LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND SERVICE DELIVERY TO THE POOR: BANGLADESH CASE STUDY. Local Government Pro-Poor Service Delivery

Transcription

1 LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND SERVICE DELIVERY TO THE POOR: BANGLADESH CASE STUDY Paper prepared for the Manila workshop: Local Government Pro-Poor Service Delivery 9th-13th February 2004 jointly sponsored by: Asian Development Bank Asian Development Bank Institute UNCDF November 2003

2 List of Abbreviations ADLG ADP AE DC DDCC DPHE FFW GoB GS ISD LGD LGED MLGRD&C NILG NGO O&M SLGDP SSC TK UDC UDCC UFT UNO UPC UNCDF UNDP UZP ZP Assistant Director, Local Government Annual Development Plan Grant Assistant Engineer Deputy Commissioner District Development Coordination Committee Department of Public Health and Environment Food for Work Government of Bangladesh Gram Sarkar Infrastructure and Service Delivery Local Government Division Local Government Engineering Department Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives National Institute of Local Government Non-Government Organisation Operation and maintenance Sirajganj Local Governance Development Fund Project Scheme Supervision Committee Bangladesh Taka Union Development Committee Upazila Development Coordination Committee Union Facilitation Team Upazila Nirbahi Officer Upazila Project Coordinator United Nations Capital Development Fund United Nations Development Programme Upazila Parishad Zila Parishad Final Draft Report 2

3 CONTENTS Executive Summary 1. Introduction 2. Background: national policy and institutional context for decentralisation and local infrastructure and service delivery 2.1 Overview 2.2 Legal and Institutional framework 2.3 Issues, constraints and opportunities 3. Local Development Programme: Analysis of the Sirajganj Local Governance Development Fund Project 3.1 Background and overview 3.2 Outline of innovations Financing ISD Planning and budgeting for ISD Implementation or production of ISD General accountability & monitoring mechanisms 3.3 Pro-poor service delivery outcomes Financing ISD 4 General Lessons Planning and budgeting for ISD Implementation of production of ISD General accountability & monitoring mechanisms References Annex 1 Annex 2 Annex 3 Table showing line department representation at District, Upazila and Union Parishad levels Participatory Performance Review format Union Parishad Revenue Mobilisation Annex 4A Schemes identified and implemented by 19 UPs in Annex 4B Schemes implemented by 26 UPs Final Draft Report 3

4 Executive Summary Background Local government in Bangladesh today is weak, and especially so in rural areas. The lowest tier of government, the Union Parishads, have limited resources, little revenue raising authority, and almost no influence on how the central government uses its resources in their areas. Union Parishads are dominated by the District and sub district (Upazila) administrations. Education, health, nutrition, family planning, irrigation, agricultural services, and other services are generally managed directly by the central government officers. The Sirajganj Local Governance Development Fund Project (SLGDP) project aims to promote decentralised participatory planning and local governance in Bangladesh. It demonstrates the potential benefits for service delivery and poverty reduction of decentralising funds to the Union Parishad level, and promoting local infrastructure and service delivery processes that involve participatory planning and capacity building. The project is being implemented in Sirajganj District, and combines the following components: 1. The provision of funds directly to the Union Parishad level on an annual block grant basis. These funds are controlled and managed by the Unions. 2. The promotion of participatory planning processes at ward level as part of wider improvements in accountability and governance; 3. The provision of support and incentives for the Union Parishads to improve their performance and accountability; In this case study, the nature of innovations associated with the decentralised service delivery arrangements of SLGDP are analysed and directly compared with other ISD arrangements prevailing at Union Parishad level. The impact of such ISD arrangements upon service delivery are considered Innovations and Issues Comparisons are made with the Annual Development Plan grant (a model of weak decentralisation in which the Union Parishads have limited ISD selection and implementation responsibilities with responsibility for financial decision making at the Upazila level), and the Special Relief Grants such as Food for Work (which represent a more centralised, patronage style model of provision directly controlled by the MP and local party cadres). Innovations are described in relation to finance, participatory planning, implementation of ISD, and accountability. (a) Finance The SLGDP provides funds directly to the Union Parishad level on a block grant basis. These funds are controlled and managed by the Unions. The grant seeks to mirror the standard ADP Grant in both size and the allocation criteria used. The key benefits associated with SLGDP include the following: Greater certainty in the allocation levels for the grants (ADP grants can be prone to political manipulation). Performance based funding (by which those UPs which have performed well in the previous year are eligible for additional funding in the next year). This has been shown to incentivise performance improvements. Final Draft Report 4

5 The timing of the SLGDP grant allows the UPs to undertake a better budgeting processes (the UPs usually receive notification of their ADP allocations in October, whilst annual budgets are prepared in June). The flow of funds directly to the UP has helped to move the focus of decision making about scheme selection and implementation to the local level. (b) Participatory Planning The promotion of participatory planning processes is a central dimension of the SLGDP project, both as a means of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery as well as serving a wider objective of strengthening civil society and democratic processes. There is no prevailing culture of participation within the Union Parishads. The SLGDP has hence supported participation through Upazila Project Co-ordinators (full time project staff) and a Union Facilitation team (volunteers from the community). The scheme has established community planning committees at the Union, Ward and Scheme levels. These committees are led by the UP members and are formed in an open and inclusive manner. Participatory planning processes are then undertaken in each ward and also at Union level. The ward level participatory process is usually a two day event, generally involving between 120 and 200 people. In most unions, the attendees are divided into three or four groups (generally with a separate planning group for women) for consideration of problems and possible projects. Specific activities undertaken include: mapping, problem identification, prioritisation of problems, scheme identification, scheme prioritisation and short listing. The SLGDP process has not to date become fully institutionalised within the UPs, all of which continue to manage the ADP planning processes without participation. In part this reflects the perception amongst some UP members that complete transparency is not in their political or personal interests. (c) Implementation The SLGDP implementation processes mirror those of the ADP. Technical designs and final approvals are obtained from the LGED (line dept) engineer and schemes require approval from the UDCC. Government regulations that contracts of more than TK 50,000 (US$830) must be tendered to commercial contractors also apply. Union Parishads seek to avoid the use of commercial contractors because their control over implementation of works is more limited, and because levels of corruption are perceived to be higher and quality levels lower. All three ISD arrangements (SLGDP, FFW and ADP) utilise committees formed to manage and monitor implementation. There are, however, significant differences in the manner in which these committees function and in how implementation is undertaken. Under SLGDP levels of community participation and monitoring are higher, and there are stronger institutional arrangements for O&M. These impact positively upon the quality of ISD. In both ISD arrangements the LGED engineer plays an important role in cost estimation, technical assurance and final certification. Under all ISD arrangements this can be problematic both in terms of technical quality and corruption. (d) Accountability Improving accountability is an objective that underpins SLGDP s innovations. It is closely linked to the promotion of participatory processes, as well as to the Final Draft Report 5

6 establishment of a structure of community organisations that play an active role in the identification, selection, construction and maintenance of new development schemes. SLGDP, however, has also undertaken a range of other innovations that have further served to strengthen and institutionalise greater accountability: Performance Assessment - An annual performance review is undertaken in the manner of a Public Report card. This assesses the overall performance of the UP and is also linked to the release of incentive based funds; Standing committees - Such committees are a statutory obligation. SLGDP has sought to make them operational and has worked to achieve a clearer definition of their roles and responsibilities; Scheme Notice boards and public information - SLGDP has supported better public information on schemes and UP activities. Contingency funds (for information provision and travel costs) are allowed for in scheme estimates. Scheme assessments and participatory planning reviews The project has developed these accountability mechanisms which have a project specific focus. Pro-poor Outcomes The study has analysed the relative efficiency, effectiveness and quality of different institutional arrangements for local infrastructure and service provision. An emphasis has been placed on a comparison of the impact of the more innovative arrangements for decentralised service delivery under the UNCDF sponsored Sirajganj project with the less decentralised mechanisms of the Annual Development Plan grant. A more limited form of comparison is made with systems of provisioning under the various relief schemes such as Food for Work and Test Relief etc. In each case the study team attempted to triangulate quantitative data with qualitative evidence from a cross section of stakeholders. Quantitative data was obtained the through the analysis of the standard design schedule of rates and, estimates at Upazila level and scheme expenditure at Union Parishad level alongside the valuation of assets, based on field inspection. At the same time qualitative data was gathered through semi structured interviews and focus group discussions. It was understood that an analysis of comparative efficiency levels under different ISD arrangements expressed in terms of price alone will not reflect real differences in the nature of ISD. Given this, the study team has adopted an audit approach to efficiency measurement based upon a comparison of the price and value of assets produced under different ISD arrangements. Technical assessments in the field produced estimates of the value of works undertaken in relation to estimated or bid prices (depending on the type of service arrangement) and any shortfall or gap was assumed to represent a shadow cost of provision. At the same time the study has attempted to capture differential levels of effectiveness based on an assessment of the appropriateness and usefulness of individual schemes as well as differential levels of sustainability based on analysis of overall scheme serviceability and durability. (a) Finance The SLGDP grant approach has a number of beneficial outcomes. There is greater predictability in fund allocation, which allows the UPs to engage in medium term budgeting and planning processes. In addition the funds release mechanisms result in a greater degree of autonomy and greater UP control over budget allocation and fund management. The improved timing of fund release also allows the UPs to undertake Final Draft Report 6

7 a proper budget preparation process. A final difference between SLGDP and ADP is greater transparency in the fund allocation process. There has been a reduction in the scope for the diversion of funds either between UPs or out of UPs altogether. (b) Planning The differential level of participation in planning and budgeting under the different ISD arrangements is quite marked. Under SLGDP arrangements there are typically around 1,100 people involved in each UP in different aspects of the planning process. The main outcome arising from this is that planning is more demand led. This has undoubtedly served to ensure that projects are broadly more pro-poor. In contrast to SLGDP s scheme selection approach which allows freedom in the types of schemes selected, ADP funding rules do not allow a UP to allocate more than 40% of its total allocation on roads and other communication infrastructure. Other ceilings relate to education, agriculture and physical facilities. Another dimension of people s participation is greater value addition to many of the schemes improving the quality of the final output. Because they have been involved and recognise the scheme as a priority, they are often more willing to provide additional inputs so as to improve the quality beyond the estimate, (c) Implementation The impact of decentralised ISD arrangements on scheme implementation is perhaps the most marked of all the impacts observed in the study. It was clear that there were a number of problems with the ADP schemes relating to numerous instances where there have been attempts to save expenditure through the use of inadequate and inferior materials, the lack of adequate labour and poor supervision leading to serious shortcomings in both the execution and quality of works that will have a long term impact on overall asset sustainability. For example, field verification of culvert construction confirmed that SLGDP schemes were capable of producing very substantial differences in use of materials, labour and other inputs and strict adherence to technical specifications as regards slab thickness, wall footings, plastering, shuttering and finishing. Moreover, these structures were confirmed to be able to withstand double the load of an ADP structure with a minimum lifespan of years or between 3-5 times that found under ADP provision. The very high quality of SLGDP works was reported, in part, to be a function of the implementation and supervision process and in part a function of the budget that provided sufficient funds to produce a quality of structure well above that specified. Meanwhile, a higher budget allocation for a smaller structure under ADP provision resulted in a far inferior product well below even the minimum technical specification demonstrating a high degree of inefficiency on the part of ADP schemes compared to SLGDP. A comparison of the efficiency, effectiveness and quality of minor road schemes under different ISD arrangements broadly conforms to the above findings and section sets out in detail some of the technical engineering deficiencies of the ADP approach and their wider impact upon the nature of infrastructure. Overall, the study found a 37 per cent average differential between the value of the new asset and book value or price under ADP contracted arrangements. There was an average 75 per cent reduction in the life of the asset under ADP contracted arrangements and a 35 per cent shortfall in the time required for completion of works to specified standards. Moreover SLGDP schemes were shown to have an average 30 per cent value addition arising from mobilisation of community resources. Final Draft Report 7

