Capacity Utilisation Policy

Transcription

1 Capacity Utilisation Policy Network Utilisation Strategy June 2003 BRITAIN S RAILWAY, PROPERLY DELIVERED

2 BRITAIN S RAILWAY, PROPERLY DELIVERED 1 Contents Network Utilisation Strategy 1. Introduction Background What is the Capacity Utilisation Policy? The Network Utilisation Strategy Related SRA Policies and Strategies Respective Roles 5 2. Development of the Network Utilisation Strategy Performance and Congestion Using Capacity More Effectively Engineering Access and Diversionary Routes Planning Assumptions Growth NUS Growth Planning Assumptions Long Distance Statement Overview Development of the Statement for Passenger Services Development of the Statement for Freight Services Competition between Passenger Service Providers Route Utilisation Strategies Context and Purpose Scope and Schedule Process for the development of a Route Utilisation Strategy Service Specification for 2004 Timetable Applying the Network Utilisation Strategy and Route Utilisation Strategies Appendices 34 Appendix A CUI Analysis 34 Appendix B Track Access Conditions Decision Criteria 36 Appendix C Long Distance Statement for Passenger Services 37 Appendix D Long Distance Statement for Freight Services 40

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4 BRITAIN S RAILWAY, PROPERLY DELIVERED 3 1. Introduction 1.1 Background The SRA published its Capacity Utilisation Policy (CUP) consultation document in September This set out the SRA s views on the need for a policy and its proposed structure. The consultation document proposed a general policy for using existing network capacity (the Statement of Principles), an associated strategy for the use of the national rail network (the Network Utilisation Strategy), and a series of Route Utilisation Strategies (RUSs). Consultation responses broadly endorsed this way forward. The aim of the Capacity Utilisation Policy is to deliver benefits for rail users. It will help deliver better train running performance, service improvements (in advance of infrastructure enhancements), and better access arrangements for effective engineering work. It aims to get the best use out of existing capacity in the short and medium term and to inform choices about what is needed in the longer term. The SRA published the Statement of Principles in December Revised appraisal criteria were published by the SRA in April This document is the SRA s Network Utilisation Strategy (NUS). The NUS has been prepared under section 206 of the Transport Act 2000 and it sets out the policy and planning framework for ten Route Utilisation Strategies (RUSs), which are due to be published from June This is set out below. The responses to the consultation on the Capacity Utilisation Policy have been extremely valuable in helping the SRA to develop its policies, and in particular this NUS document. Consultation responses were addressed in Capacity Utilisation Policy: Responses to Consultation, published in December 2002 and available on the SRA s website at What is the Capacity Utilisation Policy? Like other transport systems nearing saturation, our GB rail network suffers from poor performance. The industry s analysis of available capacity and decisions on its use have not always resulted in the best use of capacity. There is now a need to plan how best to co-ordinate the various calls on the network s capacity. Principle One in the Statement of Principles was that the CUP will: formulate clear strategies for capacity utilisation that specify the best use of existing network capacity to meet customer needs balancing service provision, maintenance access and performance levels and taking into account anticipated changes in demand. These strategies will provide the link between the Government s objectives and the use of network capacity. No of train services (throughput) Capacity Utilisation Policy Statement of Principles December 2002 Network Utilisation Strategy (NUS) June 2003 Engineering Access Mix of services Route Utilisation Strategies (RUS) from June 2003 Performance Figure 1 CUP Trade-Offs 1 Appraisal Criteria A Guide to the Appraisal of Support for Passenger and Freight Rail Services April 2003.

