Nord Stream 2. Espoo Consultation Finland - Estonia. Responses to Relevant Comments to the Espoo Report in the Statement from Estonia

Transcription

1 Nord Stream 2 Espoo Consultation Finland - Estonia Responses to Relevant Comments to the Espoo Report in the Statement from Estonia

2 Page 2 of 12 Table of Contents 1 Introduction Climate Change, Paris Climate Agreement and the Project Compliance with EU Climate and Energy Policy and Environmental Legislation Gas Demand Indirect Impacts on Marine Mammals Sediments and Nutrients Survey Data for Munitions Espoo Report Terminology Espoo Report Terminology (continued) Monitoring in Finland and Russia Results Monitoring of Seals Atlas Map W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINESTEN

3 1 Introduction Page 3 of 12 The Espoo Convention defines a transboundary impact as any impact, not exclusively of a global nature, within an area under the jurisdiction of a Party caused by a proposed activity the physical origin of which is situated wholly or in part within the area under the jurisdiction of another Party. Nord Stream 2 s Espoo Report addresses any potential transboundary impact on Estonia that could be caused by a proposed activity taking place in the Finnish EEZ. In the framework of the Espoo consultation process for Nord Stream 2, Estonia has provided a statement including comments to Nord Stream 2 s Espoo Report. The Finnish Competent Authority for the Environmental Impact Assessment has asked Nord Stream 2 AG to respond to relevant comments from Estonia. This document provides the responses to these comments. 2 Climate Change, Paris Climate Agreement and the Project Compliance with Statement Climate and Energy Policy and Environmental Legislation The Estonian Fund for Nature considers that the Espoo Report does not handle the issue of climate change substantially. For instance only a general statement is made in point (page 4), but this is not supported by adequate calculations or references, and the effects of energy conservation measures or renewable energy sources have not been analysed. In alignment with the Estonian Fund for Nature, the Ministry of Environment also observes that the Espoo Report has unclear statements about climate issues, which makes it difficult to trust the results. For instance, the statement on page 42 "Through the continued use of natural gas, ambitious targets set by the Paris Agreement of 2016 on climate change can be reached without jeopardizing the overall security of energy supply" is overly general, not referring to any real analysis, and to what extent there is a need to use natural gas. In addition, the Estonian Fund for Nature considers that the Nord Stream 2 project is in contradiction with the aims of the Paris climate agreement and the climate aims and environmental acquis of the European Union, as well with international environmental law. On account of this, the project should not be permissible. The Ministry of Environment of Estonia also notes that, to achieve the ambitious goal, a rapid shift to low carbon economy is needed and large new fossil fuel investments can inhibit the achievement of that goal. The Ministry of Environment of Estonia notes regarding climate change that it is not clear whether the Nord Stream 2 project is consistent with the EU Climate and Energy Policy. The Ministry emphasized that, in the context of EU Climate and Energy packet 2020 and EU Climate and Energy Framework 2030, the energy security should be increased through reducing dependence on imported energy and achieving European Energy Union. The Ministry adds that, the Espoo Report is built on the assumption that climate goals are not fulfilled, which gives an implication that the EU Climate Policy is not taken seriously in planning the project. This raises the following question: has a risk assessment carried out or an alternative scenario elaborated for the situation when the EU is fulfilling its climate goals and demand for natural gas is lower than projected? The Ministry of the Environment is on the position that the Report should take into account the scenario where the EU is acting in accordance with climate targets. Most importantly, there is a need to have a full analysis of W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINESTEN

4 Page 4 of 12 the impact of the project on EU Climate and Energy Policy. If this investment is contradicting the EU policy or restraining the achievement of climate goals, it should not be carried out. Answer The Espoo Report describes in detail why additional natural gas imports are needed for the EU in order to support security of supply. It is also shown that natural gas is the fossil fuel with the least greenhouse gas (and other) emissions resulting from combustion. This is the main reason for natural gas being an ideal transitional energy source as long as more renewables generation capacities (incl. the required transportation and different yet to be found technological solutions) are needed to cover the energy demand of the EU. In the Espoo Report it is also shown how Nord Stream 2 compares with other transport options, in terms of efficiency and methane gas emissions. A study recently published by the WWF highlights the benefits of LNG as a replacement for fuel oil in marine transport. However, when used in large quantities as a fuel in the European energy system, the emissions generated by the LNG production and importing process make pipeline gas the superior option. A detailed analysis of alternative transport options shows the clear advantage of Nord Stream 2 over both onshore pipelines and LNG supply chains in terms of efficiency and reduced emissions. 1 Using natural gas and working towards emission reduction targets are not mutually exclusive, quite the contrary. Nord Stream 2 AG agrees that much remains to be done for the EU to reach its 2050 goal of 80-95% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. Looked at from today s perspective, many technological approaches to this goal become identifiable, with an increased share of various forms of renewable energy playing a priority role in all of them. However, all these approaches have to be able to pass the test of engineering feasibility and economic viability. Germany, the largest energy consumer in the EU, emits around 900 million tonnes of CO2 per year, more than any other EU country. As Germany approaches the deadline for the closure of its last nuclear power stations in the early 2020s, emissions have increased, due to increased quantity of coal burned in the power generation process. The role of natural gas has been discussed in many studies, including the latest WWF energy model for a German coal phase-out (Zukunft Stromsystem Kohleausstieg 2035), which sees gas as playing a bigger role, both in Germany (depending on the scale of the proposed increase in the 1 1. Critical Evaluation of Default Values for the GHG Emissions of the Natural Gas Supply Chain by dbi Gas- und Umwelttechnik looks at different gas supplied to the EU market and analyses three supply corridors for Russian gas. The results show that the Nord Stream corridor, with newer, more efficient onshore pipelines and a long stretch of highly efficient offshore transport through the Baltic Sea has the lowest carbon emissions among the Russian export corridors 46% lower than the alternative onshore system GHG Intensity of Natural Gas Transport - Comparison of Additional Natural Gas Imports to Europe by Nord Stream 2 Pipeline and LNG Import Alternatives by ThinkStep AG makes a life-cycle comparison of Nord Stream 2 with LNG imports from four countries, including methane emissions and emissions-equivalents associated with materials used for and the construction of the pipeline of LNG infrastructure. The results show that Nord Stream 2 emits 2.4 to 4.6 times less CO2- equivalents than the LNG exporters where differences in how the gas is produced (unconventional or conventional methods) and how far it has to be shipped make up the spread. W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINESTEN

5 Page 5 of 12 contribution of renewables and of the corresponding coal phase-out), and in neighbouring countries. To ensure that gas can play this role, a well-supplied, competitive and resilient gas market is needed. As European domestic production continues its long decline, more of this supply will need to be imported in the coming years. These new imports will need a new reliable and efficient infrastructure, to allow gas to be transported from the gas fields to the market. This is why Nord Stream 2 is important for Europe. For every 55 billion cubic metres of gas that can be brought to Europe and used to replace coal in power generation, up to 160 million tonnes of CO2 can be saved, representing approximately 14 % of the emissions generated by the EU power generation industry. The Nord Stream 2 project is consistent with the EU Climate and Energy policy. The requirement of a growing import requirement of natural gas into the EU is derived and elaborated in detail in section 2, project justification, of the Espoo Report (the underlying natural gas demand ultimately basing on the EU Reference Scenario 2016). Since EU domestic natural gas production will undisputedly decrease significantly over the next decades, a growing import requirement for natural gas is the consequential fact. Basing the natural gas demand planning for Nord Stream 2 on a reference scenario has been (and is today) good practice for all energy infrastructure projects in the EU. That does not mean to neglect ambitious policy decisions (that may or may not be successfully implemented in the future), but rather to base this kind of sensitive planning on more robust scenarios in order to guarantee security of supply also in case that these objectives are not (or not entirely) met. Of course, there is a chance, that the demand for natural gas will be lower in the future. This has also been analysed in the Prognos report the main reference for the Nord Stream 2 gas demand forecast. 2 In summary, Nord Stream 2 will support the achievement of the ambitious climate goals of the Paris agreement. It is also not conceivable, why the infrastructure investment into Nord Stream 2 which is borne completely by private investors should hinder any additional investments of other players in the market for instance in the further buildout of renewable energy. As described in section 2 of the Espoo Report, project justification, and in responses to other statements of the Estonian Fund for Nature (please also refer to the Gas Demand below), Nord Stream 2 will facilitate and support the use of natural gas in Europe as a viable option. In consequence, the Nord Stream 2 project is not contradicting any of the referred agreements or legislation. 3 Gas Demand Statement According to the Estonian Fund for Nature, contrary to the Espoo Report, the energy consumption of the European Union (including natural gas) is consistently decreasing. In addition, the Ministry of Environment of Estonia commented that there are doubtful statements about energy and gas demand in the EU, which aim to strengthen the impression that additional gas is needed. Firstly, page 4 states that "Natural gas is expected to remain an important energy source with projections of stable or increasing demand in the coming decades." However, the EU Reference Scenario 2016 states that Post 2020, a slight 2 Prognos AG, Status und Perspektiven der europäischen Gasbilanz (2017) W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINESTEN

6 Page 6 of 12 decrease in gross inland consumption of gas is projected. It is also unclear why Figure 2-1 (page 35) is showing an increase in demand for the EU Reference Scenario, while the EU Reference Scenario actually projects a decrease in consumption. Secondly, page 8 states the following: Although non-implementation of Nord Stream 2 would avoid the predominantly temporary, local and minor environmental and socio-economic impacts, it would also mean other ways of meeting Europe's growing energy demand would be required. In fact, the EU energy demand is on a steady decline since 2005 (EU Reference Scenario 2016, page 3). Answer In section 2, the description of the project justification of the Espoo Report, it is shown in detail why additional net import requirements for natural gas will materialise over the next years and decades. This is based on the gas demand forecast provided by the independent institute Prognos who in turn base their outlook on the EU Reference Scenario 2016, i.e. a stable (or only very slightly increasing) demand for natural gas is assumed. 3 As for the EU Reference Scenario 2016, the corresponding numbers are all publicly available. In 2015, the scenario assumes a gross inland consumption of natural gas in the EU28 of 387,731 ktoe whereas for example in 2045 this figure slightly increases to 394,957 ktoe. This is exactly the database that the Espoo Report is built upon. The statement quoted from page 8 of the Espoo Report could indeed be worded more precisely (as it is shown in section 2, project justification) saying that it would also mean other ways of meeting Europe's growing import demand of natural gas would be required. 4 Indirect Impacts on Marine Mammals Statement The Estonian Fund for Nature considers, as indirect impacts have not been taken into account, then the assessments regarding marine mammals seem to be underestimated. With respect to the Gulf of Finland population of ringed seal varying evaluations have been given, from moderate to major (e.g. page 362). As this is a critically endangered population, then the implementation of the project should not be allowed. Answer The indirect impacts, notably those associated with reduction or changes in food sources (e.g. bioaccumulation of contaminants in fish and benthic fauna and/or reduction in food availability arising from the presence of the pipeline), have been considered and scoped out due to the negligible impact on those components of the food chain (e.g. fish) relevant to the mammals. Hence there will not be any significant indirect impacts on these species from such changes. The two rankings for impacts of underwater noise generation on the Gulf of Finland ringed seal population presented in section of the Espoo Report relate to the impact level that may occur without and with the mitigation measures to which Nord Stream 2 AG had committed at its time of writing. These rankings take account of the vulnerability and hence critical nature of this population as specified in the submission and are thus major and moderate respectively. In other words, the Espoo Report demonstrates that the use of acoustic deterrent devices and presence of marine mammal observers on board, will reduce 3 Prognos AG, Status und Perspektiven der europäischen Gasbilanz (2017) W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINESTEN

7 Page 7 of 12 potential impact on marine mammals from major (without such mitigation) to moderate (with the mitigation). However, subsequent to the submission of the Espoo Report, Nord Stream 2 AG has committed to use bubble curtains for in-situ clearance of munitions in the vicinity of the most sensitive receptors. The location where such measures will be adopted are in proximity to Natura 2000 sites (with seals listed as a conservation objective) and to those areas known to be used by the Gulf of Finland ringed seal population in the Finnish EEZ. The reduction of 6-8 db in underwater noise levels resulting from application of bubble curtains will ensure that the impact ranking for Gulf of Finland ringed seal population will decrease from moderate to minor. An updated assessment based on the use of bubble curtains as an additional mitigation measure will be submitted to the competent Finnish authorities as part of the Water Permit application (the process through which impacts on Natura 2000 sites are considered in Finland). 5 Sediments and Nutrients Statement The Estonian Fund for Nature states that the recurring argument in the report that the impact on sediment movement and thence release of materials is short-term and negligible has not been adequately proved. Also the analysis of the release of nutrients from sediments is insufficient. Answer Sediment movement and release of materials The sediment movement that may be caused by Nord Stream 2 construction was initially modelled using state-of-the-art modelling software, and subsequently evaluated in the light of experience obtained during Nord Stream construction and associated monitoring. Numerical modelling of sediment movement was performed using a flexible mesh version of the MIKE 3 hydrodynamic (HD) model suite for three-dimensional modelling of currents, water levels and the transport of suspended sediment. The model was a development of the existing Baltic Sea model of DHI, which was calibrated and validated in the Danish straits and the western Baltic Sea. For the Nord Stream 2 model a dedicated calibration and validation of the model in the Gulf of Finland has also been carried out, using current and salinity/temperature data from the Nord Stream monitoring program. The model resolution was approximately 800-1,600 m within a 10 km band along the planned pipeline corridor, and increased further away from the pipeline up to 3-5 km. The numerical particle transport model MIKE 3 PT was used to model the transport of sediment and contaminant spill during the construction phase, based on current velocities and water level provided by the hydrodynamic results from the MIKE 3 HD model. The results from the MIKE 3 PT were independent of the calculation mesh of the MIKE 3 HD model and could be saved in a finer mesh than the hydrodynamic input, which may be necessary to resolve the plumes resulting from the spill. Three simulation scenarios were chosen to represent different conditions in relation to particle transport and temperature/salinity stratification: Summer scenario (June 2010): Representation of relatively calm current conditions with low particle transport capacity and with relatively high temperature and salinity stratification. W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINESTEN

8 Page 8 of 12 Normal scenario (April 2010): Representation of average current conditions with average particle transport capacity and with average temperature and salinity stratification. Winter scenario (November 2010): Representation of relatively strong current conditions with high particle transport capacity and with relatively low temperature and salinity stratification. Evidence collected during Nord Stream monitoring was considered and used to evaluate the reliability of the modelling: Postlay trenching: The plough used during post-lay trenching created a plume of suspended sediment, with a release rate conservatively derived from the measured suspended sediment concentrations (SSCs) in the range of 3-25 kg/s. The plume was most dense near the plough, with concentrations up to a maximum of 22.3 mg/l observed at a distance of approximately 100 m. The plume widened and concentrations decreased with distance from the plough, with concentrations less than 4 mg/l observed at a distance of approximately 500 m behind the plough. This indicates that a significant quantity of the suspended sediment settled during the initial 500 m of transport. Together, the monitoring results indicated that the results of the sediment dispersion modelling can be considered conservative (i.e. on the safe side). Rock placement: Monitoring of sediment dispersion related to rock placement was undertaken in Russia in 2010, and Finland in 2010 and In Russia, the highest concentration (20 mg/l) was measured one hour after rock placement at a distance of 100 m from the placement location. Measurements in Finland (2010) confirmed that increases in suspended sediment concentration (SSC), and hence turbidity, were limited to the lowermost 10 m of the water column and that the impact distance, taken as the 10 mg/l contour, was less than 1 km from the rock placement site. Subsequent monitoring in Finland (2011) showed SSC peaked above 10 mg/l at only one sensor located 200 m from the construction site, on three occasions with a total duration of 6.5 hours. The monitoring results indicated that the maximum values of SSC caused by rock placement were significantly lower than those calculated by numerical modelling, and that the numerical modelling was thus highly conservative. Munitions clearance: Monitoring also showed that munitions clearance resulted in smaller craters than was predicted by the modelling, and the actual total amount of released sediment was substantially smaller than predicted by the model. The modelling performed predicted affected areas and time spans for SSC levels above thresholds of 10 and 15 mg/l, and the results are summarized in the Espoo Report (Tables 10-2 to 10-5). A comparison of the figures given in these tables with the monitoring results, described above, shows that the models can be considered to be highly conservative. As documented in the Espoo Report (Section ), the ambient levels of SSC under calm conditions are typically 1-2 mg/l, with substantially higher levels occurring during storm events. Release of nutrients from sediments In terms of release of nutrients the expected overall load scenarios for N and P based on their potential release from Nord Stream 2 seabed intervention works are provided in the Espoo Report (Section ). For Russia, Finland, Sweden and Denmark, the median concentration of N and P in the seabed sediments in the Finnish EEZ has been used for all countries (0.7 g P/kg dry weight and 3.0 g N/kg dry weight). This has resulted in a predicted release of approximately 43 W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINESTEN

9 Page 9 of 12 tonnes P and 186 tonnes N. These figures are however conservative (i.e. highly likely to overestimate the situation that will occur in reality) because the concentration of N and P in the fine-grained deep-water sediments in the Finnish EEZ is in general higher than that occurring in shallower water with more sandy sediments in the other countries. Furthermore, the predictions of nutrient levels that informed the assessment documented in the Espoo Report assumed that all of the N and P in the sediments that become suspended are subsequently released to the water column. However, in practice a large proportion will stay bound to the particles and thus resettle with them back on the seabed i.e. will not be released to the water column. The majority of the releases N and P from seabed interventions works in the deeper part of the Baltic Sea will occur below the halo- and thermoclines where there are high gradients in water density. Bottom water containing the released N and P will therefore not mix with the overlying (less dense) surface water where light is available for photosynthetic plankton. Since the N and P released to the bottom water will not become available for photosynthetic organisms, it will not cause an increase in primary production and hence contribute to the eutrophication of the Baltic Sea. For German waters, the potential release of bioavailable N and P from seabed interventions has been calculated based on seabed concentrations and laboratory analysis of bioavailability. A worst case assessment carried out this way has shown the potential release of 15 and 239 tonnes of bioavailable P in Greifswalder Bodden and Pomeranian Bay, respectively. For N, it was assessed that, based on analysis of sediments and pore-water, dredging will not notably contribute to any re-mobilisation of N in German waters. The analyses contained in the Espoo Report regarding sediment movement and release of sediment associated nutrients, as summarised above, are thus sufficient to justify the prediction of negligible impacts documented in that report. 6 Survey Data for Munitions Statement The Environmental Board reiterates that according to the Espoo Report the significant adverse transboundary impact (also to Estonia) is related to underwater noise stemming from munitions clearance works in the Finnish and Russian pipeline route sections. These works have adverse impact to marine mammals, especially to the Gulf of Finland population of ringed seal. At the same time it is said in the Report (page 282) that as a geophysical munitions screening survey has not yet been undertaken in Finland, the presence of munitions has been determined based on the experience of the Nord Stream pipeline system. The Environmental Board requests clarification on the following: as this issue has been determined sensitive, then why has the necessary survey not been conducted before the commencement of the EIA, or is the Espoo Report going to be amended after the conduction of the survey (if this is requisite on the basis of the results)? Answer The assessment of the impacts of munitions clearance documented in the Espoo Report is based on the assumptions that a maximum charge size (based on the range of charges encountered in Nord Stream project) is detonated at a location where the pipeline route is closest to sensitive areas i.e. a worst case scenario in terms of impact. The modelled W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINESTEN

10 Page 10 of 12 locations have thus been selected due to their proximity to environmentally sensitive areas including those in Estonia. The Permit applications will however include the results of surveys and evaluations by munition experts which are being undertaken after the submission of the Espoo Report to establish the actual munitions locations and charge sizes. As an additional mitigation measure, Nord Stream 2 committed to use bubble curtains to reduce the impacts of munition clearances in proximity of sensitive receptors. This detailed information is informing a revised assessment which will either confirm the level of impact documented in the Espoo Report or establish that it will be lower (e.g. if the munitions are further from Estonia and/or the charge sizes smaller than assumed in the original predictions). This approach, as adopted in the Finnish EIA and the Espoo Report, is normal practice and in line with legal requirements relating to permitting of similar projects in Finland. It therefore does not require the Espoo Report to be amended after the conduction of the survey. The validity of this approach is supported by the results to date of such more detailed assessments which predict that, including the use of additional mitigation measures (bubble curtains), the impacts will be lower than those reported in the Espoo Report. 7 Espoo Report Terminology Statement The Environmental Board notes that it is stated in point (page 24) that a precautionary approach has been adopted resulting in a moderate ranking for onset of permanent hearing loss and non-lethal blast injury on the Gulf of Finland ringed seal population. The Environmental Board points out that the vague term, moderate should not be used in this context: it should be clearly brought out if the proposed activity is likely to cause significant impact or not (i.e. is the impact acceptable). Answer The methodology used in the Espoo Report and in the national EIAs applies a ranking to the impacts. An impact ranked as major is considered significant, while those ranked as minor and negligible are not significant. Moderate impacts may or may not be significant, depending on the context and are highlighted together with supporting information so that the decision making authority can make this determination. 8 Espoo Report Terminology (continued) Statement In addition, the Environmental Board points out that the term used in Article 6 (3) of the Directive 92/43/EEC is adverse impact, so the same term and approach should also be used in the Espoo Report. For reasons of clarity it should be specified in the title of Table 9-17 (page 207) that subsequently only those designated species and habitats are listed which are in the impact area of the proposed activity. For instance, the purpose of protection of Struuga SAC includes more species and habitats than listed in Table W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINESTEN

11 Page 11 of 12 Answer Article 6 (3) of the Habitats Directive (92/43/EEC) refers to the need, through Appropriate Assessment (sometimes referred to as "Natura Assessment ), to ascertain whether the project has potential to give rise to significant effects on the Natura 2000 site. Section of the Espoo Report, which documents the method adopted, makes clear that the ranking relates to adverse effects and specifies which rankings may be significant. It is thus not necessary to use the term adverse impact throughout the Report. In accordance with the requirements of EU legislation, Nord Stream 2 have carried out Natura 2000 screening assessments of all Natura 2000 sites (existing or proposed) which could potentially be affected by activities associated with construction or operation of Nord Stream 2. This screening, the results of which are presented in Table 9-17, was based on a combination of inter alia: the distance of the sites from Nord Stream 2 activities and the propagation characteristics of impacts arising from Nord Stream 2 and the nature of the features for which the sites were designated. If such potential is identified, then a full Appropriate Assessment must be undertaken. However, if the screening identifies that there is no potential for significant adverse impacts to occur, then a full Appropriate Assessment is not required. Table in the Espoo Report, which summarises the results of the screening process, and Section , which considers the potential for transboundary impacts on the Struuga site, refers to river habitats and species, and states that, due to their propagation characteristics, impacts from Nord Stream 2 will not reach the site. There is thus no need to provide further details of the habitats and species for which it is designated. 9 Monitoring in Finland and Russia Statement On the basis of point 18, according to the Environmental Board, the monitoring programme of Nord Stream Pipeline system and the proposed monitoring programme of the Nord Stream 2 project are deficient with regards to underwater noise and marine mammals. In the case of Nord Stream Pipeline system in Russia, only grey seal population was monitored, but not ringed seal population. Pursuant to Table 18-1 (page 608) in the case of Nord Stream 2 project underwater noise monitoring is planned only in Finland, but not in Russia. Monitoring of marine mammals is not planned in Finland, in the case of Russia it is unclear (the criterion is flora and fauna, onshore and offshore). Based on this, the Espoo report should be revised and amended. Answer Chapter 18 of the Espoo Report, proposed environmental monitoring, outlines the main parameters which are planned to be monitored during Nord Stream 2 s construction and operation. However, detailed monitoring programmes will have to be developed in collaboration with and approved by the national competent authorities. The Finnish Competent Authority for the Environmental Impact Assessment states, The proposal for the monitoring programme of the project, which was presented in the report, is appropriate. At this stage it is confirmed that marine mammals will be monitored in Russia during construction and operation of Nord Stream 2 as this is an authority requirement and also in line with the Nord Stream 2 position regarding status of seals in the Gulf of Finland. W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINESTEN

12 Page 12 of 12 Monitoring of marine mammals was also performed for the existing Nord Stream pipeline (during both construction period and first years of operation), however, it is possible that ringed seals were not registered during the monitoring due to the generally low number of individuals and their behavioural pattern. As part of the Finnish monitoring programme, it is proposed that measurements of underwater noise with sensors installed in the areas designated or important for seals are performed as raised levels of underwater noise is the only potential impact on seals in Finnish waters. The monitoring programme for Finland will be attached to the water permit application. 10 Results Monitoring of Seals Statement The Ministry of Environment of Estonia highlighted that one of their main concerns is related to the Gulf of Finland population of seals, especially regarding the ringed seal which already is a critically endangered population which means that the loss of even one specimen might have significant impact on the whole population. Because of this additional adverse pressure on the seal populations must be avoided and all measures to mitigate adverse impact must be implemented. The Ministry of the Environment is interested in receiving monitoring results, inter alia, regarding this particular issue. Answer Nord Stream 2 AG commits that no offshore construction activities will be performed during the ice period, which is critical to marine mammals, and that mitigation measures, such as use of acoustic deterrent devices and presence of marine mammal observers on board of the vessel, will be implemented during munitions clearance. Monitoring reports of Nord Stream 2 AG will be made publically available, including the results of telemetry study of the Baltic ringed seals which is currently ongoing in Russia. 11 Atlas Map Statement Regarding the Espoo Atlas the map Raw Material Extraction Sites (RM-01-Espoo), the Ministry of Environment of Estonia considers that it should also include sand extraction sites situated in the Gulf of Finland, near the Naissaar Island. Answer The Espoo Atlas generally displays sites and features that are within the area of influence of the Project. The Naissaare sand extraction site is about 21 km from the pipeline route and therefore not within the area of influence of the project. W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINESTEN

13 Nord Stream 2 Espoo Consultation Finland - Germany Responses to Relevant Comments to the Espoo Report from Germany

14 Page 2 of 14 Table of Contents 1 Introduction Statement from WWF and BUND about Nutrients Statement from WWF and BUND about Pollutants Statement from WWF, BUND and NABU about Munitions Statement from WWF and BUND about Ringed Seals W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINGEREN

15 1 Introduction Page 3 of 14 The Espoo Convention defines a transboundary impact as any impact, not exclusively of a global nature, within an area under the jurisdiction of a Party caused by a proposed activity the physical origin of which is situated wholly or in part within the area under the jurisdiction of another Party. Nord Stream 2 s Espoo Report addresses any potential transboundary impact on Germany that could be caused by a proposed activity taking place in the Finnish EEZ. In the framework of the Espoo consultation process for Nord Stream 2, the competent authority in Germany has forwarded several statements that it received from German stakeholders. The Finnish Competent Authority for the Environmental Impact Assessment has asked Nord Stream 2 AG to respond to relevant comments from German stakeholders. This document provides the responses to these comments. 2 Statement from WWF and BUND about Nutrients Statement WWF and BUND state that the Gulf of Finland is one of the worst nutrient-contaminated areas in the Baltic Sea. Suspended sediment will rise in the Finnish area too, not just due to impact from the Russian border area. The planned munitions detonations will also release nutrients and suspended sediment that will additionally impact on the ecosystem. The documents do not provide any specific details of how much suspended sediment will be released in the Finnish area. Answer The release of sediments and sediment-associated contaminants is outlined in Section in the Espoo Report (Overview of modelling results (Munitions clearance: Table 10-2, Rock placement: Table 10-3)) Additional information is available in Appendix 3 (Nord Stream 2 modelling and Nord Stream experience, Section 2.1 Sediment and contaminants dispersion). This includes dispersion as a consequence of munitions clearance as well as rock placement (post lay trenching is not proposed in Finnish waters). Release of sediments The sediment movement that may be caused by Nord Stream 2 construction was modelled using state-of-the-art modelling software, which was verified and calibrated using monitoring data from Nord Stream construction. Three simulation scenarios were chosen to represent different conditions in relation to particle transport and temperature/salinity stratification. Modelling in offshore areas covered sediment releases from post lay trenching, rock placement and munitions clearance. The anticipated sediment spill from munitions clearance in Russian and Finnish waters is 2,600 tonnes in total, and the anticipated sediment spill from rock placement in Russian, Finnish, Swedish and Danish waters is 5,200 tonnes in total. Release of nutrients from sediment For Russia, Finland, Sweden and Denmark, the median concentration of N and P in the seabed sediments in the Finnish EEZ has been used for all countries (0.7 g P/kg dry weight W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINGEREN

16 Page 4 of 14 and 3.0 g N/kg dry weight). This has resulted in a predicted release of approximately 43 tonnes P and 186 tonnes N. These figures are however conservative (i.e highly likely to overestimate the situation that will occur in reality) because the concentration of N and P in the fine-grained deep-water sediments in the Finnish EEZ is in general higher than that occurring in shallower water with more sandy sediments in the other countries. For comparison, the annual inputs of N and P to the Gulf of Finland alone were 116,568 tonnes of N and 6,478 tonnes of P, and 824,875 tonnes of N and 31,883 tonnes of P for the entire Baltic Sea during the years (Table 9-4 in the Espoo Report). In other words, the total N release to the water that would be caused by Nord Stream 2 corresponds to about 2 hours of background inflow. Considering that the nutrient release caused by Nord Stream 2 would occur over the timespan of many months, it is clear that the contribution to N and P loads in the water column in the Gulf of Finland and elsewhere will be minor compared to the background input. Furthermore, the predictions of nutrient levels that informed the assessment documented in the Espoo Report assumed that all of the N and P in sediments that become suspended are subsequently released to the water column. However in practice a large proportion will stay bound to the particles and thus resettle with them back to the seabed i.e. will not be released to the water column. 3 Statement from WWF and BUND about Pollutants Statement WWF and BUND state that the measures will release toxic pollutants into the water column in the Finnish marine area, even though the levels of pollution will not be as high and as continuous as in the Russian area. The levels for PAH (polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons) are exceeded over an area of 118 km2 in the Finnish marine area for 19 hours, the levels for dioxins and furans for a period of more than seven hours. Nord Stream regards this as insignificant. WWF deems a remobilisation of these dangerous pollutants from the sediment to be fundamentally unacceptable. Answer The modelling results from munition clearance presented in the Espoo Report indicate that the total area where the Predicted No Effect Concentration in seawater (PNEC) of Benzo(a)pyrene (which is one of the most toxic substances of the Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAH)) could be exceeded for any period of time in Finnish waters is 118 km 2. The majority of this area would experience such exceedances for less than 5 hours with only 8km 2 potentially experiencing such exceedances for longer periods but less than 19 hours. Areas and time spans for any elevated levels of dioxin/furans and zinc are much less than these (see section in Espoo Report for details). As modelling has been based on munition clearance of 24 objects, the area subject to exceedance of the PNEC-value for more than 5 hours will be on average <0.4 km 2 /munition object cleared). It should be noted that the PNEC value is a highly conservative one derived from laboratory tests on the most sensitive organisms from different trophic levels occurring globally. Thus while values below PNEC are a reliable indicator of no impact, exceedances of them do not necessarily mean there will be an impact, but rather that further consideration of the context W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINGEREN

17 Page 5 of 14 is required. In relation to the Baltic Sea, the Environmental Quality Standard concentration for benzo(a)pyrene in the sea environment specified in the Finnish Government decree of the Council of State 1308/2015 on substances dangerous and harmful to the aquatic environment, is thus appropriate. This concentration is μg/l i.e. significantly higher than the highest predicted dissolved concentrations for benzo(a)pyrene in sea water from Nord Stream 2, which are typically in the order of μg/l. Hence, the predicted change in its concentration from Nord Stream 2 is within accepted norms and no significant impacts are anticipated on the Baltic Sea biota from such changes. The same comments are valid for the modelling and assessment of the potential significance on the Baltic ecosystems from changes in concentration of dioxins (EQS ng/l) or zinc (no EQS). Thus the release and dispersion of contaminants from munition clearance inside Finnish waters will have no significant impacts on marine flora and fauna. 4 Statement from WWF, BUND and NABU about Munitions Statement WWF, BUND and NABU state that according to the plan the pipeline extends through the entire Baltic proper and the Gulf of Finland, the entire area must also be considered with respect to munitions. It is presumed that about 300,000 tonnes of conventional and up to 65,000 tonnes of chemical munitions are located in the German Baltic Sea. Core areas for chemical munitions are located near Denmark; mine belts and further dumping sites are located in the Swedish, Finnish and Russian part of the route. Therefore, there is a latent high risk of encountering munitions when implementing infrastructure projects. In 2011, after several years of work by a German Federal Government/Länder working group on behalf of the ARGE BLMP, an evaluation report was presented ( describing the current situation of all types of munition in German marine waters and expressing recommendations regarding handling of the remnants of war. Since then, progress reports ( are published at regular intervals and are discussed in an international context with the Baltic Sea countries and international initiatives such as the International Dialogue on Underwater Munitions ( Simultaneously, different research projects were launched which are in particular meant to develop and assess alternative clearance methods. It is incomprehensible that Nord Stream 2 seems to consider the munitions topic to be so uncontroversial that they have dispensed with new thorough surveys. (Compare Espoo Specific Topic Areas p ). Thus, they state under Munitions in Germany: As part of the planning for the construction of the pipeline, Nord Stream 2 AG initially collected and analyzed all available information on areas suspected to be contaminated with explosive ordnance, in particular on minefields and areas for the disposal of conventional and chemical munitions in the Baltic Sea. The results of this collection can only be called entirely insufficient and incomprehensible in terms of its seriousness. No reference is made as to the sources and information accessed and it is not clear if a current and complete assessment of the situation along the route is available. W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINGEREN

18 Page 6 of 14 Although the detection methods and the assessment regarding the extent and handling of old munitions have made considerable progress over the last seven years since the last planning phase, the project investor partly relies upon the old data, the necessary investigations had not been completed at the time of the assessment or new data sources and research projects remained unconsidered. Thus, investigations on conventional munitions in Russia were carried out in April 2017; however, no results are as yet available. The data collection in Finland will also be delivered later. In 2016, a visual inspection of two corridors was undertaken in Sweden. Apparently, no new additional investigations were carried out in Denmark and Germany after construction of the first pipeline. Even despite the further development of modern detection technology enabling the location of old munitions even in the sediment, no new screening was performed. NABU calls for the detailed disclosure of the analysis of all available information on minefields and munition dump sites alluded to in the Espoo Report. It may be doubted that all of the possible sources also mentioned in the following were covered exhaustively. At the same time, we would point out that the position of munitions in the sediment changes dynamically over the years and that anthropogenic activities such as bottom trawling or gravel and sand extraction cause active displacements. The progress report by the Federal Government/Länder working group Munition in German Marine Waters published in 2016 ( blob=publicati onfile&v=8) states that two grenades were displaced and detonated near the Nord Stream pipeline. This is further proof of the dynamic displacement of munitions in the Baltic Sea area in comparison to the Nord Stream investigations. As a consequence, a new and up-to-date survey of the planned route of Nord Stream 2 in a coordinated process using state-of-the-art technology is indispensable. The results must be attached to the revised planning documents. The construction of Nord Stream has already shown that old munitions along the route must be anticipated. As a result of the environmental impact assessments, 100 old munitions ( were removed from the seabed to ensure safe routing. As circumvention of potential munitions finds by diverting the route cannot be ensured in every case, a detailed concept for munitions clearance must be prepared and presented. Given that, according to the current state of scientific research and considering the stipulations of the EU Marine Strategy Framework Directive as well as the FFH Directive, the underwater detonation of munitions is not an option, the concept must include the use of state-of-the-art clearance technology. The condition of the munition determines the hazard potential and the technique to be used. The MIREMAR international conference ( held by NABU in 2010 has provided an overview of clearance technology already existing today. Among others, this includes the use of underwater robotics, mobile detonation chambers, water cutting and photolytic destruction methods. An additional chapter is to be compiled in which environmentally compatible clearance methods according to today s state of scientific research and technology are discussed and an alternative clearance concept and accompanying mitigation measures for the protection of endangered and protected species such as the harbour porpoise, seals and fish as well as protected habitats are presented and proposed. Without this concept, it is inconceivable to carry out any preparatory construction work. W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINGEREN

19 Page 7 of 14 In the meantime, there are several joint projects in Germany or at a European level with German participation addressing the potential impacts of munitions on the marine environment (DAIMON project) ( and also the detection and environmentally friendly salvage and disposal of old munitions (project UDEMM ( and the RoBEMM project ( The WWF calls for evidence that recent results of the projects mentioned are incorporated into the Nord Stream 2 planning and that an environmentally compatible salvage and disposal concept for potential munitions finds and different types of munitions are prepared and attached to the planning documents. In the framework of the preliminary investigations regarding chemical munitions, only the Danish area was considered as it is assumed that no old chemical munitions can be found in the other areas. The Espoo Report itself states that the analysis methods have advanced and been refined over the last few years. It may be that additional deposits of chemical munitions are therefore identifiable. Correspondingly, further chemical analyses of the sediment along the planned routing are to be carried out. After all, there is no doubt that chemical as well as conventional munitions have already been dumped en route on the way from the port of embarkation to the dumping sites. However, the research of old documents in German archives and in archives of the Allies has not yet been completed so that no such general clearance (free of chemical or conventional munitions) can be granted for any marine area. The statement under Chemical warfare agents that [...] shell casings of many chemical munitions have corroded over the time and CWAs have been released into the surrounding marine environment, where they have been accumulating in the seabed sediments. remains unclear. It is generally known that chemical munitions were often installed in the grenade in glass cartridges which do not corrode, but rather are not chemically detectable until displacement or mechanical destruction. This confirms the urgent necessity for a complete preliminary investigation of the total planned route using state-of-the-art chemical and physical detection technology and additional video techniques. As some countries will only be carrying out their environmental impact assessments in the coming weeks, an evaluation of the total project and its impacts is not possible at this point in time - a term of six months for follow-up investigations and re-participation is requested as, in compliance with the precautionary principle, an evaluation on the basis of today s data is impossible. WWF and BUND further state that in the Finnish area, considerable pollution can be anticipated due to munitions clearance. In Section , the project initiator states that no detailed studies have yet been carried out in terms of concrete suspected munitions sites in the Finnish area. This means that there are no meaningful documents for assessment purposes relating to this important area. WWF calls on the Finnish approval authorities not to issue any further approvals until the relevant detailed investigations into munitions have been carried out and to require the relevant documents to this effect to be submitted. The WWF is unable to carry out an assessment based on the documents available we will provide further comment as soon as we have been provided with the relevant basis. The data relating to the impact on marine W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINGEREN

20 Page 8 of 14 mammals already suggests that in the Finnish area there will potentially be a direct impact on porpoises and ringed seals from detonations. Answer Comments relating to munitions address the following areas of concern: The adequacy generally of munitions survey data for the complete pipeline route Chemical munitions survey data; and The impact of conventional munitions clearance on marine mammals, including Harbour Porpoise and Ringed Seals Munitions Surveys along the pipeline route The Nord Stream 2 pipeline routing is based on rigorous, recently acquired and detailed sitespecific survey data. The risk posed by munitions (conventional and chemical) is well understood by Nord Stream 2 and the planned routes draw on an Nord Stream 2 survey campaign utilising a variety of the latest remote sensing techniques, the extensive survey data gathered for the Nord Stream project, and secondary information sources including consultation with the authorities in affected countries. The Nord Stream 2 munitions screening survey campaign (primary data collection) is both intensive and extensive and covers all areas where there is an interface with the seabed during construction, including as a minimum: The entire pipeline Installation Corridor (16.5m wide) and incorporating route alternatives under consideration A Security Corridor of 70m wide in the Gulf of Finland where secondary information sources show a high density of munitions All seabed intervention areas where rock will be placed or where trenching is planned Gradiometer surveys for offshore sections where rock placement and post-lay trenching is required and for nearshore areas where dredging will be undertaken. This will enable detection of sub-surface objects to the planned depth that the pipeline will be buried. Nord Stream 2 has adopted a staged approach to survey to establish a safe corridor for pipeline installation and subsequent operation, which integrates environmental, engineering and construction input to ensure that where possible, impact mitigation is integrated into the route selection process. The staged approach includes: Reconnaissance Survey (entire route) A Reconnaissance Survey was initially conducted (November 2015 to May 2016) from the Russian landfall to the German landfall. This was performed using dedicated survey vessels (and Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) for shallow sections of the route in Russia) and on average, a 1,500m wide corridor was surveyed. The corridor width was up to 5km in Finland to cover alternative route selections and generally more difficult seabed topography. Data collected included bathymetry (at a 2m x 2m bin grid resolution), side scan sonar, sub bottom profiler and magnetometer. Reduced line spacing in Germany and Russia achieved a higher density of soundings in these shallower sections. From these data for the route between landfall Russia and landfall Germany, the engineers selected two potential routes (A and B). An interpretation of the data also included the identification of possible Cultural Heritage Objects (CHO) and munitions items both chemical and conventional. W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINGEREN

21 Detailed Survey Page 9 of 14 Based on the reconnaissance survey results, the proposed routes were selected for further detailed survey. These routes were subjected to a more detailed survey in Denmark, Sweden and Finland (April and May 2016). Two 130m corridors were surveyed centred on lines A and B using a specialised ROV flown between 4.5m and 12m above the seabed. Data collected included bathymetry at 20cm x 20cm bin grid resolution, side scan sonar and sub bottom profiler. As well as producing a detailed bathymetric and geophysical overview, this data set was analysed and interpreted to assist in the identification of possible CHO, munitions, and cable crossings. These targets and cables were identified for visual investigation. The routes were optimised based on the detailed survey. In Germany and Russia, due to shallow water depths, surveys are characterised by very dense survey line spacing and sensors are very close to seabed. The survey resolution is in the order of 0.5x0.5m in shallow water areas. Within the combined Installation Corridor (the potential interface of future pipelines with the seabed) and Security Corridor width of ~70m in total and for various intervention works areas, including future post-lay trenching and rock placement, an ROV mounted magnetometer array (gradiometer system) was used for the detection of ferrous items on the seabed. These surveys commenced 2016 and were recently completed in Finland and included the visual identification by ROV and classification of Magnetic Anomalies (potential munition related objects). The results of these Munitions Surveys are under review by the design contractor. To reduce the requirement for the clearance of conventional munitions and to avoid potential interaction with potential chemical munitions, a number of localised re-route options are under consideration and are subject to further detailed and munitions surveys. It should be noted that in addition to munitions screening surveys, which have provided essential information for route planning, Nord Stream 2 recognises that as the authors point out, munitions can be displaced by demersal trawling, sand and gravel extraction and storm events. To address the risk to the pipeline posed by the dynamic nature of seabed munitions, Nord Stream 2 will undertake additional surveys, including pre-pipelay surveys just prior to the pipelay activity to check for new objects on the seabed. Regular inspections of the pipeline throughout its operating life will also be undertaken. Finally, as for Nord Stream, the Nord Stream 2 construction process will incorporate a chance finds procedure for both munitions related object and cultural heritage objects. This will incorporate reporting protocols and will be accompanied by standby arrangements for object classification and procedures for management of risk to ensure the necessary environmental safeguards are maintained through their avoidance or removal. Nord Stream 2 survey data is subject to strict quality control through a rigorous peer review process involving established survey companies and munitions experts. Extensive and intensive surveys along the pipeline route have enabled the detection of both conventional and chemical munitions. As described in of the Espoo report, there are no known chemical munitions dumpsites in Russian, Finnish or German waters (TW and/or EEZ). Munitions surveys undertaken for Nord Stream 2 confirm this for the selected pipeline route. W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINGEREN

22 Page 10 of 14 Known dumpsites for chemical munitions are located in the Bornholm Basin (within Danish waters) and the Gotland Deep (mainly within Swedish waters). As described in the Danish EIA (Section 13.5), thorough UXO surveys of the pipeline corridor during the design phase, together with specified criteria to avoid certain areas in pipeline routing activities, have addressed the risk of chemical munitions. Munitions surveys undertaken for the Nord Stream 2 route options in Denmark have identified 12 chemical munitions and show an absence of conventional munitions. As per recommendation of the Admiral Danish Fleet, munitions are to be left untouched and if required, local rerouting will avoid interaction. The positions of the munitions in the navigation database will be marked as areas to avoid. Surveys utilising ROV visual inspection methods have not identified glass chemical warfare vials in Danish, Swedish or German waters. The identified chemical munitions tend to be thin walled and, therefore, have corroded, leaving the central metallic core exposed on the seabed. Construction of Nord Stream 2 within Danish waters includes rock placement and trenching of the pipelines into the seabed in some sections. Disturbance of the seabed may cause spreading of remains of Chemical Warfare Agents (CWA) originally dumped after WWII. As described in Section of the Espoo Report a sampling survey in Danish waters to evaluate CWA concentrations in seabed sediments was conducted along the Nord Stream 2 route in 2015 and Chemical analysis revealed presence of several types of CWA in seabed sediments. Potential releases of CWA into the water column and associated biological risks have been assessed. The toxicological study has shown that the concentration of CWA in the water column will remain below the level at which a negative impact on the biological environment would be expected. No chemical warfare agents were found within the Swedish EEZ during Nord Stream. There are no known dumping sites for chemical munitions along the proposed route corridors for Nord Stream 2 and surveys undertaken for Nord Stream 2 in Swedish waters have not detected any chemical munitions. As the route crosses an edge of the precautionary zone around the dumping site between Gotland and Latvia, HELCOM guidelines for chemical munitions will be observed for project activities involving interaction with the seabed in this area. Conventional munitions clearance methods and mitigation of impacts on marine mammals Public domain information sources show conventional munitions in the Gulf of Finland (Finnish and Russian sectors of the route). Surveys undertaken for Nord Stream confirmed the presence of a number of munitions and Nord Stream 2 surveys show the same or similar distribution. Nord Stream 2 AG is observing the mitigation hierarchy with respect to munitions whereby local rerouting is undertaken to avoid munitions where feasible. Where rerouting is not possible, Nord Stream 2 considers various technical alternatives to conventional munitions clearance methods as well as additional mitigation measures for in situ clearance. Munitions clearance will be required in Finnish and Russian waters. Clearance is not planned within the Swedish EEZ given the low density of munitions found in the survey corridor. Localised rerouting will be performed in Swedish waters to avoid identified munitions. Clearance is not planned in Danish waters as surveys have not identified the presence of conventional munitions, and chemical munitions will be avoided. In Germany, a number of magnetic anomalies have been identified within the pre-trench section. It is planned that these will be excavated and recovered to the support vessel as necessary. As with Nord Stream, no in situ clearance of munitions by detonation is planned in German waters. W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINGEREN

23 Page 11 of 14 Standard munitions clearance methods utilised by the navies in the Baltic Sea including the annual international NATO manoeuvre Open Spirit, comprise in-situ clearance by detonation. Nord Stream implemented a number of mitigation measures for such in situ clearance work in the Gulf of Finland, including the use of marine mammal observers, passive acoustic monitoring and acoustic deterrents (seal scrammers). Nord Stream 2 AG has already committed to these for the Nord Stream 2 project to ensure there are no marine mammals, large shoals of fish or diving birds in the area prior to detonation. Further, munitions clearance operations as well as all offshore construction activities for the Nord Stream 2 project will be carried during the ice-free period, i.e. outside the sensitive period for seals. In addition to these standard mitigation measures, Nord Stream 2 has evaluated a range of alternatives to conventional munitions clearance methods as follows: deflagration (low order burn as opposed to a high order detonation) water jet cutting salvage operations using freezing techniques salvage operations using robotics detonation just below the surface use of lifting bags to move munitions away from the route a novel technique involve the adaption of a barge to incorporate a munitions bunker where salvaged munitions would be safely detonated Nord Stream 2 has also assessed a range of additional mitigation for the propagation of underwater noise associated with in situ munitions clearance and is considering the following measures in more detail, including their suitability for application in the Gulf of Finland: minimum donor charges including the use of shaped charges use of bubble curtains to reduce pressure waves during blasting Having analysed above mentioned mitigation measures for in-situ clearance, Nord Stream 2 AG has committed to use bubble curtains for in situ clearance of munitions, in the vicinity of the most sensitive receptors. The location where such measures will be adopted are thus those in proximity to Natura 2000 sites (with seals listed as a conservation objective) and to those areas known to be used by the Gulf of Finland ringed seal population in the Finnish EEZ. Bubble curtains will be used for a detonation of approximately 20 munitions, the final information will be included in the Finnish permit application. As the assessment of the feasibility of the various technical alternatives (in addition to bubble curtains), is on-going, Nord Stream 2 AG will provide further details regarding the selected methods, their limitations and additional mitigation measures as part of the upcoming Finnish permit applications. The combination of munitions clearance methods that Nord Stream 2 selects must be technically feasible, safe for personnel and equipment and it has to satisfy the objective of reducing the potential impact to marine mammals. Considering that countries have national requirements and standards, the proposed method(s) will have to be accepted by the various authorities, including defence agencies. W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINGEREN

24 Page 12 of 14 Environmental Impact Assessment Detonation of underwater munitions can potentially have a harmful impact on the marine life and this has been assessed in the Espoo Report, supported by underwater noise modelling. The assessment documented in the Espoo Report was based on the use of array seal scarers (to which Nord Stream 2 AG has committed). This has been demonstrated to be effective in greatly reducing the risk that marine mammals are very close when the detonation occurs and thus also that they suffer significant blast injury or death due to exposure to the shock wave from the explosion.. It is important to note that munitions clearance operations will be carried during the ice-free period, i.e. outside the sensitive period for marine mammals The methodology adopted in the assessment however also recognises the vulnerability of the ringed seal, in particular the Gulf of Finland population and the importance of individuals within that population. Thus, even though the likelihood of blast injuries occurring is small, a precautionary moderate impact ranking (i.e. potentially significant ranking) was allocated at both population and individual level to this population of ringed seals in the assessment documented in the Espoo Report. However, subsequent to the submission of the Espoo Report and as stated above, Nord Stream 2 AG has committed to use bubble curtains for in situ clearance of munitions in the vicinity of the most sensitive receptors in the Finnish EEZ. The reduction of 6-8 db in underwater noise levels resulting from their application will thus ensure that any impacts on these sites and population are not significant. An updated assessment based on the use of bubble curtains as an additional mitigation measures will be submitted to the competent Finnish authorities as part of the Water Permit application. It is also correct that detonation of underwater munitions causes a small and localised dispersion of seabed sediments and hence also potentially of sediment-associated contaminants. These have therefore also been assessed in the Espoo Report, supported by numerical modelling of the dispersion of sediments and sediment-associated contaminants and shown not to be significant. 5 Statement from WWF and BUND about Ringed Seals Statement WWF and BUND state that at the beginning of the 20th century, ringed seals constituted the largest seal population in the Baltic Sea, comprising a total of approx. 200,000. As a result of selective hunting, climate change and environmental pollution leading to sterility, the number of ringed seals was reduced in the 1980s to 5,000 and has since recovered to 15,000-20,000. The current situation of the ringed seal population in the Baltic Sea is summarised in the following WWF study: WWF Finland Report The Baltic Ringed Seal, Ahola et al (Download: The ringed seal population in the Baltic Sea is subdivided into four populations. The smallest of these comprises 100 individual animals and is located in the Gulf of Finland. The following section looks at the occurrence of ringed seals in this area according to adjacent countries. W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINGEREN

