243 1.123 1.137 0.014 Difference 0.233 0.462 0.229 33 34 Model Y it = duration of spell on WC A it = period after benefits hike H it = treated or high earnings group (Income>E 3 ) Y it = β 0 + H it β 1 + A it β 2 + A it H it β 3 + ε it Diff-in-diff estimate is β 3 35. * get the treatment effect. gen treat=highearn*afchnge.. * run difference in difference regression. reg ldurat highearn afchnge treat Source SS df MS Number of obs = 5347 -------------+------------------------------ F( 3, 5343) = 39.58 Model 188.983823 3 62.9946077 Prob > F = 00 Residual 8503.76169 5343 1.5915706 R-squared = 0.0217 -------------+------------------------------ Adj R-squared = 0.0212 Total 8692.74552 5346 1.62602797 Root MSE = 1.2616 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ldurat Coef. Std. Err. t P> t [95% Conf. Interval] -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- highearn.2325891.0487277 4.77 0.1370629.3281152 afchnge.0141418.0452831 0.31 0.755 -.0746316.1029151 treat.2291051.0700319 3.27 1.091814.3663963 _cons 1.123241.031039 36.19 0 1.062391 1.18409 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Interpret coefficients Compare results to 2 x 2 table exactly the same Very low R 2 36 9

Making the model more complicated So far, a very simple model Two groups Two periods However, the treatment may cover more than 1 group The treatment may happen at very different time periods across groups How to generalize this type of model for Many treatments Multiple groups being treated Example: States as laboratories Tremendous variation across states in their laws Variation across states in any given year Variation over time within a state Examples Minimum wages, welfare policy, Medicaid coverage, traffic safety laws, use of death penalty, drinking age, cigarette taxes, 37 38 Empirical example: Motorcycle Helmet laws 1967, Feds require states to have helmet law to get all federal highway money By 1975, all states have qualifying law 1976, Congress responds to state pressure and eliminate penalties 20 states weaken their law and only require coverage for teens 8 states repeal law completely 1991 Federal law again provides incentives for laws covering everyone A bunch of states pass universal laws Congress changes its mind and in 1995 eliminate penalties Again many states drop the law Currently 20 states have universal law 27 have teen coverage only 39 40 10

FARS Helmets are estimated to reduce the likelihood of death in a motorcycle crash by 37%. (Center for Disease Control) http://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/pdf/m c2012/motorcyclesafetybook.pdf Where does this number come from? Fatal Accident Reporting System Census of motor vehicle accidents that produce a fatality Produced since 1975 Detail information about Accident Vehicles Drivers 41 42 Select sample from FARS, 1988-2005 Unique sample Two riders on motor cycle At least one died (accident was severe enough to produce a death) Where one of the riders used a helmet, the other did not +-------------------+ Key ------------------- frequency row percentage column percentage +-------------------+ fatal helmet 0 1 Total -----------+----------------------+---------- 0 240 511 751 31.96 68.04 10 Pr(Die no helmet) = 0.68 36.31 61.64 50.40 -----------+----------------------+---------- 1 421 318 739 56.97 43.03 10 Pr(Die helmet) = 0.43 63.69 38.36 49.60 -----------+----------------------+---------- Total 661 829 1,490 44.36 55.64 10 10 10 10 Benefits of a helmet, reduce prob. of death by 37% (0.43-0.68)/0.68 = -0.37 43 44 11

Sources of bias using one-dimensional data Why would looking at one state over time provide a potentially biased estimate? Why might looking at the difference between states at a point in time provide a biased estimate? Motor cycle fatality rate -- treatment state 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 CA: Adopts Helmet Law in 1992 1.60 1.20 0.80 0.40 Motor cycle fatality rate -- comparison state 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Year California Comparison states 46 2.50 FL: Repeals Helmet Law in 2000 1.60 2.00 LA: Repeals in 1999, Adopts in 2004 1.80 Motor cycle fatality rate -- treatment state 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 1.20 0.80 0.40 Motor cycle fatality rate -- comparison state Motor cycle fatality rate -- treatment state 1.60 1.40 1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Year 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Year Florida Comparison states 47 Louisiana Comparison states 48 12

2.00 TX: Adopts in 1989, Repeals in 1998 2.50 CA: Adopts Helmet Law in 1992 1.60 1.80 Motor cycle fatality rate -- treatment state 1.60 1.40 1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 Motor cycle fatality rate -- treatment state 2.00 1.50 1.00 0.50 1.20 0.80 0.40 Motor cycle fatality rate -- comparison state 0.20 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Year 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Year TX Comparison states 49 California Comparison states 50 Results for CA alone 2.00 1.80 TX: Adopts in 1989, Repeals in 1998. reg mcdrl speed65 unemp bac_10 trend helmet_law if state=="ca" Source SS df MS Number of obs = 18 -------------+------------------------------ F( 5, 12) = 22.84 Model 2.14855814 5.429711628 Prob > F = 00 Residual.225732886 12.018811074 R-squared = 0.9049 -------------+------------------------------ Adj R-squared = 0.8653 Total 2.37429102 17.139664178 Root MSE =.13715 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ mcdrl Coef. Std. Err. t P> t [95% Conf. Interval] -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- speed65.4358863.1725389 2.53 0.027.0599564.8118163 unemp.0340391.0485866 0.70 0.497 -.0718221.1399003 bac_10.3175587.157151 2.02 0.066 -.0248439.6599612 trend.065022.0149018 4.36 1.0325538.0974902 helmet_law -.8972242.168596-5.32 0-1.264563 -.5298851 _cons -.3775448.2939152-1.28 0.223-1.017931.2628414 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 51 Motor cycle fatality rate -- treatment state 1.60 1.40 1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Year TX Comparison states 52 13

