PROOF OF AN AGREEMENT
|
|
- Emily Morgan
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 PROOF OF AN AGREEMENT Circumstantial Evidence Relevant to the Existence of an Agreement in Violation of Section 1 Presented by: Mark Glueck Richard Higgins Presented to: Date: July 12 th, 2012 Location: Washington, DC, and Houston and Dallas, TX 1
2 Overview Types of coordination - Express agreement o Direct evidence Per se illegality o Indirect (circumstantial) evidence Rule of reason - Tacit collusion Theory of collusion: self-enforcing agreements Circumstantial economic evidence Class actions 2
3 Collusion Lessening of competition through coordination among competitors to fix competitively sensitive variables (price, output, capacity, advertising, etc.) - Explicit collusion - Tacit collusion o Parallel accommodating conduct 3
4 Explicit Collusion Mutual understanding and acceptance of an agreement reached through communication to fix price above competitive levels Evidence of express agreement can be direct or indirect - Circumstantial vs. concrete When direct evidence is available, Per se illegality is appropriate - Expected cost of Type I >> expected cost of Type 2 - Costly adjudication - Guidance: clear and easily provided 4
5 Tacit Collusion Parallel accommodating conduct ( conscious parallelism ) - Mutual understanding reached without communication beyond rivals pricing decisions - Consistent with independent decisions in oligopolistic market - No Section 1 violation, but see Horizontal Merger Guidelines and - Posner: High Fructose Corn Syrup 5
6 Explicit collusion An explicit agreement may be inferred in the absence of direct evidence of coordination Four steps (summary judgment, trial on the merits): - Evidence of parallel conduct - Plausible theory of coordination that causes antitrust harm - Circumstantial evidence: plus factor(s) that tend to exclude the possibility that the alleged conspirators acted independently - Conduct against self-interest but for agreement 6
7 Competition vs. Coordination Prisoner s dilemma: output choice - Payoff Matrix The joint-profit maximum (merger outcome) may be self-enforcing subject to specific strategies - Indefinite repeated interaction - Chain-store paradox 7
8 Economic Theory of Collusion Agreement-Detection-Punishment paradigm (Stigler) - Agreement on punishment scheme also required - Must be self-enforcing: no incentives to cheat (a SPNE) 8
9 Fundamental Relation Profit for Firm j ($) PV[C] < PV[P] C P Collusion Competition T T+d Time 9.a
10 Theory cont. A self-enforcing relation applies to punishment phase also - We ll let him go this time! Fundamental relation depends on: - Time preference - Target agreement, time to detection and severity of punishment o Influenced by more basic factors 10
11 Indirect Proof of Explicit Collusion Parallel conduct Plausible anticompetitive scheme Plus factors - Economic evidence o o Structural evidence Behavioral evidence - Non-economic evidence 11
12 Evidence of Parallel Conduct Not sufficient - Firms in oligopolistic market recognize interdependence and as a result: o o Correlated pricing Correlated responses to changes in costs and demand - Dissent (Posner, High Fructose Corn Syrup): an alternative approach: o o Econometrics used to estimate demand and costs, and competitive market price simulated Comparison of competitive price and actual price - But, are effective remedies available? Posner (JTC Petroleum): monetary fines to deter tacit collusion 12
13 Plausibility Would collusion be profitable for participants? Gains from collusion greater than the gains from deviating from the agreement? Likelihood of detection? Transparency? Efficacy of retaliation? 13
14 Plus Factors Critical to have evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the alleged conspirators acted independently: one or more plus factors - PROBLEM: plus factors cannot distinguish between tacit and explicit collusion Most critical plus factor: - Evidence that the alleged conspirators acted against self-interest but for anticompetitive coordination o Disinvestment during period of rising prices o Foregoing profitable market expansion 14
15 Economic Evidence of Plus Factors Structural evidence - Market characteristics conducive to concerted action Behavioral evidence: market performance - Market outcomes and firm conduct that are inconsistent with competition Non-economic evidence - Circumstantial evidence of meetings between high-level officials - Econometric evidence of anticompetitive effects of meetings 15