25 Page 13 of 14 The main resting sites of the ringed seal in Russia are the coastal area of the Kurgalsky peninsula at the Narva Bay and the Moshchny and Malvy Island reefs to the north-west of it. Here there has also been a sharp decrease in the population in recent decades. More than 100 ringed seals were counted here in the 1990s, while in the years no more than 40 animals were observed resting. At nearby Malvy Island, sighting figures dropped from to 2-3 individuals. Helcom published the results of a ringed seal radio marking investigation as part of the BALSAM project in 2015: This also shows that the waters of the Narva Bay and the islands to north of it constitute a key ringed seal habitat. In Estonia the last ringed seal populations have been observed around the islands of Vaindloo and Uhiju. The entire Estonian coast was once inhabited by ringed seals. In Finland, most ringed seals in the Gulf of Finland have been registered on ice floes in the easternmost area near the Russian border, with a maximum of 16 individuals. At the Hamina archipelago there have been individual sightings of young animals. This report shows clearly that the main area of distribution of the highly endangered ringed seal in the Gulf of Finland overlaps directly with the sections shown in the project area where the level for a permanent and temporary hearing threshold shift is exceeded for seals in connection with the detonation of munitions. It must therefore be assumed that the noise of underwater explosions (M1-M3 in Russia and M1 in Finland) would reach the ringed seal habitats situated in this area and that individuals of the protected species would be killed by the blast wave. Even though some colony sites are not located in the direct environment of the detonation, it is impossible to prevent ringed seals from being in the sea water in the immediate surroundings of the blasts. The probability of this occurring is in fact very high since the colonies (see above) are situated around the planned detonation centres (M1-M3 in Russia and M1 in Finland) and the animals pass back and forth between the colonies, so ringed seals could be directly impacted by the blast. Answer Baltic ringed seals population size in the Gulf of Finland Estimated number of Baltic ringed seals in the Finland Gulf, based on results of aerial surveys for the period , remains low and amounts to maximum 100 individuals. Nord Stream 2 AG initiated these studies in 2013 (as part of Nord Stream extension feasibility study) and in Experts confirm that main part of population is concentrated within Russian waters with main haul-outs being north of Kurgalsky peninsula and islands Moschnyi and Malyi. This also corresponds with Helcom BALSAM 2015 data and confirms that the Narva Bay route option in Russia avoids the main habitats of Baltic ringed seals. Environmental Impact Assessment The description and assessments of the impacts from Nord Stream 2 on marine mammals in general including those relating to the ringed seal populations have been provided by the Danish Centre for Energy and Environment (DCE), which is a part of the University of Aarhus in Denmark 1. The BALSAM data referred to in the WWF comments have indeed been used as source for the description of the distribution of ringed seals. 1 Sveegaard, S., Galatius, A. & Tougaard, J Marine mammals in Finnish, Russian and Estonian waters in relation to the Nord Stream 2 project Expert Assessment. Aarhus University, DCE Danish Centre for Environment and Energy, Commissioned report from DCE Danish Centre for Environment and Energy, to Rambøll/Nord Stream 2. W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINGEREN

26 Page 14 of 14 The assessment documented in the Espoo Report was based on the use of array seal scarers (to which Nord Stream 2 has committed). This has been demonstrated to be effective in greatly reducing the risk that marine mammals are very close when the detonation occurs and thus also that they suffer significant blast injury or death due to exposure to the shock wave from the explosion. Notably the DCE report concludes that the Lofitech device is considered effective in deterring seals out to a distance of at least some hundred meters 2. At further distances, out to around 1 km, the seals may not be deterred, but will change their behaviour and spend more time at the surface 3. Using the proposed setup described in the Espoo report, where several (four) scarers will be used, seals would be displaced from an area within at least 500 m from the detonation site, beyond which they would be more surface active up to approximately 1300 m from the detonation site. The methodology adopted in the assessment however also recognises the vulnerability of the ringed seal, in particular the Gulf of Finland population and the importance of individuals within that population. Thus, even though the likelihood of blast injuries occurring is small, a precautionary moderate impact ranking (i.e potentially significant ranking) has been allocated at both population and individual level to this population of ringed seals. However, subsequent to the submission of the Espoo Report and as stated above, Nord Stream 2 AG has committed to use bubble curtains for in situ clearance of munitions in the vicinity of the most sensitive receptors in the Finnish EEZ. The location where such measures will be adopted are thus those in proximity to Natura 2000 sites (with seals listed as a conservation objective) and to those areas known to be used by the Gulf of Finland ringed seal population in the Finnish EEZ. The reduction of 6-8 db in underwater noise levels resulting from their application will thus ensure that any impacts on these sites and population are not significant. An updated assessment based on the use of bubble curtains as an additional mitigation measures will be submitted to the competent Finnish authorities as part of the Water Permit application. 2 Mikkelsen, L., L. Hermannsen, and J. Tougaard "Effect of seal scarers on seals. Literature review for the Danish Energy Agency." In, 19. Roskilde: Aarhus University, DCE. 3 Gordon, J., C. Blight, E. Bryant, and D. Thompson "Tests of acoustic signals for aversive sound mitigation with harbour seals. Report to Scottish Government Marine Mammal Scientific Support Research Programme MMSS/001/11." In. St. Andrews: SMRU. W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINGEREN

27 Nord Stream 2 Espoo Consultation Finland - Latvia Responses to Relevant Comments to the Espoo Report in the Statement from Latvia

28 Page 2 of 6 Table of Contents 1 Introduction Emergency Preparedness in case of Oil Spill Pipelay with DP Vessels and Munitions Detonation Reference to Ventspils in the Espoo Report... 5 W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINLATEN

29 1 Introduction Page 3 of 6 The Espoo Convention defines a transboundary impact as any impact, not exclusively of a global nature, within an area under the jurisdiction of a Party caused by a proposed activity the physical origin of which is situated wholly or in part within the area under the jurisdiction of another Party. Nord Stream 2 s Espoo Report addresses any potential transboundary impact on Latvia that could be caused by a proposed activity taking place in the Finnish EEZ. In the framework of the Espoo consultation process for Nord Stream 2, Latvia has provided a statement including comments to Nord Stream 2 s Espoo Report. The Finnish Competent Authority for the Environmental Impact Assessment has asked Nord Stream 2 AG to respond to relevant comments from Latvia. This document provides the responses to these comments. 2 Emergency Preparedness in case of Oil Spill Statement Another separate issue with great importance is the establishing and ensuring of early warning system for accidents, awareness and possibility of rescue services in the case of emergency to deal with potential accidents. Environmental vulnerability mapping and ranking has been carried out as a part of the project "Sub-regional risk of spill of oil and hazardous substances in the Baltic Sea (BRISK)". Maps covering environmental vulnerability in relation to oil spills have been determined and drift simulations were carried out to determine the likelihood of an area being contaminated by spilled oil. We conclude that even though with low probability, the simulation of the probability of oil after two days shows, that to some extent oil spills can reach Latvian waters. We agree that the HELCOM countries have adopted a recommendation on the development of national ability to respond to accidental spills of oil and other harmful substances. The specified response times for combating oil spills are that within six hours the spill location shall be reached in the response region of the respective country; an adequate and substantial on-site response action must be implemented within 12 hours; countermeasures against a spill of oil or hazardous substances should be initiated within two days. Nevertheless we consider that EIA report should not only refer to these provisions, but should also contain a notification model or chart, identifying the actions and time frames in state of an emergency for notification of responsible institutions in the affected countries. Answer For the scope of the offshore pipeline construction activities an Emergency Response Plan (ERP) will be prepared and implemented in line with HELCOM requirements. The ERP will minimise and where possible mitigate against the HSES effects of unplanned environmental accidents (e.g. fuel/ oil spills, disturbance of munitions, pipeline failure or vessel collisions). The ERP will include measures such as the following: Emergency notification plan and assigned emergency responders at all worksites, to ensure fast and appropriate response. Emergency plans will be documented, accessible and easily understood. The effectiveness of plans and procedures will be regularly reviewed and improved as required W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINLATEN

30 Page 4 of 6 Plans and procedures will be supported by training and, where appropriate, drills. Specification of safety equipment. Oil spill response equipment, including IMO approved spill kits, will be held on Project vessels and equipment lists will be maintained. Project vessels will be equipped with emergency oil spill response procedures and staff will be trained in the application of such procedures. Tier 1 category incidents will be responded using an approved Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP). The SOPEP will cover hazardous materials, waste and oil. A dedicated Oil Spill Prevention and Response Plan (OSPRP) will be developed (by ORSL) as a contingency for Tier 2 and 3 oil spills. 3 Pipelay with DP Vessels and Munitions Detonation Statement The Latvian Environmental State Bureau considers it is crucial to use dynamically positioned vessels during the construction to diminish necessity for munitions clearance and possible impacts of anchoring in the territory where mine risk is high. It is of utmost importance, especially taking into consideration several places in the Baltic Sea, where mines or chemical ammunition objects are found during investigations, which asks for very precise laying of pipeline to avoid unnecessary additional accidents. It is necessary to find best compromise between necessity to ensure safe laying of the pipeline by blasting or removing dangerous objects (founded in the vicinity of pipeline route) and the negative effects of blasting as such. Necessary mitigation measures before and during blasting have to be ensured to minimize the possible negative effects. Answer Nord Stream 2 AG agrees that dynamically positioned (DP) pipe lay vessels will eliminate the necessity for munitions clearance of an anchor corridor which would be required for anchor lay vessels. Accordingly, DP lay vessels will be utilized for areas where our surveys show high concentrations of munitions, including the Gulf of Finland. Nord Stream 2 is observing the mitigation hierarchy with respect to munitions whereby, in addition to the use of a DP lay vessel, local rerouting will be undertaken to avoid munitions where feasible. Where rerouting is not possible, Nord Stream 2 considers various technical alternatives to conventional munitions clearance methods as well as additional mitigation measures for in situ clearance. Standard munitions clearance methods utilised by the navies in the Baltic Sea including the annual international NATO manoeuvre Open Spirit, comprise in-situ clearance by detonation. The Nord Stream project implemented a number of mitigation measures for such in-situ clearance work in the Gulf of Finland, including the use of marine mammal observers, passive acoustic monitoring and acoustic deterrents (seal scrammers). Nord Stream 2 AG has already committed to these for the Nord Stream 2 project to ensure there are no marine mammals, large shoals of fish or diving birds in the area prior to detonation. Further munitions clearance operations as well as all offshore construction activities for the Nord Stream 2 project will be carried during the ice-free period, i.e. outside the sensitive period for the grey and ringed seals. W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINLATEN

31 Page 5 of 6 In addition to these standard mitigation measures, Nord Stream 2 has evaluated a range of technical alternatives to conventional munitions clearance methods as follows: Deflagration (low order burn as opposed to a high order detonation) Water jet cutting Salvage operations using freezing techniques Salvage operations using robotics Detonation just below the surface Use of lifting bags to move munitions away from the route A novel technique involve the adaption of a barge to incorporate a munitions bunker where salvaged munitions would be safely detonated. Nord Stream 2 has also assessed a range of additional mitigation for the propagation of underwater noise associated with in-situ clearance and considered the following measures in more detail, including their suitability for application in the Gulf of Finland: Minimum donor charges including the use of shaped charges Use of bubble curtains to reduce pressure waves during blasting Having analysed above mentioned mitigation measures for in-situ clearance, Nord Stream 2 AG has committed to use bubble curtains for in situ clearance of munitions, in the vicinity of the most sensitive receptors. The location where such measures will be adopted are thus those in proximity to Natura 2000 sites (with seals listed as a conservation objective) and to those areas known to be used by the Gulf of Finland ringed seal population in the Finnish EEZ. The reduction of 6-8 db in underwater noise levels resulting from their application will further ensure that any impacts on these sites and population are not significant. 4 Reference to Ventspils in the Espoo Report Statement In order to achieve a safe and smooth supply chain, the Nord Stream 2 project plans on using onshore facilities comprising two weight coating plants in Kotka, Finland, and Mukran, Germany, and four pipe storage yards located in Finland, Sweden and Germany. However, as stated in the EIA Report, - the logistics concept is subject to further optimisation, and the possibility to use the Freeport of Ventspils in Latvia as an additional pipe storage yard is being considered. It was concluded in the public meeting that was held in Riga on 6th of June 2017, that the use the Freeport of Ventspils in Latvia is no longer being considered, because it does not meet the necessary criteria required for the involvement in the Nord Stream 2 project. We kindly ask the project developers to amend the EIA Report accordingly and to remove references to Freeport of Ventspils from the text of EIA documentation. Answer The logistics concept described in the Espoo Report is based on two weight coating plants in Kotka, Finland, and Mukran, Germany, and four pipe storage yards located in Finland, Sweden and Germany as shown in Figure 6-1 of the Espoo Report. Using the Freeport of Ventspils is only mentioned as a possibility in the Espoo Report. Nord Stream 2 AG has stated in the public meeting that was held in Riga on 6 June 2017 that using the Freeport of Ventspils is no longer a consideration. This consequently means that the logistics concept as described in the Espoo Report is valid as it is based on two weight coating plants in Kotka, W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINLATEN

32 Page 6 of 6 Finland, and Mukran, Germany, and four pipe storage yards located in Finland, Sweden and Germany. An amendment to the described logistics concept in the Espoo Report is therefore not required. W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINLATEN

33 Nord Stream 2 Espoo Consultation Finland - Lithuania Responses to Relevant Comments to the Espoo Report in the Statement from Lithuania

34 Page 2 of 14 Table of Contents 1 Introduction Energy Union, Gas Market and Project Rationale Assessment Methodology Route Alternatives, Onshore Pipeline Fisheries Genotoxic Impacts Natura Emergency Response Compensation of Damages Environmental Monitoring Crossing of Infrastructure W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINLITEN

35 Page 3 of 14 1 Introduction The Espoo Convention defines a transboundary impact as any impact, not exclusively of a global nature, within an area under the jurisdiction of a Party caused by a proposed activity the physical origin of which is situated wholly or in part within the area under the jurisdiction of another Party. Nord Stream 2 s Espoo Report addresses any potential transboundary impact on Lithuania that could be caused by a proposed activity taking place in the Finnish EEZ. In the framework of the Espoo consultation process for Nord Stream 2, Lithuania has provided a statement including comments to Nord Stream 2 s Espoo Report. The Finnish Competent Authority for the Environmental Impact Assessment has asked Nord Stream 2 AG to respond to relevant comments from Lithuania. This document provides the responses to these comments. 2 Energy Union, Gas Market and Project Rationale Statement Lithuania is deeply concerned with the Nord Stream 2 project. These concerns are geopolitical, legal and environmental. The Nord Stream 2 project in our view goes against the aims of European Union (hereinafter - EU) policy on climate change mitigation, energy security, Energy Union and gas supply diversification. Lithuania maintains its consistent position that all energy infrastructure projects with European relevance needs to be compatible with EU law (incl. EU Third Energy Package) and EU energy policy objectives. Lithuania supports the European Commission's view that Nord Stream 2 would facilitate expansion of Gazprom's position on EU's main gas markets and increase Europe's dependence on one supplier and on one route. Lithuania also supports European Commission's position that Nord Stream 2 project contradicts EU's core energy policy objectives - energy security and diversification of routes and of sources - and that there is no need in the EU for such additional infrastructure. The implementation of this project would allow the single supplier (Russian Federation) to dominate the European gas market, undermining regional energy security. It will merely add one more route from the same supplier and will increase already great EU dependence on this supplier. The assumptions made by the developer regarding the necessity to increase the capacity of EU natural gas import are not enough justified, as the current EU gas import capacity is twice the annual demand for natural gas import. Moreover, after the implementation of the planned natural gas import infrastructure projects in the EU, the total EU natural gas import capacity would be three times higher than the annual EU demand for gas import. Therefore, a full-scope analysis, that would clearly identify all economic and social estimations assessing the impacts of the Nord Stream 2 project on the balance change of natural gas suppliers in the EU; the dominance of single natural gas supplier in the EU gas market and the need for another natural gas route from the same supplier should be carried out prior the permitting of the project. A more detailed analysis of the Nord Stream 2 impact to the current and alternative gas supplies (gas flows) should be carried out to ensure that Nord Stream 2 would not create any adverse effects to market access for alternative gas suppliers, also to maintain a balanced level of capacity for the gas supply from Russia for EU internal gas market. Also, a more detailed project's assessment against the EU W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINLITEN

36 Page 4 of 14 regulatory and policy framework is needed to justify its compliance with EU law and energy policy objectives. The project should be permitted only if such analysis provides undeniable evidence of its economic validity and compliance with EU climate and energy policy taking into account EU Third Energy Package requirements, the objectives set out in the Energy Union Strategy such as free third party access to the natural gas transmission networks in Europe, increasing competition between gas suppliers, diversification of resources, as well as the goals of 2020 Climate and Energy Package, 2030 Climate and Energy Framework and a Roadmap for Moving to a Competitive Low Carbon Economy in On the 9th of June 2017, the European Commission have asked the Member States for a mandate to negotiate with Russia an agreement on the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project. Lithuania urges all Parties of Origin to proceed with any permit granting procedures only when (and if) such negotiations will be concluded. Answer The reasoning why additional transport capacity for Russian gas is required in order to ensure security of supply for the EU is elaborated in detail in section 2 (project justification) of the Espoo report. These findings are based on, and backed up by, relevant third party studies by reputable expert organisations (e.g. PROGNOS AG). Summarising the key arguments, the following can be stated: The EU continuously faces decreasing domestic production and thus a growing import requirement to meet its demand. At the same time, gas imports from sources like Norway and North Africa are about to decline because of decreasing export capabilities (for different individual reasons). This effect is not limited to some future timeframe but is happening now already. By the early 2020s, this situation will get increasingly more challenging for the EU supply balance, as the LNG market is forecasted to tighten, constraining the cargoes available for Europe. In addition, this competition over available LNG supplies could be even stiffer during a cold winter in the northern hemisphere, and in cases of peaks in gas demand (e.g. nuclear outages such as in France in 2016/17) or shocks in supply (e.g. Groningen field earthquakes). The result of these risks materializing at a time of constrained LNG availability would be peaks in gas price or even a gas shortage. Looking at these risks, Russian pipeline gas will be an available unrestricted supply source, able to react to higher supply requirements from the European markets. However, to secure this supply, reliable and sustainably available additional pipeline capacities are needed. The inadequate condition of the pipeline system transporting Russian gas through the Central Corridor via the Ukraine towards the EU means that the supplies on the Central Corridor cannot be considered as sustainably available beyond what the operators in the Ukraine and the international lenders provide for in terms of repair funds. When these restrictions and risk scenarios are factored in, Nord Stream 2 capacities will be necessary to cover the increasing import gap of the EU as of Moreover, Nord Stream 2 will not increase dependency from a single supplier and in fact rather drive the EU objectives of further diversification and greater flexibility in natural gas supply. Nord Stream 2 as a mere transport infrastructure can and will not impact (or increase) demand for natural gas in the EU. Diversification is a valid strategy to hedge against risks and ensure competition on the EU s internal market. Nord Stream 2 as an additional supply W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINLITEN

37 Page 5 of 14 route contributes to this objective. The Northern Corridor with Nord Stream 2 and the Bovanenkovo field will deliver diversification of supply routes Nord Stream 2 will be completely independent of the existing Nord Stream pipeline both in terms of routing and operations/systems and access to a new vast, low-cost and already-developed gas reserve. When calling for diversification, the European Commission s approach also has to account for the realities of where the gas can realistically come from and how affordable it is to be shipped to the EU. Nord Stream 2 thus is not aiming at replacing any other transport route. It is part of an additional new route corridor that will provide access for European consumers to the largest Russian gas reserves in North-Western Siberia. It is the most direct, competitive and environmentally friendly transport route to European markets. The very idea behind completing a genuine EU internal energy market is to make it irrelevant where gas comes from. This process is underway, with more liquid gas hubs and trading, better interconnectors and more transparency. Nord Stream 2 will also support the achievement of the ambitious and committed climate targets of the EU. In fact, using natural gas and working towards emission reduction targets are not mutually exclusive, quite the contrary. Nord Stream 2 AG agrees that much remains to be done for the EU to reach its 2050 goal of 80-95% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. Looked at from today s perspective, many technological approaches to this goal become identifiable, with an increased share of various forms of renewable energy playing a priority role in all of them. However, all these approaches have to be able to pass the test of engineering feasibility and economic viability. Germany, the largest energy consumer in the EU, emits around 900 million tonnes of CO 2 per year, more than any other EU country. As Germany approaches the deadline for the closure of its last nuclear power plants in the early 2020s, emissions have increased, due to increased quantity of coal burned in the power generation process. The role of natural gas has been discussed in many studies, including the latest WWF energy model for a German coal phase-out (Zukunft Stromsystem Kohleausstieg 2035), which sees gas as playing a bigger role, both in Germany (depending on the scale of the proposed increase in the contribution of renewables and of the corresponding coal phase-out), and in neighbouring countries. To ensure that gas can play this role, a well-supplied, competitive and resilient gas market is needed. As European domestic production continues its long decline, more of this supply will need to be imported in the coming years. These new imports will need a new reliable and efficient infrastructure, to allow gas to be transported from the gas fields to the market. This is why Nord Stream 2 is important for Europe. For every 55 billion cubic metres of gas that can be brought to Europe and used to replace coal in power generation, up to 160 million tonnes of CO 2 can be saved, representing approximately 14% of the emissions generated by the EU power generation industry. Nord Stream 2 AG has also compared its proposed system with other transport options, in terms of efficiency and methane gas emissions. A study recently published by the WWF highlights the benefits of LNG as a replacement for fuel oil in marine transport. However, when used in large quantities as a fuel in the European energy system, the emissions generated by the LNG production and importing process make pipeline gas the superior option. A detailed analysis of alternative transport options shows the clear advantage of Nord Stream 2 over both onshore pipelines and LNG supply chains in terms of efficiency and reduced emissions. W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINLITEN

38 Page 6 of 14 3 Assessment Methodology Statement Impacts of the Nord Stream 2 project have been mainly assessed using only qualitative criteria (i.e. negligible, small, medium or large). Such approach does not reflect the real impacts that can be estimated using quantitative criteria. In most cases, the environmental impacts are assessed as negligible or small, however application of quantitative criteria may lead to different assessment results and identification of unforeseen adverse effects. Answer As outlined in Section 7.5 of the Espoo Report the terms low, medium, high etc. refer to rankings rather than criteria for allocation of such rankings. These rankings are, however, determined through the systematic application of criteria relating to the importance and sensitivity of receptors, and the magnitude of impacts. As shown in Tables 7-5 to 7-13 of the Espoo Report, these criteria may be quantitative or qualitative, or a combination of the two. For example, the importance of a species may be determined by its conservation status (e.g classification in various Red Lists) and/or its function in the ecosystem (e.g. as food source for species higher in the food chain) which cannot be expressed numerically. However, elements of the magnitude of an impact can often be expressed quantitatively e.g. the percentage of a species population affected, level of noise experienced, extent of sediment dispersion etc. Where this is the case these have been determined through numerical modelling or quantitative monitoring results. Thus quantitative data and criteria have therefore provided the foundation for much of the assessment. This approach to EIA is widely adopted and reflects the methods provided in most guidance relating to that process. These recognise that, due to the complexity of the environment and how it responds to perturbations, its characteristics and the consequences of any impact on it cannot be expressed in purely quantitative terms. The adherence to well defined criteria as provided in Tables , however, ensures there is both consistency and transparency in the allocation of rankings, whether based on qualitative or quantitative criteria. There is thus a robust audit trail for the ranking adopted, which means the same effects and scale would be predicted should the assessment be repeated. Thus previously unforeseen effects would not materialise through such a repeated exercise, as stated in the submission. 4 Route Alternatives, Onshore Pipeline Statement Lithuania still believes that the gas pipeline land route (e.g. onshore route through Ukraine) is a viable alternative of the gas supply from Russia to Europe taking into account the likely long-term impacts and the sensitivity of the Baltic Sea. Therefore, the land alternatives should be subjected to detailed analysis in the EIA documentation and their impacts should be compared with the impacts of the sea alternative, in order to justify that offshore pipeline is the optimal choice from the environmental, socioeconomic and technical point of view. W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINLITEN

39 Page 7 of 14 Answer The Espoo Report demonstrates that the proposed offshore pipeline does not result in major impacts. Only a small number of moderate impacts are predicted and the majority of impacts that may arise will be minor or negligible i.e. not significant. As set out Section 5 of the Espoo Report, comprehensive route considerations have been undertaken during several phases, starting with the North Transgas project in 1995 to the development of the Nord Stream and subsequently also by Nord Stream 2. The previous assessed alternatives form the basis of the routing that is currently being considered for Nord Stream 2. During the previous Nord Stream project, requests to consider an onshore alignment were put forward by the stakeholders during the permitting process. In the project s response to this, it was apparent that onshore pipelines entail additional environmental and socio-economic effects in comparison with offshore projects. Onshore pipeline challenges include human settlements, roads, railways, canals, rivers, surface landforms, agricultural land, site reinstatement and potentially sensitive ecosystems and cultural heritage sites. Furthermore, overland pipelines also require additional infrastructure sites such as compressor stations approximately every 200 km to maintain pressure for gas transport flow, which would require significant land and energy usage while emitting noise and emissions to air. Transmission is also less efficient compared with offshore pipelines. Experience with Nord Stream confirmed that impacts were localised and temporary and demonstrated that offshore pipelines are the most advantageous approach with respect to all considered aspects, including environmental, cost, supply capacity and security. For these reasons, there has been no further consideration of an onshore alternative in the Espoo Report. According to a study conducted by KPMG on the Ukrainian gas market where the key results of a detailed third party study on the technical condition of the Ukrainian transport pipeline system are quoted (non-public third party study, conducted by leading engineering firm, Mott McDonald, in 2011), the Ukrainian transport pipeline system is in an inadequate condition. Apparently, there is a significant investment/maintenance backlog. The required repairs are planned and financed (with loans from EBRD and EIB) only for one pipeline (U-P-U) with an annual capacity of about 30 bcm/a. This is the reason why the sustainably available capacity for gas transit from Russia to the EU through the Ukrainian transport pipeline system can only be stated with 30 bcm/a. The theoretically higher capacity of about 120 bcm/year cannot be assumed to be sustainable. The other corridor to bring Russian gas to the EU, though the Yamal Europe pipeline is already operating at maximum capacity today and is expected to continue to do so in the future as well. Other pipeline infrastructures dedicated to connect the Russian gas fields with the EU gas market are neither planned nor financed. So, there are no realistic existing land alternatives. 5 Fisheries Statement EU legislation regulating fisheries in the Baltic Sea allows the Member States to fish in the exclusive economic zones of other countries (hereinafter - EEZ), therefore the negative impacts on the fish stocks in any EEZ will also negatively affect the business of Lithuanian fishermen. Increased noise and water turbidity during construction and operation of the W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINLITEN

40 Page 8 of 14 pipeline, possible oil spillage and the spread of toxic substances in the water after the movement of seabed sediment or the damage of the dumped chemical munitions will have adverse impacts on fauna, flora and fish stocks by affecting spawning, causing malformations, intoxicating fish, and damaging the fish nutritional base. The direct and longterm negative impacts on the fishing industry in Lithuania will also be caused by the loss of fishing areas, longer fishing routes, higher fishing costs due to bypass of the pipeline routes. Therefore, the Espoo Report should contain methodology and procedure on calculation of losses for fishermen and the size of damages. Answer Noise As outlined in the Espoo report (Section ) the only source of underwater noise that will be sufficiently loud to potentially result in fish injury (tissue damage to hearing apparatus) or mortality is munitions detonation. Modelling results show that the noise levels that could potentially cause risk of mortality will, depending on the context (munition size etc.), extend m from the detonation site while those that could cause injury could extend up to 1.5 km from it (Table 10.36). While the detonation may result in some mortalities over a limited area, numbers of fish affected will be extremely low compared to the population level and will not impact on any important spawning or nursery areas which are too distant from all munitions areas in the Gulf of Finland to be affected. Such a level of impact will not affect the viability or functioning of the fish populations or fisheries that depend on them and is therefore not considered significant. Other activities that generate underwater noise, including rock placement, may result in avoidance behaviour by fish species in their close proximity, but the fish will return a short time after the cessation of activities so that no significant impacts are predicted. It is also noted that none of these impacts will extend into Lithuanian waters. Oil spills The risk of an oil spill from one of the construction vessels have has been calculated in chapter 13 of the Espoo Report. The total annual frequency of oil spills resulting from construction activities is estimated to 1.6x10-4 oil spills per year (>1 tonnes), corresponding to a return period of 6,200 years. Statistically, the number of oil spill accidents in the Baltic Sea has been estimated to be 2.9 per year (HELCOM, 2002, Environment of the Baltic Sea area Helsinki Commission 2002, Baltic Sea Environmental Proceedings No. 82B). The increased risk of accidental spills introduced by the activities related to the construction of the pipeline is hence in the order of magnitude of 0.01%, compared with the situation without construction activities. Increased turbidity and spread of toxins As outlined in Table of the Espoo Report release and resettlement of sediment and associated release of pollutants and nutrients has potential to give rise to more than minor impacts on fish. Nord Stream 2 AG has undertaken extensive investigations of the effects of the sediment redistribution and re-sedimentation on the pelagic and benthic environment of the Baltic Sea. Based on the calculated volumes of sediments released during the seabed intervention works (trenching and rock placement) and the average concentrations of W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINLITEN

41 Page 9 of 14 nutrients and pollutants in the sediments, the releases of nitrogen, phosphorous, heavy metals and organic contaminants from sediment were predicted, as well as their dispersion characteristics and the resulting increase in their concentrations in the water column and their spatial extent and duration. Potential contamination hotspots, i.e. areas where sediment concentrations of heavy metals and/or organic contaminants or CWAs exceeds the measured mean values, are restricted to deep parts of the route, where the seabed is below the halo- and thermoclines i.e. layers where there are high gradients in salinity and temperature respectively and living organisms are scarce or absent due to the low oxygen content of the bottom water. Modelled results of the dispersion of contaminants for representative scenarios are shown in Atlas Maps MO-04-Espoo and MO-05-Espoo. Further comparison of the predicted amounts of released contaminants with the regional inputs from other sources (riverine, atmospheric, ship traffic, diffuse sources, etc.) shows that volumes released to the water column due to Nord Stream 2 construction will be much less (generally less than a few %), and that the spatial extent of any small increase in contaminant or nutrient level that may occur will be extremely limited (areas and amounts are summarized in Tables 10-2, 10-3, 10-4, and 10-5 in the Espoo Report). This is partly due to the fact that only a minor fraction (in the order of 10 %) of the contaminants released into the water column will become bioavailable; the majority will remain bound to the sediment particles and therefore settle to the seabed within similar distances In some parts of the proposed Nord Stream 2 route, the sediment may contain chemical warfare agents (CWA) i.e. toxic substances that may have been released from chemical munitions that were dumped on the seabed, or the by-products of their degradation. Concentrations of CWA and their by-products measured within the sediment were used to determine the worst-case concentrations of such agents that could occur in the water column as a result of their release from sediments during seabed interventions. These calculations showed that CWA released from the sediment will not pose a threat to marine life (Sanderson, H. and Patrik Fauser, P., 2016, Prospective added environmental risk assessment from re-suspension of chemical warfare agents following the installation of the Nord Stream 2 pipelines Aarhus University, Department of Environmental Science). The duration of any increased contaminant, nutrient, and CWA or their by- product levels that may occur in the water column will be short term (maximum of the order of a few days but typically much less). This very small and localised increases in concentrations of contaminants or nutrients that may occur at selected location, will be insufficient to result in adverse impacts on fauna, flora and fish stocks by affecting spawning, causing malformations, intoxicating fish, and damaging the fish nutritional base which by their nature is dependent on repeated exposure. These predictions are supported by empirical evidence, relating the potential for bioaccumulation in benthic fauna, from the monitoring of Nord Stream construction. Effects on fishing industry With regards to the operational phase is has to be noted that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is designed in the same way as the already existing Nord Stream pipeline and both pipeline systems are confirmed to be over-trawlable, hence no fishing areas are lost and there are no longer fishing routes nor are there higher fishing costs due to bypass of the pipeline W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINLITEN

42 Page 10 of 14 routes. The fishing activities (value of catches) by Lithuanian fishermen are mapped in the Espoo Atlas map FC-15-Espoo - the information is gathered from relevant authorities. 6 Genotoxic Impacts Statement Sections of the Espoo Report on biota assessment include and describe only general biological parameters (fauna, flora, fish, birds, etc.) which are not very informative in assessing the early and long-term biological changes that may occur as a result of the construction, testing or operation of the gas pipeline. Long-term ( ) environmental genotoxicity studies in 395 research stations in the Baltic Sea revealed a tremendous increase in genotoxicity in open sea areas in compared with the period of In the open areas of the Baltic Sea from the Gulf of Finland to the south, dominates a particularly high environmental genotoxicity risk degree for the survival of fish populations (Barsiene et al., 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016). In 2016 the decrease of environmental genotoxicity risk is observed only in some littoral areas of Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Sweden. The implementation of the Nord Stream 2 project will very likely provoke a new wave of environmental degradation for a period of 5-7 years, which will undoubtedly have a negative impact on the functioning of marine organisms, in particular fish, populations. During the construction phase, the gas pipeline will be laid not only in the areas where the collision with the chemical or conventional munitions is possible, but also in the accumulation zones of the various pollutants (such as heavy metals and organic pollutants). However, the Espoo Report does not provide clear information, whether the early biological effects of the secondary pollution caused by environmentally harmful substances (due to seabed intervention works in such areas) are assessed. In addition, the Espoo Report does not define the long-term ecotoxicological consequences of the secondary pollution. It is unclear which indicators will be used to monitor the ecosystem health in such areas and whether the long-term projections of pollution and biological effects correlation will be well targeted. Ecotoxicological impact assessment using sensitive bio-indicative and bio-testing methods is necessary in the secondary pollution zones. The determination of changes in the genotoxicity of the environment should be carried out in the areas of dumped munitions and pollution accumulation zones in order to correctly assess the adverse impacts on the Baltic Sea ecosystem. Moreover, such assessment should take into account the ecotoxicological consequences of the implementation of the Nord Stream project. Answer Consideration of bioaccumulation of contaminants and potential for genotoxic impacts within organisms and the food chain is provided in the Espoo Report Sections , 3,4 and 5 (Benthic flora and fauna, fish, birds, mammals) and (humans). The statement from Lithuania highlights an increase in genotoxicity observed in the Baltic Sea in the period Both modelling of sediment/contaminant dispersion and environmental monitoring performed during Nord Stream construction shows that the amounts of CWA or other contaminants that were suspended in the water phase during seabed interventions were small (orders of magnitude below applicable toxicity thresholds) and short-lived, and were insufficient to have negatively affected the fish populations. They W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINLITEN

43 Page 11 of 14 thus demonstrate that the changes experienced during this period are not related to Nord Stream Nord Stream 2 AG however recognise that the Baltic Sea is a heavily polluted basin, with a vast number of studies showing high concentrations of different pollutants in fish tissue. It has thus undertaken extensive investigations of the effects of the sediment redistribution and re-sedimentation on the pelagic and benthic environment of the Baltic Sea and adopted a precautionary approach in the assessment of such effects. Based on the calculated volumes of sediments released during the seabed intervention works (trenching and rock placement) and the average concentrations of nutrients and pollutants contained in the sediments the releases of nitrogen, phosphorous, heavy metals and organic contaminants from sediment were predicted, as well as their dispersion characteristics and the resulting increase in their concentrations in the water column and their spatial extent and duration were modelled. The modelling results are presented in the Espoo-report (Section 10.1 and in Appendix 3) and the dispersion of contaminants for representative scenarios shown in Atlas Maps MO-04- Espoo and MO-05-Espoo In relation to CWAs, concentrations of 29 different CWAs and their by-products (which had highest detection frequencies in deep waters) measured from 121 sediment samples, were used to determine the worst-case concentrations of such agents that could be present in the sediments subject to seabed interventions. Modelling based on such a worst case concentration, combined with worst-case release rates, showed that even when adopting such a precautionary approach, accepted exposure concentrations (notably predicted no effects concentration (PNEC)) for fish communities will not be exceeded. They therefore will not pose a threat to marine benthic or pelagic life (Sanderson, H. and Patrik Fauser, P., 2016, Prospective added environmental risk assessment from re-suspension of chemical warfare agents following the installation of the Nord Stream 2 pipelines Aarhus University, Department of Environmental Science). Similar arguments apply to other pollutants such as metals and organic contaminants. This arises in part from the fact that metals, organic contaminants and the types of CWA present in the Baltic Sea are poorly soluble in water, and will mainly be present as particulate material that will rapidly resettle on the seabed after getting suspended, In addition potential contamination hotspots, i.e. areas where sediment concentrations of heavy metals and/or organic contaminants and/or CWAs exceed the measured mean values, are mainly restricted to deep parts of the route where the seabed is below the halo- and thermoclines i.e.layers where there are high gradients in salinity and temperature respectively and living organisms are scarce or absent due to the low oxygen content of the bottom water. Although the bottom water is stagnant most of the time, it will eventually be either pushed further into the Baltic Sea or mixed with more shallow water during rare events of saltwater intrusion, occurring every few years. Since the increases in contaminant levels in the bottom water caused by Nord Stream 2 are temporary (on a scale of a few hours to days), the concentration of contaminants will have normalized long before this happens. It is therefore concluded that the construction of Nord Stream 2 twin pipelines will not result in a detectable increase in contaminant levels or in the associated environmental genotoxicity Further, a comparison of the predicted amounts of released contaminants with the regional inputs from other sources (riverine, atmospheric, ship traffic, diffuse sources, etc.) shows that volumes released to the water column due to Nord Stream 2 construction will be much less (generally less than a few %), and that the spatial extent of any small increase in W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINLITEN

44 Page 12 of 14 contaminant or nutrient level that may occur will be extremely limited (areas and amounts are summarized in Tables 10-2, 10-3, 10-4, and 10-5 in the Espoo Report). This is partly due to the fact that only a minor fraction (in the order of 10 %) of the contaminants released into the water column will become bioavailable; the majority will remain bound to the sediment particles and therefore settle to the seabed within similar distances. Furthermore, the duration of any increased contaminant, nutrient, and CWA or their byproduct levels that may occur in the water column will be short term (maximum of the order of a few days but typically much less). This combined with the mobile nature of organisms that may migrate or be transported across national borders (and are thus only present in any location for short period of time) means that the duration of any exposure to the very small and localised increases in concentrations of contaminants or nutrients that may occur at selected location, will be insufficient to result in bioaccumulation, which by its nature is dependent on repeated exposure. It can therefore be concluded that bioaccumulation of contaminants through the food-chain will not occur to an extent that is measurable above the existing background level. Hence no significant genotoxological impacts due to bioaccumulation are predicted on such species, including those that move across borders, and on hence also on humans that consume such species. It can thus be concluded that the long-term pollution and biological effects referred to in the statement will not occur. These predictions, based on a precautionary approach, are supported by empirical evidence, relating the potential for bioaccumulation in benthic fauna, from the monitoring of Nord Stream construction. A monitoring programme of eco-toxicological and physical effects on biota (mussels) was performed by experts from Marine Monitoring at the two Natura 2000 areas, Hoburgs Bank and Norra Midsjöbanken (Sweden) during post-lay trenching that demonstrated that no eco-toxicological or physical impact on mussels occurred. In relation to indicators, the EIA Directive does not specify requirements for monitoring and the Espoo Convention anticipates that the monitoring requirements, and hence associated indicators, will be agreed through the current consultation process between parties. Indicators therefore have yet to be determined and are not included in full in the Espoo Report. However since the assessment documented in the Espoo Report and summarised above identified that there would be no potential for significant ecotoxological effects on biota or on higher species in the food chain, it is anticipated there is unlikely to be any need or justification to monitor their status through indicators based on the above parameters. 7 Natura 2000 Statement In order to verify the analysis of impacts on the Natura 2000 sites, we kindly ask to obtain a preliminary opinion from the European Commission on project implementation, pursuant to the provisions of Article 6(4) of Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora (Habitats Directive). Answer Art. 6 sec. 4 of the Habitats Directive (respectively national implementation of said provision), only stipulates the requirement for an opinion of the Commission in the case of a predicted significant adverse impact on priority natural habitat types and/or priority species. The W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINLITEN

45 Page 13 of 14 potential for significant adverse impacts on the integrity or conservation objectives of Natura 2000 sites to result from the implementation of Nord Stream 2 has been assessed in accordance with the requirements of the Habitats Directive. These assessments concluded that there was no such potential. Consequently, there is no need to ask the European Commission for an opinion in this context. 8 Emergency Response Statement In the Espoo Report it is stated that the developer will prepare and implement an emergency response plan which will also cover cooperation and coordination with relevant Baltic Sea emergency response agencies, however, no details are provided how this cooperation/coordination will be organised (i.e. who will do what and when). As all countries may be affected in case of accidents, a detailed framework covering all countries of the Baltic Sea should be developed in order to ensure that the responsive measures will be taken in the most effective way. Answer A country-specific Maritime Authorities Communications Procedure will be developed for each relevant country, and each vessel will have an Emergency Response Flowchart/procedure in place prior to the start of construction. 9 Compensation of Damages Statement It should be clear that the developer will be liable for the adverse effects on the Baltic Sea ecosystem caused by the implementation of the Nord Stream 2 project; therefore it would be useful to develop a framework for compensation of damages (resulting from the project implementation) which would include legal measures and financial guarantees prior the permitting procedure. Answer Nord Stream 2 carries out all activities based on applicable international law, EU law and national laws. As far as compensation measures are required to be provided for or agreed upon at this stage according to applicable provisions, Nord Stream 2 acts accordingly. Nord Stream 2 will act likewise in the future. There are no legal grounds for further measures in this regard. W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINLITEN

46 Page 14 of Environmental Monitoring Statement The relevant comments and proposals received during transboundary consultation process should be taken into account when preparing the final environmental monitoring programme. Answer Extensive environmental monitoring will take place, both during construction and subsequently during the operational phase. The programs will take into account relevant comments and proposals received during the transboundary consultation process and will be developed in collaboration with, and approved by, national authorities prior to the start of the construction. The monitoring programmes will benefit from experience obtained during the construction and operation of Nord Stream. All results of environmental monitoring will be made publicly available. 11 Crossing of Infrastructure Statement It should be clear that measures will be taken in order to prevent disruption of operation of existing infrastructure in the Baltic Sea (e.g. power and communication cables) as well as restriction of the implementation of the planned infrastructure projects (e.g. gas pipelines and electricity links) during the construction and operation of the Nord Stream 2. Answer Nord Stream 2 AG is in negotiations with the owners of all pipelines and operational cables that will be crossed by Nord Stream 2 about the technical solution for the crossings. Agreement with some cable owners are already in place. The technical solution will be based on standard industry practice, similar to that successfully used for Nord Stream and will be developed in co-operation with both parties. The same approach will apply for future infrastructure projects that will cross Nord Stream 2 when the pipelines are in operation. It is noted that there are dozens of crossings where Nord Stream crosses existing cables and where recent cables have crossed the existing Nord Stream pipelines. W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINLITEN

47 Nord Stream 2 Espoo Consultation Finland - Poland Responses to Relevant Comments to the Espoo Report in the Statement from Poland

48 Page 2 of 58 Table of Contents 1 Introduction Adequate consideration of Natura 2000 sites including Lawica Słupska and Kallbådan Islets and Waters Mitigation for Underwater Noise in Relation to Fish... 6 Appendix A Content of the Espoo Report Assessment of Natura 2000 Network Monitoring Documentation Methodology Modelling and Mitigation Measures Differences Justification for the Investment Implementation and Option Analysis Decommissioning Emergencies Munitions (Conventional and Chemical) and Chemical Warfare Agents Migration between Natura 2000 sites Impact on Harbour Porpoise Noise from Construction Works and Impact on Marine Mammals Impact on Spawning Areas and Movement of Fish Sediments Disturbance and Potential Release of Contaminants Cumulative Impacts Preventive and Mitigation Actions Monitoring Impact on Fish Impact on Fisheries Maritime Planning Climate W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINPOLEN

49 Page 3 of 58 1 Introduction The Espoo Convention defines a transboundary impact as any impact, not exclusively of a global nature, within an area under the jurisdiction of a Party caused by a proposed activity the physical origin of which is situated wholly or in part within the area under the jurisdiction of another Party. Nord Stream 2 s Espoo Report addresses any potential transboundary impact on Poland that could be caused by a proposed activity taking place in the Finnish EEZ. In the framework of the Espoo consultation process for Nord Stream 2, Poland has provided a statement including comments to Nord Stream 2 s Espoo Report. The Finnish Competent Authority for the Environmental Impact Assessment has asked Nord Stream 2 AG to respond to relevant comments from Poland. This document provides the responses to these comments. In addition to providing responses to comments relevant to Finland, Appendix A of this document provides responses to general comments or comments that are not directly attributable to proposed activities taking place in the Finnish EEZ and that are part of the Polish statement. 2 Adequate consideration of Natura 2000 sites including Lawica Słupska and Kallbådan Islets and Waters Statement The Ministry of Environment of Poland states that the area Ławica Słupska (Słupsk Bank) (PLC990001) was omitted in the analyses referring to the pipeline impact on Natura 2000 sites, despite the fact that the need to assess impact on this area had been mentioned in the scoping statement. For other Natura 2000 sites presented in the Espoo Report, the description of the impact is too general, and in the case of some areas, as the authors claim, the assessment at the current stage is not yet complete (Chapter p. 404/405). Therefore, in the case of Kallbådan Islets and Waters, due to the lack of adequate assessment on Natura 2000 site, significant impact cannot be excluded (Table 10-48, p. 405). This confirms the conclusion set out in point 1 of this statement regarding premature commenting on documentation in the transboundary context. Answer In accordance with the requirements of Habitats Directive, Nord Stream 2 AG has carried out Natura 2000 screening assessments and/or, where required, full Natura Assessments of all Natura 2000 sites (existing or proposed) which, based on: the features for which they were designated, the propagation characteristics of impacts arising from Nord Stream 2 to which such feature could be sensitive and the location of the site, could potentially be affected by activities associated with the pipeline s construction or operation. Inclusion of Lawica Slupska (Słupsk Bank) (PLC990001) W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINPOLEN

50 Page 4 of 58 The Ławica Słupska (Słupsk Bank) (PLC990001) site which is designated primarily for its sandbanks and the birds it supports is too distant (more than 70 km) from Nord Stream 2 for such features to be potentially affected (e.g. by suspended sediments, contaminants, above water noise etc.). Notably, it does not support mammals that can potentially be affected by underwater noise that propagates some distance from the construction activities. It was thus not necessary to undertake further consideration of this site as part of a Natura 2000 Assessment process. Consideration of other Natura 2000 sites including the Kallbådan Islets and Waters site For existing Natura 2000 sites in German waters, full Natura 2000 Assessments were undertaken as part of the EIA process for those sites which will be crossed by or are within 5 km of the Nord Stream 2 alignment. For existing Natura 2000 sites in Danish and Swedish waters, the Natura 2000 screening was undertaken as part of the national EIA process whereas for Estonia a standalone report was produced (as such an assessment is not required under Russian legislation). These screening assessments determined whether there could be potential for significant impacts to be experienced by such sites. For the proposed Hoburgs Bank och Midsjobankarna site, a consultation exercise was undertaken with the Swedish authorities and a separate supplementary report to the Swedish EIA was produced that specifically considered the potential implications of Nord Stream 2 construction and operation on the integrity of that site and its values. The Natura 2000 sites in Finnish waters have been considered in accordance with Section 65 of the Finnish Nature Conservation Act, which implements the Habitats Directive. Screening reports are provided to the ELY centre (the regional environmental authority) which determines whether a full Natura Assessment is required and if so provides its opinion on the outcome of such an assessment taking account of views of Metsahallitus (the authority that supervises Natura 2000 sites). Approval of the Natura Assessment is a condition for granting the Water Permit which enables construction to commence. Ahead of this process, however, an appraisal of the potential for significant effects on Natura 2000 sites to arise from Nord Stream 2 was provided in the Finnish EIA, and the results summarised in the Espoo Report For Natura 2000 sites in Polish waters, screening assessments of the potential for significant effects to arise from Nord Stream 2 was provided in the German EIA documentation and the results summarised in the Espoo Report. These assessments concluded that the sites are too distant from the pipeline route for the features for which they are designated to be potentially affected by its construction or presence. It was thus not necessary to undertake further consideration of these sites as part of a Natura 2000 Assessment process. From all the above studies that were undertaken as part of the EIA process it was concluded that there would be no potential for significant impacts on the integrity or conservation objectives of Natura 2000 sites except for possibly on the Kallbådan Islets and Waters site where, based on an initial precautionary analysis (a conservative scenario with respect to munition size, location and receptor sensitivity), the potential for an impact ranking of up to moderate was predicted. The results of these studies were documented in the Espoo Report together with the stated intention to undertake a full Natura Assessment that would more accurately model, consider W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINPOLEN

51 Page 5 of 58 and evaluate the impacts at the Kallbådan Islets and Waters site in order to confirm whether they would be as per the conservative scenario determined through the appraisal undertaken as part of the EIA, or at a lower level. However, in accordance with the precautionary principle specified in the Habitats Directive, ahead of such a full assessment a worst case scenario was been documented in the Espoo Report. The Natura Assessment for the Kallbådan Islets and Waters site has now been completed as part of the Finnish Natura 2000 process and concluded that the Nord Stream 2 project, either individually or in combination with other projects and plans, will not adversely affect the integrity of the site, or the achievement of the conservation objectives for which it was included in the Natura network. The screening assessments of other Natura 2000 sites in Finnish waters, similarly undertaken as part of the Finnish Natura 2000 assessment process, also supported the results of the appraisal made in the EIA i.e. that there would be no potential for significant impacts on the integrity or conservation objectives of these sites. In the case of the Sea Area South of Sandkallan Natura 2000 site this was further substantiated by a subsequent full Natura Assessment undertaken to address specific queries raised by Metsallitus, As the full Natura Assessments for the German sites, the Sea Area South of Sandkallan and Kallbådan Islets and Waters sites, the supplementary report for the proposed Hoburgs Bank och Midsjobankarna site and the screening assessments for all other sites show that there is no potential for significant impacts on any of the existing or proposed Natura 2000 sites, there is similarly no potential for significant impacts on the network of such sites from Nord Stream 2 activities in their vicinity. With respect to activities in Finnish waters such a conclusion is supported by the statement from the Finnish Competent Authority for the Environmental Impact Assessment (which includes both the Finnish EIA Report and the Espoo Report) that, due to project activities in the Finnish EEZ, the project has no transboundary impacts on the Natura 2000 areas in other countries. The Natura Screenings and full Assessments are subject to review by the appropriate agencies as part of the EIA / permitting process (in the case of impacts that may arise from activities in Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Russia) and as part of a separate the Natura Assessment review and subsequent Water permitting process in Finland. During the Water permitting phase, both the permitting authority and the interested authorities, stakeholders and public, have the possibility to review and comment on the Natura 2000 Assessment regarding the Kallbådan Islets and Waters and the Sea Area South of Sandkallan site. This procedure is in line with the Finnish national legislation that defines the Natura 2000 assessment procedure. The Espoo Report thus provides an accurate assessment of potential impacts on Natura 2000 sites in a manner that allows the competent authorities to consider such factors in their decision making. Where was uncertainty at the time of preparation of the Espoo Report (e.g. in relation to the Kallbaden site) the assessment has been based on a precautionary approach as required by the Directive. The public and interested stakeholders, have an opportunity through the EIA and Espoo consultation processes and the Water Permit Consultation process (in Finland) to comment on these assessments thus ensuring compliance with relevant legal requirements with respect to access to information and participation. W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINPOLEN

52 Page 6 of 58 The Natura Assessment process and its documentation in the transboundary context is therefore not premature as stated in the submission. 3 Mitigation for Underwater Noise in Relation to Fish Statement The Espoo Report requires supplementation with regard to measures mitigating impact of the project s implementation phase on fish, in particular limitation of impact of the underwater noise (connected, among other things, with munitions clearance). Answer As outlined in the Espoo Report (Section ) the only source of underwater noise that will be sufficiently loud to potentially result in fish injury (tissue damage to hearing apparatus) or mortality is munitions detonation (which will be limited to Finnish and Russian waters). Modelling results show that the noise levels that could potentially cause risk of mortality will, depending on the context (munition size etc.), extend m from the detonation site, while those that could cause a degree of injury could extend up to 1.5 km from it (Table 10.36). The areas where there is potential for such impacts to occur will therefore not extend into Polish waters. While the detonation may thus result in some mortalities over a limited area, numbers of fish affected will be extremely low compared to the population level and will not impact on any important spawning or nursery areas which are too distant from all munitions areas in the Gulf of Finland to be affected. This prediction is supported by monitoring of munitions detonation during construction of Nord Stream. Since this level of impact will not affect the viability or functioning of the fish populations, or fisheries that depend on them, it is not considered significant and does not, therefore necessitate mitigation. Although a temporary hearing loss (TTS) may occur, physical damage to the hearing apparatus of fish rarely leads to permanent changes in the detection threshold, as the sensory epithelium will regenerate in time. Thus again, as such impacts at the predicted small spatial scale will not affect viability of fish populations no specific mitigation is required. Other activities that generate underwater noise, including rock placement, dredging and vibropiling may result in avoidance behaviour by fish species present in their close proximity, but the fish will return a short time after the cessation of activities so that no significant impacts necessitating specific mitigation are predicted. Similarly none of the other identified sources of potential impacts on fish (e.g. release and resettlement of sediment and associated release of pollutants and nutrients) has potential to give rise to more than minor impacts on fish (Table 10.37). Thus mitigation measures are not required specifically for these impacts. W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINPOLEN

53 Page 7 of 58 Appendix A Responses to General Comments W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINPOLEN

54 Page 8 of 58 1 Content of the Espoo Report Statement Documentation regarding environmental assessment was included for opinion to affected parties as a part of environmental impact assessment in transboundary context. The Ministry of Environment of Poland considers that contents analysis shows that it is not a final documentation for Nord Stream 2 and cannot be regarded as basis for implementation of the investment. In Polish opinion the documentation does not provide solid analysis, which would make environmental interference justifiable. As stated by the Espoo report creators, while they were preparing the documentation they did not possess the detailed information regarding the pipeline route, since it was still in preparation (ch , p. 262; ch p. 641), technical specification and information regarding the surface required for the investment (ch , p ), information regarding location and type of munitions in fauna endangerment context (ch , p. 404/405), information regarding archaeological sites which may be endangered (ch , p. 449; ch , p. 485/486). Espoo report does not contain complete and consistent methods for limiting and monitoring negative environmental impact (ch. 16.2, p. 636; ch. 18.1, p. 660) or complete information regarding other projects, effects of which may add to the impact of pipeline (ch. 14.3, p. 562). Nature analysis was based upon selective, incomplete studies and information regarding natural environment. Both Espoo Convention, Section 4, item 1 with Appendix II and Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 2011/92/UE of 13 December 2011 regarding assessment of effects of public and private projects on environment (OOS Directive), Section 5 and Appendix IV, clearly define minimal requirements regarding contents of environmental documentation submitted for review. The submitted documentation regarding Nord Stream 2 does not contain all required data and information since they will be altered and discussed in much more detail during following actions and procedures, as well as because the project for the investment is not final. Answer The documentation provided in the Espoo Report systematically characterises all sources of potential impacts from Nord Stream 2 (Chapter 8); identifies all baseline features that could be affected by such sources of impacts, classifies them in terms of their importance and sensitivity to such impacts (Chapter 9); and assesses the eventual outcome for the environment arising from Nord Stream 2 with the proposed mitigation measures in place (Chapter 10). These analyses have been undertaken in accordance with the general method outlined in Chapter 7 (with detailed methods, e.g. of modelling and surveys, provided in appendices). Other sections of the report cover, amongst others: project description; the main alternatives considered and any associated environmental constraints, and the reason for selection of the preferred option, gaps and uncertainties and their implications for the assessment, and a non-technical summary. Where there has been uncertainty in any of these analyses e.g. due a lack of data, this is highlighted and a precautionary approach adopted in the assessment. Such a method reflects current best practice in relation to EIA and is consistent with the requirements of the 2011 EIA Directive (including Annex IV), and the Espoo Convention, (including Article 4 and Appendix II). It thus provides a solid analysis, the results of which can inform decision makers of the environmental consequences of project implementation, W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINPOLEN

55 Page 9 of 58 and assist in their determination of whether it is justifiable in environmental terms, as well as a robust and transparent audit trail to support such decision making. Below are detailed answers to those sections in the Espoo Report to which the Polish opinion refers to, claiming that the information provided is incomplete: Project route (ref to Sections , 16.3) Nord Stream 2 has adopted a staged approach to survey to establish a safe corridor for pipeline installation and subsequent operation, which integrates environmental, engineering and construction input to ensure that where possible, impact mitigation is integrated into the route selection process. The staged approach includes: Reconnaissance Survey (entire route) A Reconnaissance Survey was initially conducted from the Russian landfall to the German landfall. This was performed using dedicated survey vessels (and Autonomous Underwater Vehicles or AUVs for shallow sections of the route in Russia) and on average, a 1,500m wide corridor was surveyed. The corridor width was up to 5 km in Finland to cover alternative route selections and generally more difficult seabed topography. Data collected included bathymetry (at a 2m x 2m bin grid resolution), side scan sonar, sub bottom profiler and magnetometer. Reduced line spacing in Germany and Russia achieved a higher density of soundings in these shallower sections. Detailed Survey Based on the reconnaissance survey results, routes were selected for further detailed survey. These routes were subjected to a more detailed survey. 130m corridors were surveyed along the selected routes using a specialised ROV flown between 4.5m and 12m above the seabed. Data collected included bathymetry at 20cm x 20cm bin grid resolution, side scan sonar and sub bottom profiler. As well as producing a detailed bathymetric and geophysical overview, this data set was analysed and interpreted to assist in the identification of possible cultural heritage objects (CHO), munitions, and cable crossings. These targets and cables were identified for visual investigation. The routes were optimised based on the detailed survey. In Germany and Russia, due to shallow water depths, surveys are characterised by very dense survey line spacing and sensors are very close to seabed. The survey resolution is in the order of 0.5x0.5m in shallow water areas. Data gathered from the reconnaissance survey and the detailed survey provided the Espoo Report authors with extensive information for the entire corridor and thus informed a robust and thorough environmental and social impact assessment of the range of pipeline alignments that could be taken forward. Where specific information was not yet available (e.g. confirmation that objects observed on the seabed are indeed cultural heritage objects (CHO)at the time of preparation of the Espoo Report, the assessment reported in that document followed a precautionary approach i.e. assumed that these unidentified objects could have cultural heritage value. Therefore for example the numbers objects classified as CHOs in Section of the Espoo Report are likely to be overestimates of the numbers present as they include features which have not yet been confirmed as CHOs through visual inspection (and therefore may not be CHOs). Selective and incomplete studies and information W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINPOLEN

56 Page 10 of 58 The purpose of the EIA studies are to generate the specific information required to reliably inform the assessment (and decision makers) of whether there is potential for a significant impact to arise and, if so, the level of such impact. This potential will only occur where there is: presence of environmental receptors that could be sensitive to project activities and the occurrence such project activities that constitute sources of impact on such receptors and a pathway between the two. For example, in the deeper part of the Baltic Sea, the majority of nutrients released from sediments during seabed interventions works will occur below the pycnocline (the layer where there is a steep density gradient) where living organisms are scarce or absent due to the low oxygen content of the bottom water and will not become available to organisms in the upper, photic, zone. Thus, although there are both sources of impact and receptors present, there will be at most a limited pathway between the two. Hence, there will be no significant impacts on eutrophication of the Baltic Sea, and further studies to assess impacts in such locations are not required. The variation in conditions (source, receptor and pathway) that occur along the pipeline route has therefore required a similar variation in approaches to surveys, modelling, assessment etc. The nature of such studies were determined through a systematic scoping process (documented in Chapter 8 and within Chapter 10). The different nature of the studies and analyses adopted along the length of the pipeline thus reflects the specific context at each location and is more robust than a one size fits all approach to generating information to inform the assessment. Hence, rather being selective and incomplete, as stated in the feedback, the information and studies presented in the Espoo Report reflect an approach that has been customised to the specific context, which necessarily varies along the pipeline route. As the Espoo Report draws on the EIAs undertaken in the five countries through which the pipeline passes, the nature of the studies also reflects any variation in specific methods required by each of the national authorities to comply with their regularity requirements. However, in all case the principle of fit for purpose rather than of one size fits all as described above has been applied. While some gaps in information are identified in Chapter 19 of the Espoo Report, it is also noted that none of these have implications or the validity of the assessment since, where there has been any uncertainties that could affect the assessment outcome, a precautionary approach adopted. This include any uncertainty relating to the surface areas of the seabed (ref to Section ) required for rock placement alluded to in the feedback. Thus such gaps and uncertainties do not result in an incomplete study. It should be noted that Nord Stream 2 is in the unique position to benefit from experience gained from the existing Nord Stream pipelines, especially from the over six years of environmental monitoring. The monitoring results have shown that a) there are no significant environmental impacts, b) the impacts are in line with or less than assessed in the environmental impacts assessments predicted for Nord Stream, and c) that there are no significant transboundary impacts. In addition, Nord Stream 2 has performed extensive additional environmental field surveys in Russia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Germany during 2015 and Further, the modelling used for Nord Stream 2 was enhanced using the monitoring results from the Nord Stream Project. Location and nature of munitions in fauna endangerment context (ref to Section ) The assessment of the impacts of munition detonation (which will be limited to Finnish and Russian waters) documented in the Espoo Report is based on assumptions whereby a W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINPOLEN

57 Page 11 of 58 maximum charge size is detonated at a location where the pipeline route is closest to sensitive areas i.e. a worst case scenario in terms of impact. The ongoing studies will either confirm this level of impact or establish that it will be lower than that predicted in the Espoo Report. This approach is therefore in accordance with the precautionary principle. It is sufficient to inform decision making in accordance with the EIA Directive and Espoo Convention and therefore and does not result in an incomplete study. Location of archaeological sites (refs to Section and ) While not all cultural heritage objects have been identified, Nord Stream 2 AG has committed to a chance finds procedure and has demonstrated that through its adoption it will be possible to avoid significant impacts on cultural heritage. Such an approach is standard practice for archaeology which, due its often buried nature, cannot be fully identified prior to construction. Nord Stream 2 AG policies require the project to comply with the cultural heritage procedures of the International Finance Corporation (IFC Performance Standard 8), which is widely accepted as best practice in this respect, and will ensure that all cultural heritage features are appropriately safeguarded. Thus the absence of complete data regarding cultural heritage features does not constitute a lack of completeness of the EIAs or Espoo Report. Mitigation (ref to Sections 16.2 and 11.3) Where mitigation is required to address identified adverse impacts, Nord Steam 2 has committed to measures as specified within Chapter 10 and summarised in Chapter 16. Since, as described above, in the sub-section Selective and incomplete studies and information, the potential for an impact to occur may, depending on the environmental context and the proposed activities at each location, vary along the pipeline so too may the nature of the required mitigation e.g. mitigation measures related to dredging activities will be limited to locations in Germany and Russia. However, for the majority of the offshore areas many of the measures, notably those relating to vessel activities, will be standard across much of the project (as opposed to varying for particular locations and activities) e.g. controls of air emissions, and on discharges to water. These mostly comprise a range of established proven techniques so there is confidence that the predicted with mitigation environmental outcome can be achieved and they therefore do not require detailed specification, although where applicable the measures have been tailored to the particular Nord Stream 2 project activities and associated impacts. The assessment presented in the Espoo Report does not rely on new or very specific measures which could require more detailed specification to provide evidence of their effectiveness (if for example the project was relying on alternative untested methods for munitions removal). The approach to mitigation adopted for Nord Stream 2 is thus in accordance with the requirement to provide A description of the measures envisaged to prevent, reduce and where possible remedy/offset any significant adverse effects on the environment as set out in Article 5.3b and Annex IV.6 of the EIA Directive (which is understood to be the intent of the feedback provided as this relate to mitigation although it is Article 5.3c and Annex IV.7 that relate to other issues, that are cited in the submission) and a similar specification under Annex 2e of the Espoo Convention, as well as in line with good practice guidance and established precedent to demonstrate the effectiveness of such measures. Monitoring (ref to Section 18.1) W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINPOLEN

58 Page 12 of 58 Although the EIA Directive (2011) does not specify requirements for monitoring, several of the countries through which Nord Stream 2 will pass require monitoring as part of conditions set out in permits, rather than under an explicit legal basis. The Espoo Convention (Article 7) recognises that surveillance of the activity and the determination of any adverse transboundary impact may be undertaken as part of post project analysis. Article 5 of the Espoo Convention suggests that monitoring of the possible measures to mitigate significant adverse transboundary impact is one of the issues that may be discussed and negotiated during the consultations between parties that are conducted after distribution of the Espoo documentation. Ahead of this, the Espoo Convention (Appendix 2(h)) specifies that Where appropriate, an outline for monitoring and management programmes and any plans for post-project analysis may be provided in the Espoo Report. Such an outline is provided in Section 18 of the Espoo Report and is based on experience of Nord Stream and the specific monitoring requirements of each country. The approach to monitoring documented in the Espoo Report thus complies with the EIA Directive and the Espoo Convention as well as any additional requirements in each PoO. It is thus complete in this respect. The Finnish Competent Authority for the Environmental Impact confirms in its statement for the Finnish section that the proposal for the monitoring programme of the project, which was presented in the report, is appropriate. Consideration of other projects (ref to Section 14.3) The cumulative impacts of Nord Stream 2 with other existing and proposed projects in the Baltic area have been assessed in the national EIAs and in the Espoo Report. The methodology applied to set out the parameters within which the cumulative impact assessment has been undertaken is clearly described in Chapter 14.2 of the Espoo Report. Nord Stream 2 has considered both planned projects that have been approved and, where feasible and appropriate, those that are currently in preparation. The project has thus given due consideration to cumulative impacts with planned projects in the Baltic Sea in accordance with the requirements in the relevant countries. Since, as described above, where relevant the information on which the Espoo Report is based meets the requirements of the EIA Directive, its content meets the requirements of the Espoo Convention and a robust process has been applied to the analysis of such information, the documentation is complete. 2 Assessment of Natura 2000 Network Statement The Ministry of Environment of Poland states that it is worth noting that some of the nature analysis including those regarding the impact on Natura 2000 areas, as well as its integrity and cohesion, will be discussed in the indefinite future, probably after transboundary discussions. When discussing requirements in Section 6(3) of the Habitats Directive it is worth to note that the assessment was conducted in a general way in regard to specific conservation areas and nature components, which are within jurisdiction of individual states. However, there was no assessment of general impact on the Baltic Sea ecosystem and on W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINPOLEN

59 Page 13 of 58 outside areas. There was no assessment of pipeline impact on consistency of conservation areas and resources, including Natura 2000, especially during construction, which poses the greatest threat. The presented documentation does not indicate preparation of options for the course and area of pipeline landing in order to limit its impact on existing and planned conservation areas of Natura The Espoo Report says that the problem of saving the consistency of network is yet to be analysed and the assessment results of impact on Natura 2000 areas will be analysed and the question whether any of the provided effects may affect the functioning of Natura 2000 will be answered. Then all possible transboundary effects will be identified (ch , p. 405). The investment runs through all Baltic Sea cutting through 3 conservation sea areas (PA-05-Espoo map), 6 Natura 2000 areas and violating habitats (shoals, reefs etc.) of sea mammals, fishes and birds, including wintering, migrating and breeding birds encountered in these areas. The presented analysis do not mention the impact of utilization of the infrastructure on marine environment after its termination. After conducting additional analysis regarding Nord Stream 2 pipeline impact on Natura 2000 network mentioned above, it will be necessary to conduct the transboundary impact assessment in order to allow each affected state to be able to get acquainted with comprehensive and final documentation. Lack of second transboundary review will constitute the violation of Espoo Convention requirements. Answer In accordance with the requirements of the Habitats Directive, Nord Stream 2 AG has carried out Natura 2000 screening assessments and/or, where required, full Natura Assessments of all Natura 2000 sites (existing or proposed) which, based on: the features for which they were designated, the propagation characteristics of impacts arising from Nord Stream 2 to which such features could be sensitive and the location of the site, could potentially be affected by activities associated with the pipeline s construction or operation. For existing Natura 2000 sites in German waters, full Natura 2000 Assessments were undertaken as part of the EIA process for those sites, which will be crossed by or are within 5 km of the Nord Stream 2 alignment. For existing Natura 2000 sites in Danish and Swedish waters, the Natura 2000 screening assessments were undertaken as part of the national EIA process whereas for Estonia a standalone report was produced (as such an assessment is not required under Russian legislation). These screening assessments determined whether there could be potential for significant impacts to be experienced by such sites. For the proposed Hoburgs Bank och Midsjobankarna site, a consultation exercise was undertaken with the Swedish authorities and a separate supplementary report to the Swedish EIA was produced that specifically considered the potential implications of Nord Stream 2 construction and operation on the integrity of that site and its values. The Natura 2000 sites in Finnish waters have been considered in accordance with Section 65 of the Finnish Nature Conservation Act, which implements the Habitats Directive. Screening reports are provided to the ELY centre (the regional environmental authority) which determines whether a full Natura Assessment is required and if so provides its opinion on the outcome of such an assessment taking account of views of Metsahallitus (the authority that supervises Natura 2000 sites). Approval of the Natura Assessment is a condition for granting the Water Permit which enables construction to commence. Ahead of W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINPOLEN

60 Page 14 of 58 this process, however, an appraisal of the potential for significant effects on Natura 2000 sites to arise from Nord Stream 2 was provided in the Finnish EIA, and the results summarised in the Espoo Report. For Natura 2000 sites in Polish waters, screening assessments of the potential for significant effects to arise from Nord Stream 2 were provided in the German EIA documentation and the results summarised in the Espoo Report. These assessments concluded that the sites are too distant from the pipeline route for the features for which they are designated to be potentially affected by its construction or presence. It was thus not necessary to undertake further consideration of these sites as part of a Natura 2000 Assessment process. From all the above studies that were undertaken as part of the EIA process, it was concluded that there would be no potential for significant impacts on the integrity or conservation objectives of Natura 2000 sites except for possibly on the Kallbådan Islets and Waters site where, based on an initial precautionary analysis (a conservative scenario with respect to munition size, location and receptor sensitivity), the potential for an impact ranking of up to moderate was predicted. The results of these studies were documented in the Espoo Report together with the stated intention to undertake a full Natura Assessment that would more accurately model, consider and evaluate the impacts at the Kallbådan Islets and Waters site in order to confirm whether they would be as per the conservative scenario determined through the appraisal undertaken as part of the EIA, or at a lower level. However, in accordance with the precautionary principle specified in the Habitats Directive, ahead of such a full assessment a worst case scenario was been documented in the Espoo Report. The Natura Assessment for the Kallbådan Islets and Waters site has now been completed as part of the Finnish Natura 2000 process and concluded that the Nord Stream 2 project, either individually or in combination with other projects and plans, will not adversely affect the integrity of the site, or the achievement of the conservation objectives for which it was included in the Natura network. The screening assessments of other Natura 2000 sites in Finnish waters, similarly undertaken as part of the Finnish Natura 2000 assessment process, also supported the results of the appraisal made in the EIA i.e. that there would be no potential for significant impacts on the integrity or conservation objectives of these sites. In the case of the Sea Area South of Sandkallan Natura 2000 site this was further substantiated by a subsequent full Natura Assessment undertaken to address specific queries raised by Metsallitus, As all the full Natura Assessments for the German sites, the Sea Area South of Sandkallan and Kallbådan Islets and Waters sites, the supplementary report for the proposed Hoburgs Bank och Midsjobankarna site and the screening assessments for all other sites show that there is no potential for significant impacts on any of the existing or proposed Natura 2000 sites, there is similarly no potential for significant impacts on the network of such sites from Nord Stream 2 activities in their vicinity. With respect to activities in Finnish waters such a conclusion is supported by the statement from the Finnish Competent Authority for the Environmental Impact Assessment (which includes both the Finnish EIA Report and the Espoo Report) that, due to project activities in the Finnish EEZ, the project has no transboundary impacts on the Natura 2000 areas in other countries. W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINPOLEN

61 Page 15 of 58 The Natura Screenings and full Assessments are subject to review by the appropriate agencies as part of the EIA / permitting process (in the case of impacts that may arise from activities in Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Russia) and as part of a separate the Natura Assessment review and subsequent Water permitting process in Finland. During the Water permitting phase, both the permitting authority and the interested authorities, stakeholders and public, have the possibility to review and comment on the Natura 2000 Assessment regarding the Kallbådan Islets and Waters and the Sea Area South of Sandkallan site. This procedure is in line with the national legislation that defines the Natura 2000 assessment procedure. The Espoo Report thus provides an accurate assessment of potential impacts on Natura 2000 sites in a manner that allows the competent authorities to consider such factors in their decision making. Where was uncertainty at the time of preparation of the Espoo Report (e.g. in relation to the Kallbaden site) the assessment has been based on a precautionary approach as required by the Directive. It demonstrates that there will be no significant impacts on the consistency of Natura 2000 sites, or on the Baltic Sea ecosystem of which they form a part, or on outside areas, which are specifically described as requiring assessment in the feedback from the consultee. The public and interested stakeholders, have an opportunity through the EIA and Espoo consultation processes and the Water Permit Consultation process (in Finland) to comment on these assessments thus ensuring compliance with relevant legal requirements with respect to access to information and participation. There is thus no need for further analysis or review regarding impacts on the Natura 2000 network, including those that might be transboundary in nature, or for another round of review in order to comply with the requirements of the Espoo Convention. 3 Monitoring Documentation Statement Espoo Report states that the final environmental monitoring programme, including procedures, points and period of monitoring (ch. 18, p. 660) will be developed later in agreement with adequate states and corresponding institutions. However, date and method of these consultations has not been stated as well as whether affected states that are involved in current environmental procedures will be invited to partake in such consultations. In Polish opinion, according to ETA certification environmental impact assessment may be conducted if it is possible to identify all eventual outcomes related to environment (Delena Wells, C-201/02). Additionally, if it is not possible to fully identify impact on environment the assessment should be conducted again during later stages of investment procedures (Crystal Palace, C-290/03). According to the above, Poland recognizes that the documentation submitted for review is only preliminary documentation, which should be supplemented with missing data and then will be submitted to public and institutions of all affected parties for review again in accordance with Espoo Convention. Answer The Espoo Convention (Article 7) recognises that surveillance of the activity and the determination of any adverse transboundary impact may be undertaken as part of post W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINPOLEN

62 Page 16 of 58 project analysis while Appendix V (a) states that the objectives of the post project analysis include: a) Monitoring compliance with the conditions as set out in the authorization or approval of the activity and the effectiveness of mitigation measures (b) Review of an impact for proper management and in order to cope with uncertainties; (c) Verification of past predictions in order to transfer experience to future activities of the same Type Article 5 of the Espoo Convention suggests that such transboundary monitoring is one of the issues that may be discussed and negotiated during the consultations between parties that are conducted after distribution of the Espoo documentation. The detailed monitoring measures cannot therefore be defined until after both of the following have been established: Nord Stream 2 has developed monitoring programmes in consultation with the relevant national PoO authorities and in consideration of the statements received; Conditions of the permit relating to monitoring have been established. Ahead of this, the Espoo Convention (Appendix 2(h)) specifies that "Where appropriate an outline for monitoring and management programmes and any plans for post-project analysis and any plans for post-project analysis may be provided in the Espoo Report. Such an outline is provided in Section 18 of the Nord Stream 2 Espoo Report and is based on experience of Nord Stream and specific monitoring requirements of each country. The Finnish Competent Authority for the Environmental Impact Assessment confirms in its statement for the Finnish section that the proposal for the monitoring programme of the project, which was presented in the report, is appropriate. Completeness of EIA The determination of all eventual outcomes related to environment referred to in the feedback is not dependent on completion of a monitoring programme so it is unclear why this comment is included within a section relating to monitoring. As outlined above (Section 2, Content of the Espoo Report) the information on which the Espoo Report is based meets the requirements of the EIA Directive, a robust process has been applied to the analysis of such information, and the report content meets the requirements of both Espoo Convention and EIA Directive. The documentation is therefore not preliminary but is complete in terms of the requirements of both the national EIA procedures and the Espoo Convention. Therefore there is no need for the Espoo Report to be supplemented or subject to further review. 4 Methodology Statement The Ministry of Environment of Poland states that the methodology description is too vague, indirect access to study results, as well as very varied and selective approach towards W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINPOLEN

63 Page 17 of 58 studies conducted in individual countries of origin means that it is not possible to verify conclusions in submitted environmental documentation regarding nature, range and significance of impact. As a result, a requirement stated in Espoo Convention Appendix II, subparagraph f). Polish scoping statement contained application for description of environmental study methodology and accepted assumptions regarding forecasting model used in order to verify presented results. Information regarding nature studies conducted in relation to investment in the Espoo Report are too vague and there were some unjustifiable differences noted in regards to studies of marine nature components conducted by various parties of origin. According to information in the table 9-1 (p. 158) nature studies along the planned Nord Stream 2 route conducted in in five Parties of Origin were not conducted in the same scope in all of them. For example, sea birds, fishes and mammals were studied only in Russia and Germany, while plankton was studied only in Russia. Espoo Report does not cover the description of methodology of the studies, detailed results; it only contains references to original documents in the form of environmental documentation form states of origin, which are available only in national languages, which makes it impossible for Polish institutions and public to get acquainted with their content. While describing condition of natural environment of Baltic Sea creators of Espoo Report based its content partially on publications and results of outdated studies (references to zooplankton and phytobenthos study from 2010 r.). It is worth noting that the purpose of these studies was not to gather information regarding specific component of marine environment in Nord Stream 2 impact area. There is no detailed information regarding indicators, which may be later used during monitoring stage for pipeline environmental impact. For example, there is no information regarding taxonomic structure, number and biomass of plankton and zooplankton, taxonomic composition and biomass of phytobenthos. The study of water environment in regards to the aforementioned components is needed not only because plankton and phytobenthos is significant component of food chains, but also because condition of phytoplankton and zooplankton is biological indicator, which is considered during ecological water assessment in accordance with European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/60/WE of 23 October 2000, which states framework for common actions in regards to water policy (Water Framework Directive) and Marine Strategy Framework Directive 2008/56/WE. Results of studies regarding Baltic Sea and analysis of project impact on the area should be presented while taking into account assessment of sea water condition and references to environmental outcomes for sea water. Importance of credible and full environmental data gathered during natural inventory listing for area, which may be influenced by the project was highlighted in methodology guidance of European Commission regarding Section (3) and (4) of Habitat Directive 92/43/EWG subparagraph Assessment of plans and projects significantly affecting area of Natura In the face of lack of information, conclusions in regards to impact of the investment on natural environment, including components of Natura 2000 areas, are considered to be highly uncertain. The documentation gathered for the aforementioned procedure is not homogeneous in terms of details and scope of presented data and conclusions in reference to sections located in areas subject to jurisdiction of various states. Answer W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINPOLEN

64 Page 18 of 58 Addressed above in the response Content of the Espoo Report which outlines how a solid and robust analysis has been provided in the Espoo report, which thus addresses requirement of Appendix II f. Difference on nature of studies along the route (ref Table 9.1) Addressed above in response to Content of the Espoo Report : Selective and incomplete studies and information. Detailed information only available in language of nation where impact arises The Espoo Report which has been translated in full into all the languages of the Affected Parties includes all the content identified in Article II of the Espoo Convention thus meets the needs with respect to providing sufficient information to enable public participation under Articles 2.2, and 4.2 of the Convention. Lack of detail of indicators for monitoring As described above in response to Content of the Espoo Report : Monitoring, the 2011 EIA Directive does not specify requirements for monitoring and Espoo Convention (Appendix 2(h)) specifies that Where appropriate, an outline for monitoring and management programmes and any plans may be provided: there is thus no requirement under within either of these instruments to provide detailed information regarding indicators, which may be used later during monitoring as specified in the comment. Lack of detail of taxonomic structure, number & biomass of plankton and zooplankton, taxonomic composition & biomass of phytobenthos The assessment of impacts on both plankton and benthos documented in the Espoo Report identified that there would be no potential for significant impacts on the functioning or viability of these taxa, or indirectly on those of the higher species for which they form part of the food chain. There is thus no need to monitor their status based on the above parameters. In relation to biological indicators, as outlined in the response Monitoring Documentation : monitoring measures and hence indicators and data required to populate them, cannot be defined until Nord Stream 2 has both: developed monitoring programmes in consultation with the relevant national PoO authorities and in consideration of the statements received, and established conditions of the permits relating to monitoring. Lack of homogeneity in detail and scope of data and conclusions Addressed above in response to Content of the Espoo Report : Selective and incomplete studies. 5 Modelling and Mitigation Measures Differences Statement The Ministry of Environment of Poland states that, due to unclear reasons, there are also differences in regards to types of constructions works, which were taken into account when modelling environmental impact. For example, only in Russia the modelling of submarine noise propagation (table 10-6 p. 320) considered the operation stage of the pipeline, while W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINPOLEN

65 Page 19 of 58 pipeline laying modelling was analysed only in Germany. However, in case of the latter, there was no impact analysis in regards to marine mammals and fishes in terms of submarine noise propagation during placement of the rock material. Moreover, the aforementioned actions, as well as excavations, were not modelled in dispersion and re-sedimentation in German waters (table 10-1 p. 312). Also the approach regarding proposed minimization procedures is not homogeneous. A range of solutions is limited to specific sections of the pipeline. For example, prohibitions regarding actions on specific dates, limitations regarding light emissions, equipment used to limit turbidity of water, limitations for sea floor occupation or its reclamation is to be implemented only on German waters. This approach is not justifiable since the impact which is to be limited using aforementioned methods will be present also in the areas in jurisdiction of other states and should be applied similarly. Moreover, occurrence of nature components (i.e. specific bird species) with dedicated minimization actions is not limited only to German area. Answer The Polish statement refers to differences in modelling for different countries as outlined in tables 10-1 and 10-6 in the Espoo Report. The differences in modelling of the environmental impacts are due to differences in the nature and location of both the construction activities and of the baseline conditions in such areas. Differences in modelling of dispersion and re-sedimentation of sediments and of sedimentassociated contaminants: - Munitions clearance is only planned to be performed in the Gulf of Finland, hence modelling of impacts due to munitions clearance are limited to Russia and Finland. - Rock placement is taking place in Russia, Finland, Sweden and Denmark but only in Russia and Finland there are elevated contaminant levels which require modelling of contaminants. - Trenching only takes place in Sweden and Denmark, hence it has been modelled in Sweden and Denmark. - Dredging only takes place in Russia and Germany, hence it has been modelled in Russia and Germany. Only in Russia there are elevated contaminant levels, hence modelling of contaminants was only performed in Russia. Differences in modelling of underwater noise: W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINPOLEN

66 Page 20 of 58 - Munitions clearance is only planned to be performed in the Gulf of Finland, hence modelling of impacts due to munitions clearance are limited to Russia and Finland. - Rock placement is taking place in Russia, Finland, Sweden and Denmark and modelling is hence relevant for these countries. - Dredging only takes place in Russia and Germany, hence it has been modelled in Russia and Germany. - Vibro-piling is only relevant in Russia - Pipe-lay in Germany was added due to an authority requirement. - Underwater noise during operation is only modelled in Russia, because there is only a compressor station at the Russian landfall, and the compressor station is the only potential significant source of pipeline noise during operation. As for modelling, mitigation/minimisation measures also vary spatially due to differences in the environmental context and activities, and hence impacts that may occur in different locations. 6 Justification for the Investment Implementation and Option Analysis Statement The Ministry of Environment of Poland states that the Polish scoping opinion references Section 4, item 4 in relation to subparagraph b of Appendix V of Espoo Convention, as well as Section 5, item 1 in relation to Appendix IV subparagraph 2 Environmental Protection Directive and applied for analysis to include options of location of the planned pipeline, identification of alternative routes and detailed analysis of all possible routes and indication of environmental causes for selection of preferred option and natural factors and results, which led to exclusion of other options (application for comparative analysis of considered options). Scoping opinion highlighted the need for detailed justification regarding environmental documentation in terms of such significant environmental interference regarding Baltic Sea in relation to the planned project. This issue is essential in regards to available information on partial utilization of existing transmission power infrastructure of Nord Stream pipe I and II and also in regards to sustainable use of Baltic Sea resources and the need to conserve the vulnerable marine ecosystem. The investment implementation, which impacts Baltic Sea environment should be preceded with alternative solutions, which used existing transmission and LNG infrastructure. The Espoo Report pointed out the need to build 2 additional pipes for the gas pipeline because of increase in demand gap. According to the creators of the Espoo Report this is a result of decrease in gas extraction in European Union (EU). According to data present in W-PE-EIA-GEN-REP-800-FINPOLEN