Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach
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1 Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach ARPITA GHOSH Cornell University NIPS 2013 Workshop on Crowdsourcing: Theory, Algorithms, and Applications Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 1 / 26
2 Users on the Web: Online collective effort Contribution online from the crowds: Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 2 / 26
3 Users on the Web: Online collective effort Contribution online from the crowds: Reviews (Amazon, Yelp), online Q&A sites (Y! Answers, Quora, StackOverflow), discussion forums Wikipedia Social media: Blogs, YouTube,... Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 2 / 26
4 Users on the Web: Online collective effort Contribution online from the crowds: Reviews (Amazon, Yelp), online Q&A sites (Y! Answers, Quora, StackOverflow), discussion forums Wikipedia Social media: Blogs, YouTube,... Crowdsourcing: Paid and unpaid; microtasks and challenges Amazon Mechanical Turk, Citizen Science (GalaxyZoo, FoldIt), Games with a Purpose, contests (Innocentive, Topcoder) Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 2 / 26
5 Users on the Web: Online collective effort Contribution online from the crowds: Reviews (Amazon, Yelp), online Q&A sites (Y! Answers, Quora, StackOverflow), discussion forums Wikipedia Social media: Blogs, YouTube,... Crowdsourcing: Paid and unpaid; microtasks and challenges Amazon Mechanical Turk, Citizen Science (GalaxyZoo, FoldIt), Games with a Purpose, contests (Innocentive, Topcoder) Online education: Peer-learning, peer-grading Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 2 / 26
6 Incentives and collective effort Quality, participation varies widely across systems Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 3 / 26
7 Incentives and collective effort Quality, participation varies widely across systems How to incentivize high participation and effort? Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 3 / 26
8 Incentives and collective effort Quality, participation varies widely across systems How to incentivize high participation and effort? Two components to designing incentives: Social psychology: What constitutes a reward? Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 3 / 26
9 Incentives and collective effort Quality, participation varies widely across systems How to incentivize high participation and effort? Two components to designing incentives: Social psychology: What constitutes a reward? Rewards are limited: How to allocate among self-interested users? A game-theoretic framework for incentive design Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 3 / 26
10 The game-theoretic approach to incentive design System design induces rules specifying allocation of rewards Self-interested users choose actions to maximize own payoff Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 4 / 26
11 The game-theoretic approach to incentive design System design induces rules specifying allocation of rewards Self-interested users choose actions to maximize own payoff Participation ( Endogenous entry ) Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 4 / 26
12 The game-theoretic approach to incentive design System design induces rules specifying allocation of rewards Self-interested users choose actions to maximize own payoff Participation ( Endogenous entry ) Revealing information truthfully (ratings, opinions,... ) Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 4 / 26
13 The game-theoretic approach to incentive design System design induces rules specifying allocation of rewards Self-interested users choose actions to maximize own payoff Participation ( Endogenous entry ) Revealing information truthfully (ratings, opinions,... ) Effort: Quality of content (UGC sites) Output accuracy (crowdsourcing) Quantity: Number of contributions, attemped tasks Speed of response (Q&A forums),... Incentive design: Allocate reward to align agent s incentives with system Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 4 / 26
14 Incentive design for crowdsourcing Reward allocation problem varies across systems: Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 5 / 26
15 Incentive design for crowdsourcing Reward allocation problem varies across systems: Why? Constraints, reward regimes, vary with nature of reward: Monetary; social-psychological (attention, status,... ) Attention rewards: Diverging [GM11, GH11]; subset constraints [GM12] Money-like rewards: Bounded; sum constraints [GM12] Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 5 / 26