16 Structural Evidence Demand elasticity - Inelasticity makes price fixing more profitable Market concentration - Small numbers in dominant group makes agreement easier; makes detection easier Opportunities to communicate - Promotes agreement both for target and punishment scheme - But, facilitates re-negotiation during punishment phase - McCutcheon: Section 1 prohibition on communication makes renegotiation less likely: Section 1 enforcement promotes price fixing Price transparency - Facilitates detection 16
17 Structural Evidence cont. Product homogeneity - Makes agreement and detection of noncompliance easier - Exception: tit-for-tat pricing scheme unworkable with homogeneous products Demand volatility - Volatility makes detecting cheating more difficult Symmetry - Promotes agreement: target and punishment schemes easier to devise 17
18 Structural Evidence cont. Supply elasticity - Greater elasticity requires more inclusive conspiracy - High fixed-to-variable cost ratio makes competition more risky Facilitating practices: basing point pricing, MFNs, e.g. - An agreement among competitors about business practices that make coordination more likely or more effective, either by making coordination easier or making it easier to sustain a collusive agreement. - An agreement among competitors to adopt a facilitating practice may be prosecuted either as an anti-competitive agreement in and of itself or as circumstantial evidence of price fixing. - Successful defense: offsetting procompetitive benefits 18
19 Behavioral Evidence Uniformity of conduct Coincidence of conduct Uniform market shares Departure from established business practices Actions against self-interest: plants shut down during period of rising prices 19
20 Behavioral Evidence cont. Evidence that price/cost margin increased significantly after: - Start of alleged conspiracy (see graphs) - Formation of trade association or industry meetings - Substantial period of price decline Evidence that a collectively determined rule lessens competition (see bar chart) 20
21 Dollars Per Unit Behavioral Evidence (example 1) 21 Evidence of Structural Break (Based on Average Price Before Conspiracy) Average Overcharge = $ Period Price But-for Price 21
22 Dollars Per Unit Behavioral Evidence (example 1) 21 Evidence of Structural Break (Based on Cost-Adjused Price) Average Overcharge = $ Period Price But-for Price 22
23 ($) Behavioral Evidence (example 2) Effect of Blue Laws on Automobile Sales 18,000 16,000 Cities With Blue Laws $15,634 Cities Without Blue Laws $14,897 14,000 12,000 10,786 12,345 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 0 Avg New Car Price N=20 Volume (per month) Avg New Car Price N=26 Volume (per month) Note: Differences are statistically significant. 23
24 Behavioral Evidence in Specific Markets Bid market Regression model designed to explain individuals historical bids in terms of common cost and demand factors Residuals: bid variation not explained by differences in market fundamentals (e.g., energy costs) and observable bidder characteristics (e.g., distance of bidders plants from worksite) 24
25 Bid Market Analysis cont. Evidence from regression model: Are the bidders residuals independent? Do bidders in the same situation bid the same? Are competitive bids affected in the same way by fundamentals? Affirmative answers suggest conspiracy but they are not dispositive 25
26 Defending Against a Section 1 Charge vs. Government - Reverse government process of screening and verification Screening: (1) Does industry have traits conducive to collusion? (2) Evidence of structural breaks in price/cost margins, share volatility, bid patterns during alleged conspiracy period, etc.? 26
27 Defending... cont. Verification: (1) Compare conduct of alleged conspirators with conduct of non-conspirators or with their own behavior at a different time or place; (2) Which model explains outcomes best? Collusion or competition? 27
28 Implications for Class Certification Class-wide treatment appropriate where common impact can be demonstrated Orientation shifts from supply- to demand-side evidence of homogeneity Class identified from analysis of evidence rather than articulated scope of agreement Plausibility is coordination plausible on structural and behavioral terms for the entire purported class? 28
