Côte d'ivoire. Country Profile 2006

Transcription

1 Country Profile 2006 Côte d'ivoire This Country Profile is a reference work, analysing the country's history, politics, infrastructure and economy. It is revised and updated annually. The Economist Intelligence Unit's Country Reports analyse current trends and provide a two-year forecast. The full publishing schedule for Country Profiles is now available on our website at The Economist Intelligence Unit 26 Red Lion Square London WC1R 4HQ United Kingdom

2 The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit is a specialist publisher serving companies establishing and managing operations across national borders. For over 50 years it has been a source of information on business developments, economic and political trends, government regulations and corporate practice worldwide. The Economist Intelligence Unit delivers its information in four ways: through its digital portfolio, where the latest analysis is updated daily; through printed subscription products ranging from newsletters to annual reference works; through research reports; and by organising seminars and presentations. The firm is a member of The Economist Group. London The Economist Intelligence Unit 26 Red Lion Square London WC1R 4HQ United Kingdom Tel: (44.20) Fax: (44.20) london@eiu.com Website: New York The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Building 111 West 57th Street New York NY 10019, US Tel: (1.212) Fax: (1.212) newyork@eiu.com Hong Kong The Economist Intelligence Unit 60/F, Central Plaza 18 Harbour Road Wanchai Hong Kong Tel: (852) Fax: (852) hongkong@eiu.com Electronic delivery This publication can be viewed by subscribing online at Reports are also available in various other electronic formats, such as CD-ROM, Lotus Notes, online databases and as direct feeds to corporate intranets. For further information, please contact your nearest Economist Intelligence Unit office Copyright 2006 The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited. All rights reserved. Neither this publication nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited. All information in this report is verified to the best of the author's and the publisher's ability. However, the Economist Intelligence Unit does not accept responsibility for any loss arising from reliance on it. ISSN Symbols for tables "n/a" means not available; " " means not applicable Printed and distributed by Patersons Dartford, Questor Trade Park, 151 Avery Way, Dartford, Kent DA1 1JS, UK.

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4 Comparative economic indicators, 2005 Country Profile The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2006

5 Côte d'ivoire 1 Contents Côte d'ivoire 3 Basic data 4 Politics 4 Political background 7 Recent political developments 13 Constitution, institutions and administration 15 Political forces 19 International relations and defence 23 Resources and infrastructure 23 Population 25 Education 26 Health 26 Natural resources and the environment 27 Transport, communications and the Internet 30 Energy provision 31 The economy 31 Economic structure 32 Economic policy 35 Economic performance 36 Regional trends 36 Economic sectors 36 Agriculture 40 Mining and semi-processing 41 Manufacturing 42 Construction 43 Financial services 44 Other services 44 The external sector 44 Trade in goods 45 Invisibles and the current account 46 Capital flows and foreign debt 47 Foreign reserves and the exchange rate 49 Regional overview 49 Membership of organisations 56 Appendices 56 Sources of information 57 Reference tables 57 Population 57 Transport statistics 57 Electricity production and consumption 58 Petroleum production and consumption The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited Country Profile 2006

6 2 Côte d'ivoire 58 Government finances 59 Money, credit and interest rates 59 Gross domestic product 59 Gross domestic product by expenditure 59 Consumer price inflation 60 Food crop production 60 Production of main cash crops 60 Gold, oil and gas production 61 Manufacturing production 61 Construction statistics 61 Stockmarket indicators 62 Exports (fob) 62 Imports (cif) 63 Main trading partners 64 Balance of payments, IMF series 65 Net official development assistance 66 External debt, World Bank estimates 66 Reserves 67 Exchange rates Country Profile The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2006

7 Côte d'ivoire 3 Côte d'ivoire Basic data Land area Population Main towns Climate Weather in Abidjan (altitude 20 metres) Languages Measures Currency Financial year Time Public holidays in ,463 sq km 17.9m (mid-2004; IMF estimate) Population in '000 (at the 1998 census) Abidjan 2,878 Bouaké 462 Yamoussoukro 299 Daloa 173 Tropical Hottest months, February-April, C (average daily minimum and maximum); coldest month, August, C; driest month, January, 41 mm average rainfall; wettest month, June, 495 mm average rainfall French, Dioula, Baoulé, Bété and other local languages Metric system CFA franc; fixed to the euro at a rate of CFAfr656: 1. Average exchange rate in 2005: CFAfr527.5:US$1; exchange rate on February 16th 2006, CFAfr557.5:US$1 January-December GMT Fixed: January 1st, Labour Day (May 1st), Independence Day (August 7th), Assumption (August 15th), All Saints' Day (November 1st), Peace Day (November 15th), Christmas (December 25th) Variable (according to Christian and Muslim calendars may vary): Tabaski (January 10th, December 31st), Prophet's birthday (April 11th), Easter Monday (April 17th), Ascension Day (May 25th), Whit Monday (June 5th), Eid Al Fitr (October 24th) The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited Country Profile 2006

