Kjeller, 10 October 2017 SUMMARY REPORT IAEA INTEGRATED SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF RESEARCH REACTORS (INSARR) MISSION TO JEEP II RESEARCH REACTOR INTRODUCTION Institute for Energy Technology (IFE), Kjeller, Norway 3-10 October 2017 Following a request from the Institute for Energy Technology (IFE), Norway, the IAEA conducted an INSARR mission at the JEEP II research reactor, which is a tank type reactor, owned and operated by IFE and located at the Kjeller site. JEEP II is 2 MW power, cooled and moderated by heavy water and uses 3.5% enriched UO2 fuel. The reactor went critical for the first time in 1966, and since then has undergone several upgrades and refurbishment. The reactor is mainly used for research, doping of silicon, and radioisotope production. In addition to the JEEP II reactor, the IFE site at Kjeller has other radiation and nuclear facilities, including fuel fabrication, low and intermediate radioactive waste management, hot cells, and spent fuel storage. IFE is currently preparing for renewal of the operating license of the JEEP II reactor, which is valid till the end of 2018. The licensing authority of the reactor is the Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services, based on recommendations from the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority (NRPA), the national regulatory body. The objective of the INSARR mission was to review the operational safety of the reactor, covering reactor management, safety committee, safety culture, management system, training and qualification, safety analysis report (SAR), safety analysis, operational limits and conditions (OLCs), conduct of operations, maintenance and ageing management, safety of the utilization programme and modifications, operational radiation protection and waste management, emergency preparedness and response, and decommissioning plan. The review was performed following the methodology established by the IAEA Guidelines for Research Reactors Safety Review (INSARR Guidelines, 2013 Edition), which are based on the IAEA safety standards. The mission team was composed of three IAEA staff members: Mr A. Shokr (Head, Research Reactor Safety Section (RRSS) - Team Leader), Mr D. Sears (Senior Safety Officer, RRSS, Deputy Team Leader); and Ms D. Engstrom (Safety Culture Specialist, Operational Safety Section(OSS)), and five external experts: Mr H. Abou Yehia (Consultant, France), Mr G. Storr (Consultant, Australia); Mr K. Du Bruyn (Senior Manager, SAFARI-1 Research Reactor, South Africa), Mr R. Waldman (Consultant, Nuclear Energy Secretary, Argentina), and Mr O. Wouters (Safety Manager, HFR reactor, the Netherlands). The main technical counterpart of the mission was Mr O. Reistad, JEEP II Reactor Manager. Mr A. Valseth, Head of the IFE Nuclear Technology, Physics, and Safety Sector and Deputy President of IFE participated in several sessions of the mission. Senior managers and technical staff of the JEEP II reactor participated in the technical discussions and activities of the mission. The following NRPA staff also attended the mission as observers: Mr H. Mattsson, Ms T. Sekse, and Mr E. Bray. Mr N. Huseby, IFE President and Ms S. Dysvik, Head of Nuclear Safety Section, NRPA, also attended the exit meeting session. 1
CONDUCT OF THE MISSION The entry meeting started with a welcome address by Mr A. Valseth, which included the background of the request of the INSARR mission as well as the IFE structure and main field of activities. This introductory address also included description of the IFE future work and planned improvements. The meeting included a presentation from JEEP II reactor manager on the main characteristics of the JEEP II reactor and its safety status. In addition to the documents provided to the IAEA team before the mission, the IFE and JEEP II managers and technical staff made several presentations during the mission which covered all review areas of the INSARR mission. These presentations provided an overview of the status of the reactor facility and its associated documentation, and were followed by detailed discussions within the framework of the mission activities. The conduct of the mission included the following activities: Examination and assessment of JEEP II reactor safety and operating documentation; Walkthrough of the JEEP II reactor and associated facilities; Discussions with the JEEP II reactor management and operating personnel, and IFE managers and technical staff; Interviews with IFE and JEEP II staff for review of the safety culture programme; Discussions among the IAEA team members; Preparation of the mission report. During the first day of the mission, the IAEA team and the technical counterparts made a walkthrough of the reactor and its associated facilities. During the visit, the team observed good housekeeping within the reactor building. The team discussed with the reactor operating personnel various aspects of the reactor operational safety and made recommendations and suggestions for further improvement. Four and one half out of six days of the mission time were dedicated to a series of technical sessions and plenary discussions with the technical counterparts, walkthrough the facility, interviews for the review of the safety culture programme, preliminary drafting of the mission report, and final discussion with the technical counterparts about the findings and conclusions of the mission, with general agreement from the counterpart on the IAEA recommendations. The exit meeting was held on Tuesday, 10 October 2017, with the participation of the IFE President, the representatives of the NRPA, IFE managers, and JEEP II reactor management and technical staff. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The IAEA team appreciated the openness and transparency of the IFE and JEEP II staff, and noted the significant work being planned and performed for future operation of the reactor. The team also noted the efforts being exerted by IFE in establishing and implementing a national strategy for managing spent fuel and radioactive waste and in developing a decommissioning plan for the research reactor in line with the IAEA safety standards. Additionally, the team observed the continued improvement in the effectiveness of the IFE safety committee, emergency preparedness, and implementation of an effective maintenance programme for the reactor safety systems and components. 2
