Human and organizational factors (HOF) in nuclear safety - ASN s point of view and oversights

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Human and organizational factors (HOF) in nuclear safety - ASN s point of view and oversights Thomas Houdré ASN, Nuclear power plants department AIEA Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems Ottawa April 2013 Human and organizational factors, safety and security culture 1

Content The importance of the human and organisational factors for safety and radioprotection: which point of view of ASN? ASN s actions and oversights in the area of the human and organisational factors 2

The importance of the human and organisational factors for safety and radioprotection which point of view of ASN? 3

Socio-technical systems (1) Operator Physiological caracteristics Skills Etc. HOF factors are particularly concerned with anything that has to do with the people involved (physiological characteristic, workforce, skills, motivation, fatigue, etc.), 4

Socio-technical systems (2) Working environment Light, thermal and sound levels Etc. HOF factors are also concerned with anything that has to do with the working environment (light, thermal and sound levels, etc.) 5

Socio-technical systems (3) Material and technical systems Tools Documents, procedures Softwares Etc. HOF factors are also concerned with anything that has to do with the material and technical systems (Tools, Documents, procedures, Softwares, etc.) 6

Socio-technical systems (4) Organization Work shift Co-activity Task distribution Functional and hierachical links Etc. HOF factors are also concerned with anything that has to do with the work organization (work shift, co-activity, task distribution, functional and hierarchical links, etc.) 7

Socio-technical systems (5) Organization Work shift Co-activity Task distribution n Functional and hierachical links Etc. Activité Operator Physiological caracteristics Skills Etc. E Material and technical systems Tools Documents, procedures Softwares Etc. Work activity Working environment Light, thermal and sound levels Etc. 8

Variability of context Work activity The situations actually encountered by individuals in the field vary constantly (equipment which does not react as expected, night-work, inexperienced colleague, varying levels of urgency, labour disputes, etc.) Requiring the workers to adapt the way they work to attain the expected outcome. This adaptation has a cost (in terms of fatigue, stress, health, etc) It is the licensee s responsibility to ensure that workers are placed in satisfactory working conditions and have the possibility to adapt the way they are carrying out their tasks (room of manoeuvre) at an acceptable cost 9

Human cost Inappropriate resources (for instance inadequate tools, cramped or poorly lit working environment, insufficient training or practice, poor design of manmachine interfaces, shortage of spare parts, professional teams destabilised by organisational change, under-manning or insufficient time allocated for tasks) can lead to risks An operating situation in which performance is satisfactory but in which this was obtained at very high human cost to those involved is a source of risk Only a slight variation in the context or change of a member of personnel can be enough to prevent the required performance level from being reached 10

The operator, a reliability vector, & sometime an unreliable factor The operator as the unreliable factor? (too) Often considered as the weakest link in the organization Limitation of the operator s contribution (mechanisation) The operator as the reliability vector? Detect / correct deficiencies Recovers from downgraded situations Bypass or compensate inefficient rules / process Creates solutions 11

Areas of activities Engineering activities during design of a new installation or modification of an existing one Particularly, ASN considers the licensee must use a user-centered design through an iterative process including analyse, design and evaluation phases Activities carried out during the operation of existing nuclear installations throughout their period of operation Decommissioning activities Throughout these activities, importance to establish experience feedback, particularly analysis of root causes (usually organisational) and the lessons to be learned Adequate and appropriate resources and skills must be committed by the licensee at both national and local levels 12

ASN s actions and oversights in the area of the human and organisational factors 13

ASN s oversight About 15 specialists of human and social sciences: ergonomics, psychology, sociology, management sciences at ASN and IRSN (Technical Support Organization) Oversight HOF related topics inspections (25 dedicated inspections in 2013) Advisory committee and IRSN assessments HOF addressed topics in the stress test Social, organizational and human factors steering committee 14