8 4 Côte d'ivoire Politics No quick end to the crisis in sight Once considered one of the most stable countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Côte d'ivoire has experienced a rapid collapse of political order since 1999, degenerating into civil war in September The main political parties signed the Marcoussis peace accord in January 2003 and a national reconciliation government was installed in March However, it functioned only sporadically, with various opposition parties suspending their participation for long periods of time. By the end of October 2005, when the presidential election, which was originally supposed to have concluded the peace process, had been scheduled (although it was eventually postponed), little of the accord had been implemented owing to disagreements over the interpretation of the reform agenda and the lack of trust between the president, Laurent Gbagbo, and his supporters and the political opposition and former rebels, known as the New Forces, which have controlled the northern half of the country since the start of the civil war. Faced with the prospect of a constitutional vacuum, the international community stepped up its involvement, and in October 2005 the UN Security Council, on the recommendation of the African Union (AU), extended Mr Gbagbo's mandate for a year and required the designation of a new prime minister with extensive executive authority. Charles Konan Banny, the former governor of the regional central bank, was eventually selected after an acrimonious process. He has formed a new government of national unity, but this also faces foot-dragging by the presidential camp and enormous practical and political challenges. Although elections are supposed to take place by October 2006, meeting that deadline will require overcoming the same obstacles that have proved intractable so far, leaving the prospects for a final resolution of the crisis unclear. Political background Félix Houphouët-Boigny rules for 35 years Côte d'ivoire became independent in August 1960, with the francophile Félix Houphouët-Boigny as president. Mr Houphouët-Boigny came to dominate the country's political life, and in the 1960s and 1970s presided over Côte d'ivoire's emergence as one of Africa's few stable and economically successful countries. His party, the Parti démocratique de Côte d'ivoire-rassemblement démocratique africain (PDCI-RDA, known as the PDCI), became similarly dominant. There was remarkably little internal strife, and no significant external threat. The president avoided expenditure on a costly, and possibly untrustworthy, army, with national defence largely entrusted to France. Côte d'ivoire's success as an exporter of cocoa, coffee, timber and tropical fruits was another important factor in its stability. These exports quickly enabled the country to achieve an enviable level of prosperity. The number of French people working in the country came to exceed that in colonial times, and highrise buildings transformed the Abidjan skyline. Called in by the PDCI regime to contribute to the country's development, immigrants arrived from Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and other neighbouring countries, mostly to work as seasonal Country Profile The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2006

9 Côte d'ivoire 5 workers on cocoa and coffee plantations. Many settled in Abidjan and in the fertile farming regions in the centre of the country. A turbulent fin de régime Henri Konan Bédié takes over A coup installs General Robert Gueï During the 1980s commodity prices fell and Côte d'ivoire began to face serious economic and social problems. As Mr Houphouët-Boigny declined into senility, popular dissent increased and by the beginning of the 1990s demonstrations and strikes had become commonplace. The first multiparty elections were held in 1990 and were won by the PDCI and Mr Houphouët-Boigny, who defeated the Front populaire ivoirien (FPI) and Mr Gbagbo amid accusations of vote-rigging. For the first time, Mr Houphouët-Boigny established the post of prime minister, appointing Alassane Ouattara, an economist and former governor of the regional central bank, Banque centrale des Etats de l'afrique de l'ouest (BCEAO). Mr Ouattara conducted an economic reform programme in the face of significant resistance within the ruling party, particularly from the president of the National Assembly, Henri Konan Bédié. Upon Mr Houphouët-Boigny's death in December 1993, Mr Ouattara and Mr Bédié both vied for the succession, which Mr Bédié eventually won by invoking constitutional provisions transferring power to the speaker of parliament in the event of the death of the president, while Mr Ouattara left the country to take up a post at the IMF in Washington. Mr Bédié began consolidating his own power, moving his loyalists into key positions in the administration and sidelining those sympathetic to Mr Ouattara. A pro-ouattara party, the Rassemblement des républicains (RDR), broke away from the PDCI in June Mr Bédié was re-elected with 95% of the vote in the October 1995 presidential election, which both the FPI and the RDR boycotted. However, all the major political parties did take part in the legislative election in November 1995, in which the PDCI retained an overwhelming majority in parliament. Support for the Bédié government started to flag in 1998 as the economy showed signs of faltering. In mid-1998, as both domestic and international support for Mr Bédié waned rapidly, parliament passed broad constitutional changes. The electoral code was amended, requiring that a presidential candidate should have an Ivorian father and be able to demonstrate ten years of continuous residence. This strengthened the powers of the president and sought to bar Mr Ouattara from standing in the 2000 presidential election, on the grounds of "dubious nationality". In early 1999 the IMF and the EU announced that they had both stopped financial support for the government, owing to growing concerns about fraud and corruption. On December 24th 1999 Mr Bédié was overthrown in a bloodless coup, which was generally greeted with relief by the population and political parties. The coup was led by a group of young army mutineers headed by General Robert Gueï. He denied having political ambitions and promised new elections by the end of An all-party government was formed in January 2000, but intense competition and political manoeuvring soon led to an informal FPI-PDCI alliance against the RDR. RDR ministers were sacked from the cabinet in May 2000 and efforts were made to change the constitution to include an even more restrictive definition of the concept of "ivoirité", again aimed at preventing Mr Ouattara from standing as a presidential candidate. The constitution and The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited Country Profile 2006