5 4 BRITAIN S RAILWAY, PROPERLY DELIVERED Capacity utilisation is therefore essentially about the trade-offs between number and mix of services, engineering access and performance, all within the context of growing demand. The pyramid at Figure 1 illustrates these trade-offs. Particularly important trade-offs include: Performance vs number and mix of services: There is a strong, well evidenced, relationship between performance and number of train services (see section 2). The more trains that run on a given network, the greater the incidence of reactionary delays they experience. Engineering access vs mix and number of services: There are choices about the extent to which possession arrangements aim to maximise customer convenience (e.g. shorter possessions) or engineering efficiency. 1.3 The Network Utilisation Strategy The publication of the NUS is a key stage in the development of a comprehensive capacity utilisation policy. The NUS: Explains how the SRA is developing and intends to apply the Capacity Utilisation Principles to help formulate policy and strategies to achieve growth and improve performance (section 2); Makes explicit the planning assumptions about demand growth used in this Strategy (section 3); Includes a Long Distance Statement (LDS) setting out the SRA s working assumption on freight and passenger service levels to 2011 (section 4); Describes the methodology and programme for developing the RUSs and the SRA s overall planning framework (the ten RUSs will focus on congested routes whilst the SRA s new Regional Planning Assessments will provide nationwide coverage) (section 5); Sets out the timetable changes that the rail industry plans to introduce in 2004 (section 6); and Concludes by outlining how the SRA will implement the NUS and RUSs. The SRA expects to revise the NUS, after consultation, once the Rail Regulator s Interim Review of Access Charges is completed and in the light of emerging RUS insights. Furthermore it should be noted that the NUS represents the current views of the SRA. In many cases other factors will have to be taken into account when final decisions are made, particularly when those decisions are to be taken by Network Rail or the Rail Regulator. 1.4 Related SRA Policies and Strategies In developing this Strategy, the SRA has had regard to its statutory duties including the Directions and Guidance issued by the Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers and the Mayor of London. The NUS will contribute to and is compatible with the SRA s Strategic Plan. Strategies put forward under the Capacity Utilisation Policy have to be affordable and represent value for money. They should also have particular regard to local transport plans where relevant and be consistent with Regional Planning Guidance issued by the Secretary of State. Also in the preparation of this Strategy, the SRA has taken into account the provisions of EC Directives 2001/12 EC, 2001/13 EC, 2001/14 EC known as the First Infrastructure Package. The Package addresses access rights for international freight and the conditions necessary to ensure nondiscriminatory access. The Package, which is soon to be transposed into UK law, places a number of obligations on the Infrastructure Manager, the SRA and the Rail Regulator. In the case of Great Britain, the infrastructure manager will generally mean Network Rail, Union Railways, Eurotunnel and London Underground. The SRA is working within these EC obligations in this Strategy and in the development of RUSs. The SRA s Franchising Policy Statement, published on 6 November 2002, defines a new form of partnership with franchisees focussed on delivering reliable performance, meeting passenger needs and containing costs. New franchise agreements will set a clear obligation to operate the passenger timetable specified by the SRA. The SRA will generally require franchisees to exercise their rights under track access

6 BRITAIN S RAILWAY, PROPERLY DELIVERED 5 agreements in a way that is consistent with the SRA s decisions on competing priorities, including SRA strategies flowing from the Capacity Utilisation Policy. This approach is designed to optimise service delivery and maximise value for money across a constrained network through the introduction of changes to service patterns. New franchise agreements will allow services to be enhanced where there is a sound business case, and reduced where existing services are unduly congesting the network or are ineffective in cost-benefit terms. The SRA s Fares Review is considering the level and scope of fares regulation. The Review aims to allow more scope for innovation in fares and ticket types to allow operators to make better use of available capacity. At the same time, it will maintain protection for passengers in markets where operators have a significant degree of market power, for example on commuter services. The SRA proposes to publish its conclusions in June The SRA has recently undertaken a policy evaluation on overcrowding. The outcomes of this study are currently being considered and further work will be undertaken on this topic over the coming months. The NUS takes account of the SRA s West Coast Strategy, published in June 2003, and the Freight Strategy. Directions and Guidance require the SRA to produce and keep under review a Strategy for passenger rolling stock. The Rolling Stock Strategy will be consistent with this NUS. The SRA also has a duty to formulate, and keep under review, a Strategy relating to services in various parts of Great Britain for facilitating the carriage of passengers or goods by rail by way of the Channel Tunnel. This NUS recognises (as will the future Channel Tunnel Strategy) the British Railways Board s obligations under the Channel Tunnel Usage Agreement and other factors such as the Capacity Utilisation Policy. The SRA expects to consult on a Channel Tunnel Strategy in Spring As part of the Rail Regulator s Interim Review process, the SRA will provide the Rail Regulator with a specification of the outputs it wants to buy from Network Rail. A provisional specification will be produced in July/August with the final version in September The SRA will keep the NUS under review in the light of its choices for this baseline output specification. The service levels proposed in the RUSs and future versions of the NUS will also need to be consistent with conclusions from the Interim Review. 1.5 Respective Roles Although the Rail Regulator and the SRA have, in many respects, common statutory purposes they will exercise different (though complementary) powers for achieving those purposes. Specifically on the issue of capacity: The SRA sponsors the consumption of capacity to deliver passenger and freight services and ensures the adequacy of capacity to carry those services (through franchising passenger services, awarding grants and loans, and sponsoring enhancements). The Rail Regulator s role 2 is to determine the fair and efficient allocation of network capacity by the infrastructure provider through his approval or direction of new and amended access contracts. Network Rail allocates network capacity as infrastructure manager, under the supervision of the Regulator. Track access contracts are bilateral contracts between Network Rail and its customers, generally train operators, and incorporate by reference the Track Access Conditions, which contain the processes that apply network-wide covering matters such as compilation of the timetable. Capacity also needs to be allocated for maintenance, renewal and enhancement of the network. Opportunities for Network Rail and its contractors to carry out such work are set out in Rules of the Route agreed each year through a consultation process. Short-term changes relating to individual possessions on the network are agreed through a process set out in the National Rules of the Plan. 2 The Rail Regulator also has concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of Fair Trading to investigate potential breaches of the Competition Act 1998 in respect of the supply of services relating to railways.