29 Implications for Class Cert. cont. Was the agreement avoidable for members of the class? Does analysis of structural and behavioral plus factors constitute a testable method of demonstrating common impact? 29
30 Finance Scholars Group 2101 L Street, NW Washington, DC (202) Finance Scholars Group California. Illinois. New York. Texas. Washington DC 30
Noncooperative Collusion
Noncooperative Collusion The Cournot Oligopoly model was a single-period noncooperative model. In most models of imperfect competition, it is true that if firms independently try to maximize their short-term
More informationRegional Competition Center for Latin America presents: Guidelines on exchanges of information among competitors
Regional Competition Center for Latin America presents: Guidelines on exchanges of information among competitors Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz* NYU Stern School of Business 1 One of the main objectives of the
More informationCollusion and Unilateral Price Announcements. Antonio Capobianco Senior Expert on Competition Law, OECD Competition Division
Collusion and Unilateral Price Announcements Antonio Capobianco Senior Expert on Competition Law, OECD Competition Division 1 COLLUSION AND MARKET TRANSPARENCY Greater transparency in the market is generally
More informationChapter 15 Oligopoly
Goldwasser AP Microeconomics Chapter 15 Oligopoly BEFORE YOU READ THE CHAPTER Summary This chapter explores oligopoly, a market structure characterized by a few firms producing a product that mayor may
More informationANDY GAVIL: Hi. I am Andy Gavil. I m a professor of law at Howard University
ANDY GAVIL: Hi. I am Andy Gavil. I m a professor of law at Howard University School of Law in Washington, and I m here today with Michael Turner of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission to talk about proving
More informationCase T-342/99. Airtours plc v Commission of the European Communities
Case T-342/99 Airtours plc v Commission of the European Communities (Competition Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 Decision declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common market Application for
More informationECN 3103 INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION
ECN 3103 INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION 6. Collusion and Cartel Policy Mr. Sydney Armstrong Lecturer 1 The University of Guyana 1 Semester 1, 2016 Introduction Definition (Collusion) Collusion is when some or
More informationRegional Competition Center for Latin America presents Guideline on Coordinated Effects Study in Merger Cases
Regional Competition Center for Latin America presents Guideline on Coordinated Effects Study in Merger Cases Prepared by the CRCLA With an introduction by Competition Policy International This month,
More informationPRICE FIXING, BID RIGGING, AND MARKET ALLOCATION SCHEMES: WHAT THEY ARE AND WHAT TO LOOK FOR
PRICE FIXING, BID RIGGING, AND MARKET ALLOCATION SCHEMES: WHAT THEY ARE AND WHAT TO LOOK FOR An Antitrust Primer This primer briefly describes the most common antitrust violations and outlines those conditions
More informationBook Review Competition Policy and Collusion
theantitrustsource w w w. a n t i t r u s t s o u r c e. c o m A p r i l 2 0 1 8 1 Book Review Competition Policy and Collusion Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. The Theory of Collusion and Competition Policy
More information! lecture 7:! competition and collusion!!
! lecture 7:! competition and collusion!! the story so far Natural monopoly: Definitions (Ideal) Pricing solutions Regulation in practice Regulation under asymmetric information Competition policy: Introduction
More informationPrice-Fixing and. Repeated Games. Collusion and cartels. Recent events. Collusion and cartels 2. Cartels. Recent cartel violations 2
Collusion and cartels Price-Fixing and What is a cartel? attempt to enforce market discipline and reduce competition between a group of suppliers cartel members agree to coordinate their actions prices
More informationEconomic Fundamentals:
Economic Fundamentals: Vertical and Coordinated Effects in Mergers Debra J. Aron, Ph.D. Navigant Economics Northwestern University May 27, 2016 Disclaimer This presentation covers only a sampling of the
More informationICN Mergers Working Group Coordinated Effects. Adrian Proctor Economic Adviser, Mergers, OFT
ICN Mergers Working Group Coordinated Effects Adrian Proctor Economic Adviser, Mergers, OFT 1 Structure of the presentation Introduction Potential Focal points for Coordination Risk factors for all focal