10 6 Côte d'ivoire electoral code were approved by 87% of voters in a referendum in late July. With presidential and legislative elections forthcoming, General Gueï announced his candidacy on behalf of the newly formed Union pour la démocratie et la paix en Côte d'ivoire (UDPCI) although he later stood as an independent candidate. He also proceeded to purge the army, in response to which many of his erstwhile military backers took refuge in neighbouring countries. A month later the Supreme Court disqualified all of the main presidential candidates except for General Gueï and Mr Gbagbo. The RDR and the PDCI boycotted the election in protest. Mr Gbagbo has a difficult mandate General Gueï's attempt to claim victory over Mr Gbagbo in what was obviously a rigged election was thwarted by a popular uprising on October 25th General Gueï was forced into hiding, after losing the support of the army. Mr Gbagbo was declared the winner, but this was immediately contested by Mr Ouattara's supporters, who denounced the election as fundamentally flawed and took to the streets. Clashes between RDR militants on one side and the army and FPI supporters on the other turned particularly violent on October 26th. A mass grave of 57 people was later found in Yopougon, north of Abidjan, most of the victims being Muslims from the north, like Mr Ouattara. Presidential election, Oct 2000 Votes % of total Laurent Gbagbo (Front populaire ivoirien) 1,062, Robert Gueï (independent) 587, Francis Wodié (Parti ivoirien des travailleurs) 102, Theodore Eg Mel (Union démocratique et citoyenne) 26, Nicolas Dioulo (independent) 13, Invalid ballot papers 254, Total 2,046, Registered voters - 5,475,143 Voter turnout (%) Source: Comité national électoral. Despite substantial misgivings, France and other influential partners eventually endorsed Mr Gbagbo's election in the absence of a better alternative. In the legislative poll that followed in December, Mr Ouattara's candidacy was rejected once again, prompting the RDR to boycott the contest. Unrest prevented voting from taking place in the north; by-elections were later held in January 2001, without the RDR. The PDCI won most seats in the legislative elections, a total of 98, narrowly followed by the FPI with 96 seats. In a new FPI-led government, Pascal Affi N'Guessan was appointed prime minister, but the PDCI also took up some ministerial posts along with the Parti ivoirien du travail (PIT) and some independents. Country Profile The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2006

11 Côte d'ivoire 7 Legislative election results (seats) Oct 1995 Dec 2000-Jan 2001 Front populaire ivoirien (FPI) Parti démocratique de Côte d'ivoire (PDCI) Parti ivoirien des travailleurs (PIT) 0 4 Mouvement des forces d'avenir (MFA) 1 Union démocratique et citoyenne (UDCY) 1 Rassemblement démocratique des républicains (RDR) 13 5 Independents 0 18 Unallocated 0 2 Total Voter turnout (%) n/a Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Reconciliation seemed to be progressing well Developments in 2001 seemed to presage a reconciliation, starting with local elections on March 25th, in which all of the political parties took part. Mr Bédié, Mr Ouattara, and General Gueï agreed to participate in a forum of national reconciliation held in Abidjan between October and December The forum's non-binding recommendations offered a consensual framework. It called on the judiciary to recognise Mr Ouattara's nationality, and on all political parties to accept the results of the elections and the new constitution and to form a national unity government. It also recognised the need to overhaul the judiciary and the security forces and to reform land ownership, immigration and nationality policies. In January 2002, a meeting between Mr Gbagbo, Mr Bédié, General Gueï and Mr Ouattara appeared to cement the reconciliation. Mr Ouattara was awarded his nationality certificate and hopes increased that he would be recognised as an eligible candidate in the 2005 elections. A government of national unity, including the RDR, came into being on August However, the FPI still dominated the new government, retaining 21 seats in a cabinet expanded from 28 to 39 portfolios. Recent political developments A mutiny spirals into civil war The September 2002 coup attempt and the ensuing descent into civil war took the country entirely by surprise. On September 19th a military mutiny erupted in Abidjan, Bouaké (the second city), and the northern town of Korhogo, apparently led by junior officers. Several days of violence in Abidjan led to the assassination of General Gueï and of the interior minister, Emile Boga Doudou, as well as attempts on the life of Mr Ouattara and other leading political figures. The mutiny was put down in Abidjan amid repression and reprisals by pro-fpi gendarmes and vigilantes against immigrants, northerners and presumed RDR sympathisers. However, in Bouaké and Korhogo it took hold and was soon joined by rebellious officers who had been living in exile in Burkina Faso. As the mutineers swiftly took control of the entire northern half of the country, often welcomed by the local population, the military front hardened along an east-west line, splitting the country almost exactly in two. Fearing a prolonged civil war that could drag in other countries in the region, the French government stepped up its military presence in Côte d'ivoire, The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited Country Profile 2006