7 6 BRITAIN S RAILWAY, PROPERLY DELIVERED The Rail Regulator, in taking decisions on applications for the approval or direction of new access contracts and amendments to existing contracts, is under a statutory duty, amongst other things, to facilitate the furtherance by the SRA of its Strategies, and to have regard to the SRA s financial position (under section 4 of the Railways Act 1993 as amended by the Transport Act 2000). The Rail Regulator has made clear that he will always consult the SRA on individual applications. The Rail Regulator has welcomed the development by the SRA of a Capacity Utilisation Policy, which will help inform his decisions on the allocation of capacity in specific applications, particularly when he is considering likely changes to the pattern of services over time. He said:..over the next year or so the majority of passenger franchise operators will need to seek new access agreements or extensions. This represents a significant peak of work for the Office of the Rail Regulator. The process of handling these applications will be greatly assisted by the work the Strategic Rail Authority is doing to develop its Capacity Utilisation Policy and route utilisation strategies. 3 The Rail Regulator is in the process of implementing a regulatory reform programme intended to deliver better rail services by: developing new stronger, simpler, streamlined template access contracts for passenger and freight train operators; promoting cross-industry work to improve the understanding and measurement of rail network capacity; and better holding Network Rail to account for its activities, including the day-to-day operation of the network, the sale of capacity to its customers, and compilation of the timetable. The SRA supports the Rail Regulator s reform programme and looks forward to working with him on the remaining elements of his reforms, such as the development of his policy on moderation of competition. The SRA s CUP and the Regulator s reform programme, taken together, will provide an improved railway founded on: an improved contractual framework that will help train operators to work better with Network Rail; and better analysis and information on the capacity available, the trade-offs involved in its consumption, and the outputs for passengers and freight customers to meet the Government s policy priorities for the railway. As owner and operator of the network, Network Rail obviously plays an essential role in its utilisation, performance and development, and undertakes work in many areas to that end. In line with the initiatives explained above, Network Rail is committed to working together with the SRA, ORR and the industry to achieve better capacity utilisation and to drive costs down. This work includes: reviewing the Rules of the Plan; establishing a better definition of the physical capacity of the network; identifying congested parts of the network and making recommendations on a range of potential solutions; refining and developing the analysis of relevant trade-offs; and sharing the results of its route and network strategy analysis. The International Rail Regulator is responsible for access matters relating to international intermodal freight services and services operated by international groupings such as Eurostar. The IRR acts in accordance with the Railways Regulations 1998 and the Directives they implement. The SRA has a duty to have regard to the need to protect all persons from dangers arising from the operation of railways (including, in particular, by 3 The Rail Regulator's foreword to Criteria and Procedures for the Approval of Passenger Track Access Contracts: Third Edition A Consultation Document, ORR, London, December 2002

8 BRITAIN S RAILWAY, PROPERLY DELIVERED 7 taking into account any advice given by the HSE). The Rail Regulator has a similar duty. Safety is primarily a matter for train operators and Network Rail as the relevant holders of safety duties, under the regulation of HSE. A number of devolved and regional bodies have a role in service specification, and therefore in sponsoring the consumption of capacity. Passenger Transport Executives (PTEs) can submit a statement specifying, among other things, the services that the SRA should secure to meet their public transport requirements, and the PTE is a party to the franchise agreement. Sub-sections 8A-8C inserted by the Transport Act 2000 into section 34 of the Railways Act 1993 set out circumstances in which the SRA is not compelled to comply with a PTE s specification. To the extent that the CUP will be delivered by the SRA through franchises, it will need to reflect all the relevant provisions of Section 34. Where the reason for not complying with a PTE s statement of services for a franchise agreement is because of the impact on SRA expenditure, or on other railway services, the Secretary of State s Directions and Guidance require the SRA to ensure that the competing options for services are evaluated on a fair and comparable basis. The SRA has a duty to consult the Welsh Assembly Government before formulating a Strategy and from time to time as part of keeping its Strategies under review. Although the Welsh Assembly Government does not have service specification functions or powers of Directions and Guidance, it has an important role in service planning and capacity improvement. In May 2002 Scottish Ministers issued Directions and Guidance to the SRA specifying the levels of service which the Scottish Executive and Strathclyde PTE wished to see provided through the new Scottish franchise. The SRA is accordingly working to a franchise agreement specifically designed for Scotland. In January 2003 the Mayor of London issued Directions and Guidance to the SRA, which are subject to qualifications designed to safeguard national rail interests and the SRA s budget. The Directions and Guidance say that in all respects the SRA should work with Transport for London (TfL) to develop an acceptable and reasonable balance between suburban services designed to meet the specific needs of London and longer distance and freight services, where they compete for scarce capacity.