8 (d) Accountability The case study has shown that accountability mechanisms under the ADP are weak. The main planning mechanisms are restricted to a handful of Union members on behalf of some 8,000 households. This contrasts with the active involvement of people under SLGDP, and associated improvements in general levels of awareness. A major accountability initiative under SLGDP is represented by the Participatory Performance Assessment concept. This exercise is conducted in an open public forum where members of the community are invited to comment on and question UP performance. The assessment results in a grading of performance linked to scheme eligibility for the following year, and has been shown to successfully incentivise improvement. Overall a major benefit of this process is the dissemination of information on the linkages between tax compliance, collection and service delivery, and UPs report that one direct benefit of this process is a greater willingness on the part of ordinary citizens to pay their taxes (because they have a better understanding of how their taxes are being used). Post completion Scheme Assessment Reports under SLGDP also provide a formal mechanism for improving accountability through which a technical inspection is undertaken on scheme completion and any deficiencies and problems are highlighted for immediate remedial action or as a future lesson. Standing Committees have also had some impact on improved accountability. Their role and impact is limited by the fact that many have only recently been formed, and control of services often rests with government line departments at Upazila level. As such their only direct influence on service delivery agencies is through liaison and advocacy. Nonetheless the Standing Committees have in some cases begun to take up some local initiatives to improve services in their areas. A number of forestry committees have undertaken tree planting along roadsides through leasing out land. In one UP the Water and Sanitation Committee had undertaken a survey of access to sanitary latrines and was promoting access subsidised sanitary wares. Lessons learned Overall the study has shown the direct and positive impacts of the SLGDP upon infrastructure and service delivery. This demonstrates what can be achieved in Bangladesh using innovative mechanisms which empower local government institutions. This can serve to inform and influence GoB policy nationally. Wider replication will, however, require an understanding of the policy context and of the difficulties and barriers to the more effective implementation of the SLGDP approach. Bangladesh has a highly constrained institutional and policy framework guiding the activity of local government. Union Parishads have limited operational responsibility, resourcing and capacity, and are dominated by sectoral agencies especially operating at the District and Upazila level, as well as by the political influence of Members of Parliament. There are also systemic constraints towards increasing the influence of UPs. Line departments are upwardly accountable, and often the Upazila level officers themselves also have limited influence on resource allocation processes (which are decided centrally). Moreover there is generally very limited co-ordination between line departments, and no coherent form of spatial planning, which might promote co-ordination. Finally attitudes and the administrative culture does not recognise the value of the contribution of the UPs. Final Draft Report 8

9 It is also clear that decentralised approaches such as SLGDP need to be undertaken in conjunction with considerable training and capacity development together with the development of accountability mechanisms. The participatory planning process has been widely recognised as improving scheme selection, implementation and O&M. Currently, however, the process is not underpinned by a sound base of information on the physical and social conditions of communities and especially of the poor. And whilst both the GoB and SLGDP have promoted the objective of greater participation of women, in practice they are often only passively involved. Changing attitudes towards participation and countering other vested interests is also difficult. It is notable that even in those UPs implementing the SLGDP most successfully the ADP planning process has not also been taken up in a participatory manner. In relation to ISD implementation, the TK 50,000 limit on community contracting has a distorting effect upon infrastructure implementation resulting in a preponderance of smaller schemes. The engineering estimate process also remains weak, failing to provide the required technical screening, and often resulting in sub standard works. The quality of schemes undertaken by commercial contractors is also often poor, and mechanisms to improve accountability and redressal are required. In relation to accountability, the challenge that remains is to institutionalise these processes throughout all the activities of the Union Parishads. In part this requires a process of changing attitudes towards accountability. In the context of a time limited project this is difficult. A core issue for the wider replication of the SLGDP programme is the institutional capacity within deconcentrated government departments to support the development of the Union Parishads. The government structures that should take a lead in this would include the Office of the Assistant Director, Local Government (ADLG) at District level, UNO at Upazila level and Assistant District Commissioner (General) all of whom have a mandate to supervise and support local government. Since UNOs are overstretched the main resource for capacity development would have to come from the ADLG at district level who is a more junior officer in cadre terms to the UNO. The ADLG office would have to be substantially enhanced in terms of its potential for capacity development. This could be addressed through a combination of donor support as envisaged under the proposed UNDP Strengthening Local Governance Project, perhaps in combination with a smaller amount of funding under ADP to support a block grant component in scheme provisioning. Another option would be to assign dedicated local government staff on contract at Upazila level for a defined period until such time as UPs were familiar with processes and able to implement works based upon the SLGDP model. Overall Whilst many challenges remain, there is such clear evidence of enhanced cost effectiveness, value added and sustainability under SLGDP ISD arrangements that a strong case could be made for GoB to consider earmarking at least a part of the current ADP allocation for devolved block grant funding along SLGDP lines. Technical assistance to support the implementation of such a model could be considered as part of a broader capacity development initiative for local government. Such an initiative, for example, is under active consideration by UNDP at present with a useful focus on strengthening the role of the ADLG office to coordinate training at UP level. Final Draft Report 9

10 1. Introduction This report forms one of four international case studies commissioned by UNCDF to investigate the impact of different sets of decentralised institutional arrangements (both policies and practices) upon pro-poor infrastructure and service delivery provision in rural areas. Studies have been undertaken in Nepal, Cambodia, Uganda and Bangladesh, and the Asian Development Bank has also commissioned a complementary series of studies of local government in the urban context. This case study is structured into the following sections: Analysis of the policy and institutional context of decentralisation in Bangladesh; A description of innovative infrastructure and service delivery (ISD) arrangements (associated with the UNCDF supported Sirajganj Local Governance Development Fund project); Analysis of the outcomes and impacts of these innovations on infrastructure and service delivery; Lessons and conclusions. Box 1: Bangladesh at a glance Bangladesh is one of the world's poorest countries. At least 80% of the country's population lives in poverty. Its economy is largely based on agriculture, which engages some 74% of the workforce. Its population of more than 150 million is concentrated into a land area of only 143,998 km. Because of its unique location in the delta region of several large rivers, its low elevations and its high population density, the people of Bangladesh have had to cope with a wide array of natural calamities such as cyclones, flooding and drought whilst also working to achieve basic development and improve livelihoods of the poor. (Source UNCDF website) 2. Background: national policy and institutional context for decentralisation and local infrastructure and service delivery 2.1. Overview Local government in Bangladesh today is weak, and especially so in rural areas. Local councils or Union Parishads have limited resources, little revenue raising authority, and almost no influence on how the central government uses its resources in their areas. Union Parishads are dominated by the District and sub district (Upazila) administrations, which exercise heavy-handed control, especially with regard to the use of funds and the hiring and disciplining of staff. Education, health, nutrition, family planning, irrigation, agricultural services, and main secondary roads are all managed directly by the central government officers. The low levels of fiscal decentralisation are shown by the fact that local governments share of the total public expenditure is estimated not to exceed 2 percent (GoB/PPRC (2003) in Chowdhury (2003)). In addition to this highly centralised administrative control there is very limited directly elected political representation at a local level. Whilst the constitution Final Draft Report 10

11 does allow for this at every administrative level, only Union Parishad members are directly elected. Members of Parliament exert considerable influence and control at the Upazila level but this is often exercised in a manner akin to patronage that can serve to distort local government activities according to personal and party political priorities. There has been considerable variation over time in structures of local government including a period of direct political representation at Upazila level from 1981 until 1991 during the Ershad regime, and most recently with the current government s introduction a new Gram Sarkar (village council) system in July Much of this experience with decentralisation has not, however, been good and local institutions often became associated with patronage, clientelism and corruption. 2.2 Legal and Institutional framework The powers of local government are enshrined in the Constitution of Bangladesh, which requires that: Local government in every administrative unit of the Republic shall be entrusted to bodies, composed of persons elected in accordance with the law, and, Parliament shall by law confer powers on the local government bodies to impose taxes for local purposes, to prepare their budget and to maintain funds (Commonwealth Local Government Handbook (2003)) The primary legislation defining the powers of rural local government includes: Local Government (Union Parishads) Ordinance 1983; The Upazila Act, 1988; The Zila Parishad Act, 1988; The Hill District Local Government Parishad Act, 1989; The table overleaf shows the structure of rural local government in Bangladesh. The country has six administrative Divisions and four metropolitan areas. Each Division consists of Districts and in rural areas these are subdivided into Upazilas. The latter comprise a number of Union Parishads made up of villages. The table shows the limited extent of devolution and the corresponding strength of the parallel system of central government line departments operating at the local level with limited local accountability. Indeed, it is estimated that there are 35 Ministries, 50 Departments and over 400 Directorates or autonomous bodies with representation at these levels. Annex 1 shows the main line department positions at the district level and below, and the corresponding departments and ministries to which these positions are accountable. The composition, roles, responsibilities and fiscal status of the three lowest tiers of government are briefly outlined below. Upazila Level As noted previously, since abolition in 1991, there is no elected representation at the Upazila level. The representation of government departments and agencies at this level continues, but their officers remain under the full authority of central government and operate with upward accountability. The associated sectoral planning and implementation processes of these line departments tend to involve centralised decision making over plan priorities and funds allocation. As such this represents a clear deconcentrated model of infrastructure and service delivery. Final Draft Report 11

