A Brief Introduction to EIM Bidding and Market Design 9/7/2017

Similar documents
Briefing on intertie deviation settlement proposal

Fixed / Price Sensitive Demand Bids, Load Response, Virtual Bidding & Pump Storage Optimizer in the Day Ahead Market

Dispatch Signal & Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP)

Two Settlement PJM /06/2016

LMP Calculation and Uplift

Decision on intertie deviation settlement proposal

Residual imbalance energy settlement and ramp rate changes for self-scheduled variable energy resources

MARKET ISSUES BULLETIN

Energy Imbalance Market Year 1 Enhancements

Bid cost recovery and variable energy resource settlement Straw proposal

Wholesale Electricity Transactions A State Regulatory Perspective

RTO Overview and Day 2 Markets. EAI Technical Conference May 26, 2011

Stepped Constraint Parameters. Issue Paper

Day Ahead Market Enhancements: Issue Paper/Straw Proposal

Price Formation. Eric Ciccoretti Attorney-Advisor Office of Energy Policy and Innovation Federal Energy Regulatory Commission June 13, 2017

2016 Fall Release Training - Bid Cost Recovery Modification and Variable Energy Resources Settlement

Section 3 Characteristics of Credits Types of units. Economic Noneconomic Generation.

Energy Imbalance Market Year 1 Enhancements Phase 2. Draft Final Proposal

PJM Markets. Energy and Ancillary Services. PJM State & Member Training Dept. PJM /29/2014

Markets Report. Jennifer Warner-Freeman Senior Economist, Market Analysis January 22, PJM 2018

Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP): Basics of Nodal Price Calculation

Energy Uplift (Operating Reserves)

Self-Schedules Bid Cost Recovery Allocation and Lower Bid Floor

California Independent System Operator Corporation Fifth Replacement Electronic Tariff

Energy Uplift (Operating Reserves)

Energy Imbalance Market Design Straw Proposal and Issue Paper. Stakeholder Meeting April 11, 2013

Key Issues and Consideration in Market Design, Operational and Oversight

FERC Order 764 Settlements

1st International Conference on Large-Scale Grid Integration of Renewable Energy in India Durgesh Manjure, MISO Energy September 6, 2017

Energy Imbalance Market (EIM) Benefits and Challenges

Markets Report. Paul M. Sotkiewicz, Ph.D Chief Economist, Markets MC Webinar March 23, 2015 PJM 2015

PJM Wholesale Markets. Hisham Choueiki, Ph.D., P.E. Ohio PUC Staff October 20-24, 2014 Tbilisi, Georgia

Energy Imbalance Market Year 1 Enhancements. Issue Paper and Straw Proposal

Markets Report. Jennifer Warner-Freeman Senior Economist, Market Analysis March 19, PJM 2018

APS Stakeholder Meeting. September 9 th 2016

Flexible Ramping Products

EIM Settlements Load Customer Training September 13, 2016

Congestion and Marginal Losses

Flexibility in the Swiss Electricity Markets. Jan Abrell Energieforschungsgespräche Disentis 2019,

Industry Perspectives on FERC Standard Market Design

Energy Markets - The Basics

FERC Order 764 Implementation


EIM Greenhouse Gas Enhancement. Draft Final Proposal

Day Ahead Market Enhancements. Issue Paper/Straw Proposal

Open Access Technology International, Inc. (OATI)

Stakeholder Comments Template

3.2 Market Buyers Spot Market Energy Charges.

Potential Methodology to Account for OFO Penalties Incurred due to Real-time Energy Dispatches

Committed Offer: Offer on which a resource was scheduled by the Office of the Interconnection for a particular clock hour for the Operating Day.

Price Formation Education Session Day 1 Economic Dispatch

DIRECT ENERGY PJM MIC. Marji Philips Tyler Little August 12, 2015

EIM Mitigation. EIM Offer Rules Workshop July 19, Brittany Dean and Gabe Murtaugh Market and Infrastructure Policy

Competitive Wholesale Electricity Market, Transactions, Pricing and LMP Decomposition

Proposed Opportunity Cost Guideline Changes PJM Cost Development Guidelines, Manual 15, Section 8

Overview of PJM: Looking Back to Look Forward Tokyo Power Market Summit

Renewable Integration: Market & Product Review Phase 1

UTC Activity Pre and Post 162 FERC 61,139: January 1, 2017 through March 8, 2018

LMP Implementation in New England

Day-Ahead Energy Market

Reserve Market. PJM State & Member Training Dept. PJM /06/2016

3.2 Market Settlements.

Dispatch Signal & Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP)

Energy Imbalance Market Update

Energy Imbalance Market Overview

CHAPTER 5 SOCIAL WELFARE MAXIMIZATION FOR HYBRID MARKET

Seattle City Light: GHG Impacts of EIM Participation

Markets Report. Paul M. Sotkiewicz, Ph.D Chief Economist, Markets MC Webinar January 20, 2015 PJM 2015

Congestion and Marginal Losses

Joanne Flynn David Cormie NFAT Technical Conference July 15, 2013

Current Language Proposed Revisions Rationale

Analysis of the Broader Regional Markets Initiatives

NEW YORK INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR

Report on Performance of the California ISO s Local Market Power Mitigation Mechanism