The team also identified areas requiring improvement. The activities of the mission resulted in recommendations and suggestions to address these areas for further safety improvements. These mainly covered safety management and organizational aspects, safety analysis and safety documents, and the operating programme and technical modifications to the facility, and are presented as follows. Safety management and organizational aspects IFE should develop and improve the existing strategies on establishing effective leadership for safety and on developing and maintaining a strong culture for safety. IFE management system should be revised in accordance with the IAEA safety standards to integrate nuclear safety objectives in all processes and procedures, providing for operational safety enhancement of the reactor. The organization structure of the JEEP II operation should be improved by: Avoiding the overlap and potential conflict of duties and authorities of the safety manager and reactor manager, in particular with respect to core management and fuel handling; Establishing adequate measures and practical arrangements to ensure effective quality verification of the activities important to safety that are carried out by the individuals swapping their functions between operation and maintenance; Considering assignment of a radiation protection officer dedicated to the reactor. In view of the IFE restructuring under consideration, adequate analysis should be performed (and measures taken accordingly) to ensure that a high level of safety is maintained within the organization responsible for reactor operation, including with respect to availability of adequate resources (human and financial), operation/management system documentation, and necessary support services. A safety committee should be established, in accordance with the IAEA safety standards, to advise the reactor manager on the safety of the JEEP II reactor. It is suggested that such committee includes members from the research reactor (HBWR) in Halden. The functioning of the IFE safety committee should be further improved by: Revising the list of items to be reviewed by the committee to include any proposed changes (instead of major changes, which is not defined in the document, or changes ) in the licensing documentation, IFE s management documents and operating procedures important to safety ( green books ), and in the physical protection system; Establishing procedures to ensure effective follow-up on the implementation of the Committee s recommendations; Revising the contents of the safety documents to be submitted to the committee with respect to new technical installations (or modifications) to include safety analysis, commissioning programme, changes to the operational limits and conditions, radiation protection and waste management, and operating procedures as well as the need for staff training. 3
Safety analysis and safety documents The safety analysis should be reviewed against the IAEA safety standards SSR-3 and SSG- 20 and revised as needed to ensure that the analysis provides for adequate identification and selection of postulated initiating events, and that it identifies the enveloping accident conditions with evaluation of the radiological consequences and comparison against acceptance criteria. The analysis of the positive reactivity insertion events should be revised taking into account the enveloping values of the reactor safety parameters, including the total rod drop time. The results should be used to evaluate the adequacy of the currently established operational limits and conditions on maximum excess reactivity, maximum reactivity insertion rate, and minimum reactivity shutdown margins. The results should also be used to establish limits on reactivity worth of (fixed and non-fixed) experiments. Analysis of a postulated blockage of the fuel element coolant channels should be performed and included in the SAR. The results of the analysis should be used for the justification of the need (or not) of installation of instrumentation (with alarm signals) on pressure difference across the core. The operating rules should be revised to ensure establishment of a set of operational limits and conditions for the reactor operation regime characterized by operation below 10 kw. The operational limits and conditions, which are currently scattered in several documents, should be collected and presented in a single document (or a Chapter in the SAR) in accordance with the IAEA safety standards No NS-G-4.4, including description of the specifications objectives, applicability, statements (i.e. limiting values/conditions), and bases (justification) of their selection. Operating programmes and technical modifications of the facility Training and qualification A formal training and qualification programme should be established for JEEP II shift leaders. A retraining programme for operating personnel should be developed and implemented in accordance with the IAEA safety standards No SSR-3 and NS-G-4.5. This programme should cover operating experience feedback from the reactor and other similar facilities, procedures that are not frequently performed, changes to the reactor systems, experiments, and safety documents, and selected topics from the initial training programme. It is suggested to consider revision of the condition on re-authorization of operating personnel if they are absent from reactor operation from one year to a shorter period (suggested 6 months). Operating procedures The occasion of next review of the operation procedures (including operation, maintenance and in-service-inspection) should be taken as an opportunity to revise them to include the normal values of the relevant operating parameters with consistent engineering units and the associated acceptance criteria. 4
