One Meating Place P.O. Box 269 Elizabethtown, PA Phone: (717) Fax: (717) Website:

Transcription

1 One Meating Place P.O. Box 269 Elizabethtown, PA Phone: (717) Fax: (717) Website: Preparedness and Response to Agricultural Terrorism Training Course Summary January 17-19, 2006 Introduction The Preparedness and Response to Agricultural Terrorism course, developed by Louisiana State University (LSU) and the National Center for Biomedical Research and Training (NCBRT), is a major initiative supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through the Office for State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (SLGCP). The purpose of the three-day course was to provide community planners, as well as those in the food production chain, who would be among the first to note the effects of an attempted attack on the nation s food supply, with information to respond to an act of agricultural terrorism. Participants gained the necessary skills to identify and recruit individuals in a unique position to identify potential threats to the cultivation, production, processing, transportation, or distribution of the nation's food supply. The potential for harm to the food supply is magnified by the nation s food processing system. To facilitate the rapid movement of product from processing/harvesting to consumers, a network of centralized, large distribution centers for multiple retail outlets has evolved. Ironically, the very system of efficient distribution that ensures an American s access to abundant and varied food makes the U.S. food processing distribution system (including the packaging process) particularly susceptible to terrorist activity. A single, successful act of terrorism to the food supply could have catastrophic economic, psychological, and public health impact to the entire nation. If the nation s food supply is to remain safe, a network of adequately trained, equipped, and exercised community planners must be enlisted. The course gave attendees the tools to recognize possible targets of opportunity in their region, understand the resources that may be available within the community/region and develop that infrastructure of resources, create a comprehensive response plan for their region, and produce a plan to identify, collect, and share information with state and federal agencies. The training was divided into modules, and after each module a related scenario was discussed in-depth by the group. The course began by providing the potential social, economic, public health, as well as animal and plant health impacts that might result from an agroterrorist event. Instructors emphasized that prevention, deterrence, and response to agroterrorism is vital to national security. What is Agroterrorism? Agroterrorism is defined as the use of a biological, chemical, radiological, or other agent against either the pre-harvest or post-harvest stages of food and fiber production to inspire fear or cause economic damage, public health impact, or other adverse impact against the U.S.

2 The chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive (CBRNE) agents that compromise weapons of mass destruction (WMD) agents were discussed, in addition to the various motivators for terrorists. The Food and Drug Administration s Risk Assessment for Food Terrorism lists a broad range of agents that could be used for food terrorism. WMD agents are relatively easy to manufacture in small quantities, readily available, and relatively cheap. A terrorist organization wishes to create fear, recognition for the cause, cause overreaction by government, obtain money and equipment, disrupt and/or destroy infrastructure, and destroy lives. Five basic types of terrorists or terrorist groups are capable of using WMD weapons: lone individuals, domestic terrorists, internationally sponsored groups, doomsday cults, and insurgents. Terrorists also have five major classifications for motivation which are political, religious, racial, environmental, and special interest. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) assigns potential bioterrorist agents of concerns to three categories, A, B, and C. Category A and B diseases are of great concern because they have the potential to overwhelm public health facilities and cause significant loss of life. Some examples of Category A diseases are Smallpox, Anthrax, and Botulism. The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) also has a listing of animal diseases of agroterrorist concern. The likelihood that a disease or agent will be chosen as a bioterrorist weapon is greater if the disease/agent is easily obtainable, transported, cultured, and dispersed. WMD agents may originate from home production, laboratory/commercial production, industrial facilities, foreign military sources, and medical/university research facilities. Aerosol dispersion of WMD agents is one of the most effective. Dissemination can occur through letters/packages, insect vectors/animals, contaminated clothing, contaminated food, and/or contaminated water. Other methods are breaking devices, bursting or exploding devices, and fomites (a carrier of the hazard). Why is Agriculture an Easy Target? The infrastructure of the U.S. agricultural industry (i.e. farm fields, barns, food processing plants, transportation, etc.) is vulnerable and in many situations can be easily accessed and manipulated. Field days, local shows, and demonstrations are common, and provide an ample opportunity for delivery vehicles, farm service companies, as well as a wide assortment of visitors to enter the farm. This opendoor policy provides potential terrorists with easy access to unsecured chemicals, animal populations, and/or crops they might contaminate. Wildlife also share disease susceptibility with domestic animals and can serve as a reservoir for infection of domestic diseases or as a means of foreign disease introduction into a susceptible animal population. Biosecurity measures however, have become a top priority on large commercial poultry and swine operations due to the increased concentration of animals on these farms. Foreign diseases and organisms pose the greatest threat to agriculture for the following reasons: lack of immunity in animals and lack of resistance in plants, often overwhelm native species (especially with insects), ineffectiveness of standard agricultural/biological/chemical resources to eliminate the pathogen, and often require extraordinary measures to control and eradicate the intrusive agents. Several foreign animal and plant diseases were discussed in depth. Recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports indicated that there were gaps in the federal controls that protect agriculture and the food supply. Some problems identified were port and border inspections, food processing security measures, domestic transportation, and international trade. The document, FSIS Safety and Security Guidelines for the Transportation and Distribution of Meat, Poultry, and Egg Products, was referenced in this section as a guidance document intended for small facilities and shippers. It also offers assistance in developing a security plan, screening and educating employees, securing the facility, and guidance for specific modes of transportation.