12 Table 1: The structure of rural local government Sub-national levels Mandatory ISD functions under local control Political Representation Line dept presence and control Financing Comments 64 Districts or Zilas Avge population: 1.9 mill Avge area: 2,250 sq km Implementation of Govt devpt plan. Review and support for Upazila activities. Implementation and financing of some road construction, repair of UP and school buildings, maintenance of gardens, planting of trees, grants and scholarships. No direct political representation. A Zila Parishad consists of a ZP Secretary, Accountant and in some districts an LGED Engineer. District Development Coordination Committee consists of DC and line dept heads. Deputy Commissioner holds overall co-ordination role. Senior line department officers responsible for separate provision of a wide range of services. Empowered to collect taxes (land transfer taxes, leasing of ferry ghats and water bodies, certain licence fees and rental of property) Receive ADP grant. A longstanding but now largely inactive institution. Infrastructure responsibilities duplicate those of the line departments. Population of largest 1,997,150. Population of smallest 579, Sub Districts or Upazilas Avge population: 250,000 Avge area: 300 sq km Coordination, monitoring, and contribution to the planning of development activities of the Upazila Advice to UPs on scheme preparation, Co-ordination of scheme preparation. No direct political representation. Upazila District Co-ordination Committee (UDCC) comprising: UP Chairmen, UNO (secretary), MP (special adviser), Line dept officers (non voting) UNO (central govt officer) responsible for planning, implementation & co-ordination of development activities. Line departments responsible for separate provision of a range of services, eg Health, education, water, etc. (see Annex 1) Line department budgets the primary source of finance. Control of ADP allocation between UPs. Decision on allocation of market lease revenues and other funds received at UPZ level. Significant informal political influence exerted by the MP. ADP financial allocations decided by the UDCC. Population of largest 676,168 Population of smallest 11,621 4,500 Union Parishads Avge population: 27,000 Avge area: 30 sq km 38 functions, ill defined, including: Planning, coordination and monitoring of the ADP Construction and maintenance of small scale infrastructure Law & order, dispute settlement; Registration of births & deaths. 12 elected members (one for each of nine wards and 3 women members each representing 3 wards). Line departments responsible for separate provision of a range of services (See Annex 1). Officers accountable to their line depts and not to UP members. Powers to collect taxes. ADP grant allocation primary source for local development. Special relief funds released on discretionary basis. Grant cover half recurrent costs. Actual staffing and financial powers do not match functional responsibilities. In practice, limited scheme selection and implementation responsibilities. Subject to formal and informal control by the MP, UDCC, and government regulations. Population of largest 134,438 Population of smallest 1,122 68,000 Villages or Gram Sarkar Avge population: 1,500 1,750 Avge area: Participatory planning, Local community mobilisation. Support to the UP No direct political representation. 15 person council chaired by the UP member. UP woman member serves as adviser in her three wards. None. None. The Gram Sarkar is based at the ward level. A recent innovation. Fears of local political capture, and that it will marginalize the UP Circa 2 sq km Final Draft Report 12

13 There is a recognition that planning and co-ordination of development activity is required at the Upazila level, and this is provided by both the Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO) the central government appointed officer, with responsibilities for administrative co-ordination, and by the Upazila Development Coordination Committee (UDCC). The UDCC comprises the chairmen of the respective UPs within the Upazila and is chaired on a rotating basis by a Union Chairman. The Members of Parliament act as Special Advisers to the UDCCs and the UNO serve as Member Secretaries. Upazila level officers of government line agencies are non voting members. The UDCC is not a corporate body but is rather an administrative body that aims to coordinate, monitor, and contribute to the planning of development activities in the Upazila. In relation to the Union Parishads, the UDCC decides on the allocation of Annual Development Plan (Block) Grants across the Upazila to each UP. In practice the influence of the MP, UNO and line department representatives on this body is significant. The formal responsibilities of the UDCC include: Reviewing and co-ordinate area-wise scheme feasibility, area wise priorities for development projects and other matters; Preparing development projects; Advising UPs in the implementation of rural development schemes; Ensuring co-ordination between local and national development priorities; Advising on acceptance and implementation of development projects on the request of UPs; Resolving inter-union and inter-sectoral conflicts; and Reviewing progress of development projects under implementation across the UZP. In practice there is very weak co-ordination at the Upazila level. There are a number of causes of this including: professional conflict between specialist and generalist departments of GoB; limited scope for line department officials to contribute towards the development planning of their respective ministries (this generally occurs centrally); and the fact that neither the Deputy Commissioner (at district level), nor the UNO have any responsibility for the preparation and co-ordination of comprehensive regional development plans (UNDP 2003) The Union Parishad 1 The Local Government (Union Parishads) Ordinance of 1983 and its subsequent Amendments (most recently in 1998) provide the legislative framework for UPs, which are further regulated and controlled by orders and circulars issued by the LGD. UP Membership and staffing. The elected body of the Union Parishad comprises a Chairperson and 12 elected members, one for each of nine wards and 3 women members each representing 3 wards. The administrative staff comprise a UP Secretary, Dafadar (village police) and 9 Chowkidars (watchmen), all appointed by government line departments. None of the UP staff are directly recruited and employed by the UP Salaries and members payments are met partly from 1 Annex 4 provides examples of demographic and land area information for some Union Parishads in Sirajganj District. Final Draft Report 13

14 government grant and partly from own-revenue (the own revenue portion is often not met due to inadequate revenue collection) Functions and Operation of UPs. UPs are broadly responsible for economic, social and community development and have a list of 38 functions, not always well defined. In practice the main functions of the UP are: Construction and maintenance of small scale infrastructure (roads, bridges, culverts, canals) although UPs do not have formal financial or contracting authority; Planning, coordination and monitoring of the Annual Development Plan; Local revenue mobilisation and collection; Enforcement of law & order, dispute settlement and monitoring encroachments; and Registration of births & deaths. The UP Chairman is the key executive functionary of the Union Parishad and some powers are ascribed purely to him/her rather than to the Union Parishad as a whole. The Chairman s responsibilities include: Supervision of staff (appointments, approval of leave, salaries); Chairing meetings, agendas and committees; Revenue mobilisation; Preparation & implementation of budget; Coordination & monitoring of Union development schemes; Local judicial functions (village court, salish (informal dispute arbitration)); and Dissemination of information and communication. It is a mandatory requirement that the UP establish a total of 13 standing committees dealing with a range of sectoral issues. The most important committees relate to: Finance & Establishment; Audit & Accounts; Education; Health; Agriculture; and Cottage Industries. Given that responsibilities for the implementation of programmes in health, education, water and other services lie with the government line departments at Upazila level and above, in general these committees can have little more than a liaison and advocacy role. Their impact is dependent upon the openness of individual line dept officers to take listen to their views. Moreover, in practice few of these committees are operational. Sources of Finance. UPs have some revenue raising powers. Sources include, holding tax, market fees, vehicle and trade taxes, and others. Revenue from own sources has remained static over the years at no more than an average of TK 100,000 (US$1,660) per annum, in part due to the reluctance of elected members to incur opposition and the lack of effective enforcement and penalties (Annex 3 provides a sample of tax demand and collection data for 20 UPs). UPs also receive an annual revenue budget allocation and, indirectly, an annual allocation of development funds through the ADP Block Grant for Union and Upazila Development, managed by the UDCC. Unions are restricted in their use of the Block Grant by detailed guidelines (see section 3.2.1). Moreover, the local ADP allocation process is not always transparent (and allocations can be affected by political Final Draft Report 14

15 factors). The timing is also often not synchronised to the local budget process (see analysis below). UPs may also receive development resources for Special Relief Works programmes. The largest of these are Food for Works and Test Relief. Others include: Vulnerable Group Development, Vulnerable Group Feeding, Rural Infrastructure Maintenance Programme, Old Age Pension, and allowances for Widows and Freedom fighters. These allocations are made entirely at the discretion of Members of Parliament, and are controlled at the Upazila level (through a Upazila Project Implementation Committee). UPs have little influence over them. Village (or Ward) Level There is no directly elected representative body at village level. The current Government, however, enacted legislation in July 2003 for the establishment of Gram Sarkar to be constituted at Ward level. These bodies will comprise a 15 member council, chaired by the elected UP member, with the Women s UP member serving as adviser to each of the three wards representing their constituency. The membership of the UP will comprise a range of community representatives 2. Selection of the membership is the responsibility of the UNO and ideally should be based on the consensus of at least ten per cent of the population of the ward. The Gram Sarkar is intended to support the activities of the Union Parishad through encouraging activity at the village level. It is responsible for participatory planning, and for harnessing local leadership to mobilise individuals at the grassroots level. Whilst it is the stated intention of the Gram Sarkar institution to support and strengthen the Union Parishad government, its impact on the ground is yet to be seen, but there are concerns that it may actually represent a threat to the role of the Union Parishad through being manipulated as a political tool serving to strengthen local party cadres. There are also concerns that women will be marginalized from Gram Sarkar activities. 2.3 Issues, constraints and opportunities Overview As can be seen from the above, public service delivery arrangements in Bangladesh are highly centralised and strongly controlled by a large administrative system which has no direct accountability to local political representatives and which monopolises development expenditure at the local level. Moreover the quality and coverage of the resulting service provision is generally poor. Teachers and doctors are frequently absent from work. Corruption is widespread. Upazila health clinics are unsanitary and medicines are often not available as they are sold privately by clinic staff. The courts suffer from a large backlog of cases and the police are often perceived to serve the interests of the elite. Accountability 2 The guidelines for the selection of Gram Sarkar suggest the following composition: three women representatives including a trained Ansar/VDP member; one farmer; two landless farmers; one male Ansar/VDP member; one teacher; one physician or professional; one businessman; one member of cooperatives; one ex-freedom fighter; and one distinguished individual. Final Draft Report 15

16 Local government is characterised by weak systems of governance and poor accountability while the deconcentrated administrative system operates within a context of upward accountability with limited orientation towards local communities. In general there is a significant divide between public service providers and their clients. Local communities have very limited scope to complain about or influence the nature of public service provision and where no provision exists are often forced to seek alternatives such as the private or NGO sectors. Poor governance and accountability is also a function of a system that contains limited checks and balances as well as of the prevailing culture of political patronage. Political patronage The political process at the local level is arguably underpinned by a system of patronage. Resource allocations from higher tiers of government to localities (such as the Special Relief Programmes and the ADP allocation to UPs) are often determined by personal or party political imperatives rather than by need, and there is seldom transparency in these processes. The Members of Parliament have also been formally sanctioned to play an abnormally direct role in local development, which serves to stifle and control grass roots political processes and are strongly opposed to increased devolution. This in part explains the centre s reluctance to devolve power downwards in a manner that would stimulate political competition and create alternative power bases at a local level. Bangladesh s one significant experience with decentralisation in the 1980s under Ershad was able to occur precisely because of the lack of political competition at the centre. Representation at Upazila level It is now generally recognised that, whatever the earlier limitations of the Upazila Parishad experiment in the 1980s, the presence of an elected body at this key level of administration is a powerful vehicle for popular representation, coordination and for increasing local pressure for downward accountability on bureaucrats deployed at the Upazila. Moreover the institutional vacuum at this level is widely felt to be a constraint both on effective local planning and management of basic development activities and services, and on overall local governance. Recently there has been considerable debate about local government reform as seen prior to the last election and in the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, but since coming to office the present government has stepped away from any radical change, such as the establishment of elected Upazila Parishads. This is in part due to significant bureaucratic and political opposition. Union Parishads It is clear that the Union Parishads are operating in a highly constrained policy environment. This presents both constraints and opportunities. The former include: Limited autonomy. Although the UPs have substantial implementation responsibilities for development activities they have only limited financial management and contracting powers. UPs can administer earthworks, tree plantation, food-aid schemes and any projects financed from their own funds. However, under the Annual Development Plan Block Grant for Union and Thana Development a UP can only administer up to eight schemes per year not exceeding Final Draft Report 16