12 8 Côte d'ivoire agreeing to police the ceasefire line following the agreement of a truce on October 19th. After two new rebel groups, Mouvement pour la justice et la paix (MJP) and Mouvement populaire ivoirien du Grand-Ouest (MPIGO), opened a new front in the west of the country, the French contingent held the western rebels at a strategic crossroads and the government hurried to bolster the underequipped army with emergency arms purchases, as well as hiring mercenaries. France breaks the stalemate after ECOWAS fails to do so The Marcoussis Accord Inconclusive peace negotiations at the end of 2002, under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), hardened attitudes on all sides. The political climate worsened, with assassinations of presumed opposition sympathisers in Abidjan, atrocities carried out on civilians by both the government and rebels, and a refugee crisis in the west. Fearing an escalation of the crisis, in January 2003 the government, rebels and main political parties agreed to hold peace talks under French supervision at Marcoussis, a Paris suburb. The results were approved by a summit of African heads of state, the French president, Jacques Chirac, and the UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan. Seydou Diarra, an elder statesmen who was General Gueï's prime minister, was selected to lead a reconciliation government that included the established political parties as well as the rebels. Resumption of political and financial support was made contingent on compliance with the accord. Prospects for the implementation of the Marcoussis Accord were quickly undermined by resistance from Mr Gbagbo and controversy over the distribution of portfolios in the new government. A series of further negotiations took place in Accra (Ghana), at which Mr Gbagbo extracted further concessions, notably that the holders of the defence and security portfolios should be appointed by committee. The remainder of the portfolios were distributed more or less evenly to the FPI, the PDCI, the RDR and the MPCI. The government convened in early April 2003 only for new difficulties to emerge. The presidency sought to control opposition ministers by directly appointing their powerful permanent secretaries. Stand-offs took place over crucial positions, including the defence and security portfolios and the appointment of new management for the state-owned television station. The meeting of the Ivorian political parties and rebel movements at Marcoussis took place under strict French supervision. To the surprise of many observers, the talks yielded a comprehensive accord substantially echoing the findings of the 2001 national reconciliation forum. The points of agreement included the following: a national unity government should be formed including all major parties and rebel groups at senior ministerial level; Laurent Gbagbo should remain president, but cede many executive powers to a new prime minister; the rebels should lay down their weapons and the new government should organise the regrouping of all military forces and their disarmament under international supervision; the new government should reinforce the independence of the judiciary and restore public administration over the entire national territory; a Human Rights Commission should be established, to investigate reported abuses; the new government should propose a naturalisation law with clear criteria and a straightforward application process; the constitution should be amended to limit presidential mandates to one term and to specify that candidates should be Ivorian and born of one Ivorian parent; and the government should prepare a law to reform existing landholding laws. Country Profile The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2006

13 Côte d'ivoire 9 The government shambles from crisis to crisis The ceasefire is broken An arms embargo is imposed Lack of progress on key aspects of the Marcoussis Accord resulted in the government shambling from crisis to crisis. In September 2003 the rebel coalition, known as the New Forces, suspended its participation in the government. It rejoined the coalition in January 2004, but Mr Gbagbo began to demand that the Marcoussis reforms be subject to a referendum. By March the disarmament and reform process was badly stalled again, and in April the PDCI suspended its participation in the government to protest at obstructionism and alleged corrupt practices by the FPI. The suspension also followed violent clashes that left at least 120 people dead following a planned march against Mr Gbagbo that was forbidden by the authorities. The impasse intensified when six other parties, namely the RDR, the UDPCI, the MFA, the MPCI, the MPIGO and the MJP, decided to join the PDCI and formed a new coalition, known as the G7, with the stated objective of ensuring the full and effective implementation of the Marcoussis and Accra Accords. In May the G7 ceased dialogue when Mr Gbagbo issued a decree firing three ministers from the opposition. All parties gathered for a summit with regional heads of state in Accra in late July, where they recommitted to the Marcoussis process; Mr Gbagbo agreed to push the key elements of the agenda through a special session of parliament within a two-month period, and the New Forces agreed to begin disarming once this was achieved. However, this too resulted in no material progress, as the special session became bogged down in attempts by the FPI majority to diminish the scope of reforms or scuttle them altogether. The session concluded fruitlessly and the new date for starting the disarmament process, October 15th, was not honoured, with each side blaming the other for breaking its promises. The crisis escalated in November 2004 when "young patriot" militias ransacked the offices of pro-opposition newspapers; the next day the national military, known as the Forces armées nationales de Côte d'ivoire (FANCI), bombarded Bouaké, the country's second city and the New Forces' military headquarters, and soldiers and "young patriots" confronted peacekeepers in the demilitarised zone. After two days of bombardments a FANCI aircraft shot at a French peacekeeping post in Bouaké, killing eight French soldiers and a US civilian. In retaliation France bombed and disabled FANCI's entire air-strike capability, consisting of several fighter jets and combat helicopters. This set off four days of violent anti-french demonstrations in Abidjan by the "patriot" militias, with no police intervention to contain them. French residences and businesses were ransacked, while French troops dispatched to the city fired shots into a crowd, killing several under disputed circumstances. The French government subsequently airlifted several thousand of its nationals and their families out of the country. These events resulted in a UN Security Council resolution imposing, on November 15th, an arms embargo on Côte d'ivoire, and providing for the imposition of individual sanctions on persons deemed to be hindering the peace process. Mr Gbagbo responded that he would ensure the passage of the constitutional amendment governing eligibility conditions. However, once parliament passed the amendment in December, Mr Gbagbo reiterated his prior The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited Country Profile 2006