HOF related topics inspections Human and Organizational Factors (HOF) related topics inspections on site Quality and implementation of the jobs, skills, training and qualifications management system particularly important in the context of the renewal of the licensee workforces and skills Licensee s safety management, that is safety policy and organization, definition of roles and responsibilities, improvement process, verification and internal audits, treatment of deviances, etc. Licensee s implementation of and compliance with a process to ensure the quality of the subcontracted activities Licensee s organization to establish experience feedback on reactors during their operation, and particularly analysis of root causes (usually organisational) and the lessons to be learned 15

Advisory Committee and IRSN assessments (1) Comprehensive assessments provide a necessary complement to inspections for HOF related topics (management, organisation, etc.) Most important topics are presented to the advisory committee. After each evaluation, ASN issues its position and demands Current IRSN s in-depth evaluations on Safety management and radioprotection Managing sub-contractors Experience feedback on NPPs during their operation (every 3 years) HOF aspects of EPR Flamanville 3 operations Etc. 16

Advisory Committee and IRSN assessments (2) Previous IRSN s in-depth evaluations on Topics Maintenance operations Experience feedback on NPPs during their operation Jobs, skills, training and qualifications management system Main outcomes Better evaluation of the impact of modifications of equipments on the interactions of the workers with the NPP (User centered design) New methodology for analyse of root causes and the lessons to be learned Enhancement of the EDF s organization to anticipate the renewal of the licensee workforces and skills 17

HOF addressed topics in the post Fukushima stress test (1) Stress test required the licensees to perform complementary safety assessments of their installations, including Human and Organizational Factors 1. Conditions concerning the use of outside contractors (non covered by the European stress tests) The organisation of the use of subcontracting is a major and difficult issue o ASN considers that subcontractor monitoring needs to be strengthened and that it must not be delegated by the licensee when dealing with work that is important for safety o ASN will require the licensees to demonstrate that their organisation guarantees the availability of the necessary skills in the event of an emergency, especially should outside contractors need to be called on 18

2. Operational management of emergency situations Accident management capabilities must be enhanced o o HOF addressed topics in the stress test (2) Definition of the human actions required for the management of extreme situations Verification that these actions can effectively be carried out given the intervention conditions likely to be encountered (applicability of the human actions required to manage extreme situations) The harden safety core should include o o o o o the emergency management rooms the mobile devices vital for emergency management the active dosimetry equipment, the measuring instruments for radiation protection and the personal and collective protection equipment the technical and environmental instrumentation for diagnosing the state of the facility and assessing and predicting the radiological impact on the workers and populations the communication means vital for emergency management 19

Social, organisational and human factors steering committee (1) Pluralistic approach (alike steering committee for Post Nuclear Accident Management or waste management) Participants the licensees the trades union organisations NGO representatives the French High Committee for Transparency and Information on Nuclear Security the Ministry for Labour and the Ministries responsible for nuclear safety HOF experts and researchers Three plenary meetings of this committee were held in 2012 20

Topics/Reflexions on Social, organisational and human factors steering committee (2) The renewal of the licensee workforces and skills, which is a fundamental point at a time when a new generation of staff is taking over a more experienced one, Evaluation of the feasibility of the human interventions planned to ensure an optimal management of emergency situations The pros and cons and the complementarities of rule-based safety which aims at confining the risks by settling the practices through the formulation of rules or procedures vs. adaptative safety which is based, on the contrary, on the capacities of initiative of the workers to face the unpredictable and the natural variability of the reality Using contractors in normal operating situations: work organisation and conditions, legal aspects Etc. 21

Social, organisational and human factors steering committee (3) Three working groups started in January 2013 Using contractors in normal operating situations: work organisation and conditions Use of subcontracting: legal aspects Management of emergency situations 22

Conclusion HOF topics, a high concern for ASN Experience feedback shows that performances are essential to safety human and organizational Widely and varied oversights and actions Dedicated specialists among ASN and its TSO ASN encourages operators to develop HOF consideration in their safety studies through instructions or inspections which encourage the licensee to take over the HOF topics and to recruit HOF specialists HOF aspects are gradually integrated into policies and processes But the implementation in non NPP facilities remains insufficient Many areas still to be investigated Research is also essential to improve the scientific knowledge in this area 23