17 TK 50,000 in total value 3. Schemes of more than this value are undertaken through commercial contracts managed by line departments at Upazila level. Overlapping responsibilities. A wide range of functions have been ascribed to the UPs in law without the associated provision of the functionaries and financial authority. Some functions assigned to UPs also overlap with those of central government departments and agencies. There is, for example, considerable duplication in the local infrastructure responsibilities of the UPs and departments such as, LGED and DPHE. Women s representation. Whilst the reservation of one third of seats for women has served to increase their representation in elected office, the fact that women do not have clear ward representation (but rather are elected to represent three wards, each of which has a parallel male representative) serves to reduce their legitimacy and democratic mandate. Moreover women councillors continue to face de facto marginalisation in the performance of their duties. Financial weaknesses. Funds provided to the UPs under the ADP are not predictable in amount or timing, in spite of the official ADP allocation formula. Rather they are prone to political manipulation. Such funds also represent a very small proportion of the total development budget available locally (most of which is channelled through line departments. In relation to revenue collection the UPs have little understanding of how to capitalise on the tax potential of their areas. UPs in general are satisfied with a very small percentage of total assessment as an acceptable level of revenue and set their tax collection targets accordingly. This serves to distort the understanding of tax collection efficiency. Weak capacity. The UP institutions are also weak in terms of staffing numbers and skills. Training is inadequate, with only one institution, NILG, mandated to provide training to all levels of local government. NILG does not, however, have an effective mechanism for devolved training provision. Wider monitoring and support of the UPs is also limited. For example far fewer than the 64 ADLG positions that should play this role at district level are filled (UNDP 2003). Limited geographical scale. As a result of their small geographical coverage, UPs have limited political influence and narrow planning horizons. Perception of elite bias. There is often little transparency in planning and resource allocation and there is a general perception that elite bias and corruption exists. This is reinforced by weak auditing systems as well as the fact that certain powers are centrally ascribed to the Chairman rather than to the UP members as a whole. In spite of these weaknesses the Union Parishads are long established and politically representative institutions. Their very size serves to makes them more locally accountable than other arms of government. Levels of malpractice tend to be smaller in scale and is often more visible and thus more open to detection. They also have the potential to be more flexible and demand led in their operation. 3 Additional guidelines specify the sectoral allocations of these funds. Further detail is provided in Section Final Draft Report 17

18 3. Local Development Programme: Analysis of the Sirajganj Local Governance Development Fund Project 3.1. Background and overview The Sirajganj Local Governance Development Fund Project (SLGDP) began in July 2000 and has an expected completion date of December The project aims to promote decentralised participatory planning and local governance in Bangladesh. It demonstrates the potential benefits for service delivery and poverty reduction of decentralising funds to the Union Parishad level, and promoting local infrastructure and service delivery processes that involve participatory planning and capacity building. The project is being implemented in Sirajganj District (see Box 2), and combines the following components: 4. The provision of funds directly to the Union Parishad level on an annual block grant basis. These funds are controlled and managed by the Unions. 5. The promotion of participatory planning processes at Ward level as part of wider improvements in accountability and governance; 6. The provision of support and incentives for the Union Parishads to improve their performance and accountability; 7. Support for the formulation, selection and implementation of local community schemes; and 8. Analysis, documentation and dissemination of lessons learned to key actors at Upazila, National (LGD) and Donor (UNCDF, UNDP) level. Box 2 Sirajganj District Sirajganj is a large district located on the west bank of the Jamuna River with a population of about 2.5 million. It comprises nine Thanas (now termed Upazilas (UZP)) and 81 Union Parishads (UPs). Parts of the District, including newly-formed char lands are prone to erosion, others are low-lying and prone to flooding. The new Jamuna Bridge reaches the west bank of the river close to Sirajganj town and provides a direct route to Dhaka. The literacy rate of the district as a whole is 27 per cent (and as low as 18 per cent in one Upazila). Moreover UNDP Human Development measures rank the District as one of the poorest in the country (3 rd out of 64). The project is jointly funded by the UNDP and UNCDF and implemented by the LGD of the MLGRD&C, with a National Project Director (Director General, Monitoring, Evaluation and Planning) assisted by the Deputy Chief of the MIE Wing, and the ADLG Sirajganj District. The latter two individuals are Deputy Directors. A National Steering Committee, chaired by the Local Government Secretary, and a District Project Advisory and Coordination Committee, chaired by the DC Sirajganj District, provide the strategic direction of the project. The UDCCs have been designated to provide the coordination mechanism at Upazila level. Final Draft Report 18

19 Member of a Core Management Team include the NPD, the DPD, the Deputy Chief of the MIE Wing, the Project Monitoring Adviser and the District Project Coordinator. A project team of local consultants support implementation. These include the Project Monitoring Adviser to support the NPD; the District Project Coordinator to support the DPD/ADLG and to supervise the work of nine Upazila Project Coordinators. Specialist inputs from a Local Government Finance Adviser and a Gender Issues Adviser were also envisaged in the design but have been limited to date. In the first year of implementation the project provided support to 19 UPs. In its second and third years respectively this has been broadened to 28 and 42 UPs. The inclusion of additional UPs being decided on the basis of a performance review undertaken in 77 of the 81 UPs. A total of 523 schemes have been implemented or are under implementation in the first two rounds of the process with a total expenditure of US$ 347,000 (see Annex 8 for full details). Funding levels to the Union Parishads have deliberately been kept at a level that matches existing grants Outline of innovations In this section the nature of innovations associated with the decentralised service delivery arrangements of SLGDP are analysed and directly compared with other ISD arrangements prevailing at Union Parishad level. This direct comparison is important both to ensure a clearer definition of the nature of the innovation as well as in allowing consideration of the scope for its wider diffusion or replication. The two conventional ISD arrangements considered are: the Annual Development Plan grant (a model of weak decentralisation in which the Union Parishads have limited ISD selection and implementation responsibilities with responsibility for financial decision making at the Upazila level), and the Special Relief Grants such as Food for Work (which represent a more centralised, patronage style model of provision directly controlled by the MP and local party cadres). This comparison is valid since the SLGDP is more closely aligned to government systems than many other externally funded projects. The scale of SLGDP funding broadly matches the levels of ADP grants to the Union Parishads and the project sits within LGD and involves a range of government departments such as LGED (for engineering estimates, technical design, certification and so on). Given this, the scope for the diffusion of institutional innovations is greater. Whilst the core elements of the innovations described below are the essence of the SLGDP approach, there has been variation in the nature, extent and success of implementation between different Union Parishads. This is to be expected and this study does not seek to evaluate the levels of variation but rather to identify the range of innovations under the SLGDP model in comparison with other routine ISD arrangements and, as such, presents examples of innovation that demonstrate what is possible within the Sirajganj context. The innovations are categorised into four separate aspects of the service delivery process: financing, planning, implementation and accountability. For each of these categories the nature of change is considered whilst the impact of these innovations is analysed in Section 3.3 below. Final Draft Report 19

20 Financing ISD The SLGDP provides a grant that mirrors the ADP both in terms of size and in the allocation formula used. In both cases, the allocation of funds for capital development at Union level is based upon a criteria based formula with 40% weightage for population, 30% for land area and 30% for backwardness. The latter criterion is a composite of the level of development of local communications, literacy, nutrition and unemployment. Neither scheme applies the backwardness criteria owing to the lack of reliable data. Whilst SLGDP allocations are based on population and land area and applied in a uniform manner across all participating Unions, the ADP allocations may not necessarily be applied in the same manner. This would appear to vary from one Upazila to another where land area may or may not be considered as a factor. Moreover, in practice the allocation of funds between the Union Parishads can be subject to manipulation by the Member of Parliament through the Upazila Development Co-ordination Committee. As a result there is limited predictability in the annual allocations of grants. In contrast the SLGDP grants do provide certainty of future revenue streams subject to meeting the performance criteria (below). Under the deconcentrated arrangements of the Special Relief Schemes no criteria are adhered to for fund allocations to the Unions. This lies entirely within the discretion of the MP. In order to incentivise improvement, the SLGDP project has introduced a performance grant component whereby eligibility for grant funding during the second and subsequent years of the project depended on passing a participatory performance appraisal (see Annex 2). In addition, those UPs judged to be performing well are also eligible for a further 15 per cent bonus grant (rising to 25% and 35% in the third and fourth years respectively). To date, some fifty percent of participating Union Parishads have been eligible for these bonus funds. The SLGDP grant also recognises the importance of supporting improvement in the Union budgeting and planning processes. Currently UPs prepare their budgets in May-June, with only an approximate indication of the likely ADP allocations (they are informed of the actual annual allocation around October-November). In the absence of this knowledge there is minimal forward planning of works and the budget has little accuracy or value as a financial management tool. Under SLGDP, however, Unions are informed of their indicative planning figure in advance of the budgeting process. An important distinction of the SLGDP block grant is the fact that the funds flow directly to the Union Parishad, and are controlled at this level, whereas under ADP UP funds are controlled at the Upazila level, although UPs have retain formal responsibility for scheme selection and implementation. Union chairpersons reported that accessing the funds after completion of schemes was difficult and often required additional payments to receive the necessary technical certifications. The selection of schemes under SLGDP remains within the control 4 of the UP, subject to the completion of a participatory planning process and subject to the Government limitation that only schemes of less than TK 50,000 (US$830) can be undertaken using community contracting. In contrast ADP guidelines require Unions to prioritise scheme selection within the following criteria: 4 Unions are not, however, able to utilise SLGDP funds for recurrent expenditure purposes. Final Draft Report 20