More informationEconomics of Strategy Fifth Edition. The Dynamics of Pricing Rivalry
Economics of Strategy Fifth Edition Besanko, Dranove, Shanley, and Schaefer Chapter 10 The Dynamics of Pricing Rivalry Slides by: Richard Ponarul, California State University, Chico Copyright 2010 John
More informationModule 32. Game Theory. Module Objectives. Module Outline. I. Games Oligopolists Play
Module 32 Game Theory Module Objectives Students will learn in this module: How our understanding of oligopoly can be enhanced by using game theory. The concept of the prisoners dilemma. How repeated interactions
More informationGathering, handling and assessing evidence EU-China Competition Week Beijing, 14 March 2014
Gathering, handling and assessing evidence EU-China Competition Week Beijing, 14 March 2014 Johan Sahl Deputy Head of Unit, Cartels and Mergers Swedish Competition Authority The Swedish Competition Authority
More informationChina, Xiaomen,
PROSECUTING CARTELS: THE USE OF INDIRECT AND DIRECT EVIDENCE Kamil Nejezchleb The Czech Competition Authority Cartel Department China, Xiaomen, 19. 10. 2017 OUTLINE Prosecuting cartels general introduction
More informationINTERNATIONAL SECURITIES ASSOCIATION FOR INSTITUTIONAL TRADE COMMUNICATION ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE POLICY
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES ASSOCIATION FOR INSTITUTIONAL TRADE COMMUNICATION 1.0 Antitrust Compliance Policy ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE POLICY The policy of the International Securities Association for Institutional
More informationOligopoly C H A P T E R C H E C K L I S T. When you have completed your study of this chapter, you will be able to
Oligopoly CHAPTER17 C H A P T E R C H E C K L I S T When you have completed your study of this chapter, you will be able to 1 Describe and identify oligopoly and explain how it arises. 2 Explain the dilemma
More informationChapter 10 Dynamics of Pricing Rivalry
Chapter 10 Dynamics of Pricing Rivalry Prof. Jepsen ECO 610 Lecture 6 December 11, 2012 John Wiley and Sons Outline Dynamic Pricing Rivalry How Market Structure Affects Sustainability of Coordinating Prices
More informationCollusion and horizontal agreements
Collusion and horizontal agreements Main ingredients of collusion Situation where firms set prices above the competitive level, which can be obtained either by explicit or by tacit collusion. But not so
More informationFirst impressions on the Revised US and UK Merger Guidelines
GRC Conference, 29th September, Brussels First impressions on the Revised US and UK Merger Guidelines Damien Neven* Chief Competition Economist DG COMP, European Commission *The views expressed are my
More informationAP Microeconomics: Test 5 Study Guide
AP Microeconomics: Test 5 Study Guide Mr. Warkentin nwarkentin@wyomingseminary.org 203 Sprague Hall 2017-2018 Academic Year Directions: The purpose of this sheet is to quickly capture the topics and skills
More informationECONS 101 PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS QUIZ #6 Week 04/19/09 to 04/25/09
CHAPTER 14 Monopoly ECONS 101 PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS QUIZ #6 Week 04/19/09 to 04/25/09 1. Joe s price elasticity of demand for airplane travel is equal to 2, and Beth s price elasticity of demand
More informationChapter 12. Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior. Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools NINTH EDITION
Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools NINTH EDITION Chapter 12 Oligopoly and Strategic Behavior In an oligopoly, defined as a market with just a few firms, each firm has an incentive to act
More informationAAOE Anti-Trust Policy
2016 AAOE Anti-Trust Policy WHY DISCUSSIONS OF PRICE/COST ARE NOT PERMITTED ON THE LISTSERVES OR DURING AAOE SPONSORED ACTIVITIES AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF ORTHOPAEDIC EXECUTIVES 6602 East 75th Street, Suite
More informationcompetition policy r Palgrave Publishers Ltd 1
Definition Competition policy, also known as antitrust policy in the United States, is a body of legislated law designed to promote and maintain competition in markets. Abstract This article discusses
More informationTHE USE OF ECONOMIC EVIDENCE IN BID RIGGING CASES
THE USE OF ECONOMIC EVIDENCE IN BID RIGGING CASES Antonio Buttà Italian Competition Authority Public Procurement & Competition Policy 4 July 2017 The views expressed here are personal and do not necessarily