9 8 BRITAIN S RAILWAY, PROPERLY DELIVERED 2. Development of the Network Utilisation Strategy Three key imperatives drive the Capacity Utilisation Policy. The industry needs to: Improve train running performance by reducing congestion; Cater for significant freight and passenger growth on the existing network in a way that does not adversely affect performance; Control costs and improve underlying performance by improving engineering access arrangements. The RUSs and Regional Planning Assessments (RPAs see section 5) will be key vehicles for helping to develop solutions to satisfy these imperatives. This section sets out some of the analysis underpinning the Network Utilisation Strategy and the ways in which the SRA wants the industry to begin now to improve its use of capacity, even before the RUS programme, or RPAs, are completed. 2.1 Performance and congestion Customers expect a reliable and punctual service and the industry is working together to improve performance since the deterioration that followed the major network disruption in The PPM 4 for was 79.2% 5. Whilst an improvement on the year before, this is still below the levels of the late 1990s. As Figure 2 shows, the growth of timetabled passenger train kilometres and the consequent increase in congestion on the network have coincided with worsening performance. The relationship between increasing congestion on the network and consequent delay is the focus of this section. The causes of poor performance are complex and highly related. The main causes include: Asset condition the reliability of rolling stock and network infrastructure; Train km index 140 PPM 100% Timetabled Passenger Train km index Public Performance Measure Monthly Figure 2 PPM and Train Kilometres (Source: ATOC and SRA) 4 PPM combines data on the punctuality of trains arriving within 5-10 minutes of due time with cancellations. It is measured here in terms of a moving annual average 5 Source NRT Q4, released June 2003.

10 BRITAIN S RAILWAY, PROPERLY DELIVERED 9 Operational management the effectiveness of real-time operational decisions needed to recover from incidents; Robust planning the realism of the timetable, reflecting actual operational constraints; Planning for recovery the availability of recovery time in the timetable, spare rolling stock and traincrew; and Congestion which adds to the problem of recovery when incidents do occur. Delays can be broadly categorised into: Primary delays resulting directly from a problem with train operations, i.e. infrastructure failures, train failures, staff shortages, etc; Reactionary delays where trains are held up because of knock-on effects from a previous primary delay, but not due directly to the initial cause. For example, a train delayed due to a signal failure on departure may subsequently cause delays to other trains throughout its journey. The more congested the network, the greater the likely level of reactionary (secondary) delays that results from a primary incident. More than half the delays on the network are reactionary as shown in Figure % 75% 50% 25% 0% 24% Primary Delay (NR) 15% Primary Delay (TOCs) 61% Reactionary delays Figure 3 Breakdown of delay by cause in (Source Network Rail) One of the aims of the Capacity Utilisation Policy is to improve performance by reducing the level of reactionary delays. But to improve overall performance significantly, it will also be necessary to reduce the number of primary delay incidents and where they still occur to improve the management of recovery from them. The industry is actively tackling both primary and reactionary delays through: The work of the National Task Force to coordinate the industry s efforts to improve performance; The new Franchising Policy which defines a new form of partnership with franchisees focussed on delivering reliable performance; The Regulator s Interim Review of Passenger Access Charges, and the calibration of the performance incentive regimes. 6 Like other transport systems nearing saturation, the network exhibits a strong, and statistically significant, relationship between congestion and reactionary delay. All other things being equal, increased service provision increases reactionary delays. Historically, operators have not faced the full costs of the congestion caused by their train services and they may have had the incentive to add too many services. To address this, the Rail Regulator s 2000 Interim Review of Passenger Access Charges changed the variable cost element of the access charge and introduced congestion charging arrangements (which have not yet started to have an impact). However, given that many train operating companies depend heavily on subsidy or are operated under management contracts, the frequency and timings of many passenger services reflect administrative or historic decisions rather than the working of economic incentives. It is therefore appropriate to consider a more direct approach. The Capacity Utilisation Index Network Rail has developed a measure of the level of congestion on the network the Capacity Utilisation Index 7 (CUI). The CUI is essentially the proportion of theoretical train paths that are actually used. It is based on track and signalling capacity, rather than junction or station capacity, and is derived from the train service timetable. 6 Regimes in Schedules 4 and 8 applying to both Network Rail and TOCs. 7 Technical note on the CUI is set out at Appendix A.

11 10 BRITAIN S RAILWAY, PROPERLY DELIVERED Capacity Utilisation in 2002 Available capacity used 90% or more 70-90% % < 30 % Average Delay per Train Mile (minutes) % 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% CUI Figure 5 Reactionary Delay against CUI Application of the Capacity Utilisation Index The relationship between the CUI and delay suggests that there is a point beyond which benefits arising from the operation of further services on a route are likely to be outweighed by the effect of worsening performance. The SRA has carried out analysis to find this point and Figure 6 illustrates the results of this analysis. Base Maps Maps In Minutes 1997 Figure 4 Capacity Utilisation (Source: Network Rail) The CUI reflects both number and mix of services. For example, a metro style timetable (where trains have identical speeds and stopping patterns) might allow 20 trains per hour at a CUI level of 67%, whereas a timetable over the same route accommodating trains with very diverse speeds and stopping patterns might reach the same CUI level with just eight trains per hour. The CUI is necessarily a simple measure which will not take into account all the local issues affecting congestion. Nevertheless it is a powerful indicator of likely levels of congestion and secondary delay. Figure 4 shows the different levels of CUI on different parts of the network. The SRA tested the relationship between reactionary delay minutes and the CUI for services on different routes at different times of day. There was shown to be a strong correlation which is illustrated in Figure 5. The graph indicates that at lower levels of capacity utilisation, each time a train is added to the service its benefits outweigh its costs. But as services increase there comes a point when costs, including performance impacts, outweigh benefits. For an average train, evaluated in accordance with the SRA s appraisal criteria 8, this point occurs when the CUI is approximately 75%. Net Benefit of Additional Train Service Negative Positive Capacity Utilisation Index Figure 6 Net Benefits of Additional Train Services 8 In practice the point of indifference depends on the benefits generated by the specific additional train services. Appraisal Criteria A guide to the appraisal of support for passenger and freight rail services 8 April