21 20-40 % on transport and communications; % Agriculture; % Education; and % Physical infrastructure (water supply and sanitary latrines). The final funds flow innovation of SLGDP is that finances are made available to UPs in a single allocation. Under ADP, Union funds are released in three or four separate allocations (usually in the periods: October-November, January-February, May-June. The timing of these allocations is variable as is the final amount received. As a result, scheme selection never commences until allocations have been received. For those allocations received in May and June there is considerable time pressure to select, plan and implement the works before the end of the financial year (at the end of June) as well as before the full onset of the Monsoon (in July). The implications of this are described in more detail in Section 3.3. The timing of fund release for the Food for Works programme is better managed. Whilst the quantum and exact timing is not known funds are generally made available during the leaner seasons of the agricultural year (November and February March) when the needs of poorer groups are greater Planning and budgeting for ISD The promotion of participatory planning processes is a central dimension of the SLGDP project, both as a means of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery as well as serving a wider objective of strengthening civil society and democratic processes. The project has recognised that there was no prevailing culture of participation within the Union Parishads 5 and that changing attitudes and institutionalising participation can only be achieved incrementally. In most Union Parishads decisions about resource allocation and the selection of schemes under the ADP are made in closed meetings of the Union Parishad, perhaps after informal consultation with a limited number of trusted individuals in the area. Special Relief scheme decisions involve less participation, being generally controlled by the MP who acts on the advice of selected individuals and on the basis of direct petitions from constituents. Given this limited experience of participation, the SLGDP has supported participation through Upazila Project Co-ordinators (UPC) and a Union Facilitation team (UFT). The former are full time project staff trained in PRA techniques, whilst the latter are volunteers from the community, recruited and trained in each Union. After training they have supported the establishment of participatory community structures at Union, Ward and Scheme levels and facilitated participatory processes at Ward and Union level. Demaine (2002) reports that the use of UFTs in the Local Planning Process is generally felt to have worked well. Six UFT members are usually recruited in each Union, with a target of four men and two women. A formal application and interview process has generally been followed, and Demaine (ibid) notes that it has proved relatively easy to find talented people at the Union level able 5 It is mandatory for Unions to prepare a Union Plan Book using a methodology developed by LGED. This is a local plan presenting an inventory of the amount and condition of infrastructure and physical facilities and detailing infrastructure priorities. In practice few UPs have undertaken this planning, and those plans that have been prepared have failed to link infrastructure requirements to available resources. Final Draft Report 21

22 and willing to take on the duties required. UFTs receive six days residential training and are then intended to facilitate participatory processes Demaine (ibid) reports that overall, out of nine Union Facilitation Teams operating in 2002, seven were said to be working well, and in most cases the levels of support required from the UPCs was limited to only periodic interventions. As would be expected, UFTs do generally find it easier to operate in Unions other than their own. Establishing community structures The committees established under the SLGDP including their composition and responsibilities are shown on the table below. The organisational structure has been developed through experimentation and trial and error during the project. Earlier, Area Development Committees existed in place of WDCs, and included three wards. These were found to be too large to enable adequate participation (on average an ADC covered some 2,700 families). Table 2: Committees established under SLGDP Union Development Committee Ward Development Committee Scheme Supervision Committee Composition 20 persons, 7 persons: 7 persons 13 Union Parishad Chair and members. 1 school headmaster, 1 block supervisor, 2 women representatives of NGOs, 1 co-operative members, 1 family health worker. Union Parishad Member (Chair), Union Parishad Female Member for Ward (Deputy Chair), 2 Respectable Persons in Village, Primary School Teacher, NGO Group Member, 3 Male beneficiaries, 2 Female beneficiaries, 2 respectable persons in scheme area Female Member of VDP/Social Worker. Responsibilities Overall management of the SLGDP process, Final Scheme selection, Support for the Union Parishad. Participatory planning, Financial management of Scheme implementation, Scheme monitoring. Supervision of scheme implementation, Informing local people of progress. Comments Representatives selected by the organisations they represent. Responsibilities now incorporate those of former Scheme Implementation and Maintenance Committees. A temporary committee formed for the duration of scheme implementation. The numbers involved in the participatory exercises were difficult to manage (on average 900-2,700 families for an ADC compared to families for a typical ward). UPCs found they could not provide sufficient facilitation support for the PRA processes at Area level and received minimal support from the members of the Area Development Committee. Moreover, villagers interviewed by Demaine (2002) were found to be generally dissatisfied with the Area as the unit for planning. In a meeting Final Draft Report 22

23 held in Purnimagati, Demaine found that the level of attendance from the ward furthest away from the meeting point was significantly less than the other two wards and that, in particular, there were few women participants from that ward. It can be assumed that women s participation is more strongly affected by physical distance than men s. Separate scheme implementation and maintenance committees were also found to lack sustainability and it was felt important that those responsible for maintenance should also have been involved in implementation so that they developed a sense of ownership over the new assets. For this reason these responsibilities were passed to Ward Development Committees. The participatory process under SLGDP. The participatory planning process is based on activities intended to establish rapport with communities together with PRA exercises undertaken at ward level. At the outset a transect walk is often undertaken for problem identification and rapport building. The ward level participatory process that follows is usually a two day event, generally involving between 120 and 200 people. In most unions, the attendees are divided into three or four groups (generally with a separate planning group for women) for consideration of problems and possible projects. Specific activities undertaken include: mapping, problem identification, prioritisation of problems, scheme identification, scheme prioritisation and short listing. These are summarised on the table overleaf. The UFTs and UPCs play an active role in facilitating each of these stages. Guidelines and training are provided for each step of the process, but there is some variation in the manner in which these processes are undertaken. This planning process has developed over time. Increasing emphasis has been given to ensuring an initial problem identification phase, so that scheme proposals are related to need. Visits by members of the WDC to those schemes that have been prioritised at ward level have also been more recently introduced. This allows a preliminary assessment of feasibility. In certain cases schemes have been dropped due to technical problems, such as lack of adequate supply of earth for construction. These problems are then explained to the community and priorities are adjusted accordingly. Preliminary cost estimates are also made at this time and are entered on the scheme proposal form. Whilst scheme selection ultimately rests with the Union Development Committee, a large part of priority setting is in practice undertaken at the Ward level. Demaine (2002) cites a meeting in Belkuchi UP, in which a total of 90 schemes were originally proposed at Ward Meetings, which were later reduced by the WDCs to less than half that number. In some Unions final selection is undertaken through a formal vote. The Project Team has also developed a screening matrix for the use of the UDC in final selection (see Annex 5). This includes criteria such as: contribution to poverty alleviation, environmental impact, impact on women. UDCs consider this matrix as well as the priorities of the Ward Development Committees in the final selection exercise. In the absence of good socio-economic data much is, however, left to the judgement of the UDC. The balance of available resources and needs is also an Final Draft Report 23

24 issue. When only a small proportion of total needs can be met, there is a danger that people become dispirited. Table 3: Ward level participatory planning activities Confidence Building 2-3 hours Transect walk Undertaken by Ward Development Committee. Process facilitated by the UPC and UFTs Precursor to situation analysis. Helps to build rapport at local level. Situational analysis 5-6 hours Undertaken at ward level. Usually 3-4 planning sub groups (including separate women s group) Process facilitated by the UPC and UFTs. Map drawing exercise Assessment of local physical and social infrastructure. Problem identification Prioritisation of problems Group discussion facilitated using PRA techniques. Aggregation of priority problems Scheme identification 1 day Scheme prioritisation Scheme visit Final scheme selection Preparation of scheme proposals As above, undertaken at ward level. Usually 3-4 planning sub groups (including separate women s group) Process facilitated by the UPC and UFTs. Ranking exercise at sub group level. Women s priorities shown on separately coloured cards. To assess the social and technical feasibility of proposed schemes Preliminary cost estimates are made and entered on the scheme proposal form. Undertaken by the UDC using UDC screening matrix. Formal scheme proposal The inclusion of women and marginal groups The project has sought to ensure that women and the poorest are given voice within the planning process and that their priorities are, to some degree, represented in the final scheme selection. In the case of women, this has been attempted through requiring that at least one third of schemes selected reflect women s needs. Process based mechanisms to achieve this have included: the use of separately coloured cards to show women s needs, special planning groups for women and screening for women s interests during final selection. Increasing the participation of women remains a challenge. Planning processes The SLGDP also differs from the ADP in that the planning process is undertaken once a year and schemes for the full year are considered together. Under ADP, scheme selection and planning is undertaken as and when funds become available, Final Draft Report 24

25 and as a result planning occurs three or four times per year. This is likely to result in a less strategic or coherent approach to new development activities. For both approaches the GoB requirement that contracts of more than TK 50,000 (US$830) be commercially tendered has resulted in the selection by Union Parishads of small schemes (as far as possible within government guidelines limiting these to eight such schemes per year). In addition small schemes serve political ends in allowing work to be undertaken in a number of wards. It should also be noted that the SLGDP planning process has not yet influenced the wider system of planning under ADP that is concurrently undertaken in the same Unions. Such influence could lead a convergence in planning systems so that the same participatory techniques were used for funding under both schemes. Instead, ADP planning processes remain closed and restricted in most UPs. In part this reflects the perception amongst some UP members that complete transparency is not in their political or personal interests. Nonetheless there are signs of change, as demonstrated by the fact that Dhangora Union Parishad, visited by the report authors, has subsequent to SLGDP, begun to hold public meetings as part of their budget preparation process Implementation or production of ISD The SLGDP implementation processes mirror those of the ADP. Technical designs and final approvals are obtained from the LGED (line dept) engineer and schemes require approval from the UDCC. Government regulations that contracts of more than TK 50,000 (US$830) must be tendered to commercial contractors also apply. As stated above, Union Parishads seek to ensure in both SLGDP and other schemes that, as far as possible, contracts are estimated at less than this amount to avoid the additional 17.5 percent margin allowed for commercial contractors and the lack of control over implementation of works under contract. The management of such contracts is generally undertaken at Upazila level by LGED or other line departments. In addition Unions feel that levels of corruption are higher for such works and consequently quality is significantly worse. Complaints made at the Upazila level about the quality of work are generally ignored. This lack of control and perception of corruption is also true of the Food for Works schemes in which the Member of Parliament and his/her political support, the Ministry of Relief and/or the LGED play an active role. All three ISD arrangements (SLGDP, FFW and ADP) utilise committees formed with the express purpose of managing and monitoring implementation. There are, however, significant differences between ADP and SLGDP in the manner in which implementation is undertaken, and as Section 3.3 shows, in the quality of final outputs. The composition and responsibilities of committees monitoring community contracts are shown on Table 4 below. PICs formed for ADP and FFW schemes generally undertake only limited levels of supervision. In addition there is less interest from the community because of limited involvement in the planning process. The PIC is also a short lived body when compared to the WDC lasting only for the duration of the scheme itself. The PIC has a smaller composition and a greater geographical spread than the Scheme Supervision Committee, which tends to comprise those living in Final Draft Report 25

