Perseus A Personalized Reputation System

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Perseus A Personalized Reputation System Petteri Nurmi Helsinki Institute for Information Technology HIIT petteri.nurmi@cs.helsinki.fi

Introduction Internet provides many possibilities for online transactions Auctioning second-hand items (ebay, Amazon,...) Shopping in online stores Characteristics of online transactions Buyer and seller seldom have prior interaction history Possibility of financial loss Lack of conventional cues for assessing the trustworthiness of the other Buyer and seller cannot engage in face-to-face communications Buyer cannot examine the quality of the products Many opportunities for misbehavior Seller not sending products even if buyer has paid for them Sending products of lower quality Buyer can badmouth the seller Trust is a critical factor for these transactions to succeed If buyers do not trust sellers they will not buy items How can we make the setting more trustworthy?

Reputation Systems Reputation systems are systems that help users to assess the trustworthiness of an individual Gather information about the opinions and experiences of individuals Aggregate the information Use the aggregated information to provide cues that help assessing the trustworthiness of an individual Hence, reputation systems can be understood as word-of-mouth systems in situations where the object of interest is an active user Collaborative / content-based filtering: object of interest is passive

Example: ebay

Reputation Systems Reputation systems can consider reputation as a Global property: the reputation of an individual is shared by all members of the community Typically used in settings where the size of the community is huge Subjective property: the reputation of an individual depends on the person who examines it Typically used in smaller communities where the probability of repeated interactions is higher than in larger communities Global reputation has one severe vulnerability Examine own reputation has potential for misuse Studies have shown the buyers are willing to pay more when the reputation of the seller is high Hence an individual can gather up a high reputation and then misuse it Also possible to collude with others and to perform bogus transactions which increase the reputation of an individual To overcome this vulnerability, we have developed Perseus Reputation is subjective, but if no interaction history works similarly as a global reputation system

Perseus Perseus is a subjective reputation system The reputation of an individual depends on the person who examines it Reputation values consider three aspects Personal experiences (first hand reputation) Experiences of others (third party reputation) How much I value the experiences of others Uses stochastic approximation algorithmsł computationally effective For concreteness, we fix the problem setting to online marketplaces Two actors, buyer and seller Buyer must send money before the seller will ship the item Seller can be dishonest and not send the item After the transaction is concluded (product sent or buyer gives up hope) both parties can rate each other We assume ratings can be either negative (-1), neutral (0) or positive (+1)

First hand reputation The first hand reputation represents personal experiences the most important source of information for decisions We require that the reputation values lie in the interval [0,1] value 0 = complete distrust (dishonest) value 1 = complete trust (honest) Model we assume that the honesty of an individual depends on an unknown parameter and we estimate the parameter over time Estimator stochastic approximation algorithm used to estimate estimator Previous value of estimator rating step-size (we use max {0.01, 1/t} )

Third party reputation Third party reputation integrates information from other individuals also called witness information two main approaches social-network based: value of witness information depends on the closeness of the individuals in a social network generic: all persons considered equally The generic approach is usually used in large communities and in situations where user involvement needs to be minimized We focus on the generic approach since this is the common approach for online marketplaces Third party reputation in Perseus Calculated as an average of the ratings for an individual Opinions of non-trustworthy individuals excluded Set of trustworthy individuals Trustworthiness is determined using a threshold on the reputation values

Reputation aggregation In many cases we need a single value (per buyer - seller pair) E.g., for ranking sellers according to their reputation Hence, we need a way to aggregate the different information sources In our case, we use a weighted linear sum Most common approach found in the literature Also analysis of voting mechanisms suggests this approach Require that the weights are in the interval [0,1] and sum up to one The weights can be understood as measures of agreement between the rating and the individual information sources How to set the weights? Initially, we set the weights to the values 0.25 and 0.75 Weights are updated over time using a stochastic approximator When rating and information source agree we increase the weight towards the value 1.0 (disagree decrease towards 0.0) Agree = both the rating and the estimate given by the individual information source are the same (both positive or both negative)

Coping with unfair ratings Buyers and sellers may provide false or misleading ratings can cause unwanted biases to the estimates provides several attack opportunities To cope with unfair ratings, Perseus uses a set of heuristics We require that buyer and seller give their ratings independently First step is to determine whether the ratings agree or disagree 1. When ratings agree, we update only the reputation of the seller Prevents artificially increasing the reputation of the buyer 2. When ratings disagree, we have two options 1. When negative rating is given by buyer The buyer does not want to interact with the seller Ł decrease the reputation of the seller 2. Negative rating given by seller Seller does not want to interact with the buyerł decrease the reputation of the buyer But also decrease the reputation of the sellerłmakes transactions between the individuals less likely, but the reputation of seller remains neutral for others Our mechanism encourages giving ratings as otherwise a person could be falsely accused

Experiments: Setup and Metrics We have evaluated Perseus using a set of simulation experiments Setup adapted from Schlosser et al., imitates an online marketplace Individuals are modelled as agents with fixed behaviour patterns A fixed set of agents who act both as sellers and buyers All goods have the same price Behaviour patterns: Honest: accept transactions with neutral and trustworthy agents, carry out transactions honestly and give fair ratings Selfish: passive sellers, never buy anything and never provide ratings Malicious: as buyer accepts transactions with neutral and trustworthy agents; as seller accepts all transactions and acts honestly or dishonestly by chance Disturbing: attempt to build up a good reputation by acting honestly and then attempt to misuse the good reputation Spamming: act otherwise similarly as the honest agents, but they always provide unfair ratings Evaluation metrics: Transaction rate: portion of transactions completed successfully Number of transactions Schlosser, A., Voss, M., Brückner, L., On the simulation of global reputation systems, JASSS 9(1):2006

Experiments I First setup is an average case misbehavior analysis A fixed number of agents (250) 50 agents / behavior model 1500 iterations (each agent matched 1500 times with a random seller) Experiments repeated 50 times and results averaged over the runs Results Indicate that the rate of successful transactions remains high over time The performance system converges rapidly Able to correctly identify malicious agents and insensitive to spammers

Experiments II: Comparison Second experiment setup Use a population of 200 agents 120 of the agents are of specific misbehaving type Other types in equal amounts (20 / type), thus always 20 honest agents Goal of these experiments is to measure the performance of Perseus under extreme conditions We also repeated this experiments using other reputation systems ebay, Beta, OnlyLast (Dellarocas) and AdaptiveLie (Sakai et al.) Results Perseus performs well even under extreme conditions All transactions of Honest agents are successful Other mechanisms can support more transactions, but have worse transaction rate (i.e., less succesful transactions) Biggest difference to other mechanisms when the number of disturbing agents is high

Summary Perseus is a subjective reputation system As the mechanism is subjective, individuals cannot examine and misuse information about their own reputation Utilizes three forms of information: personal experiences, observations of others and reliability of others opinions Based on stochastic approximation Also incorporates a set of heuristics for coping with unfair ratings Evaluated Perseus under extreme conditions of misbehaviour Experiments show that the mechanism is robust against misbehaviour, under extreme conditions Current work: implementing a web-based experiment setup and evaluating performance / usefulness with real users