3 How are Meat Processors Involved? Several state and federal agencies are involved in ensuring the safety of the U.S. food supply. These agencies set standards for safe food processing and conduct inspections to ensure that foods are processed in conformance with state and federal requirements. Although several agencies are tasked with the food safety responsibilities, there are on-going coordinated efforts to minimize disruptions and facilitate smooth operations in the event of a major foodborne disease outbreak or act of terrorism in the food supply. The U.S. Department of Agriculture s (USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), the Food and Drug Administration s (FDA) Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN), FDA s Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Customs and Border Protection Agency (CBP) are some of the main agencies that are involved with food safety. Local and state governments also have responsibility for the safe processing and distribution of all foods within their jurisdictions. Both USDA- FSIS and FDA have issued security guidance for food processing facilities in order to help strengthen their biosecurity protection. The type of inspection at a meat processing facility will aid in determining what types of agencies get involved initially. FSIS has encouraged Federally-inspected facilities to develop Food Defense plans and implement measures to ensure safety from terrorism. State health departments and the state departments of agriculture facilitate the efforts for food defense with state-inspected establishments, including retail and custom exemptions, and would be involved with any problems that may occur. For more information on Food Defense plans for meat processors, contact USDA-FSIS, FDA, the state health department, or the state department of agriculture. Assessment and Preparedness Planning Traditional areas that can be classified as potential agroterrorist targets include crops in production, livestock and fisheries, water supplies, warehoused raw or processed feeds and foodstuff, feeds or foodstuff in transit, food processing operations, and food retail outlets. Assessments to determine risk and vulnerability, as well as preparedness planning must consider the type of agricultural assets to be protected. An evaluation of local agriculture systems should be conducted to determine what threats for agroterrorism exist. Those targets must be assessed for vulnerability in order to rank the individual facilities by the associated risk. Facilities with the highest risk should conduct further planning to ensure cross-jurisdictional cooperation in the event of an agroterrorist attack. Communication is critical to this stage of planning to make certain the groups involved in the plan are aware of the duties they are responsible for should an emergency take place. Preparedness involves planning, training, and exercises; personnel qualification and certification standards; equipment acquisition and certification standards; publication management processes and activities; and mutual aid agreements. Biosecurity The goal of biosecurity is to minimize the introduction of disease onto farms, limit the spread of disease already on farms, and reduce the risk of disease being carried between farms. Implementing strong biosecurity plans is an excellent start to the prevention of agroterrorism incidents. The four major biosecurity components are isolation and infection control, traffic control, sanitation, and facility security. While developing and maintaining biosecurity is difficult, it is the cheapest, most effective means of disease control available.