12 BRITAIN S RAILWAY, PROPERLY DELIVERED 11 Application of the Capacity Utilisation Index Given the strong relationship between the CUI and delays, the SRA believes that it should generally only support bids by franchised passenger operators for significant increases in train paths, in circumstances where: options for train lengthening have been deployed to the fullest extent reasonable; the proposed service relieves on-train crowding conditions; and there has been an examination, including economic appraisal, of the service performance implications. This analysis should include explicit analysis of train running performance, with the level of analysis proportionate to the importance of the change. If the organisation proposing the additional service is able to offset any adverse performance effect by other means, for example, by relinquishing or flexing other rights, the SRA believes these mitigating effects should be taken into account. Even where it could do so by use of powers contained in franchise agreements, this policy does not imply that the SRA intends to reduce train mix, or to remove existing trains wherever the CUI is already above 75%. Instead, in these situations the SRA will seek appropriate opportunities to review service levels and mix, for example when new franchises are let or within a relevant RUS. The SRA recognises that the necessary analysis will take time to conduct, but that does not mean that decisions on matters such as franchise specifications and on freight and passenger access rights can be put on hold. The SRA will increasingly seek to use this type of analysis to inform its attitude to applications for access rights from non-franchised train operators. The SRA would like the industry to review the Decision Criteria 9 determining whether they remain appropriate given the much higher usage of the network since the Access Conditions were written in The SRA also believes that Network Rail should continue to develop the rigour of the analysis it uses to inform the decisions it makes in response to applications for access rights. Any changes to the level of primary delay (i.e. delay directly caused by initial incidents such as rolling stock or infrastructure failure) have a direct impact on the level of reactionary delay. A lower level of primary delay would lead to a higher CUI threshold being sustainable. It will therefore be necessary to review regularly the analysis, in the expectation that the suggested CUI threshold will be able to rise. In the longer term signalling advances, including ERTMS, could also offer opportunities to accommodate higher levels of traffic without adversely affecting performance. 10 In practice, the costs and the benefits of each train will differ. Trains with different operating characteristics to others already in the timetable will cost more in terms of performance impact. And where additional trains serve to relieve overcrowding as well as to generate new trips through increased frequency, the benefits of each additional train can be well above average. This means that where crowding on trains is an issue (and, by implication, where these crowding issues cannot reasonably be addressed by other means such as train lengthening), the combined benefits typically continue to outweigh the delay disbenefits up to CUI values of 100%. 9 The Decision Criteria are part of the Track Access Conditions. They are set out in appendix B. They can be altered by the Class Representative Committee to the Access Conditions. 10 The SRA considers that the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS), as specified by the Interoperability Directive, has the potential to offer capacity and performance benefits in its higher level variants. ERTMS is still at an early stage of development and is being co-ordinated by the Single National ERTMS Programme (SNEP) team, led by the SRA. Further detail is available in the Year 1 report on ERTMS, available on the SRA and Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) websites.

