ANALYSES OF AN UNMITIGATED STATION BLACKOUT TRANSIENT WITH ASTEC, MAAP AND MELCOR CODE

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ANALYSES OF AN UNMITIGATED STATION BLACKOUT TRANSIENT WITH ASTEC, MAAP AND MELCOR CODE Technical Meeting on the Status and Evaluation of Severe Accident Simulation Codes for Water F. Mascari 1, J. C. De La Rosa Blul 2, M. Sangiorgi 2, Giacomino Bandini 1 1 ENEA,Via Martiri di Monte Sole 4, 40129, Bologna, Italy 2 European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Directorate G -Nuclear Safety and Security -Nuclear Reactor Safety & Emergency Preparedness, Westerduinweg 3, Postbus Nr. 2, 1755 ZG Petten(N.-H.) Netherlands

CONTENTS ENEA AND JRC JOINT ACTIVITY IN THE EU CESAM PROJECT - WP40-SAM SBO TRANSIENT INVESTIGATED CODE APPLICATION: PWR NODALIZATION DESCRIPTION CODE APPLICATION : PWR STEADY STATE ANALYSES CODE APPLICATION: TRANSIENT ANALYSES CONCLUSIONS 2

ENEA AND JRC JOINT ACTIVITY IN THE EU CESAM PROJECT - WP40-SAM In the framework of the European Project CESAM (Code for European Severe Accident Management) WP40-SAM, ENEA is involved in the development of a PWR 900 like with MELCOR code for benchmarking ASTEC code. Within this CESAM framework, ENEA and JRC started a joint research activity focused on the analysis of an unmitigated Station Blackout (SBO) with MELCOR (analyses developed by ENEA) and MAAP (analyses developed by JRC) code in order to benchmark ASTEC code (analyses developed by JRC). The references used to develop the PWR900 like MELCOR nodalization are : o L. FOUCHER, ASTEC V20R3, PWR900 like ASTEC Input Deck, Rapport n PSN-RES/SAG/2013-451. o L. FOUCHER, ASTEC V20R3, PWR900 like ASTEC Steady state calculation, Rapport n PSN-RES/SAG/2013-466. 3

SBO TRANSIENT MAIN CHARACTERISTICS The activity is focused on the use of MAAP and MELCOR code to simulate an Unmitigated Station Black-Out(SBO) to benchmark ASTEC code. The SBO transient is unmitigated and the Start Of the Transient (SOT) is characterized by: Loss of offsite Alternating Current (AC) power: Failure of all the diesel generators; Therefore: - PRZ level control is unavilable; - RCP seal injection is unavailable; - Active safey injection systems are unavailable; - Motor-driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) system is unavailable; - Auxiliary feed water is unavailable. 4

SBO TRANSIENT MAIN CHARACTERISTICS At the SOT, the following events take place: SCRAM; Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) closure; Main Feed Water closure; Start of the pump coast-down. For this first analysis the following hypotheses are also considered: Independent failure of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) pump; No RCP seals failure; Independent failure of the accumulators ; No primary boundary structures thermal induced degradation phenomena (SGTR not considered, HL/surge line creep rupture not considered) Station battery are always in operation; Post core damage strategy is assumed (SEBIM manually stuck open when the core exit temperature CET- reaches 650 C). 5

CODE NODALIZATIONS: Volumes Comparison Volume (m3) ASTEC MAAP MELCOR Primary Side Loop HL 2.75 2.75 2.75 Water box SG Hot Side 5.48 SG Ascending Side 10.38 16.98 TOP U Tube 2.24 33.23 33.23-33.23 SG Descending Side 10.38 SG Water Box Cold Side 4.75 16.25 Loop Seal 5.14 5.14 5.14 CL 7.674 7.674 7.674 Surge Line 1.352 * 1.352 PRZ 42.42 42.42 42.42 Secondary Side SG Riser 75.75 - Cavity 75.68 151.43-151.43 SG DC 24.47-24.47 TOT SG 175.94-175.94 6