16 Incentive design for crowdsourcing Reward allocation problem varies across systems: Why? Constraints, reward regimes, vary with nature of reward: Monetary; social-psychological (attention, status,... ) Attention rewards: Diverging [GM11, GH11]; subset constraints [GM12] Money-like rewards: Bounded; sum constraints [GM12] Observability of (value of) agents output Can only reward what you can see Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 5 / 26
17 Incentive design for crowdsourcing Reward allocation problem varies across systems: Why? Constraints, reward regimes, vary with nature of reward: Monetary; social-psychological (attention, status,... ) Attention rewards: Diverging [GM11, GH11]; subset constraints [GM12] Money-like rewards: Bounded; sum constraints [GM12] Observability of (value of) agents output Can only reward what you can see Perfect rank-ordering: Contests [... ] Imperfect: Noisy votes in UGC [EG13, GH13] Unobservable: Judgement elicitation [DG13] Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 5 / 26
18 Learning & incentives in user-generated content Joint work with Patrick Hummel, ITCS 13 The setting: User-generated content (Reviews, Q&A forums, comments, videos, articles,... ) Quality of contributions varies widely: Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 6 / 26
19 Learning & incentives in user-generated content Joint work with Patrick Hummel, ITCS 13 The setting: User-generated content (Reviews, Q&A forums, comments, videos, articles,... ) Quality of contributions varies widely: Sites want to display best contributions Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 6 / 26
20 Learning & incentives in user-generated content Joint work with Patrick Hummel, ITCS 13 The setting: User-generated content (Reviews, Q&A forums, comments, videos, articles,... ) Quality of contributions varies widely: Sites want to display best contributions But quality is not directly observable: Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 6 / 26
21 Learning & incentives in user-generated content Joint work with Patrick Hummel, ITCS 13 The setting: User-generated content (Reviews, Q&A forums, comments, videos, articles,... ) Quality of contributions varies widely: Sites want to display best contributions But quality is not directly observable: Infer quality from viewer votes Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 6 / 26
22 Learning & incentives in user-generated content Joint work with Patrick Hummel, ITCS 13 The setting: User-generated content (Reviews, Q&A forums, comments, videos, articles,... ) Quality of contributions varies widely: Sites want to display best contributions But quality is not directly observable: Infer quality from viewer votes How to display contributions to optimize overall viewer experience? Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 6 / 26
23 A multi-armed bandit problem Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 7 / 26
24 A multi-armed bandit problem Learning contribution qualities: Multi-armed bandit problem Arms: Contributions Success probability: Contribution s quality Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 7 / 26
25 A multi-armed bandit problem Learning contribution qualities: Multi-armed bandit problem Arms: Contributions Success probability: Contribution s quality Contributors: Agents with cost to quality, benefit from views Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 7 / 26
26 A multi-armed bandit problem Learning contribution qualities: Multi-armed bandit problem Arms: Contributions Success probability: Contribution s quality Contributors: Agents with cost to quality, benefit from views Arms are endogenous! Contributors choose whether to participate, content quality Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 7 / 26
27 A multi-armed bandit problem Learning contribution qualities: Multi-armed bandit problem Arms: Contributions Success probability: Contribution s quality Contributors: Agents with cost to quality, benefit from views Arms are endogenous! Contributors choose whether to participate, content quality What is a good learning algorithm in this setting? Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 7 / 26
28 Overview Strategic contributors: Decide participation, quality Viewers vote on displayed contributions Mechanism: Decides which contribution to display Metric: Equilibrium regret Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 8 / 26
29 Model: Content and feedback Contribution quality q: Probability of viewer upvote Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 9 / 26
30 Model: Content and feedback Contribution quality q: Probability of viewer upvote Stream of T viewers: Each viewer shown, votes on, one contribution Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 9 / 26