13 12 BRITAIN S RAILWAY, PROPERLY DELIVERED There will also be equivalent situations for freight paths, where the economic costs or benefits associated with a particular path are unusually high. The SRA is seeking to clarify and quantify the situations where adding an extra freight train above 75% CUI would generally produce net economic benefits. Early work suggests that it is more difficult to generalise about freight trains. Whether or not they produce net economic benefits will depend on location-specific questions including their similarity in performance characteristics to other trains on the route. Many parts of the network are already above 75% CUI. One of the purposes of the RUS is to enable a full examination of the current pattern and mix of services using each route to establish where there is spare capacity. The SRA s appraisal framework will be used to provide a consistent means of calculating the benefits and costs of all services. In some cases this analysis may lead to the conclusion that some services that offer particularly low value for money, or where their function is broadly replicated by other services, should be cancelled or curtailed in order to provide equal or larger benefits through the remaining services running more reliably. Further refinement of the approach to performance assessment and the modelling that supports this assessment is already being undertaken by the SRA jointly with the Rail Regulator and Network Rail. The SRA will work closely with Network Rail and the Rail Regulator to ensure that the measure is made as transparent as possible to the industry, and to all interested parties. 2.2 Using Capacity More Effectively As the previous section demonstrates, other things being equal, the more trains that run, the worse their performance. Although the CUI is already over 75% on a large proportion of the network, and performance is often poor, it would be wrong to conclude that there is no further room to meet demand growth. There are in fact other options that the industry can implement to accommodate growing demand whilst also potentially improving performance: Increase load factors (where crowding is not an issue); Lengthen trains; Improve train path take up arrangements; Change pattern and mix of train services (timetables focussed on achieving higher throughput rather than highly diverse services); Reduce timetable fragility (e.g. more robust plans for crew and stock movements); Better train regulation (revisit prioritisation rules, class regulation practices and use of passing facilities by passenger services). An efficiently used existing network is the right comparator for proposed infrastructure enhancement projects. Only once the above options have been fully explored should infrastructure solutions be considered. Load Factor and Train Lengthening Historically it has been difficult to remove passenger trains once they are included in the timetable. This lack of flexibility has meant that service patterns are not altered to reflect shifts in demand. Some near empty trains have remained in the timetable, getting in the way of other services. As shown in Figure 7, long distance operators have added more train kilometres since 1997 relative to other operators. The ratio of passenger kilometres to train kilometres has fallen for long distance operators at the same time that it has risen for other sectors. This can be partly explained by the period of network disruption from which had a greater impact on demand for long distances services. But other factors also appear important. Over this period, long distance operators often preferred to increase service frequencies rather than to lengthen existing services. This is because: of the potential for extra trips to be generated by increased train service frequencies; the industry s revenue allocation systems can sometimes inappropriately reward increases in frequency; and train lengthening often requires investment at stations, especially to lengthen platforms. On the other hand, in London and the South East, passenger kilometres have grown faster than train kilometres. Where this has not been accompanied by train lengthening, it has caused serious overcrowding on some trains. The SRA is committed to tackling overcrowding through the RUS programme and the new franchising policy.

14 BRITAIN S RAILWAY, PROPERLY DELIVERED 13 Figure 7 Growth in Passenger km and Train km between 1997 and 2003 (Source: SRA analysis) Long Distance Operators INDEX TO PKMs (billion) Timetabled Train Kilometres Passenger Kilometres London and South East Operators INDEX TO PKMs (billion) Timetabled Train Kilometres Passenger Kilometres Regional Operators INDEX TO PKMs (billion) Timetabled Train Kilometres Passenger Kilometres

15 14 BRITAIN S RAILWAY, PROPERLY DELIVERED Freight train operators have commercial incentives to operate longer and heavier trains where customer demands justify it. Freight train length can be constrained by the infrastructure and by locomotive power and pathing requirements. Information on timetabled freight kilometres and freight tonnage is currently patchy. It is the SRA s intention to develop broadly equivalent data for freight as is shown in Figure 7 for passenger services. Load Factors and Train Lengths The SRA will ensure, where appropriate, that all SRA-led capacity analysis considers the scope for improved load factors and increased train lengths as a way of achieving passenger growth, as these are normally the most costeffective approaches to delivering growth whilst maintaining performance. When the SRA defines the Service Level Commitment in each new franchise it will wish to consider this issue. On routes with adequate passenger service frequencies, the SRA s preference is to see lengthening of trains as the primary means to accommodate additional passenger demand. Longer trains are already planned for some franchises GNER, Chiltern Railways, South Central and Midland Mainline. Subject to affordability and value for money, the SRA would like to see longer trains operate over other franchises including Virgin Cross Country, Greater Anglia, Thames Trains, Trans Pennine and Central Trains. In order to improve use of capacity, the SRA wishes freight operators to operate the longest trains consistent with overall network performance and customer demand requirements and intends to work with them through the RUSs to achieve this objective. Station Capacity A key determinant of the overall capacity of the rail system is the capacity of stations to handle passenger volumes. Just as there is a finite capacity of the network to accommodate train movements, stations can only handle a finite number of passengers at one time. In planning how best to use the network it is therefore necessary to consider whether stations can cope with peak passenger volumes resulting from particular train service patterns. Whilst this document does not directly address this issue, station capacity planning is an essential part of the SRA s and Network Rail s wider planning process, and future updates of this Strategy will need to incorporate consideration of this important area. Freight Train Path Take-up Freight train operators typically hold significantly more paths than they use in practice. There are several reasons for this: Timetable planning arrangements mean that freight operators need to predict their path requirements up to 18 months in advance, whilst their customers planning horizons can be much shorter; Paths must be booked for daily repeating slots, even if they are only required on particular days, e.g. Tuesdays; Unused paths are not paid for, so there may be little disincentive against holding them. Given the need for flexibility, it is not realistic to expect 100% take-up of freight paths. However, increased path take-up creates a potential opportunity for freight growth. Existing freight access agreements contain use it or lose it provisions which can require that unused paths are relinquished. 11 The SRA wishes to ensure that such clauses adequately balance operators needs for commercial certainty with efficient use of capacity. The expression of access rights itself is not always the most appropriate either for operators purposes or in terms of the efficiency of capacity use. The SRA 11 Article 27 of Directive 2001/14/EC says that the infrastructure manager shall request the surrender of a path which, over a period of at least one month, has been used less than a defined threshold.