CODE NODALIZATIONS: ASTEC Plant Model Description ASTEC nodalizationof the primary circuit ASTEC nodalizationof the secondary circuit 7

CODE NODALIZATIONS: MAAP Plant Model Description 8 REF: http://www.fauske.com/sites/default/files/maap5%20primary%20system%20nodalization%20scheme.png

CODE NODALIZATIONS: MAAP Plant Model Description-Containment 9

CODE NODALIZATIONS: MELCOR Plant Model Description MELCOR nodalization representation Loop 1 nodalization of the PWR 900 MWe Technical Meeting on the developed Status and Evaluation by of reference Severe Accident reactor, Simulation developed Codes by for using Water Cooled Reactors, 09 12 using October SNAP 2017, IAEA, Vienna SNAP 10

CODE NODALIZATIONS: MELCOR Plant Model Description Core is modelled by a single hydraulic region, CVH package, coupled with the correspondent MELCOR code model of the COR package. Core, in the COR package is modelled with 17 axial regions and 6 radial regions; 5 radial regions are used to model the core region (in agreement with ASTEC and MAAP nodalization). Lower plenum is modelled with 7 axial regions and the core with the remaining 10 axial regions. All the supporting and non-supporting steel masses, Zircaloy masses, non-supporting Poison masses, and fuel Uranium masses are considered in the COR Package nodalization. 82.3 t of fuel and 19.23t of Zircaloyare considered in the COR package. Lower head is composed of 13 rings with 10 lower head nodes. The candling heat transfer, the lower head failure modelling, the MELCOR 3D core Technical nodalization Meeting on representation in-vessel falling debris quench model are activated. A hemisphere the Status and Evaluation of Severe Accident Simulation Codes for Water (COR package) Cooled developed Reactors, by 09 using 12 October SNAP is used as a lower head type. 2017, IAEA, Vienna 11

CODE CALCULATIONS: Steady State Analyses PARAMETERS ASTEC MAAP MELCOR MAAP DISCR(%)* MELCOR DISCR(%)* Primary side Pressurizer Pressure (bar) 155.16 155.89 154.78 0.47 0.24 Pressurizer Level (%) 50 49 50 2.00 0.00 Cold Leg 1 Flow Rate (kg/s) 4736 4738 4736 0.04 0.00 Core Flow Rate (kg/s) 13928 13894 13926 0.24 0.01 Upper Head Flow Rate (kg/s) 275 267 275 2.91 0.00 Primary Mass (kg) 185000 184535 185014 0.25 0.01 Inlet Core Temperature (K) 560 560 560 0.00 0.00 Outlet Core Temperature (K) 594.5 594.6 594.6 0.02 0.02 Secondary Side Separator Pressure (bar) 58 58 58 0.00 0.00 SG Water Mass (kg) 44385 44362 44385 0.00 0.00 SG Steam Mass (kg) 2725-2677 - 1.76 SG MFWS Flow Rate (kg/s) 512-512 - 0.00 Recirculation Ratio 4.15 4.15 4.15 0.00 0.00 *MAAP and MELCOR Technical discrepancy Meeting on (%) the is Status calculated and against Evaluation the of operational Severe Accident point predicted Simulation by ASTEC Codes for code. Water 12

RCS start to lose SG heatsink HL Two-phase flow inception Post core damage strategy SG heatsink Core uncovering and Hydrogen generation CODE Upper Core Ring failure (s) 1 2 3 4 5 ASTEC* 10953 10953 11353 11753 12353 MAAP 12786 12724 12866 13484 14815 MELCOR** 11600 13100 13380 13650 14380 CODE Core TAF Unc (s) Core BAF Unc (s) DISCR (%) TAF Unc* DISCR (%) BAF Unc * ASTEC 8000 9400 - - MAAP 8083 10165 1.04 8.14 MELCOR 7000 9570 12.50 1.81 Core Slumping Primary pressure behaviour versus time 13