Core management and fuel handling The procedures for core configuration change and fuel handling should be revised to ensure adequate quality checks and verification during the refuelling process, and that the nuclear safety parameters of newly assembled core configurations are verified by measurements, including control rod worth, reactivity shutdown margins, and excess reactivity. This requirement should be included in the operational limits and conditions. Fire safety A fire hazard analysis should be performed to identify gaps and implement improvements of the fire protection system, and results included in the SAR. If identified as appropriate in the analysis, additional fire detectors and/or fire extinguishers should be installed. In addition, it is suggested to perform an analysis to define (and to justify) the actions to be taken concerning the operation of the reactor ventilation system in case of fire. Maintenance programme The maintenance and inspection programme of JEEP II should be further improved by adhering to the established procedures on performing safety assessments for non-routine maintenance activities that are performed following error reports. Ageing management programme To complement the ongoing IFE effort, the ageing management programme should be revised in accordance with the IAEA safety standards to include identification of applicable ageing degradation mechanisms, operating practices to minimize ageing degradation, identification and implementation of ageing mitigation actions (e.g. refurbishment, modification, replacement, etc.), and periodic evaluation of the programme for its continuous improvement. Safety of utilization and modifications A process for safety categorization of experiments and modifications, with the associated routes of approval, should be established. Experiments and modifications with safety significance should be subjected to safety assessment in accordance with the IAEA safety standards No SSG-24. Operational radiation protection programme The operational radiation protection programme for JEEP II should be further improved by: Enhancing the communication between the radiation protection officers and reactor operating personnel, including clearance by the radiation protection officers of work orders and their participation in the reactor management meetings; Evaluating the adequacy (in terms of number and locations) of radiation fixed area monitors and actions taken if required by the evaluation, to install new ones (or locate them) to ensure early detection of abnormal radiation levels; Revising the programme for monitoring of external radiation and contamination levels at workplaces in accordance with the IAEA safety standards to include clear identification of places to be monitored, frequency of monitoring, equipment to be used, step-by-step instructions for performing the measurements, and records to be kept; 5
Conducting periodic walkthrough at the reactor facility aiming at identifying areas that need to be identified by signage for radiation/contamination hazards. Operational radioactive waste management Monitoring the radiological contamination of the underground water and the hydrogen concentration in the fuel storage building should be further improved by installing: Additional (suggested three) boreholes around the storage building to ensure valid underground water sampling around the facility; An alarm associated with the hydrogen detection (displayed at the reactor control room). Exceeding a specified limit on this alarm could be used to initiate an increase of the ventilation system flow rate to remove possible accumulation of hydrogen in the building. Emergency equipment In view of the absence of a reactor emergency control room, it is suggested that engineering measures are implemented to ensure provision for remote manual reactor shutdown and that the reactor data necessary for management of emergency situations (e.g. radioactive release through the reactor stack, level of the water in the reactor tank, etc.) are made available online at an appropriate location outside the reactor building. Additionally, the team recommended that JEEP II reactor management develops a plan to implement the recommendations of the mission, which could be reviewed in a follow-up INSARR mission to be conducted in 2018/2019. The implementation of the recommendations of the mission could be followed up during regulatory inspections. Finally, the implementation of the mission was done in good conditions; the excellent preparation and organization by the IFE and JEEP II reactor staff for the mission should be highlighted. The IAEA team also appreciated the commitment of the IFE senior management to enhance the reactor operational safety. Mr A. Shokr Ms D. Engstrom Mr R. Waldman Mr G. Storr Mr D. Sears Mr H. Abou Yehia Mr K. Du Bruyn Mr O. Wouters 6