14 10 Côte d'ivoire demand that it be approved by a national referendum before he could sign it into law. This manoeuvre renewed the stalemate, as the New Forces still required enactment of the amendment before beginning to disarm, while Mr Gbagbo argued that a referendum was constitutionally required and could not be held until the national territory was reunited, which presupposed the rebels having disarmed. Thabo Mbeki brokers a new peace summit Start of disarmament fails The rising concern of the international community also resulted in the consolidation of numerous mediation efforts to the South African president, Thabo Mbeki, who acted on behalf of the AU. However, the deadlock persisted owing to Mr Gbagbo's referendum demand and a number of other procedural disputes, including one on the composition and functioning of the national election commission. Facing an impasse, Mr Mbeki convened Mr Gbagbo, the leaders of the opposition parties and the head of the New Forces, Guillaume Soro, to a summit in Pretoria in early April, at which he personally brokered a new agreement over several nights of talks. The main outcome of these was a decision that each party be able to present the candidate of its choice in the presidential election, by implication allowing Mr Ouattara to run; Mr Gbagbo was to take this measure under Article 48 of the Ivorian constitution, which allows extraordinary measures when the integrity of the territory is imperilled. After a two-week delay Mr Gbagbo finally announced this measure, but also said that he would use Article 48 for any other measure that he deemed necessary, sparking opposition protests that this deviated from the summit agreement. In May the opposition solidified its unity, as the PDCI and the RDR ended the rivalry between their leaders and signed an alliance in Paris under the name Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la démocratie et la paix (RHDP), using the reference to Mr Houphouët-Boigny as the basis for solidarity and to separate themselves from the FPI. Prospects for any further progress under the Pretoria agreement dimmed when an army campaign in May to begin disarming pro-government militias in the west proved to be an utter failure. Making matters worse, a massacre of villagers in the west took place on May 31st, in a raid that Mr Gbagbo blamed on the New Forces and the opposition blamed on pro-government militias. After refusing to endorse Mr Gbagbo's interpretation of events, the army spokesman, Colonel Jules Yao Yao, was demoted and went into hiding. With turmoil in the army and increased wariness by the rebels, the latest disarmament timetable lapsed in late June, renewing the deadlock and leading Mr Mbeki to convene another summit in Pretoria on June 27th-28th. In keeping with previous patterns, this summit produced another statement of good intentions by all parties, including a renewed commitment by Mr Gbagbo to have the slate of Marcoussis/Accra reforms passed by parliament, and contingent commitments by both sides to relaunch disarmament on a timetable stretching from August to October. In mid-july Mr Gbagbo invoked Article 48 to take a series of measures ostensibly in preparation for the election; the opposition quickly objected to items concerning the composition of the election commission and the criteria for determining nationality and establishing voter rolls, long-time points of contention. Mr Gbagbo sought to press his advantage Country Profile The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2006

15 Côte d'ivoire 11 by announcing that elections would be held on schedule, presenting himself as the advocate of peace. This backfired, however, as the G7 repudiated Mr Mbeki's mediation in August, calling him biased and demanding that the AU designate a new mediator. Elections cannot be held as scheduled The new government faces its first crisis In September it became obvious that elections could not be held as scheduled; Mr Gbagbo confirmed this in a speech postponing them with no new date. International involvement intensified to stave off the onset of a constitutional crisis in which Mr Gbagbo would seek to keep office while the opposition considered him illegitimate. The Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, stepped into the discussions in his capacity as head of ECOWAS, effectively working in tandem with Mr Mbeki and restoring a degree of opposition confidence. On private recommendations from ECOWAS, the AU passed a resolution on October 6th, which the UN Security Council quickly endorsed on October 13th. The measures extended Mr Gbagbo's mandate for up to one year, until elections are held, and required the nomination of a new prime minister with extensive executive authority to implement the peace agenda that had been repeatedly agreed upon and prepare elections. An International Working Group (IWG) was also formed, to provide reinforced oversight of the peace process. Although the UN asked that the prime minister be named by October 31st, it took weeks longer for Mr Obasanjo and Mr Mbeki to find an acceptable candidate. In late November, the governor of the regional central bank, Banque centrale des Etats de l'afrique de l'ouest (BCEAO), Charles Konan Banny, was announced as prime minister, and began forming a power-sharing government. After lengthy negotiations the new government was announced in late December. Mr Banny retained the two strategic posts of finance, formerly held by the FPI, and communications, formerly held by the New Forces, entrusting them to junior ministers reporting to him; other positions were distributed more or less evenly among the FPI, PDCI, RDR, New Forces and minor parties. The new government immediately faced its first crisis in January 2006, however, when the IWG recommended the dissolution of the National Assembly its mandate had expired in mid-december. This was dominated by the FPI and its allies, and Mr Gbagbo had used it on multiple occasions to alter the text of new laws required by the peace process in ways that impaired or cancelled out their effectiveness. After the IWG's recommendation, the FPI announced that it was pulling out of the government and the entire peace process; the pro-government press levied accusations of colonial interference and "young patriots" held four days of demonstrations, paralysing Abidjan and other southern cities with no attempt by the police or the army to stop them. After this show of force Mr Gbagbo finally called for calm, with Mr Obasanjo subsequently clarifying that the working group had not dissolved the assembly, nor had it any power to do so, and the FPI rejoined the government. The issue of the extension of the National Assembly's mandate has yet to be resolved, however, with Mr Gbagbo having decreed unilaterally in late January that its mandate should be prolonged. The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited Country Profile 2006