CODE CALCULATIONS: SG1 Secondary Pressure At the SOT the SGs remain the only heat sink of the residual power generated in the core. When the secondary side opening pressure set points are reached the SGs start releasing steam to the outside atmosphere. Cycling phase inceptionis predicted in all the codes considering the different valve logics implemented in the three code nodalization by the Code- Users. 14

CODE CALCULATIONS: SG1 Liquid Mass and Total Heat Transfer Primary to Secondary Side SG1 liquid mass inventory The SG opening and cycling determine a SG mass inventory decrease. After the secondary side water depletion, the decay heat transfer almost drops to negligible values Total heat transfer between the primary to secondary 15

CODE CALCULATIONS: HL Loop1 Mass Flow Rate Versus Time Single-phase natural circulation in the primary side and heat transfer in a covered core are the main thermalhydraulic phenomena characterizing this early phase of the transient in the primary side. Three codes predicts the same qualitative behaviour though some quantitative discrepancies are observed. In particular MAAP and MELCOR computes higher primary natural circulation mass flow rate compared with ASTEC code. When the two phase natural circulation starts a decrease in the mass flow rate is predicted by all the codes 16

CODE APPLICATION: Hydrogen Generation Characterization CODE H2 Start (s) TCL 1300K (s) * Heat up rate after T>1300 K (s)** TCL 1855K (s) *** In- Vessel H2 Max (s) DISCR(%) diff H2 start **** DISCR(%) TCL 1300K **** DISCR (%) TCL 1855K **** DISCR (%) H2 max **** ASTEC 8400 9970 > 1 K/s 10080 17000 -. - - MAAP 8795 10845 > 1 K/s 10904 20876 4.7 8.8 8.2 22.8 MELCOR 8382 8700 > 1 K/s 9248 19250 0.2 12.7 8.3 13.2 *For ASTEC code is analysed the second ring behaviour, because it is the faster to increase the cladding T; for MAAP code is analysed the second ring behaviour in the upper part of the core (axial = 58/radial =1), because it is the faster to increase the cladding T; for MELCOR code is analysed the first ring behaviour at the 8 th core level because it is the faster to increase the cladding T (the core is modelled by using 10 axial level). ** The heat up rate is an important parameter because permit the operator actions and influences the phenomenology of oxidation and liquid formation in the core. ***For ASTEC code is analyses the second ring behaviour, because it is the faster to increase the CL T; for MAAP code is analysed the second ring behaviour in the upper part of the core (axial = 58/radial =1), because it is the faster to increase the CL T; for MELCOR code is analysed the first ring behaviour at the 8 th core level because it is the faster to increase the cladding T. **** ASTEC calculated data discrepancies based on the comparison with MAAP and MELCOR calculated data. 17

CODE CALCULATIONS: Cladding Temperature In MAAP A first clad temperature peak (rings 2,3,4), more pronounced in the ring 2, is followed by a cladding temperature decrease following by a further cladding temperature increase. The intact cladding temperature decrease could be due to a formation of a two phase flow in the core due to the SEBIM valve stuck opening. The same phenomenon is observed in MELCOR code MELCOR code removes more energy in comparison with MAAP starting from 9908s after the SOT. This could be one of the Intact cladding temperature at the 2th ring in the upper part of reasons of the more sensible reduction of the core predicted Technical by MAAP Meeting and on MELCOR the Status code and Evaluation and Max of Severe Accident cladding Simulation temperature Codes in for the Water MELCOR intact cladding temperature Cooled Reactors, of the 09 ring 122 October predicted 2017, by IAEA, ASTEC Vienna 18 calculation.