Results for TX alone * run a model for Texas. reg mcdrl speed65 unemp bac_08 trend helmet_law if state=="tx" Source SS df MS Number of obs = 18 -------------+------------------------------ F( 5, 12) = 9.43 Model 1.86115335 5.37223067 Prob > F = 08 Residual.473677129 12.039473094 R-squared = 0.7971 -------------+------------------------------ Adj R-squared = 0.7126 Total 2.33483048 17.137342969 Root MSE =.19868 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ mcdrl Coef. Std. Err. t P> t [95% Conf. Interval] -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- speed65.1689669.2624034 0.64 0.532 -.4027609.7406947 unemp.1301635.0747096 1.74 0.107 -.0326147.2929418 bac_08.6692796.2457196 2.72 0.018.1339026 1.204657 trend -.0405022.0284775-1.42 0.180 -.1025494.021545 helmet_law -.4592142.1645968-2.79 0.016 -.8178398 -.1005887 _cons -.5765997.464616-1.24 0.238-1.588911.4357116 53 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- State group Motor cycles registered per 100,000 Motor cycle death rate per 100,000 Never had helmet law 2366 1.18 Changed helmet law 1525 1.04 Always had helmet law 1224 0.77 54 Purely Cross Sectional Model (1990). * run basic OLS model for 1990. reg mcdrl speed65 unemp bac_08 bac_10 helmet_law if year==1990 Source SS df MS Number of obs = 48 -------------+------------------------------ F( 5, 42) = 4.48 Model 2.59400681 5.518801363 Prob > F = 23 Residual 4.86098775 42.115737804 R-squared = 0.3480 -------------+------------------------------ Adj R-squared = 0.2703 Total 7.45499457 47.158616906 Root MSE =.3402 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ mcdrl Coef. Std. Err. t P> t [95% Conf. Interval] -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- speed65.1692481.1357937 1.25 0.220 -.1047947.4432909 unemp.0524134.0490639 1.07 0.292 -.0466015.1514283 bac_08 -.0944842.2372792-0.40 0.693 -.573333.3843645 bac_10.01337 94.1658892 0.08 0.936 -.3213985.3481573 helmet_law -.4684841.1038582-4.51 0 -.6780784 -.2588898 _cons -.0643492.3042114-0.21 0.833 -.6782726.5495743 55 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ define : i 1, 2,... n; t 1, 2,... T S 1 if state i, 0otherwise i W 1 if year t, 0otherwise t Law it 1 if state i has helmet law in year t, 0otherwise y REFORM x it 0 it 1 i 2 n T S W j j k k it j 2 k 2 56 14

Why k=2 to N and j=2 to T? What does α measure? What does λ measure? Question: impact of MC helmet laws on motorcycle fatalities Data: 48 states, 18 years (1988-2005), 864 observations Outcome ln(motor cycle death rate) Death rates = deaths/100,000 population Treatment variable: =1 if state i has a motor cycle law in year t, =0 otherwise 57 58 Contains data from motorcycles.dta obs: 864 vars: 12 10 Nov 2012 09:27 size: 49,248 (99.6% of memory free) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- storage display value variable name type format label variable label ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- year int %9.0g year mcfatals double %9.0g total motor cycle fatalities state str2 %2s 2 digit postal code, AL, CA, etc. fips byte %8.0g 2 digit numeric fips code helmet_law float %9.0g =1 if motorcycle helmet law, =0 otherwise speed65 float %9.0g =1 if speed limit is 65, 0 otherwise speed70p float %9.0g =1 if speed limit is 70 plus, 0 otherwise bac_10 float %9.0g drunk driving defined as bac>=0.1, =0 otherwise bac_08 float %9.0g drunk driving defined as bac>=0.08, =0 otherwise unemp float %9.0g state unemployment rate, 5 is 5% population float %9.0g state population mregs double %10.0g motor cycle registrations ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Sorted by:. * construct dummy variables for state and year. xi i.state i.year i.state _Istate_1-48 (_Istate_1 for state==al omitted) i.year _Iyear_1988-2005 (naturally coded; _Iyear_1988 omitted) 59 60 15

. * run the difference in difference model. reg mcdrl speed65 speed70p unemp bac_08 bac_10 _I* helmet_law Source SS df MS Number of obs = 864 -------------+------------------------------ F( 70, 793) = 30.54 Model 139.812929 70 1.99732756 Prob > F = 00 Residual 51.8558902 793.065392043 R-squared = 0.7295 -------------+------------------------------ Adj R-squared = 0.7056 Total 191.66882 863.222095967 Root MSE =.25572 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ mcdrl Coef. Std. Err. t P> t [95% Conf. Interval] -------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- speed65 -.0577686.0552537-1.05 0.296 -.1662293.0506922 speed70p -.0855586.0815308-1.05 0.294 -.2456004.0744831 unemp -.0117339.0118625-0.99 0.323 -.0350195.0115517 bac_08.1423512.0725064 1.96 0.050.0000241.2846783 bac_10.1163134.0628129 1.85 0.064 -.0069859.2396127 _Istate_2 -.038139.0889074-0.43 0.668 -.2126606.1363826 delete some results _Istate_47.2392712.0896769 2.67 8.0632391.4153033 _Istate_48.3987819.09788 4.07 0.2066474.5909164 _Iyear_1989 -.2367341.052373-4.52 0 -.3395401 -.1339281 delete some results _Iyear_2005.1032509.0703676 1.47 0.143 -.0348778.2413796 helmet_law -.3728078.0458932-8.12 0 -.4628943 -.2827213 _cons.5393718.1275965 4.23 0.2889049.7898387 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 61 16