More informationJet-Kingfisher Merger Competition Issues
A-380 Jet-Kingfisher Merger Competition Issues Comdt. (Retd.) M.M. Sharma * Blatant or sensational promotion associated with Jet-Kingfisher merger has left market with innumerable doubts be it be the stakeholders
More informationDiscussion Points. Presented by the Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) to the OECD Competition Committee
The Voice of OECD Business Discussion Points Presented by the Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) to the OECD Competition Committee Cartels: Approaches to Cartel Investigations * (for the OECD
More informationChapter 15: Industrial Organization
Chapter 15: Industrial Organization Imperfect Competition Product Differentiation Advertising Monopolistic Competition Oligopoly Collusion Cournot Model Stackelberg Model Bertrand Model Cartel Legal Provisions
More informationCollusion. Sotiris Georganas. February Sotiris Georganas () Collusion February / 31
Collusion Sotiris Georganas February 2012 Sotiris Georganas () Collusion February 2012 1 / 31 Outline 1 Cartels 2 The incentive for cartel formation The scope for collusion in the Cournot model 3 Game
More informationRe: Draft Anti-Pricing Monopoly Regulation
DRAFT 8/31/09 BY EMAIL xueq@ndrc.gov.cn AND FEDEX Department of Price Supervision No. 38 Yuetan Nanjie Beijing 100824 China Dear Sir/Madam: Re: Draft Anti-Pricing Monopoly Regulation The Section of International
More informationPrinciples of Microeconomics Assignment 8 (Chapter 10) Answer Sheet. Class Day/Time
1 Principles of Microeconomics Assignment 8 (Chapter 10) Answer Sheet Name Class Day/Time Questions of this homework are in the next few pages. Please find the answer of the questions and fill in the blanks
More informationAQA Economics A-level
AQA Economics A-level Microeconomics Topic 5: Perfect Competition, Imperfectly Competitive Markets and Monopoly 5.5 Oligopoly Notes Characteristics of an oligopoly: High barriers to entry and exit There
More informationCH short answer study questions Answer Section
CH 15-16 short answer study questions Answer Section ESSAY 1. ANS: There are a large number firms; each produces a slightly different product; firms compete on price, quality and marketing; and firms are
More informationAppendix N: Market Structure Law. TV Stations Ownership
Appendix N: Antitrust and Market Structure Law Restrictions on size of ownership, and on vertical and horizontal ownership Examples Entry control: gov. licensing Merger Approvals Divestiture Media Ownership
More informationOverview of ECO410H and Introduction to Horizontal Merger Assessment ECO410H1F. Organizing Questions for Today. Class 1
Overview of ECO410H and Introduction to Horizontal Merger Assessment Class 1 1 ECO410H1F Mergers and Competition Policy Prof. Murdock Syllabus Take a moment to skim through section titles Highlight some
More informationmicro2 first module Social costs of monopoly Price regulation Price regulation Price regulation overshooting Natural monopoly Market power part III
Lecture 5 Market power part III Kosmas Marinakis, Ph.D. micro2 first module ocial costs of monopoly The social cost of monopoly is likely to exceed the deadweight loss Rent eeking: firms may use resources
More informationBasic Economics Chapter 17
1 Basic Economics Chapter 17 Oligopoly Oligopoly: (1) only a few sellers (2) offer similar or identical products (3) interdependent Game theory (how people behave in strategic situations): (1) choose among
More informationThe Anticompetitive Effects of The Apple E-book Price Fixing Conspiracy
The Anticompetitive Effects of The Apple E-book Fixing Conspiracy William Giroux and Dr. Roger Blair Department of Economics, University of Florida On July 10th, 2013, Apple was found guilty of conspiring
More informationSyllabus item: 57 Weight: 3
1.5 Theory of the firm and its market structures - Monopoly Syllabus item: 57 Weight: 3 Main idea 1 Monopoly: - Only one firm producing the product (Firm = industry) - Barriers to entry or exit exists,
More informationEcon8500_Game_Theory. Name: Class: Date: Multiple Choice Identify the choice that best completes the statement or answers the question.
Name: Class: Date: ID: A Econ8500_Game_Theory Multiple Choice Identify the choice that best completes the statement or answers the question. 1. A common assumption about the player in a game is that a.