CODE CALCULATIONS: Energy Removed by the Fluid ASTEC evolution is not quantitatively representative because the data are available (from the code user ) from 200s Technical after the Meeting SOT on and the Status the integration and Evaluation of the of power Severe Accident data- available Simulation from Codes for Water ASTEC- is missing Cooled of the Reactors, first 200s) 09 12 October 2017, IAEA, Vienna 19

ASTEC Core Degradation Visualization 20

ASTEC Core Degradation Visualization Selected Instants 21

MELCOR Core Degradation Visualization by Using SNAP 22

MELCOR Core Degradation Visualization, by Using SNAP, Selected Instants Intact Fuel Structure Water Particulate Debris Molten Pool 1 Molten Pool 2 Void 23

MAAP Core Degradation Visualization 24

Row no. for core collapse in the channels MAAP Core Degradation Visualization selected instants 25

CODE CALCULATIONS: Core Relocation CODE Upper Core Ring failure (s) 1 2 3 4 5 ASTEC* 10953 10953 11353 11753 12353 MAAP 12786 12724 12866 13484 14815 MELCOR** 11600 13100 13380 13650 14380 *Considering previous figure, where ASTEC core degradation/relocation visualization is reported, instead to consider the upper core ring failure, it is estimate the instant when the fuel ring continuity is lost. ** Upper part of the 5 th ring starts to collapse at 14380s, but other axial levels continue their failure starting from 15270s. fuel ring continuity is lost ASTEC Row no. for core collapse in the channel 1,2,3,4,5 predicted by MAAP code MAAP MELCOR 26

CODE CALCULATIONS: Total Hydrogen Generation/Oxidation Energy Generated in the Core Total Hydrogen Oxidation Energy 27

CODE APPLICATION: Hydrogen Generation Characterization 28

CODE CALCULATIONS: Hydrogen Generation and Core Relocation The materials with a lower melting temperature than fuel (as control rod, guide tube, gridsj..) determine the starting of the melting and relocation phase of the core damage. Along the core degradation and melt progression phase, the cladding and fuel failure mechanisms and the consequent core materials transport/relocation take place. These phenomena determine a loss of core geometry with a consequent change of the coolant flow path shape. The hydrogen mass production is therefore dependent from the core degradation progression and the consequent available area for the oxidation and flow blockage phenomena. Though the uncertainty to correctly estimate the amount of area available and the effect of flow blockage, in general a significant amount of hydrogen could be produced during this phase of the transient and it is estimated by the codes considering their different core material degradation/relocation modelling capability. 29

CODE CALCULATIONS: Hydrogen Generation and Core Relocation Though a detail characterization and analyses of the core material relocation/distribution and the codes representation is out of the target of the research activity here presented, the macroscopic effect of the hydrogen generation is here analysed. ASTECcode shows a general smooth progressive hydrogen production along the core degradation phase. MAAP code shows a general smooth progressive hydrogen production. MELCOR code shows instead a general progressive hydrogen production, but the previous mentioned stuck opening of the SEBIM valve determines a sensible reduction and a subsequent increase (when the cladding temperature increase again) of the oxidation rate. This, coupled with the progressive upper ring core failure and the progressive relocation of the core in the lower plenum, determines the hydrogen production versus time behaviour. 30

CODE CALCULATIONS: Hydrogen and Slumping CODE H2 Before Slumping (Kg) Tot In Vessel H2 (Kg) DISCR (%) Before Slump* DISCR (%) H2 TOT * ASTEC 273 275 - - MAAP 151 191 44.69 30.55 MELCOR 309 377 13.18 37.09 After the core material relocation into the lower plenum (slumping) additional hydrogen could be generated due to the oxidation phenomena; This part of the transient is strongly influenced by the core relocation scenario; While in MELCOR and MAAP code the slumping takes place through the core plate failure, in ASTEC code it takes place for the failure of the shroud; In ASTEC, the hydrogen Technical Meeting production on the is Status characterized and Evaluation by a of very Severe small Accident increase Simulation that permits Codes for to Water conclude that all the hydrogen is Cooled created Reactors, before 09 the slumping 12 October 2017, IAEA, Vienna 31