16 BRITAIN S RAILWAY, PROPERLY DELIVERED 15 wishes to see, where feasible and appropriate, the future expressions of freight access rights provide a better means of matching supply and demand than at present. The Rail Regulator will shortly consult on model clauses for freight access agreements and the SRA intends to work with the industry and the Rail Regulator within that process to seek to improve contract provisions. Freight Path Take-Up The SRA will work with the Rail Regulator and the industry to ensure that: Use it or lose it provisions adequately balance operators needs for commercial certainty with efficient use of capacity. Where feasible and appropriate, the future expressions of freight access rights provide a better means of matching supply and demand than at present. Spot Bids A spot bid is a bid for a path outside of the process that creates the annual working timetable. As such it provides a means of accommodating unexpected demands whether caused by market opportunities, engineering diversions or unexpected service disruption. The spot bid process relies on the existence of unused capacity, often termed white space, within which an appropriate path can be created. By its nature this is often done at short notice and the path may not be as robustly timetabled as a path resulting from the annual timetable cycle. The operation of the resulting train may therefore significantly worsen the performance of other services. Even where it is adequately timetabled, merely by adding to traffic levels, it will increase the CUI and the level of reactionary delays. Network Rail has in the past suggested that the identification of standard spare paths and restriction of spot bid rights to bids for these paths would lessen these detrimental effects. The SRA believes that Network Rail should increasingly seek to predict spot bids and identify paths to keep in reserve to accommodate them. However, except where justified by further analysis, the SRA does not advocate the automatic rejection of all bids in excess of the pre-allocated paths. The industry should review the Rules of the Plan or Access Conditions so as to give Network Rail stronger grounds to refuse bids where it believes that a resulting path could have adverse effects on network reliability or performance. Network Rail should adopt a rigorous approach when deciding whether or not it is able to accommodate spot bids, taking account of factors such as the potential impact on performance of other services and the period over which the new service would run. Spot Bids The SRA wishes to engage operators and the Rail Regulator to secure more robust provision of paths resulting from use of the spot bid process. The SRA looks to Network Rail to undertake appropriate analysis of potential spot bid rights to ensure that rights are not agreed to that will have a material detrimental effect on performance, and to put in place effective operational planning processes to modify bids where necessary. Network Rail should identify paths to keep in reserve to accommodate spot bids. However, the automatic rejection of all spot bids in excess of the pre-allocated paths will not be justified. The SRA asks the industry to review whether changes need to be made to the Rules of the Plan or Access Conditions to reflect the much higher levels of traffic now on the network than when they were put in place.

17 16 BRITAIN S RAILWAY, PROPERLY DELIVERED Pattern and Mix of Train Services The pattern and mix of train services is one of the major factors determining the real capacity of any route. For example, the theoretical capacity of the line between Leeds and York is 20 trains per hour. In practice, after providing a performance cushion, only 15 same-speed trains can be run. But, due to the pattern of mixed speed services currently in the timetable, and the impacts of trains that join, leave or cross the route, typically only five trains are actually run, even in the peak. The complex service pattern and use of rolling stock with differing characteristics may represent an efficient use of resources because it can closely reflect the needs of particular customer groups. But, where there is network congestion, even a minor reorganisation of existing services can allow increased throughput. The following can provide effective solutions to shortages of capacity: increased homogeneity in operational characteristics between the trains on a route, especially between freight and passenger services; use of passenger rolling stock with improved acceleration/deceleration especially on stopping services; or use of freight locomotives with improved traction. Pattern and Mix of Services The SRA will work closely with the Rail Regulator, Network Rail, passenger and freight operators, and other stakeholders, to seek to ensure that an appropriate pattern and mix of services is provided on each route, trading off attractiveness of service to different markets against performance effects. The RUSs will be the primary vehicle for this analysis and appraisal of options will be an essential feature. Where justified in terms of value for money and affordability, the SRA will encourage and work towards an improved pattern and mix of services, with similar performance characteristics through the RUS and franchising process. Reducing Inherent Timetable Fragility Timetables in some parts of the country are unnecessarily fragile meaning that they have little resilience in recovering from primary delay incidents such as infrastructure or rolling stock failure. One important cause of timetable fragility is the quality and precision of some timetabling base data. Network Rail is currently carrying out a Structural Review of Timetables. The review is expected to result in changes to detailed information (e.g. section running times, dwell times and allowances) as documented in Network Rail s Rules of the Plan. This will help to put in place the basic building blocks for more robust timetabling. Processes are available to challenge Network Rail s proposals if they seem unreasonable to train operators or others. Subject to validation of the adjustments by the industry, the SRA wants the outcome of the Structural Review of Timetables to be implemented. The imposition by Network Rail of differential speed restrictions, especially between passenger and freight trains, can act to reduce available capacity. The SRA would wish Network Rail to review the continuing need for such restrictions, as many of them are based on out of date characteristics, as part of its review of the Rules of the Plan. This could potentially increase Network Rail s costs, and is only likely to be desirable on congested sections of the network where reduced speed differentials would be likely to have capacity/performance benefits. There have been concerns that some passenger train operators timetables have been based on unrealistic assumptions about train crew and stock movements. The SRA recognises the value of direct through services to passengers. Linked services offer advantages to operators by reducing congestion at major stations (e.g. Birmingham New Street) and allowing increase of rolling stock utilisation. However, services that are linked are more vulnerable to knock-on performance problems. There are instances when very unlikely passenger destinations have been linked for purely operational reasons. In these cases very few passengers benefit from the through service, but the performance impacts can be significant if one leg of the journey holds up the other.