31 Model: Content and feedback Contribution quality q: Probability of viewer upvote Stream of T viewers: Each viewer shown, votes on, one contribution Viewers need not vote perfectly : q [0, γ] Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 9 / 26
32 Model: Content and feedback Contribution quality q: Probability of viewer upvote Stream of T viewers: Each viewer shown, votes on, one contribution Viewers need not vote perfectly : q [0, γ] Mechanism should be robust to γ < 1 Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 9 / 26
33 Contributors K = K(T ) potential contributors Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 10 / 26
34 Contributors K = K(T ) potential contributors Contributors are strategic agents Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 10 / 26
35 Contributors K = K(T ) potential contributors Contributors are strategic agents, choosing Whether or not to participate: Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 10 / 26
36 Contributors K = K(T ) potential contributors Contributors are strategic agents, choosing Whether or not to participate: Probability β i Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 10 / 26
37 Contributors K = K(T ) potential contributors Contributors are strategic agents, choosing Whether or not to participate: Probability β i Contribution quality: q i Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 10 / 26
38 Contributors K = K(T ) potential contributors Contributors are strategic agents, choosing Whether or not to participate: Probability β i Contribution quality: q i Actual number of contributions (arms): k(t ) K(T ) Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 10 / 26
39 Contributor utilities Cost: Quality q incurs cost c(q) c(q) increasing, continuously differentiable Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 11 / 26
40 Contributor utilities Cost: Quality q incurs cost c(q) c(q) increasing, continuously differentiable Benefit from views Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 11 / 26
41 Contributor utilities Cost: Quality q incurs cost c(q) c(q) increasing, continuously differentiable Benefit from views Psychological ([Huberman et al 09,... ]) or monetary benefit Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 11 / 26
42 Contributor utilities Cost: Quality q incurs cost c(q) c(q) increasing, continuously differentiable Benefit from views Psychological ([Huberman et al 09,... ]) or monetary benefit ni t : Views allocated to i until period t Total benefit to i: ni T Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 11 / 26
43 Contributor utilities Cost: Quality q incurs cost c(q) c(q) increasing, continuously differentiable Benefit from views Psychological ([Huberman et al 09,... ]) or monetary benefit ni t : Views allocated to i until period t Total benefit to i: ni T Mechanism: Decides which contribution to display at t Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 11 / 26
44 Contributor utilities Cost: Quality q incurs cost c(q) c(q) increasing, continuously differentiable Benefit from views Psychological ([Huberman et al 09,... ]) or monetary benefit ni t : Views allocated to i until period t Total benefit to i: ni T Mechanism: Decides which contribution to display at t Utility: u i = E[n T i (q i, q i, k(t ))] c(q i ) Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 11 / 26
45 Mapping to MAB K(T ) potential contributors, or arms Viewer t: Pull of arm at time t T : Time horizon or total number of viewers Content quality q i : Success probability of arm i Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 12 / 26
46 Mapping to MAB K(T ) potential contributors, or arms Viewer t: Pull of arm at time t T : Time horizon or total number of viewers Content quality q i : Success probability of arm i Actual number of arms k(t ), qualities q i, determined endogenously in response to learning algorithm Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 12 / 26
47 How good is a learning algorithm as a mechanism? Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 13 / 26
48 How good is a learning algorithm as a mechanism? Performance measure: Equilibrium regret Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 13 / 26
49 How good is a learning algorithm as a mechanism? Performance measure: Equilibrium regret Recall contributors choose q [0, γ] Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 13 / 26
50 How good is a learning algorithm as a mechanism? Performance measure: Equilibrium regret Recall contributors choose q [0, γ] Strong regret of mechanism M: Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 13 / 26
51 How good is a learning algorithm as a mechanism? Performance measure: Equilibrium regret Recall contributors choose q [0, γ] Strong regret of mechanism M: Regret wrt γ, Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 13 / 26