16 12 Côte d'ivoire Although the recent intervention by the international community, resulting in the formation of Mr Banny's transitional government, represents a significant change in the political landscape, the pattern of events suggests that achieving acceptable elections by the new deadline of October 2006 will be a major practical and political challenge, particularly since there has been little or no progress on disarmament and on the Marcoussis reform agenda, while the passage of time has created increasing entrenchment of vested interests on all sides in the prolongation of the status quo. As a result, although the prospect of renewed military conflict has been staved off, there is little concrete evidence that Mr Banny will succeed in his mission and that Côte d'ivoire will exit its political and military stalemate in The Ivorian crisis: important recent events September-December 2002 A military mutiny is put down in Abidjan but spreads in the north, spawning a new rebel movement, the Mouvement patriotique de Côte d'ivoire (MPCI). In October a ceasefire, enforced by France, divides the country into northern and southern halves. January-September 2003 A peace accord is reached on January 25th in France and endorsed by the African and international communities. Seydou Diarra is appointed as the prime minister in charge of forming a government of national reconciliation. January April 2004 The Parti démocratique de Côte d'ivoire (PDCI) and six other opposition and rebel parties form a coalition, the G7. May-July 2004 The president, Laurent Gbagbo, issues a decree firing three opposition ministers, including Guillaume Soro, the head of the former rebels, known as the New Forces. The New Forces are called back to Bouaké. All parties meet at an international summit in Accra, Ghana, and recommit themselves to the peace process. November 2004 Government forces bombard Bouaké. The UN Security Council imposes an arms embargo and the South African president, Thabo Mbeki, is chosen as the crisis mediator. April 2005 Mr Mbeki convenes a summit in Pretoria, South Africa. Mr Gbagbo agrees to use emergency powers to allow all parties to field presidential candidates, thus permitting Alassane Ouattara, the leader of the Rassemblement démocratique des républicains (RDR) and former prime minister, to run. May-June 2005 The PDCI and the RDR form an alliance, the Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la démocratie et la paix (RHDP). Disarmament deadlines lapse. Country Profile The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2006

17 Côte d'ivoire 13 July-August 2005 From hiding, Colonel Jules Yao Yao (demoted in June 2005) and the former chief of staff, Mathias Doué, call on soldiers to resist Mr Gbagbo's orders. Parliament again fails to pass agreed reform laws within the most recent timetable. The opposition disavows Mr Mbeki and the peace process threatens to collapse. September-October 2005 Mr Gbagbo officially postpones elections. The UN Security Council endorses African Union (AU) emergency measures for Côte d'ivoire, including the extension of Mr Gbagbo's mandate for up to one year. The Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, and Mr Mbeki begin consultations to designate a new prime minister. November-December 2005 The mediators eventually designate the governor of the regional central bank, Banque centrale des Etats de l'afrique de l'ouest (BCEAO), Charles Konan Banny, as prime minister. The term of the National Assembly lapses. Mr Banny announces a power-sharing government in which he keeps the finance and communications portfolios in the prime minister's office. January-February 2006 The International Working Group recommends the dissolution of parliament, sparking a crisis in which the Front populaire ivoirien (FPI; the party of the president) announces that it is pulling out of the peace process. Following Mr Obasanjo's mediation the FPI returns to the government. Mr Gbagbo issues a decree prolonging the National Assembly's mandate. UN financial and travel sanctions are imposed on three protagonists in the conflict, including the leader of the "young patriots", Charles Blé Goudé. Constitution, institutions and administration The constitution is changed Côte d'ivoire's first constitutional regime, which was adopted at independence in 1960, was still in place when the December 1999 coup took place. However, many amendments had been made to the 1960 constitution. The country adopted a multiparty system in 1990 in response to growing domestic and international pressure. Mr Bédié also changed the constitution twice, in a bid to reinforce his power base. It was his amendment of the electoral code in 1995 that started the debate over the concept of ivoirité. The new constitution was approved by referendum with 87% of the vote in July 2000, but it remained deeply controversial because of the last-minute revision of the eligibility rules (Article 35). The 2001 forum of national reconciliation recommended that the constitution be reviewed and clarified. This process has been overtaken by events, first by the Marcoussis/Accra agenda, which requires significant changes to the constitution, and second by the continuation of the political and military conflict, which has cast that agenda into uncertainty. Since October 2005 the country has been in an ambiguous constitutional situation whereby neither the one-year extension of Mr Gbagbo's term nor the delegation of executive powers to the prime minister are provided for in the constitution, yet the constitution has not been suspended. The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited Country Profile 2006