26 close proximity to the scheme. In the absence of capacity building the PIC members are also less technically aware. Another important difference is that the PIC is responsible for both the financial management of works and for monitoring the technical quality of works. Under SLGDP the financial management aspects are handled by the WDC, and the SSC monitors the work and is consulted prior to final payment. Given that it is openly acknowledged that some UP members when chairing the PIC are more concerned with personal financial than with quality, this separation of financial management from quality monitoring serves as an additional check. Finally, placing responsibility for both implementation and maintenance with the WDC, which is a permanent community structure, is likely to promote greater sustainability. The SLGDP arrangement also includes a small contingency in the cost estimate for the erection of public notices, travel allowances for members and other management arrangements. This encourages better and more transparent management. Table 4: Committees responsible for scheme implementation and supervision ADP: SLGDP: SLGDP: Project Implementation Committee Ward Development Committee Scheme Supervision Committee Composition 5-7 persons: 7 persons: 7 persons Union Parishad Member (Chair), Respected persons from the ward, selected by the UP member. Union Parishad Member (Chair), Union Parishad Female Member for Ward (Deputy Chair), 3 Male Beneficiaries, 2 Female beneficiaries, 2 respectable persons in scheme area 2 Respectable Persons in Village, Primary School Teacher, NGO Group Member, Female Member of VDP/Social Worker. Responsibilities Scheme implementation, Scheme monitoring. Certifying quality for final payment. Financial management of Scheme implementation, Overall Scheme monitoring. Supervision of scheme implementation, Informing local people of progress. Certifying quality for final payment. Comments A temporary committee formed for the duration of scheme implementation. Guidelines for selection exist but are not generally referred to. Responsibilities now incorporate those of former Scheme Implementation and Maintenance Committees. A temporary committee formed for the duration of scheme implementation. Final Draft Report 26

27 Field visits have provided evidence of local ownership and involvement in the implementation of SLGDP schemes. This includes the provision of additional labour (and in some cases additional finance) for projects, as well as other improvements such as the construction of greater widths and heights of road than originally estimated. Interestingly, a similar phenomenon was observed on certain ADP schemes where local residents contributed an additional 14% - 30% of total scheme cost in cases where there was strong local demand for the construction of a culvert to reduce excess water logging and the construction of a Madrasa building. This is elaborated in more detail in Section 3.3. In both ISD arrangements the LGED engineer plays an important role in cost estimation, technical assurance and final certification. Under both ISD arrangements this can be problematic. Under ADP the UPs report that the certifications required for payment cannot be obtained without the payment of commission, and under SLGDP the activities of LGED engineers are cited by UPs as the biggest single implementation problem (Mid term Evaluation, 2002 p38). There has however been some development of technical skills within the community resulting from training undertaken by LGED engineers General accountability and monitoring mechanisms Improving accountability is an objective that underpins the innovations described above. It is closely linked to the promotion of participatory processes, as well as to the establishment of a structure of community organisations that play an active role in the identification, selection, construction and maintenance of new development schemes. SLGDP, however, has also undertaken a range of other innovations that have further served to strengthen and institutionalise greater accountability. Performance review The SLGDP has introduced an annual performance review process that operates in the manner of a public report card. The review is held at a public meeting (usually attended by between 80 and 120 people) and is facilitated by the UPC. The public are asked to assess the effectiveness of the UP through marking its performance against a range of criteria. Categories for assessment include: The opening and operation of the Union Parishad office; Tax collection status; Finance and accounts; SLGDP Scheme implementation; and Additional competencies (including the participation of female members, a public budget preparation process, the operation of the village court and so on). The format for the assessment is attached as Annex 2. Section 3.3 provides analysis the impact of this process upon the performance of the UPs. Standing Committees The establishment of Standing Committees comprising UP members and selected citizens is a mandatory GoB requirement. There should be 13 such committees for Final Draft Report 27

28 such sectors as: health, education, water supply and sanitation and so on. These committees have not yet been formed in most UPs, and where formed, are not generally functional. SLGDP encourages participating UPs to establish these committees, especially those committees that are judged to be most essential (eg Health and Family Planning, Education, Finance and Establishment). SLGDP also encourages the selection of women to chair at least a third of the committees and has been requesting the Ministry (MLGRD&C) to finalise Terms of Reference for the functioning of standing committees in all UPs so as to ensure better definition of their roles and responsibilities. Notice boards and public information Whilst GoB requires that information is publicly displayed, for example at the site of construction works, in practice this is seldom the case. SLGDP, however, supports improved information flows through a contingency fund in all scheme estimates for scheme notice boards etc. SLGDP also supports better public information as part of wider processes of training, UPC facilitation and monitoring public budgetary processes in the performance review. Scheme assessment and participatory planning reviews SLGDP has also instituted a number of short reviews of project processes such as scheme selection and implementation. Whilst these reviews are not undertaken by the Unions themselves and largely serve project management purposes they do represent another means of ensuring accountability and in the longer term may help to change attitudes towards accountability Pro-poor service delivery outcomes The study has attempted to analyse the relative efficiency, effectiveness and quality of different arrangements for decentralised funding, planning, implementation and accountability of local infrastructure and service provision. Here, particular emphasis has been placed on a comparison of the impact of the more innovative arrangements for decentralised service delivery under the UNCDF sponsored Sirajganj project with the less decentralised mechanisms of the Annual Development Plan grant with a total annual allocation of TK 3 billion. A more limited form of comparison is made with systems of provisioning under the various relief schemes such as Food for Work and Test Relief etc. These represent a more centralised, patronage-style model of provision). In this way, analysis of the respective ISD arrangements was structured in such a manner as to identify the respective outcomes and impacts arising from different systems of fund allocation, planning, production and accountability relating to these various ISD arrangements. Methodology In each case the study team attempted to triangulate quantitative data with qualitative evidence from a cross section of stakeholders. Quantitative data was obtained from 3 districts through the analysis of the standard design schedule of rates and estimates in 5 Upazilas with scheme expenditure and asset valuation from 12 Union Parishads. At the same time qualitative data was gathered through semi structured interviews and focus group discussions with LGED officials at district and Upazila level, Chairpersons, Secretaries and Members at Union Parishad level, Final Draft Report 28

29 Union and Ward Development Committee members, scheme implementation and supervisory committee members and local residents and scheme labourers. Assessment Criteria Given that ISD provisioning within the various decentralised arrangements is based upon a standard schedule of rates and designs the study has found little variation in the price of work undertaken. If the estimated cost is over TK 50,000 and the service will be provided through contractor arrangement the agreed price may be around 5-10% below the estimated cost although the estimates will already include a margin for profit. In this context, an analysis of comparative efficiency levels under different ISD arrangements expressed in terms of price alone will not reflect real differences in the ability of different provider arrangements to deliver a specified output for a predetermined price. Since there may be substantial hidden costs in the form of excess profit and rent seeking, a provider will be under pressure to make savings in the quality and quantity of inputs in order to deliver at the predetermined price. These savings will often seriously compromise the extent and quality of the final output resulting in a high degree of inefficiency of provision. In this context, a comparison of service efficiency levels under different ISD regimes will necessarily have to relate the price of the service to the quality or value of the asset produced. In order to capture any potential variation in price and asset value the study team has adopted an audit approach to efficiency measurement based upon a comparison of the price and value of assets produced under different ISD arrangements. Technical assessments in the field produced estimates of the value of works undertaken in relation to estimated or bid prices (depending on the type of service arrangement) and any shortfall or gap was assumed to represent a shadow cost of provision. At the same time the study has attempted to capture differential levels of effectiveness based on an assessment of the appropriateness and usefulness of individual schemes as well as differential levels of sustainability based on analysis of overall scheme serviceability and durability. In order to provide a more detailed comparative analysis of different ISD arrangements the study examined the outcomes and impacts of each of the main aspects of decentralised service provision including scheme funding, planning, production/ implementation and accountability. Whilst the main process characteristics and differences of the different ISD arrangements have been outlined in the previous section, the following analysis will focus on the impact of these differences in relation to efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability wherever possible Financing ISD Differences in the practical application of the criteria based formula for fund allocation to UPs results in some degree of lack of uniformity and predictability of funds flow under ADP where some Upazilas may apply population and land area criteria while others may only apply population criteria. This lack of predictability in fund allocation means that UPs are less able to engage in any medium term planning and budgeting under ADP with the result that all development activities are focused on the annual cycle where schemes are planned on an ad hoc basis with no linkage Final Draft Report 29

30 to possible forward plans. Annexes 6A and 6B show ADP grant allocations over a period and the significant year to year variations. Whist this has some impact on the nature of development works at local level, there is much greater unpredictability arising from the fundamental differences in the system of fiscal devolution that operates under the different ISD arrangements. The SLGDP block grant mechanism provides UPs with a substantially higher degree of autonomy than found under ADP and other special relief schemes. The block grant mechanism ensures a much greater degree of Union control over budget allocation and funds management, that in turn, results in improved performance in meeting budget targets. This also helps to introduce the concept of the budget as an expenditure management tool rather than a formal exercise to trigger the release of grants from a higher level of spending authority. Under the block grant mechanism there is a greater level of efficiency in development planning and spending whereby UPs are able to begin the planning process sometime in May prior to the beginning of the new financial year in July. The consequent changes in the planning and budgeting calendar for SLGDP schemes ensures that planning can proceed in a more timely and effective manner allowing for a high degree of participation, consultation and debate prior to scheme selection. This contrasts sharply with the ADP funds flow process where allocation decisions are not disclosed until October often resulting in pressure for the UP to finalise proposals and submit schemes in a matter of weeks or even days as reported in a number of instances. Another major impact of the block grant mechanisms is the reduction in scope for the diversion of funds either between UPs or out of UPs altogether. This contrasts with the ADP funds flow process where there is ample evidence of the diversion of funds. The annual ADP allocations for in Ulla Para, for example, declined substantially on the previous year in 12 of the 13 Union Parishads with the exception of Barahar, which happens to be the MPs favoured Union. UP Chairmen reported that they were informed they should expect a substantial reduction in their annual allocations in that had averaged TK 488,000 in the previous year. Moreover, around the time of that the final instalment was due they were informed that the MP had requested most of the remaining budget to be transferred to a committee to supervise the purchase of school and office furniture in the Upazila. This is not an isolated case. Another example of this fund diversion related to Sirajganj Sardar Upazila where the Minister whose constituency this is encouraged UP chairpersons to transfer ADP communications allocations to the pourashavas in the UZP. Table 5 below shows the distribution of ADP allocations for three Union Parishads in Whilst the allocations in two of three had declined by around 55% and 80% respectively on the previous year, the annual allocation for Barahar as the MPs own Union Parishad can be seen to have increased by around 300% over the Upazila average allocation of TK 488,000 for An analysis of the ADP funding pattern in Ulla Para for further revealed a substantial flow of funds into the MP s own Union Parishad. This phenomenon is widely acknowledged in government and was confirmed in discussions with LGED staff at Upazila and district level as well as senior ministry officials at LGD where it was reported that the semi- Final Draft Report 30