More informationMicroeconomics Unit 2 The Nature and Function of Product Markets
Microeconomics Unit 2 The Nature and Function of Product Markets Characteristics: Large number of sellers Small market share No collusion which means? Producer s act independently Differentiated products
More information29/02/2016. Market structure II- Other types of imperfect competition. What Is Monopolistic Competition? OTHER TYPES OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION
Market structure II- Other types of imperfect competition OTHER TYPES OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION Characteristics of Monopolistic Competition Monopolistic competition is a market structure in which many firms
More informationPaul Krugman and Robin Wells. Microeconomics. Third Edition. Chapter 14 Oligopoly. Copyright 2013 by Worth Publishers
Paul Krugman and Robin Wells Microeconomics Third Edition Chapter 14 Oligopoly Copyright 2013 by Worth Publishers What s an oligopoly? (oligos = few, polis = marketplace) A. Key characteristics: Only a
More information11. Oligopoly. Literature: Pindyck and Rubinfeld, Chapter 12 Varian, Chapter 27
11. Oligopoly Literature: Pindyck and Rubinfeld, Chapter 12 Varian, Chapter 27 04.07.2017 Prof. Dr. Kerstin Schneider Chair of Public Economics and Business Taxation Microeconomics Chapter 11 Slide 1 Chapter
More informationOligopoly. Fun and games. An oligopolist is one of a small number of producers in an industry. The industry is an oligopoly.
Oligopoly Fun and games Oligopoly An oligopolist is one of a small number of producers in an industry. The industry is an oligopoly. All oligopolists produce a standardized product. (If producers in an
More informationLecture 11 Imperfect Competition
Lecture 11 Imperfect Competition Business 5017 Managerial Economics Kam Yu Fall 2013 Outline 1 Introduction 2 Monopolistic Competition 3 Oligopoly Modelling Reality The Stackelberg Leadership Model Collusion
More informationEFFICIENCIES ANALYSIS IN MERGERS
EFFICIENCIES ANALYSIS IN MERGERS International Competition Network First Annual Conference Naples, Italy September 28, 2002 Debra A. Valentine O Melveny & Myers, LLP Washington, D.C. EFFICIENCIES ANALYSIS
More informationThe following key should help you understand the different types of activities students engage in during the course:
AP Microeconomics Course Overview Name Description AP Microeconomics AP Microeconomics studies the behavior of individuals and businesses as they exchange goods and services in the marketplace. Students
More informationOligopolies Part III
Oligopolies Part III It's called an oligopoly. It's not a regular market. It's a market in which they control the prices and they've been doing it for years. Richard Miller The Prisoner s Dilemma Consider
More informationMergers. Horizontal Merger - this is a merger between two competing companies in the same industry
Mergers Types of Mergers Horizontal Merger - this is a merger between two competing companies in the same industry Vertical Merger this is a merger between two firms at different stages of the production
More informationCartels and Public procurement II
Cartels and Public procurement II Master of Public Affairs Public Procurement Classe 10 Sciences Po Outline 1 Introduction 2 Proving collusion in public procurement markets 3 The main policy tool to fight
More informationCHAPTER 6: Monopoly and Imperfect Competition
CHAPTER 6: Monopoly and Imperfect Competition 1a. Column 1 (price): -, 2, 2, 2, 2; Column 2 (quantity): 0, 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000; Column 3 (total revenue): 0, 2000, 4000, 6000, 8000; Column 4 (marginal
More informationECON 4100: Industrial Organization. Lecture 1- Introduction and a review of perfect competition versus monopoly
ECON 4100: Industrial Organization Lecture 1- Introduction and a review of perfect competition versus monopoly 1 Introductory Remarks Overview study of firms and markets strategic competition Different
More informationEconomics for Educators
Economics for Educators Lesson 7 and 5E Model Revised Edition Robert F. Hodgin, Ph.D. ii Economics for Educators, Revised Copyright 2012 All Rights Reserved 35 Economics for Educators, Revised Lesson 7:
More informationMarket Survival Market Structure Simulation
Market Survival Market Structure Simulation The Profit Maximization Assumption: This is the assumption in business and economics that firms are motivated to maximize profit. Step #1: Distribution of Roles
More informationAP Microeconomics. Content Skills Learning Targets Assessment Resources & Technology
St. Michael Albertville High School Teacher: Matthew Rooker AP Microeconomics October 2014 Content Skills Learning Targets Assessment Resources & Technology November 2014 Content Skills Learning Targets
More informationHow Antitrust Agencies Analyze M&A
practicallaw.com PLC Corporate & Securities PLC Finance PLC Law Department CONTENTS Horizontal Mergers Market Definition Market Shares and Concentration Competitive Effects Powerful Buyers Entry Analysis
More informationManagerial Economics & Business Strategy. Game Theory: Inside Oligopoly
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy Chapter 10 Game Theory: Inside Oligopoly Revised 2/12 by DF McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright Copyright 2006 by The 2006 McGraw-Hill by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc.