52 How good is a learning algorithm as a mechanism? Performance measure: Equilibrium regret Recall contributors choose q [0, γ] Strong regret of mechanism M: Regret wrt γ, in symmetric mixed-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium (β, F (q)), Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 13 / 26
53 How good is a learning algorithm as a mechanism? Performance measure: Equilibrium regret Recall contributors choose q [0, γ] Strong regret of mechanism M: Regret wrt γ, in symmetric mixed-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium (β, F (q)), T R(T ) = γt E[ q t ] t=1 Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 13 / 26
54 How good is a learning algorithm as a mechanism? Performance measure: Equilibrium regret Recall contributors choose q [0, γ] Strong regret of mechanism M: Regret wrt γ, in symmetric mixed-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium (β, F (q)), T R(T ) = γt E[ q t ] t=1 Strong sublinear equilibrium regret: Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 13 / 26
55 How good is a learning algorithm as a mechanism? Performance measure: Equilibrium regret Recall contributors choose q [0, γ] Strong regret of mechanism M: Regret wrt γ, in symmetric mixed-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium (β, F (q)), T R(T ) = γt E[ q t ] t=1 Strong sublinear equilibrium regret: lim T R(T ) T = 0 Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 13 / 26
56 How good is a learning algorithm as a mechanism? Performance measure: Equilibrium regret Recall contributors choose q [0, γ] Strong regret of mechanism M: Regret wrt γ, in symmetric mixed-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium (β, F (q)), T R(T ) = γt E[ q t ] t=1 R(T ) Strong sublinear equilibrium regret: lim T T every symmetric equilibrium of M = 0 in Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 13 / 26
57 The UCB algorithm, as a mechanism q t i : Estimated quality of i at time t UCB algorithm M UCB : Display all arms once, then Display i = arg max q t i + 2 ln T n t i Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 14 / 26
58 The UCB algorithm, as a mechanism q t i : Estimated quality of i at time t UCB algorithm M UCB : Display all arms once, then Display i = arg max q t i + 2 ln T n t i Theorem: Mechanism M UCB always has a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium (β, F (q)) Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 14 / 26
59 UCB as a mechanism: The good news Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 15 / 26
60 UCB as a mechanism: The good news Theorem If K(T ) is such that lim T T K(T ) ln T = : Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 15 / 26
61 UCB as a mechanism: The good news Theorem If K(T ) is such that lim T T K(T ) ln T = : β = 1 in any equilibria of M UCB for sufficiently large T Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 15 / 26
62 UCB as a mechanism: The good news Theorem If K(T ) is such that lim T T K(T ) ln T = : β = 1 in any equilibria of M UCB for sufficiently large T For any fixed q < γ, the probability of choosing quality q q in any equilibrium goes to 0 as T. Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 15 / 26
63 UCB as a mechanism: The good news Theorem If K(T ) is such that lim T T K(T ) ln T = : β = 1 in any equilibria of M UCB for sufficiently large T For any fixed q < γ, the probability of choosing quality q q in any equilibrium goes to 0 as T. M UCB achieves strong sublinear equilibrium regret. Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 15 / 26
64 UCB as a mechanism: The bad news Theorem Suppose lim T T K(T ) = r <. Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 16 / 26
65 UCB as a mechanism: The bad news Theorem T Suppose lim T K(T ) = r <. Then for sufficiently large T, any equilibrium has the property that no agent chooses quality greater than q = cτ 1 (1 + c(0)). Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 16 / 26
66 Improving equilibrium regret: A modified UCB mechanism M UCB MOD : Run UCB on random subset of min{ T, k(t )} arms Exploring random subset: M 1 FAIL [Berry et al 97] M 1 FAIL achieves strong sublinear regret as an algorithm for large K(T ) Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 17 / 26
67 Improving equilibrium regret: A modified UCB mechanism M UCB MOD : Run UCB on random subset of min{ T, k(t )} arms Exploring random subset: M 1 FAIL [Berry et al 97] M 1 FAIL achieves strong sublinear regret as an algorithm for large K(T ), but not as a mechanism Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 17 / 26
68 Improving equilibrium regret: A modified UCB mechanism M UCB MOD : Run UCB on random subset of min{ T, k(t )} arms Exploring random subset: M 1 FAIL [Berry et al 97] M 1 FAIL achieves strong sublinear regret as an algorithm for large K(T ), but not as a mechanism Theorem M UCB MOD achieves strong sublinear equilibrium regret for all γ 1 and cost functions c, for all K(T ) T. Why UCB works. Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 17 / 26