31 institutionalisation of the practice resulted in around 20% of the allocation being unofficially set aside. Table 5: ADP allocations (TK) in 3 Union Parishads of Ulla Para Upazila ( ) ISD Schemes Hatikumrul Purnimagati Barahar Culverts 108,635-52,248 Roads (R3) 50,000-50,000 Ditch Filling ,000 Boundary Wall ,6601 Construction of College Hostel ,000 Palisading 10,000-86,940 Canal digging 50, Building repairs girls high school - 100,000 Total 218, ,000 1,330,789 Another impact of the block grant mechanism relates to the timely release of funding instalments in line with the progress of scheme works. An analysis of the funds release process under the block grant system shows that in almost all cases UPs have been able to make payments to scheme implementation committees in an efficient manner. Whereas in the case of the less devolved grant system operating under ADP, under which funding authority lies with a higher tier of government and includes provision for MPs intervention, numerous instances of disruption and delay in the release of instalments are apparent, caused by unscheduled diversions or reallocations. The impact of such disruption results in the situation where schemes are terminated prior to completion and/ or where project implementation committees or contractors are forced to compromise on quality of design. A further impact of the less devolved system of funds allocation under ADP is the inability of the UP to formulate or adhere to an agreed work plan. This is especially the case where late final instalment payments force scheme implementation teams and contractors to rush work in order to complete before the year end. Often the receipt of the final instalment coincides with the onset of the early monsoon making it difficult to complete construction work. Finally, the performance element of the block grant mechanism has also had a marked impact on UP management with a particular emphasis on revenue improvement. The application of a detailed set of performance criteria as providing eligibility for continued receipt of block funding resulted in 10 UPs being suspended from entering the second year round until they could demonstrate improved performance in tax collection. The remaining 9 UPs had already achieved own revenue improvements during the first year and 8 of the 10 suspended UPs have now qualified for re-entry on the basis of improved revenue generation. Performance eligibility for funding has also been linked with a performance bonus concept where well performing UPs that achieve an overall score of more than 50% on a participatory performance assessment will qualify for 15% additional funding in Year Final Draft Report 31

32 2 and this will increase incrementally to 25% and 35% in subsequent years. The combined impact of performance criteria and bonus has led to the best performing UPs improving own tax mobilisation by as much as 100% in years 1 and 2. Purnigamati UP, for example, has increased own tax revenue collection from around TK 100,000 prior to the application of the performance criteria to around TK 400,000 by year 2 and projected further increases are currently estimated at TK 800,000. This compares to an average UP own tax position at TK 50,000 80,000 and is a significant achievement within the extremely negative tax culture associated with this tier of government in Bangladesh where tax collection rates are often typically as low as 10-20% of total demand Planning and budgeting for ISD An important advantage of the block grant system is the ability of the UP to address citizen s demands in an effective manner since there are few scheme rigidities and inflexibilities as is often the case in transfers from higher tiers of government. ADP funding rules, for example, include ceilings on the amount a UP can spend on various types of development activities as described in section These rigidities result in some schemes being selected for funding in spite of a lack of any real public demand. The differential level of participation in planning and budgeting under the different ISD arrangements is quite marked. Under SLGDP arrangements there are typically around 1,100 people involved in different aspects of the planning process. The vast majority of participation is concerned with the Union and Ward level participatory rural assessment (PRA) exercises. Apart from this, there are commonly over 100 people involved in ward level planning and prioritisation in each of the 9 wards comprising a UP. This contrast with the level of participation in the planning process under ADP that is often confined to the 12 UP members but may be restricted to even fewer depending upon members individual interests and availability. In Natore and Jamalpur districts members were typically unaware of ADP allocations and related schemes. The main outcome arising from this is that planning is more demand led with sufficient space for people to exercise some influence over scheme identification and selection. The high level participation from all members of the community, especially women, has undoubtedly served to ensure that projects are broadly more pro-poor than under alternative planning arrangements that are monopolised by elite processes. The impact of greater public involvement in planning can be seen in relation to the types of schemes adopted in the absence of imposed rigidities as found under ADP. Nearly 2/3 of all proposals under SLGDP have been on roads, ditch filling and culverts, although there is a more recent trend towards greater scheme diversity 6. Whilst this concentration of schemes on roads and communication infrastructure could be seen to indicate a weak poverty linkage, it should be noted that although it is difficult to target roads at the poor and vulnerable given the nature of such assets, roads can have numerous benefits for the poor as identified in the Impact 6 In % of schemes implemented under SLGDP were of this nature and 58.5% in (See Annexes 8A & B for full details of SLGDP scheme-wise investments). Final Draft Report 32

33 Assessment Study of DFID slum improvement programmes in India (IDD 1997) (provided such roads are not for the exclusive use of a few elite households). At the same time, the unstable and waterlogged terrain of rural Bangladesh make mobility more difficult and frequent repair/rehabilitation more necessary. In this geographic context the community wide benefits of roads are numerous. Roads help to improve access to markets and to social facilities. This includes access for women and the vulnerable especially the elderly, infirm and young. Discussions in the field suggested anecdotally that there had been roads built (under the Food for Works programme especially) which had benefited local elites (in one case an example was given of a road built past the local BNP party leader s house). As a result of its more open allocation process one would expect this type of resource capture to be reduced under SLGDP. The study team was not, however, able to make a definitive assessment of this. It is also not clear whether the selection of such a high proportion of roads under SLGDP truly reflects the local needs and priorities, or whether communities have been conditioned by past ADP funding programmes (and even possibly by the approach used in the SLGDP programme) to select roads. It is generally accepted in the literature on participation that citizens can prioritise elements that they recognise are expected or are more likely to be funded (see Plummer (2000)). Again the study team did not find conclusive evidence in this regard. In contrast to SLGDP s scheme selection approach, ADP funding rules do not allow a UP to allocate more than 40% of its total allocation on roads and other communication infrastructure with 20% ceilings on education, agricultural development and other infrastructure. Although this helps to provide some diversity in scheme selection in the absence of community participation, it can lead to rigidities that result in imposed schemes to fulfil quotas. In practice, however, these ceilings are often ignored. In the case of the MP s Union - Barahar, for example, more than 86% of the ADP allocation for was spent on various non road infrastructure, including the construction of boundary walls and a college hostel, non of which have a pro-poor emphasis. While elsewhere, in Hatikumrul, 72% of total ADP expenditure was allocated to roads and culverts. (Annex 7 provides a more detailed breakdown of ADP expenditure by catrgory for 12 UPs across three districts and also shows the limited extent to which the guidelines are followed in practice). Another dimension of people s participation is greater value addition to many of the schemes improving the quality of the final output. Because they have been involved and recognise the scheme as a priority, they are often more willing to improve the quality beyond the estimate, so as to produce something (in the case of a road) that is wider or higher. The study team encountered a number of measures to improve schemes. This included: Additional cash contributions towards a scheme. In the case of a road in Chandaikona, a Van Drivers Association had made additional contributions because they recognised the value of the road for their purposes. The provision of additional free labour for the works. Inclusion of turfing (grassing on the road margins) in road works undertaken. Greater willingness from the local community to provide earth. On certain ADP road schemes, earth has to be brought from a greater distance because the local community does not recognise the value of the additional works. Final Draft Report 33

34 This greater willingness to contribute towards implementation suggests that schemes which are a higher priority for communities are being selected. It is not, however, possible to infer from this that such schemes are necessarily more appropriate. Appropriateness should be a function both of local demand and also of technical suitability. Yet field level interviews found that local feasibility assessments of scheme proposals were often little more than cursory for all ISD arrangements, and that often the nature of designs was more strongly influenced by the available budget than by engineering requirements. Moreover, the study team found examples of SLGDP infrastructure which (in part as a result of the reductions in graft) were clearly over-engineered 7. This problem was common to all three ISD arrangements. Finally, the nature of the TK 50,000 cut off level for community implementation of schemes under both ADP and SLGDP arrangements reduces the ability of the community to propose more integrated schemes to address major community problems. Instead, in an attempt to retain control over implementation of schemes, both ADP and SLGDP would appear to encourage a plethora of smaller schemes that may reduce the potential of pro-poor planning Implementation or production of ISD The impact of decentralised ISD arrangements on scheme implementation is perhaps the most marked of all the impacts observed in the study. The assessment of impact on implementation and service performance was assessed in a number of ways as follows: A comparison of the estimated costs of schemes under different ISD arrangements at Upazila level is limited since all estimates are based on a standard schedule of rates that reduces the potential for variation. In the case of roads, for example, it is difficult to identify any differences in costs between SLGDP and ADP delivery arrangements since differences in the estimated costs of different schemes will reflect differences in the extent and volume of earth filling, crest and base width, road height and turfing. In the case of culverts, however, there is clearer evidence of differences in the estimated cost of schemes under different ISD arrangements. A detailed breakdown of estimates for the construction of open face culverts from 2 of the 6 UP s visited reveals a 10% cost difference between those under ADP and those under SLGDP. While the higher cost of ADP schemes could be accounted for by the additional profit margin allowed for contracted works, once these costs have been adjusted for differences in span size (7 for SLGDP and 4 for ADP) the cost difference between the schemes appears more significant. Given that the span size accounts for a high proportion of total cost and the fact that the ADP spans examined were are almost half of the SLGDP culverts there is a significant anomaly in the estimates of SLGDP schemes estimated at TK 5,000 less than ADP. 7 The study team visited a culvert on an earthen road which had been constructed under SLGDP using community contracting and it was estimated that this could bear a load of some 10 tonnes. This exceeds the size of vehicles likely to be found on such roads. The causes of this require further investigation. It may be a function of the design standards being used together with the higher quality of works achieved under SLGDP. Works undertaken by contractors to the same design standard will not have the same strength owing to leakages and associated reductions in quality. Final Draft Report 34

35 A better estimation of the real cost differences of schemes under different ISD arrangements was made through site inspection, comparing scheme costs and expenditure in relation to the estimated value of the assets created. Here, site inspections revealed a much greater cost difference between different ISD arrangements than indicated from either the estimates or reported expenditure. Field verification of the construction of open face culverts under different ISD arrangements revealed major differences between those provided under SLGDP arrangements and those under the less devolved ADP arrangement. In all cases, the culverts provided under ADP were observed to far inferior to those under SLGDP in terms of construction techniques, materials, build quality and service capacity. The main problem with the ADP schemes relates to the numerous instances where there have been attempts to save expenditure through the use of inadequate and inferior materials, the lack of adequate labour and poor supervision leading to serious shortcomings in both the execution and quality of works that will have a long term impact on overall asset sustainability (see below). Another measure of differential can be determined from a detailed examination of ISD inputs and outputs in relation to standard designs and technical specifications. Here, a common problem in ADP construction relates to the widespread adoption of improper ratios of cement to sand and brick (discussion in the field suggested that typically a ratio of is used instead of 1-2-4). Apart from the resulting poor concrete mix leading to more rapid weathering and erosion, the overall longevity of the structure is seriously compromised through inadequate curing of concrete over a period of a few days rather than the required 7 to 14 days. This can reduce the life of the asset by as much as 50%. A comparison of concrete mixing and curing practice under SLGDP shows a substantial difference in quality with strict adherence to specified standards and ratios and intensive curing. In Purnimagati UP, for example, it was reported that the Scheme Supervision and Implementation Committee members rejected a consignment of bricks that did not meet the stipulated quality. Ward Development Committee members in Hatikumrul UP showed a high level of knowledge and awareness regarding input ratios and curing practice in discussions on construction techniques and scheme monitoring. Other common problems observed included: a reduction in the thickness of concrete slabs and the masking of this through additional plastering around the visible edges of the structure; lack of plastering and pointing of brickwork; and in some cases fundamental errors in wall footing levels and lack of shear section on top footings. At best these deficiencies result in the delivery of an inferior product with a reduced lifespan of low durability and poor value for money. At worst, however, they can result in the rapid deterioration of the product, breakdown of intended service and a serious cost liability for the UP. This is shown in the figure below. This latter situation was observed in the case of 1 out of 6 culverts inspected in Haitikumrul where poor quality of inputs and labour have resulted in the serious cracking of the abutment walls and collapse of part of the top slab of the culvert rendering it unserviceable after less than 5 years from completion. Site inspections estimated a common lifespan for ADP culverts of around 5-10 years. In the case of a ring culvert in Sharifpur UP in Jamaipur district inappropriate installation and insufficient earth filling had resulted in the cracking of the culvert after just 3 months. The delayed transfer of the final ADP instalment had led to the hasty execution of works in late May just before the end of the financial year. Final Draft Report 35