Schedule 9 and 10 PJM /23/2017

Energy Imbalance Market

Day Ahead Market Enhancements

Congestion and Marginal Losses

Market-based redispatch in the Netherlands

Congestion and Marginal Losses

Stakeholder Comments Template. Day-Ahead Market Enhancements Phase 1 Initiative

California Independent System Operator Corporation. California ISO. Import resource adequacy. Department of Market Monitoring

Exhibit to Agenda Item #2

CUSTOMER GUIDE TO PJM BILLING

State of the Market Report 2006

New York Independent System Operator, Inc. NYISO Tariffs. OATT Schedules

BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF OREGON PACIFICORP. REDACTED Exhibit Accompanying Direct Testimony of Michael G. Wilding

ELECTRICITY TRADE AGREEMENT. An Assessment of the Ontario-Quebec Electricity Trade Agreement

MISO-PJM Interface Pricing Post Implementation Metrics and Criteria

Single Schedule Market Pricing Issues

California ISO. Q Report on Market Issues and Performance. February 10, Prepared by: Department of Market Monitoring

Interface Pricing Approach Whitepaper May 2015

CALIFORNIA INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR CORPORATION FERC ELECTRIC TARIFF Sheet No. 691 ORIGINAL VOLUME NO. III

Local Market Power Mitigation Enhancements

Regulation Energy Management Market Simulation. June 14, 2011

PACIFICORP CLASS 2 DSM DECREMENT STUDY

Stakeholder Comments Template. Subject: SCE Comments on Dynamic Transfer Revised Final Draft 2/18/11

Day-Ahead Market Enhancements Phase 1: Fifteen-Minute Granularity. Second Revised Straw Proposal

Flexible Ramping Products Straw Proposal Incorporating FMM and EIM

Transcription:

A Brief Introduction to EIM Bidding and Market Design 9/7/2017 Susan Hill

But First a disclaimer This presentation should not be considered a recommendation for EIM bidding strategy. The context of this presentation assumes: Hourly load conforms to your base schedule EIM resource characteristics currently in place No congestion No Bid Cost Recovery (BCR) Load includes transactions that are scheduled ahead of time (Bilateral trades, etc ) Only energy costs does not address commitment cost bidding 2

Example: A 300 MW base schedule is not settled for the entire 300 MW. It is only settled for the incremental MWH that are above and/or below 300 MW during the hour. EIM is an Incremental Market You are settled against the plan of the base schedule Generation transactions only occur for deviations from the plan to meet your load Generators are paid the LMP prices for the MW generated above your plan Generators are charged the LMP prices for the MW decremented below your plan* Bids should be made on an incremental basis, not an average all in cost * Assuming load is to plan 3

GridRUS Participating Resource 320 MW 300 MW 281 MW $25 Incremental Energy Cost $ / MW Cost Basis Incentive The EIM is structured to encourage bidding resources very close to actual cost/value for a range around the base schedule. EXAMPLE: GridRUS has a participating resource that is base scheduled at 300 MW The true incremental cost of the previous and next 20 MW (281 MW to 320 MW) is approximately $25/MW 4

Example: Bid Price & Dispatch GridRUS Submits an energy bid of 25$ / MW for +/- 20 MW around base schedule of 300 MW. 320 MW Example LMP = 30$ 320 MW Example LMP = 20$ 300 MW 281 MW Unit dispatched up to make sale 300 MW 281 MW Unit dispatched down and purchase made 25 $5 margin on any MWH above 300 MW 25 $5 savings on MWH below 300 MW Bid $ / MW Bid $ / MW The unit will move such that: Sales will be made at LMP>25$, and purchases will be made at LMPs <25$. GridRUS kept whole to costs. 5

Bids are not only used to stack resources for native load, but also used for a sale (or purchase) from a neighboring EIM member.

Moral: Inflating costs to improve margin may backfire. Bidding near costs ensures lowest cost optimization of the native load system. Example: Cost Bidding Incentive One day a GridRUS Trader decides to Bid 30$ instead of the $25 cost for the same range, trying to improve off system sales margin RISKY! The LMP goes to 28$, and the unit is moved down to 280 MW. The market now believes it is optimizing by shutting down the higher cost power (30$) and selling cheaper ($28) resources to GridRUS. This results in $25 cost power being replaced with $28 power. This increases costs 3$ / MWH above the actual cost GridRUS would have normally incurred to meet its own load. 7

Bids and the Base Schedule / Load Forecast work hand in hand in the EIM 8

Base Schedule and Loads The Base Schedule is an hourly look at loads Even if no off system EIM transfers are occurring, a participating resource may be under or over its base schedule within the hour Base Schedule is a single point in the hour There may also be load forecast error Other resources are not operating to base schedule (e.g. wind, reliability) Bidding range gives flexibility to economically optimize for native load intra-hour 9

EIM Market Design Base Schedule MW Actual Load/ Resource Profile T+0 Operating Range Over the Hour There should be bidding range adequate to cover this variability T+60 EIM market is designed to encourage bidding around the base schedule very close to cost 10

Summary A participating unit can be under or over its base schedule at any given time. To ensure best optimization for native load, bidding near cost is encouraged by market design The EIM optimizes all participants at the same time, so intra-hour cost based margins are shared and spread across the footprint, resulting in economies of scale at cost. Graduated bidding strategies above and below base schedule range may offer some additional margin for EIM transfers 11

Questions?