69 Extensions of result M UCB MOD retains strong sublinear equilibrium regret if: Each viewer is shown multiple contributions Explore min{g(t ), k(t )} arms: G(T ), G(T ) = o( T ln T ) Heterogenous types: Cost functions c τ (q) q [δ, γ], δ > 0 Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 18 / 26
70 Open questions Multi-armed bandits with endogenous arms: Strong sublinear equilibrium regret achievable with modified-ucb mechanism Many unanswered questions: Models, mechanisms Probabilistic feedback Sequential contributions Quality-participation tradeoffs with G(T ) Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 19 / 26
71 Open questions Multi-armed bandits with endogenous arms: Strong sublinear equilibrium regret achievable with modified-ucb mechanism Many unanswered questions: Models, mechanisms Probabilistic feedback Sequential contributions Quality-participation tradeoffs with G(T ) What learning algorithms make good mechanisms when arms are endogenous? Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 19 / 26
72 Incentives in crowdsourcing: Unobservable output Crowdsourced evaluation: Replace expert by aggregated evaluation from crowd Image classification & labeling; content rating; abuse detection; MOOCs peer grading,... How to aggregate evaluations from crowd? Workers have different proficiencies; Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 20 / 26
73 Incentives in crowdsourcing: Unobservable output Crowdsourced evaluation: Replace expert by aggregated evaluation from crowd Image classification & labeling; content rating; abuse detection; MOOCs peer grading,... How to aggregate evaluations from crowd? Workers have different proficiencies; possibly unknown to system: Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 20 / 26
74 Incentives in crowdsourcing: Unobservable output Crowdsourced evaluation: Replace expert by aggregated evaluation from crowd Image classification & labeling; content rating; abuse detection; MOOCs peer grading,... How to aggregate evaluations from crowd? Workers have different proficiencies; possibly unknown to system: Learn, weight to maximize accuracy Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 20 / 26
75 Incentives in crowdsourcing: Unobservable output Crowdsourced evaluation: Replace expert by aggregated evaluation from crowd Image classification & labeling; content rating; abuse detection; MOOCs peer grading,... How to aggregate evaluations from crowd? Workers have different proficiencies; possibly unknown to system: Learn, weight to maximize accuracy Input to aggregation problem comes from self-interested agents How to incentivize good evaluations from crowd? Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 20 / 26
76 Incentives in crowdsourced evaluation Incentivizing accurate evaluations, truthful reporting: (i) Unobservable ground truth (ii) Effort-dependent accuracy (Information elicitation with endogenous proficiency) Direct monitoring infeasible: Reward agreement Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 21 / 26
77 Incentives in crowdsourced evaluation Incentivizing accurate evaluations, truthful reporting: (i) Unobservable ground truth (ii) Effort-dependent accuracy (Information elicitation with endogenous proficiency) Direct monitoring infeasible: Reward agreement Problem: Undesirable low-effort/second-guessing equilibria (e.g. always say H ) Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 21 / 26
78 Incentives in crowdsourced evaluation Incentivizing accurate evaluations, truthful reporting: (i) Unobservable ground truth (ii) Effort-dependent accuracy (Information elicitation with endogenous proficiency) Direct monitoring infeasible: Reward agreement Problem: Undesirable low-effort/second-guessing equilibria (e.g. always say H ) Mechanism [Dasgupta-Ghosh, WWW 13]: Maximum effort-truthful reporting is highest-payoff equilibrium! (Assuming no task-specific collusions) Use multiple tasks and ratings: Reward for agreement, Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 21 / 26
79 Incentives in crowdsourced evaluation Incentivizing accurate evaluations, truthful reporting: (i) Unobservable ground truth (ii) Effort-dependent accuracy (Information elicitation with endogenous proficiency) Direct monitoring infeasible: Reward agreement Problem: Undesirable low-effort/second-guessing equilibria (e.g. always say H ) Mechanism [Dasgupta-Ghosh, WWW 13]: Maximum effort-truthful reporting is highest-payoff equilibrium! (Assuming no task-specific collusions) Use multiple tasks and ratings: Reward for agreement, but also identify and penalize blind agreement Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 21 / 26