18 14 Côte d'ivoire Article 35, the concept of ivoirité and the civil war The 1995 electoral code barred Alassane Ouattara from standing in the presidential election on the grounds that he could not prove that both his parents were of Ivorian descent. The code was amended in 1998, requiring that a presidential candidate should have one Ivorian parent and be able to demonstrate ten years of continuous residence. The eligibility criteria as set out in Article 35 of the new constitution were tightened shortly before the referendum took place in 2000, requiring presidential candidates to prove that they had never held any other nationality and that both of their parents were Ivorian citizens. Mr Ouattara was a student, and later held posts in international organisations, allegedly as a Burkinabé citizen. During the forum of national reconciliation in 2001, the president, Laurent Gbagbo, went so far as to admit that the two clauses had been specifically designed to exclude Mr Ouattara. Mr Ouattara's case polarised the country, some people claiming that his exclusion was based on fair constitutional rules and others insisting that he had been denied fundamental civic and political rights. This was symptomatic of the country's deepening identity crisis. The nationalistic concept of ivoirité, developed during the rule of Henri Konan Bédié and used later as a political platform by both General Robert Gueï and Mr Gbagbo, claimed that Ivorian citizenship should be restricted and protected from the influx of foreign immigrants. It is estimated that up to one-third of the total population consists of first- and second-generation immigrants, chiefly of Burkinabè, Malian, Guinean and Ghanaian origin. Labour was imported from surrounding countries as far back as the colonial period, and the numbers swelled during the boom years of the 1970s. Migrants came principally as seasonal workers on plantations, but large numbers subsequently settled in towns. Fuelled by politicians, the concept of ivoirité encouraged southerners, who are, in the main, Christian or animist, to regard themselves as "true Ivorians", and whipped up xenophobic sentiments against Muslim northerners (whether they were of Ivorian nationality or not). Although a settlement of the controversy over Mr Ouattara seemed to be in progress before the civil war erupted, the swift division of the country into rebel north and loyalist south confirmed that the concept of ivoirité had the potency to overwhelm and reframe other issues. The Marcoussis/Accra accords envision addressing ivoirité on several fronts, namely eligibility, immigration and citizenship policy, and underlying land-ownership issues. The lack of progress in implementing the accords testifies to the deep-seatedness of this dispute. Paradoxically, the question of ivoirité has faded from public debate as the civil war itself and the commitment or otherwise of the different parties to the peace process have become the primary issues. In addition, in April 2005 Mr Gbagbo agreed to use exceptional powers to allow all parties to present the candidate of their choice thereby including Mr Ouattara in the October 2005 election. Although that election did not take place, it seems likely that this precedent will hold; however, the underlying problem of ivoirité has yet to be resolved and has the potential to resurface in the context of the resolution of issues of nationality, identification and voter rolls necessary to hold a credible election, underscoring the complexity of the crisis. A powerful presidency The present constitution is still based on a strong presidential regime. The president is elected by universal suffrage for a five-year term of office, which is renewable once. The president appoints a prime minister to co-ordinate the government. Members of the unicameral parliament, the National Assembly, are also elected by universal suffrage every five years. The number of parliamentary seats has been increased from 175 to 225. A Constitutional Council handles matters of constitutional interpretation. The constitution also provides for an economic and social council and guarantees the independence of the judiciary. In practice, the courts have remained strongly influenced by the executive. Prior to the civil war, a series of major judicial reforms were announced but had yet to be implemented. These included installing a Council of State, a Supreme Court of Appeal and an Audit Office to replace the now redundant Supreme Court and its judiciary and audit chambers. Country Profile The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2006

19 Côte d'ivoire 15 Public administration is plagued by problems Heavy red tape pervades public administration, making it sometimes slow and inefficient. Financial malpractice plagued previous administrations, encouraged by the absence of auditing. Numerous cases of embezzlement by members of the Bédié government were divulged after the 1999 coup. Mr Gbagbo's administration has been implicated in a number of new scandals, including the award of public funds to support ventures by obscure or unknown local and foreign companies, along with opaque privatisation deals. There are widespread concerns that cocoa-sector revenue that should be being used for price stabilisation and sector development is being diverted into off-budget expenditure, notably military spending. The severe economic downturn since the conflict erupted in 2002 seems to have led to higher levels of generalised corruption and venality at all levels of public administration. Up to this point the government has managed to pay the civil-service wage bill, but with frequent delays, and civil-service unions in various fields, including the public health system, have launched periodic, although usually brief, protests and strikes. During the height of the military conflict in 2002 and early 2003, public administration was affected by the curfew which curtailed the workday in Abidjan. Government offices in the north and west of the country shut down and with few exceptions have yet to reopen, pending the oft-delayed implementation of the disarmament agreement. The New Forces' have established a makeshift administration which levies fees on transport and trade and maintains public safety. Many public services such as schools and clinics have not shut down altogether, but are run with minimal staff and on an improvised basis. Delegations from the central ministries in Abidjan have visited many locations, but so far only a few civil servants have been deployed. Political forces The FPI is sharing power but controls back channels Founded in 1982 by the current president, Mr Gbagbo, the nominally socialist FPI historically claimed to have offered the only genuine alternative to four decades of PDCI rule, since the party was already in opposition when the first multiparty elections took place in After Mr Gbagbo's victory in 2000, the FPI increased its parliamentary representation from 13 seats to 96 seats. It led the government and held the significant ministries from 2000 until the formation of the national reconciliation government in March The prime minister during that period, Affi N'Guessan, represented the FPI in the Marcoussis peace talks, and he remains the party president. The FPI's traditional support base is in the Bété-dominated centre-west around the cities of Daloa and Gagnoa. Support in Abidjan is also significant, particularly in the vast popular suburb, Yopougon. In the new government of Mr Banny, the FPI holds seven ministries, compared with nine in the government of Mr Diarra. However, the influential hardline faction of the FPI operates less out of the ministries than through Mr Gbagbo's presidential advisers. Leaders of the hardline group include Mr Gbagbo's wife, Simone Ehivet Gbagbo, who is also the party's leader in parliament; Mamadou Koulibaly, the president of the National Assembly; and the "prophet" Moïse Koré, pastor to Mr and Mrs Gbagbo, who are both born- The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited Country Profile 2006