36 Figure 1: ADP culvert with broken top slab. A summary of the main deficiencies observed for ADP contracted schemes for the construction of culverts is given in table 6 below with an indication of the main input deficiencies, consequent results and wider impacts. Table 6: ADP Provision of Culverts: Range of Observed Deficiencies and Impacts Input Deficiencies Direct Results Wider Impacts Poor concrete mix Inadequate curing Little or no vibration Insufficient reinforcing rods Variable quality of bricks Excessively lean mortar Errors in wall footing levels Lack of shear section for top footing Insufficient thickness of top slab Lack of wiring courts Lack of shuttering/ framework Insufficient plastering on canal side No flush pointing No back and approach filling Lack of earth filling on ring culverts Premature work completion Crumbling of concrete Peeling slab Honeycombing Uneven slab underside Buckling of slab Erosion of bricks Instability of footings Weak abutments Poor slab quality Canal side wall erosion Land side wall erosion Deteriorating brick surfaces Fungus growth on structure Weakened ring culverts Unstable structure Broken top slab Cracked abutment walls Limited load bearing capacity Poor serviceability Limited durability High repair costs Increased maintenance burden Limited lifespan Poor vehicle access Restricted vehicle use and movement Broken ring culverts Destruction of roadways At the same time, field verification confirmed that SLGDP schemes were capable of producing very substantial differences in use of materials, labour and other Final Draft Report 36

37 inputs and strict adherence to technical specifications as regards slab thickness, wall footings, plastering, shuttering and finishing. Moreover, these structures were confirmed to be able to withstand double the load of an ADP structure with a minimum lifespan of years or between 3-5 times that found under ADP provision. One such example of good quality works is shown on the figure below. The very high quality of SLGDP works was reported, in part, to be a function of the implementation and supervision process and in part a function of the budget that provided sufficient funds to produce a quality of structure well above that specified. Meanwhile, a higher budget allocation for a smaller structure under ADP provision resulted in a far inferior product well below even the minimum technical specification demonstrating a high degree of inefficiency on the part of ADP schemes compared to SLGDP. Members of project implementing committees (PICs) in ADP are mostly unaware of technical standards and specifications that would enable them to monitor works in an effective manner Figure 2: showing a good quality culvert prepared under the SLGDP scheme A comparison of the efficiency, effectiveness and quality of minor road schemes under different ISD arrangements broadly conforms to the findings on culverts analysed above. Detailed site inspections on a variety of newly constructed or rehabilitated roads under different ISD arrangements revealed a stark contrast in impact arising from differences in relative costs, efficiency and quality of work. The poorest performing schemes were once again observed to be those that had been contracted out under ADP. Here, many of the same features as noted in the provision of culverts could be observed. The asset provided was in almost all cases seen to be less than that specified in the detailed deign and thus valued at less than that estimated. Once again this leads to a situation where there is a considerable under spend on the part of the contractor, the amount of which could be seen as the shadow cost of provision representing a considerable wastage of public money. Typically, ADP roads and pathways appear to have been constructed at a narrower than stipulated width. In one case, for example, an access road to a mosque was constructed on the basis of a 10 width instead of an intended 13 as specified in the detailed engineering design. Here, the estimated cost of rehabilitation over a 265 length of road at 13 width and 2 6 height was estimated at TK 50,000. Interestingly, this compares to a SLGDP new construction at 16 width, 4 height over a length of 1,060 estimated at TK 49,890. Final Draft Report 37

38 Improper sub-grade, sub-base and base preparation and compaction (also termed ditch filling) are major weaknesses on almost all ADP roads. Once again, in the case of the access road to the mosque, in Hatikumrul UP, the almost total lack of road compacting has resulted in the collapse of large parts of the road after just 6 months since scheme completion, demonstrating an inability to withstand even a single monsoon season. In the case of the mosque access road mentioned above, poor compaction has led to a serious decline in the road crest width just months after completion of works where an original 10 road width has now eroded to less than 5 in places due to poor quality of work and lack of supervision. Improper compaction can help contractors or project implementation committee members to incur a typical saving of the cost of 5-10 labourers on a single 5 layer of earth. In the case of the above road the estimated saving on compaction was of the order of TK 8,400-9,000 representing around 35% of the probable amount spent. These deficiencies can be contrasted with the potential efficiency and quality gains observed under SLGDP arrangements. In the case of the newly constructed road no 8 in Hatikumrul UP, for example, the road could be seen to have been constructed in accordance with the design specifications. Close inspection revealed that road was already well established and fully compacted with good embankment turfing. It was reported by scheme implementation committee members that construction activities involved 28 labourers working for a period of 20 days. Interestingly, the nature of the scheme and the proposed quality of the works meant that local residents had willingly come forward to donate land and earth for the scheme. The wider impacts of the respective schemes show major differences in asset quality, durability and lifespan that have a significant impact on the overall level of effectiveness of the scheme, O&M costs and the requirement for periodic rehabilitation. The ADP mosque access road, for example, is already impassable to any vehicle including bicycles, rickshaws and motorcycles, let alone any 4wheel vehicle severely restricting the degree of access provided by the scheme. In particular, this has restricted access by the most vulnerable comprising the elderly and infirm, women and young children. These findings contrast with the roads constructed under SLGDP arrangements. If one compares the cost of the ADP road rehabilitation above with that of a newly constructed road in Hatikumrul, for example, there is a stark contrast in output between a poor quality rehabilitation of a short stretch of road under ADP with a high quality new construction of a much more substantial road of a significantly greater length and height under SLGDP. The latter has improved access for around 450 households in the neighbourhood. Here, local residents reported that the road had improved mobility and security of women in particular who no longer had to negotiate a more hazardous route through inundated land. At the same time the road now provides good access for all types of vehicles including cycles, rickshaws and rickshaw vans all of which was reported to have improved local commercial activity. Finally, the asset value differentials between ADP and SLGDP roads was estimated at a minimum of 30%, once again indicating a significant shadow cost under ADP arrangements resulting in considerable wastage of scare public resources. The value added element of the SLGDP roads schemes was estimated at anywhere from 23% to 37% of total costs (excluding donations of land). Final Draft Report 38

39 Since there is little or no O&M activity on most ADP schemes it is difficult to estimate the O&M cost differences. Suffice to say that given the catalogue of technical problems arising from poor workmanship and poor materials, the O&M liability is considerably higher under ADP arrangements than SLGDP. Key Production Findings Significant variation can be observed in the performance of ISD work undertaken through different decentralised service provision arrangements. These differences are particularly marked in the area of construction and rehabilitation of community assets such as roads, pathways, culverts and tube wells. Differences in the efficiency and sustainability of ISD arrangements are reflected in the following findings based on comparisons of the value of assets created and time deployed under different arrangements through detailed field inspection and estimation. These findings broadly show the following results: Table 7: Key production findings Key Production Findings Average % differential between the value of the asset and price under ADP contracted arrangements Average % reduction in the life of the asset under ADP contracted arrangements Average % shortfall in time required for completion of works to specified standards Average % value addition from SLGDP schemes arising from mobilisation of community resources Measure 37% 75% 35% 30% The above findings based on: a) average differentials of asset values in relation to costs; b) serviceable lifespan of assets created; and c) quantity of time inputs used; based on quantitative data from field inspection and measurement were then triangulated with qualitative information from semi-structured interviews, focus group assessments, informal discussions with site supervision committees and labourers. Here, informants consistently pointed out that ADP contacted schemes resulted in a 40% wastage or reduction in value as compared to estimated costs due to inefficient work and poor quality of inputs. This shadow cost may reduce to around 25% for ADP community implemented schemes General accountability and monitoring mechanisms Accountability mechanisms under ADP arrangements appear weak. The main planning mechanisms are restricted to a handful of Union members on behalf of some 8,000 households. Funds flow procedures under ADP make it difficult for UP chairpersons and members to be properly accountable for spending in a situation where allocations may be variable and where the release of funds is under the control of a higher tier of government. Project Implementation Committees charged with supervising and monitoring works are often ineffective while contractors rather than PICs have implemented many ADP schemes, commonly without the knowledge of chairpersons or UP members. The study found numerous instances of UP members and the community complaining that contractors simply turn up without Final Draft Report 39

40 any prior knowledge of the community and complete works that people had little knowledge of. In Hatikumrul UP an examination of ADP schemes for revealed some ADP projects that the chairperson and members had little or no knowledge of and when pressed could not even identify the location of the scheme. In such situations, accountability mechanisms are extremely weak. Once again, this contrasts quite significantly with the levels and forms of accountability under SLGDP where the overall level of public knowledge on schemes is higher due to community wide participatory planning mechanisms. This is reinforced through a systematic review of the process through PRA assessments that aim to identify process oriented problems and address these in future exercises. At the same time the institutional structures adopted under SLGDP provide for much greater levels of accountability through the Union Development Committee, Ward Development Committees and Scheme Supervision and (former) Implementation Committees. An important aspect of these institutional arrangements relates to the fact that members of Scheme Supervision Committees and Ward Development Committees have received technical training on a variety of building and engineering techniques that has helped to increase the level of accountability through an enhanced level of technical knowledge within the community. Another accountability device under SLGDP has been through the adoption of scheme signboards at the location of every project. These boards display all the salient points about a project including scheme type, dates of commencement and completion, costs and any other key features. These boards provide a very visible means of accountability to the community. Figure 3: A Scheme signboard showing the budget and work programme Post completion Scheme Assessment Reports under SLGDP also provide a formal mechanism for improving accountability through which a technical inspection is undertaken on scheme completion and any deficiencies and problems are highlighted for immediate remedial action or as a future lesson. A major accountability initiative under SLGDP is represented by the Participatory Performance Assessment concept. Here, the UP is subject to a public assessment of performance over the previous year focusing on tax collection, office management and the functioning of standing committees. This exercise is conducted in an open public forum where members of the community are invited to Final Draft Report 40