80 Moving beyond single tasks: Incentivizing overall contribution Problems so far: Incentives for single contribution/task Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 22 / 26
81 Moving beyond single tasks: Incentivizing overall contribution Problems so far: Incentives for single contribution/task Rewarding contributors for overall identity: Badges, leaderboards, reputations,... Virtual rewards for cumulative contribution Gamification rewards valued by agents; contribution to earn reward is costly Badges induce mechanisms! Design affects participation, effort from users Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 22 / 26
82 Moving beyond single tasks: Incentivizing overall contribution Problems so far: Incentives for single contribution/task Rewarding contributors for overall identity: Badges, leaderboards, reputations,... Virtual rewards for cumulative contribution Gamification rewards valued by agents; contribution to earn reward is costly Badges induce mechanisms! Design affects participation, effort from users Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 22 / 26
83 Badges and incentive design Different badge designs online: Absolute milestone badges (StackOverflow, Foursquare), versus competitive top-contributor badges (Y!Answers, Tripadvisor) Information about badge winners (StackOverflow vs Y! Answers) Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 23 / 26
84 Badges and incentive design Different badge designs online: Absolute milestone badges (StackOverflow, Foursquare), versus competitive top-contributor badges (Y!Answers, Tripadvisor) Information about badge winners (StackOverflow vs Y! Answers) What incentives do different badge designs create for participation and effort? Results Game-theoretic analysis of badge design (Easley & Ghosh, ACM EC 13) Absolute or competitive badges? Competitive badges: Fixed number or fraction of participants? Visibility of information: Transparent or not? Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 23 / 26
85 Wrapping up Incentive design for crowdsourcing Data, inputs to algorithms come from self-interested agents Mechanisms rather than algorithms: A game-theoretic framework Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 24 / 26
86 Wrapping up Incentive design for crowdsourcing Data, inputs to algorithms come from self-interested agents Mechanisms rather than algorithms: A game-theoretic framework Lots more to understand! Sequential decision making Eliciting effort with strategic contributors and raters Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 24 / 26
87 Wrapping up Incentive design for crowdsourcing Data, inputs to algorithms come from self-interested agents Mechanisms rather than algorithms: A game-theoretic framework Lots more to understand! Sequential decision making Eliciting effort with strategic contributors and raters Overall contributor rewards; sustaining contribution Learning and incentives: Designing reputations Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 24 / 26
88 Wrapping up Incentive design for crowdsourcing Data, inputs to algorithms come from self-interested agents Mechanisms rather than algorithms: A game-theoretic framework Lots more to understand! Sequential decision making Eliciting effort with strategic contributors and raters Overall contributor rewards; sustaining contribution Learning and incentives: Designing reputations Experimental and empirical: What do agents value, and how? Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 24 / 26
89 Why M UCB MOD works Lemma Any arm with quality q i q max (T ) δ receives Θ(ln T ) attention in expectation for all δ > 0 Theorem q max (T ): Highest-quality explored contribution A purely algorithmic statement; proof by contradiction For any fixed q < γ, the probability that there is some agent explored by M UCB MOD who chooses quality q > q goes to 1 as T in every equilibrium of M UCB MOD. Proof by contradiction: Demonstrate profitable deviation (Involves strategic reasoning, not purely algorithmic) Back to UCB Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 25 / 26
90 Badges and incentive design: An economic framework (Easley & Ghosh, ACM EC 13) Conclusion Design recommendations from analysis: Competitive badges: Reward fixed number, not fraction of competitors Absolute versus competitive badges equivalent if population parameters known With uncertainty, or unknown parameters, competitive badges more robust Sharing information about other users performance: Depends on convexity of value as function of winners Incentives in Crowdsourcing: A Game-theoretic Approach 26 / 26
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