More informationPart III: Market Structure 12. Monopoly 13. Game Theory and Strategic Play 14. Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition
and Part III: Structure 12. Monopoly 13. Game Theory and Strategic Play 14. and 1 / 38 and Chapter 14 and 2015.12.25. 2 / 38 and 1 2 3 4 5 3 / 38 and Q:How many firms are necessary to make a market competitive?
More informationEconomics in antitrust and competition Our services
Economics in antitrust and competition Our services Economic evidence in competition law September 2017 KPMG.com/in Rapidly increasing awareness of competition law, rising number of cases before the Competition
More informationAntitrust Issues Involving Mergers, Acquisitions & Exclusive Licensing in Pharma and Biotech
Antitrust Issues Involving Mergers, Acquisitions & Exclusive Licensing in Pharma and Biotech Michael S. McFalls Jones Day ACI Pharmaceutical Antitrust Conference May 21, 2008 *These views are those of
More informationANTITRUST FOR PURCHASING PROFESSIONALS Protecting Competition in Florida
ANTITRUST FOR PURCHASING PROFESSIONALS Protecting Competition in Florida Attorney General of Florida Antitrust Division Lizabeth Brady Chief, Multistate Antitrust Enforcement ANTITRUST LAWS SHERMAN ACT
More informationAntitrust Compliance Guidelines. Approved by the PODS Board of Directors April 21, 2011
Antitrust Compliance Guidelines Approved by the PODS Board of Directors April 21, 2011 PODS Antitrust Compliance Guidelines One of the major goals of the Pipeline Open Data Standard Association (PODS)
More informationThe importance of these laws and the serious consequences of violating them make it crucial for you to understand how they
Antitrust Guidelines Policy Number: 1800 Applies To: All Policy Owner: Regan MacPherson Current Revision Date: 04-MAY-2016 Previous Revision Date: 06-SEP-2013 Last Annual Review Date: 18-DEC-2012 Policy
More informationThe past two decades of international experience
UNILATERAL MARKET POWER IN WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS FRANK A. WOLAK* The past two decades of international experience with wholesale electricity markets has demonstrated that significant consumer harm
More informationMarket Structure - Oligopoly
Market Structure - Oligopoly The Term Oligopoly has been derived from two Greek words. Oligi which means few and Polien means sellers. Thus Oligopoly is an abridged version of monopolistic competition.
More informationVertical Restraints, Exclusive Dealing, and Competition on the Merits
Vertical Restraints, Exclusive Dealing, and Competition on the Merits Global Antitrust Institute Hawaii November 2015 October 30, 2012 1 The Economics of Vertical Restraints 2 Vertical Restraints Definition:
More information3. Cartels and Collusion
Competition less than jointly max profit firms have incentives to avoid competition These incentives are basis for competition policy Explicit cartels, implicit tacit collusion How would these show up
More informationRoundtable on. Competition Policy and Public Procurement
Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy Geneva, 9 11 July 2012 Roundtable on Competition Policy and Public Procurement Written contribution by Sudan The views expressed are those
More informationAntitrust Insights. Screening and Testing for Collusive Conduct in the Absence of a Smoking Gun. From the Editor. By Laila Haider and Graeme Hunter
Summer 2010 Screening and Testing for Collusive Conduct in the Absence of a Smoking Gun By Laila Haider and Graeme Hunter Antitrust Insights From the Editor That competition and consumers are harmed by
More informationMerger Analysis and Anti-Trust
Merger Analysis and Anti-Trust Merger: The process in which two or more independently owned firms join under the same ownership. This process could be a merger, takeover, integration, or acquisition. It
More informationPrice signaling. An economic perspective. Raphaël De Coninck
An economic perspective 1 Overview Coordination and information Economics of coordination Potential anticompetitive effects and efficiencies of information exchanges Public announcements Invitation to
More informationLegal and Economic Aspects Of Competitive Market Behavior. GARY R. ALLEN Senior Research Scientist. DONALD CULKIN Graduate Legal Assistant and
Legal and Economic Aspects Of Competitive Market Behavior by GARY R. ALLEN Senior Research Scientist and DONALD CULKIN Graduate Legal Assistant and CHERYL MILLS Graduate Economics Assistant VIRGINIA TRANSPORTATION
More informationManagerial Economics Prof. Trupti Mishra S.J.M School of Management Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay. Lecture - 33 Oligopoly (Contd )
Managerial Economics Prof. Trupti Mishra S.J.M School of Management Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay Lecture - 33 Oligopoly (Contd ) We will continue our discussion on theory of Oligopoly, typically
More informationA Planned Course Statement for. Economics, AP. Length of Period (mins.) 41 Total Clock Hours: 123. Periods per Cycle: 6 Length of Course (yrs.) 1.