CODE CALCULATIONS: Hydrogen Generation Hydrogen mass production is dependent from the core degradation progression and the consequent available area for the oxidation and flow blockage phenomena. Discrepancies related to these parameters underline the modelling difference of the code related to core material degradation/relocation determining o differences in the available area for the oxidation process, o different flow blockage condition, and o differences in the code node porosity predicted, etc. It is important to underline that the area available for the oxidation has a great uncertainty Technical Meeting due on to the the Status complex and Evaluation phenomena of Severe Accident taking Simulation place Codes for during Water the degradation Cooled and Reactors, relocation 09 12 October of the 2017, core IAEA, material Vienna and limited full scale 32

CODE CALCULATIONS: Transient Analyses RELEVANT PHENOMENOLOGYCAL ASPECTS ASTEC MAAP MELCOR MAAP DISCR* (%) MELCOR DISCR* (%) SG1,2,3 Cycling Inception(s) 200 100 30 - - SEBIM Cycling Inception(s) 4200 3757 4058 10.55 3.38 Two Phase inception in the HL (s) 6400 6404 6300 0.06 1.56 Core TAF Uncovered(s) 8000 8083 7000 1.04 12.50 H2 Start (s) 8400 8795 8382 4.70 0.21 SEBIM Stuck Open (s) 9200 10099 9414 9.77 2.33 Core BAF Uncovery(s) 9400 10165 9570 8.14 1.81 TCL 1300K (s) 9970 10845 8700 8.78 12.74 TCL 1855K (s) 10080 10904 9248 8.17 8.25 Upper Core Ring Failure 1 (s)** 10953 12786 11600 16.74 5.91 Upper Core Ring Failure 2 (s)** 10953 12724 13100 16.17 19.60 Upper Core Ring Failure 3 (s)** 11353 12866 13380 13.33 17.85 Upper Core Ring Failure 4 (s)** 11753 13484 13650 14.73 16.14 Upper Core Ring Failure 5 (s)**/*** 12353 14815 14380 19.93 16.41 Slumping Inception (s) 16600 15526 14580 6.47 12.17 Vessel Failure(s) 18157 20608 19250 13.50 6.02 *ASTEC calculated data discrepancies based on the comparison with MAAP and MELCOR calculated data. **For ASTEC it is estimate the instant when the fuel ring continuity is lost. ** For MELCOR calculation, the upper part of the 5th ring starts to collapse at 14380s, but other axial levels continue their failure starting from 15270s. 33

CONCLUSIONS The results of the calculated data show that the three codes predict the phenomenological evolution in a good qualitative agreement though with some quantitative differences. In particular, considering the time sequence of relevant phenomenological aspects, the maximum percentage discrepancy between ASTEC and MAAP/MELCOR calculated data is at maximum of about the 20% for the main selected safety related parameters chosen as figure of merit. The most relevant differences are observed in the in-vessel hydrogen mass production prediction. Such discrepancies underline some modeling differences between the three codes related to core material degradation/relocation, determining differences in the available area for the oxidation process, different flow blockage conditions, different code node porosity prediction, etc. In addition it is to note a phenomenological discrepancy related to the slumping predictions between ASTEC and MAAP/MELCOR calculations: while MAAP and MELCOR predict a core lower plate failure with a consequent relocation of degraded core material in the lower plenum, ASTEC predicts the relocation of the degraded core material through the shroud failure. 34

CONCLUSIONS Considering o the hypotheses of the transient(no ECCS intervention, scram at zero, no pump leakage, etc) and o the maximum degree of freedom left to the Code-User (hydraulic and core nodalization strategy and degree of detail, setting of the boundary conditionj) and o the general phenomenological agreement of the transient phenomenology predicted by the three codes(with the exception of the slumping phenomenology) the results of the code calculations can be used as a confirmation of the transient phenomenological evolution of the postulated accident. It is progress and under discussion through the authors the ZR oxidation characterization and the analyses of the corium composition in the lower plenum. Future activity based on a strictly congruence analysis between core structures nodalizations (geometry and mass) is endorsed. 35

Authors thank the funding received from the 7th Framework Programmeof the European Commission via the CESAM project; Special thanks for GRS for the coordination of Project; Special thanks for JRC for the coordination of the WP40 activities; Special thanks for the IRSN for the support and comments on the activity. 36