4 Recognizing an Agroterrorism Event The characteristics of an agroterrorism act may not be obvious to the primary responders. Some characteristics that may indicate the incident is of a terrorist nature are an occurrence of a disease or insect out-of-season or at a historically unlikely location, multiple or simultaneous events in different geographic regions, an initially large number of diseased animals or crops, event occurs in a location near a highly visible area, or involves an unexpected strain of disease agent. The incident should be at first approached suspiciously when signs indicate a possible agroterrorist event. The components of an agroterrorism investigation are epidemiological investigations, pathogen type and strain identification, and laboratory evidence of weaponization development. It is always better for the farmer, veterinarian, extension agent, or meat and produce inspectors to report a potential bioterrorism incident earlier rather than later. Responders should be mindful of additional indicators of agroterrorism, including diagnosis considerations, publicity of the event before the outbreak by a terrorist group claiming responsibility, and similarities to known terrorist caused events. Response to an Incident of Suspected Agroterrorism Agroterrorism events are challenging because they are more complex than natural disasters, slow to present themselves and difficult to detect, and difficult to classify because of the diversity of agricultural targets. The majority of agricultural related disasters are handled primarily by local and state government officials. There are minimal numbers of federal agency staff with a responsibility for these types of disasters that could be initially deployed to assist. Disaster proclamations may be declared by governors or the U.S. president if the situation is beyond the capacity of local or state officials or agencies (respectively). USDA s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is responsible for preventing and responding to the entry of foreign animal or exotic plant diseases in the U.S. Should suspicion of an event be present, the local veterinarian must contact the state veterinarian to report a possible Foreign Animal Disease (FAD). State veterinarians or USDA Area Veterinarians in Charge (AVICs) will assign a Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD) to complete the investigation. Again, it is important to error on the side of caution when dealing with a possible agroterrorist event. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) was developed by the federal government and provides a more operational and tactical protocol for joint operations with local, state, and federal agencies/organizations involved in domestic critical incident management. The Incident Command System (ICM) is an on-scene structure of management-level positions suitable for managing any incident. If an investigation is occurring, the government agencies and organizations that are involved will be responsible for implementing the ICM to ensure those persons involved understand their duties and roles within the investigative process. Quick response and thorough investigations aid in reducing the spread of disease or contamination and assist in determining the who, what, where, when, how, and why of the situation. Disposal, Disinfection/Decontamination, and Remediation Disposal of a large amount of material (whether animal or plant) is one of the greatest challenges a disease response task force will encounter. It is not always easy to determine the best method of disposal; community resources are frequently used and the impact of disposal is a community concern. The primary objective of the disposal of carcasses, animal products, materials, and wastes is to prevent further dissemination of infection. Disposal should be completed as soon as possible after the destruction of the animals to minimize any opportunity for infectious material to disperse. Methods of disposal include burial, cremation, rendering, composting, and other emerging technologies. Burial is considered the

5 preferred method of carcass disposal because it is more rapid, lacks odor, and is less visible. When selecting a disposal site consider equipment access, environmental aspects, soil type and depth, animal tonnage, proximity and odors, and documentation of the site location. Disinfection, whether of animals, people, property, or equipment, serves to prevent further spread of the disease. Even very small virus particles can cause continuation of the disease. Decontamination generally refers to the removal of chemical, biological, or radiological particles contaminating an animal, equipment, or property. It also prevents further exposure of the offending agent and potential crosscontamination. Critical judgment must be used to determine the correct method of disinfection for the situation. Every community should have a business continuity plan ready for disasters. Methods for sustaining local businesses during a disaster are critical for the recovery of an affected community. The emergency response plan should also address the issue of mental health and counseling for affected persons. One of the first steps toward economic recovery is damage assessment and terrorism event recovery. Develop strategies within the emergency response plan for engaging producers, food industry personnel, local emergency managers, medical professionals, and local law enforcement in effective control and containment activities following state and federal response. Conclusion The Preparedness and Response to Agricultural Terrorism course was another excellent reminder of the importance of food defense planning for all segments of agriculture. It brought to light how to develop relationships with key local and state officials who would play an important role in the response to an agroterrorist attack. AAMP was included in a network of agencies and organizations that would provide assistance and support in the event of an emergency. The information sharing and networking of critical persons are two of the most important parts of preparedness planning and AAMP s involvement will not only benefit our local agricultural community, but members nationwide who can take what was learned back to their individual communities. For more information on Food Defense, AAMP has a Crisis Management and Food Security Training For Small Volume Meat & Poultry Processors manual that is available for sale (contact the AAMP office), and resource materials available on AAMP s website Foodsecurity.asp.