18 BRITAIN S RAILWAY, PROPERLY DELIVERED 17 Reducing Timetable Fragility The SRA wishes to see the outcome of Network Rail s Structural Review of Timetable compilation implemented subject to validation of the adjustments by the industry. The SRA will encourage franchised operators to ensure that appropriate performance analysis has been undertaken to demonstrate that timetables are robust with sufficient turnarounds and adequate train crew resources, especially where the rationale for linked services is operational rather than customer-driven. 2.3 Engineering Access and Diversionary Routes It is not possible to have the rail network available for continuous operation. Engineering access (possessions) is required for inspection, maintenance and renewal activities to take place. If insufficient time is allowed for possessions then performance suffers and there may also be an impact on safety. This is a core issue in capacity utilisation because engineering access impacts directly on the amount of time available to run passenger and freight services. The number and mix of train services in turn impact directly on the amount of engineering work required. The Rail Regulator s Interim Review of Access Charges is currently considering the cost efficiency of different options for possession regimes and train services. Given that this NUS is produced whilst the Interim Review is being carried out, and whilst the SRA is preparing its submissions to the Comprehensive Spending Review 2004, it is not appropriate for the NUS to include a statement on preferred possessions regimes at this stage. Engineering Access The SRA would wish Network Rail to prepare robust plans for major renewals sufficiently far in advance (typically two years) to ensure that operators can plan how best to meet their customers needs during the works. The RUSs will consider the appropriate balance of engineering access and train service provision, especially for regular maintenance activities. Where possible this should allow for the use of diversionary routes (many of which are already designated for this purpose). The experience of the West Coast Route Modernisation (WCRM) project indicates that, with proper planning, a more efficient major renewals programme can be defined if longer possessions are adopted rather than the conventional possession arrangements. Research by the Rail Passengers Council, together with Network Rail, ATOC and RSSB, indicates passengers understand the efficiency of this approach and prefer the big bang to get the work over with. Freight operators indicate similar preferences. However, advance warning and information is key, allowing adequate alternative arrangements to be offered to passengers.

19 18 BRITAIN S RAILWAY, PROPERLY DELIVERED 3. Planning Assumptions Growth 3.1 NUS Growth Planning Assumptions For the purpose of the NUS, and in particular to inform the Long Distance Statement (section 4), the SRA has produced a set of planning assumptions about freight and passenger demand growth. These are based on an assessment of external factors (such as economic growth) and the effects of currently committed enhancements. 12 These planning assumptions have been specially created for the Network Utilisation Strategy. They are useful for planning best use of the existing network, because they exclude the impact of any enhancements, other than those already committed. They are different from the SRA s growth forecasts in Strategic Plan, 2003, which: include the effects of some uncommitted enhancements; cover a ten, not a nine year period; are constrained by crowding assumptions. The SRA s planning assumption for the Network Utilisation Strategy is that demand growth between and will be in the region of 20-30% for passenger kilometres and 25-30% for freight tonne kilometres respectively. Passenger Growth The passenger planning assumptions are broken down into the main business segments (sector levels) in Table 1. The overall planning assumption of 20-30% incorporates considerable variation within the sector level figures. Growth in passenger long distance travel is heavily driven by enhancements to services and by GDP. However, peak travel in London and South East is mainly driven by levels of employment in London, and hence follows a different trend. Even greater variations will naturally emerge within each sector when considering individual TOCs or routes. These variations primarily reflect the differences in markets served and the level of committed enhancements. These planning assumptions are more sensitive to specific route drivers than national economic drivers and highlight the need for planning routes individually as well as at sector level. Figure 8 below shows the planning assumption for total passenger kilometres in relation to historical growth on the network. The rate of passenger growth has levelled off over the last two years but the SRA expects it to increase in line with economic activity. Table 1 Planning Assumptions for Passenger Market broken down by Sector Sector Range in Sector-level Planning Assumptions to Long Distance Operators 45% - 55% London and South East Operators 10% - 15% Peak 0% - 15% Off-Peak 15% - 25% Regional Operators 15% - 20% TOTAL Passenger 20% - 30% Passenger Kilometres (billions) Figure 8 Historical Demand and Growth Assumption Passenger These planning assumptions are comparative (they do not include the potential effects of other initiatives) and take into account the relatively low rates of passenger growth in the period to