20 16 Côte d'ivoire again evangelical Christians. This group appears to have consolidated its sway over the FPI and has demonstrated its overtly good relations with the "young patriot" militias. The PDCI seeks a revival The RDR has become a key political actor Founded in 1946 by the late president, Mr Houphouët-Boigny, the PDCI-RDA, known as the PDCI, held office from 1960 to It remained the only legal party until 1990, when the first multiparty elections took place. The number of PDCI seats has now fallen from a comfortable majority of 146 in 1995 to a still substantial 98. Ousted by the December 1999 coup, the party has nonetheless managed to maintain a solid base of support in the Akan-dominated central and eastern regions, particularly around the administrative capital, Yamoussoukro, and Bouaké. The PDCI's historic strength in other regions, notably the north and the far west, has been supplanted in recent years by the RDR and the UDPCI respectively. The PDCI underwent an internal power struggle after losing incumbency. After Mr Bédié returned from France to participate in the 2001 forum of national reconciliation, he won an internal election and resumed the presidency of the party in Despite the presence of several rival currents, Mr Bédié appears to have successfully restored his pre-eminence within the party. The PDCI accepted posts in Mr Gbagbo's government, but has taken pains to differentiate itself from FPI policies as the civil war has continued. Its alliance with the RDR under the RHDP label has consolidated the single most important alliance within the G7 coalition of opposition parties and New Forces, lending the PDCI a strategic role at the political centre of the coalition. The RDR was formed in June 1994 by dissidents from the ruling PDCI who remained loyal to Mr Ouattara. A liberal opposition party, the RDR draws its main support from the north, Mr Ouattara's home region. A former deputy managing director of the IMF, Mr Ouattara has also enjoyed significant international support. The RDR's boycott of the 2000 legislative election placed it largely outside the formal constitutional arena; subsequent by-elections garnered the party a mere five seats. However, it came first in the March 2001 local elections, leading in the north and also in urban districts in several other regions. The RDR entered Mr Gbagbo's government of national unity a month before the civil war, and the outbreak of the war and the spread of rebellion in the north the party's base appeared to take it by surprise. The state media accused the RDR of fomenting the rebellion, however, and the party leadership went into hiding or exile to avoid detention. After the Marcoussis agreement the party joined the national reconciliation government with seven ministers, although their effective power was highly curtailed in practice. The formation of the G7, and later of the RHDP, has consolidated the RDR's position as a crucial political presence, however. In the new government of Mr Banny the RDR holds five portfolios. Mr Ouattara, who has now been recognised as an eligible presidential candidate, returned in January 2006 from prolonged selfimposed exile in France, reasserting his position in the Ivorian political scene despite fears for his security. Country Profile The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2006

21 Côte d'ivoire 17 The former rebels are not an official political party One result of the civil war is the emergence and conversion to politics of armed movements, now known collectively as the New Forces. The main rebel group, the MPCI, assumed its political identity several weeks into the war, with the former student leader, Guillaume Soro, as secretary-general. As a result of its military gains, the MPCI obtained seven seats in the first reconciliation government and has six in the new government. The New Forces have six posts, and Mr Soro is minister in charge of the reconstruction of the north. Although they have not made the formal transition to political party, the New Forces have assumed a hybrid role as members of an alliance of political parties, yet at the same time the de facto government of the country's northern half. The MPCI's backers and sources of funding, which have allowed it to run an organised and relatively disciplined military campaign, are still largely mysterious and the source of much speculation, with supporters of Mr Gbagbo alleging that the MPCI is nothing more than the "military wing" of the RDR and funded by Mr Ouattara. In fact, little is known, other than that the New Forces currently fund themselves, at least in part, by levying duties on the entry and transport of goods within their zone, as well as from both licit and illicit trade across the border to Burkina Faso and Mali. The other two rebel groups, the MJP and MPIGO, are confined to the west and are smaller, less well organised and less popular than the MPCI. The "young patriots" A number of militias and youth activist groups have emerged since the start of the war under the broad designation of "young patriots". Most prominent among them is the Groupement patriotique pour la paix (GPP). These organisations are led by former student activists and typically gather young men from the vast pool of under-employed urban youth in Abidjan. The "young patriots" have served as a de facto militant wing for Mr Gbagbo's hardline supporters, and have fomented strikes and demonstrations, including violent attacks against French business interests, immigrants and suspected opposition sympathisers. The actual number of organised "young patriot" militants is considered to be quite small; however, they have proved to be capable of shutting down economic activity in Abidjan, as they are allowed to act with impunity. The most visible "young patriot" leader, the so-called General, Charles Blé Goudé, enjoys unfettered access to the presidency and is considered to be close to Mr Gbagbo's wife. Other "young patriot" leaders include Eugène Djué and Jean-Yves Didopieu. The most organised groups, such as the GPP, constitute de facto militias and are armed. They have argued that they must be considered in the disarmament process and compensated for laying down their weapons. Complementing the "young patriot" movements based in Abidjan are other armed groups that have been formed principally in the centre-west of the country around Gagnoa, where the FPI and Mr Gbagbo's ethnic group, the Bété, are dominant. These militias have established numerous roadblocks in the region and have also clashed with peacekeeping forces stationed along the western portion of the ceasefire line. The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited Country Profile 2006