Lorenzo Magnolfi. 41 Trumbull St. Apt 3 Department of Economics

Transcription

1 Lorenzo Magnolfi Home Address: Office Address: 41 Trumbull St. Apt 3 New Haven, CT Telephone: (+1) lorenzo.magnolfi@yale.edu Personal web page: Citizenship: Italian, J-1 US Visa (Not subject to Two-Year Rule) Fields of Concentration: Primary Field: Industrial Organization Secondary Fields: Applied Econometrics, Applied Microeconomics, Law and Finance Desired Teaching: Microeconomics Econometrics Industrial Organization Comprehensive Examinations Completed: 2012 (Oral): Industrial Organization, Econometrics 2011(Written): Microeconomics, Macroeconomics Dissertation Title: Essays in Industrial Organization Committee: Professor Philip Haile Professor Steven T. Berry Professor Dirk Bergemann Professor Mitsuru Igami Expected Completion Date: May 2016 Degrees: Ph.D., Economics,, 2016 (expected) M.Res., Economics, European University Institute, 2010 M.Sc., Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra Barcelona GSE, 2009 Laurea Magistrale (M.A.) cum laude, Economics, Università di Firenze, 2008

2 Fellowships, Honors and Awards: University Dissertation Fellowship,, 2015 Carl Arvid Anderson Prize Fellowship, Cowles Foundation,, 2014 Cowles Foundation Fellowship,, Doctoral Fellowship, EIEF Scholarship for Ph.D. studies, 2010 (Declined) Italian Foreign Ministry Scholarship for Ph.D. Studies at EUI, Teaching Experience: Teaching Fellow, : Game Theory (instructor: B. Nalebuff), Spring 2014 Probability and Statistics (instructor: T. Armstrong), Fall 2013 Industrial Organization (instructor: P. Haile), Spring 2013 Microeconomic Theory I (instructor: K. Rozen), Fall 2012 Teaching Fellow, NYU in Florence: Money and Banking (instructor: G. Gallo), Fall 2009, Spring 2010 Research and Work Experience: Research Assistant to Professor Hans-Joachim Voth, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2009 Working Papers: Estimation of Discrete Games with Weak Assumptions on Information with Camilla Roncoroni, October 2015, Job Market Paper #1 Political Connections as Barriers to Entry in the Supermarket Industry with Camilla Roncoroni, October 2015, Job Market Paper # Regulatory Competition and the Market for Corporate Law with Ofer Eldar, October Works In Progress: National Champions and Competition in Grocery Retail, October 2015 Languages: Italian (native), English (fluent), Spanish (fluent), French (intermediate) References: Prof. Philip Haile P.O. Box Phone: (+1) philip.haile@yale.edu Prof. Steven T. Berry PO Box Phone: (+1) steven.berry@yale.edu

3 Prof. Dirk Bergemann P.O. Box Phone: (+1) Prof. Mitsuru Igami PO Box Phone: (+1) Dissertation Abstract Chapter 1: Estimation of Discrete Games with Weak Assumptions on Information [Job Market Paper] (joint with Camilla Roncoroni) We propose a new method to estimate the distribution of preferences when behavior is described by equilibrium play in static discrete games, while maintaining weak assumptions on the information available to players. Structural game theoretic models are useful to quantify the impact of policy on the decisions of strategic firms, but require assumptions on primitives that are unknown to the researcher. We focus on assumptions about the information available to players, since these are key in determining model s predictions, and misspecification of features of the information structure could result in biased estimates of the parameters of interest. In contrast to the existing literature, we do not fully specify the information structure of the game. Instead, we allow for all information structures consistent with the assumptions that players know (i) their own payoffs, (ii) the distribution of opponents payoffs, and (iii) parameters and observable covariates. Our object of interest is the set of all parameters that are identified if predictions are generated by any Bayes Nash Equilibrium (BNE), given an admissible information structure. As a consequence, our model nests the standard assumptions, adopted in the existing literature, of complete information and perfectly private information. We make this approach tractable by adopting a weaker solution concept that captures the predictions of equilibrium behavior for all possible information structures: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (BCE), as defined in Bergemann and Morris (2013, 2015). We characterize the (sharp) identified set obtained under the assumption of BCE behavior, and show that it contains all and only the parameters that are compatible with the data and with a BNE given an admissible information structure. We show that entry games with BCE behavior are point identified under the same assumptions that guarantee point identification in models that restrict the information structure. Moreover, identified sets are narrow enough to be informative in simple examples of entry games with modest levels of variation in observable covariates. The robustness achieved by our method is desirable, because misspecification of the information structure can result in biased estimates. In an application, we present quantitative evaluations of the effect of the presence of large shopping centers on competition in the Italian supermarket industry, by estimating a model of static entry. We estimate our model and compare the results with estimates obtained under the assumption of complete information. The two methods yield different parameter estimates and different market structure implications of a policy that would prevent large shopping centers from operating in small geographical markets.

4 Chapter 2: Political Connections as Barriers to Entry in the Supermarket Industry [Job Market Paper #2] (joint with Camilla Roncoroni) This paper empirically investigates how political connections affect entry into a retail industry. Political connections can result in a privileged relationship with the regulator, thus allowing the connected firm to profit from political advantages. However, political connections are likely to hurt non-connected competitors, and imperfect competition can ultimately decrease consumer welfare. We focus on the largest grocery retailer in Italy, Coop Italia, a network of consumer cooperatives which has historical links to political parties. We measure the strength of its political connections across geographical markets by counting the number of cooperatives directors who have also been local government officials. Our model allows political connections to distort firms' ability to enter a market in three ways: by imposing higher entry costs for non-connected firms, by lowering entry costs for the connected firm, and by helping the connected firm produce more informed forecasts of competitors profitability and entry decisions. We estimate a game-theoretic model that accounts for both the interdependence among firms entry decisions and the effect of market variables, including a measure of political connections. The informational environment is affected by the presence of political connections, and the connected player may be better informed than its competitors about market conditions. To take this into account, we adopt a new method to estimate the entry game under weak assumptions on the informational environment. We allow the connected firm to have privileged information, without assuming that it necessarily has it. Our approach provides confidence sets for parameters, including parameters that measure the effect of political connections on firms entry decisions. We find a positive effect of political connections on cooperatives profits, and a negative effect on some competitors. In a counterfactual, we examine the effect on market structure of a policy that makes entry regulation more transparent, thus removing the effect of political connections. We also link market structure outcomes to consumer welfare and estimate a model of demand and pricing for supermarkets. We obtain bounds on the expected welfare change and quantify the welfare cost of connections. Chapter 3: Regulatory Competition and the Market for Corporate Law (joint with Ofer Eldar) U.S. firms can choose the corporate governance laws that apply to them through incorporation decisions, and states compete to attract firms. Delaware dominates the market for incorporations, though recently Nevada, a state with laws that strongly protect managers, has acquired a sizable share of this market. To address the debate on the desirability of competition for corporate charters, we develop an empirical model of firms choice of corporate governance laws based on a set of legal and firm characteristics, and where firms choices are subject to inertia in decision making. We estimate the model using panel data on states laws, and a novel database that accurately tracks incorporation decisions for all U.S. public firms from 1995 through Our study reveals that even though there were relatively small shifts in market shares and few reincorporations in this period, states corporate laws have a significant effect on firm incorporation decisions. Although it is impossible for states to compete with Delaware by

5 copying its laws without replicating its judicial system, there is elasticity in the demand for corporate laws, which is concealed by inertia. Contrary to the race to the bottom view of this market, we show that large corporations dislike laws that afford greater protection to managers, particularly anti-takeover statutes and provisions that exempt officers from liability. Our counterfactual analysis suggests that Delaware could lose significant market share and revenues if it were to adopt such laws.