East Penn School District Secondary Curriculum A Planned Course Statement for Economics, AP Course # 266 Grade(s) 12 Department: Social Studies Length of Period (mins.) 41 Total Clock Hours: 123 Periods
More informationThree Rules and Four Models
Three Rules and Four Models Three Rules: How to find the profit maximizing quantity: A firm will maximize its profit (or minimize its losses) by producing that output at which marginal revenue and marginal
More informationThree Rules and Four Models
Three Rules and Four Models Three Rules: How to find the profit maximizing quantity: A firm will maximize its profit (or minimize its losses) by producing that output at which marginal revenue and marginal
More informationINTERNATIONAL DIGITAL PUBLISHING FORUM ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE POLICY AND GUIDELINES
INTERNATIONAL DIGITAL PUBLISHING FORUM ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE POLICY AND GUIDELINES It is the policy of the International Digital Publishing Forum ("IDPF" or "the Forum") to comply with all antitrust and
More informationPerspectives on judging competition law cases: the role of economic evidence
Perspectives on judging competition law cases: the role of economic evidence Frederic Jenny Professor of economics ( ESSEC Business School) Chair, OECD Competition Committee Pre-BRICS International Competition
More informationCompetitor Agreements
COMMENTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION S SECTIONS OF ANTITRUST LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING THE CANADIAN COMPETITION BUREAU S BIG DATA AND INNOVATION DRAFT DISCUSSION PAPER The views stated in
More informationChapter 13 Outline. Challenge: Intel and AMD s Advertising Strategies. An Overview of Game Theory. An Overview of Game Theory
Chapter 13 Game Theory A camper awakens to the growl of a hungry bear and sees his friend putting on a pair of running shoes. You can t outrun a bear, scoffs the camper. His friend coolly replies, I don
More informationFundamentals of Antitrust Economics Series: Econometrics
Fundamentals of Antitrust Economics Series: Econometrics Friday, July 1, 2016 12:00 PM 1:00 PM ET Sponsored by the ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Economics Committee Laila Haider, Ph.D. Edgeworth Economics
More informationMergers in the energy sector. Xavier Vives IESE Business School
Mergers in the energy sector IESE Business School Outline Trends. The quest for size Characteristics of electricity markets Horizontal merger analysis Vertical merger and foreclosure Remedies Market power
More informationHorizontal agreements and coordinated effects
Horizontal agreements and coordinated effects CCP training course Matthew Johnson 6 October 2017 Outline explicit vs. tacit coordination oligopoly theory static dynamic empirical methods for assessing
More information15 OLIGOPOLY. Chapter. Key Concepts. Prisoners Dilemma Payoff Matrix. A s strategies. Deny. Confess. 4 years. 12 years. Confess.
Chapter 15 OLIGOPOLY Key Concepts Prisoners Dilemma Payoff Matrix What Is Oligopoly? Oligopoly is a market structure in which natural or legal barriers prevent the entry of new firms and in which a small
More informationAP Microeconomics Review Session #3 Key Terms & Concepts
The Firm, Profit, and the Costs of Production 1. Explicit vs. implicit costs 2. Short-run vs. long-run decisions 3. Fixed inputs vs. variable inputs 4. Short-run production measures: be able to calculate/graph
More informationUse the following to answer question 4:
Homework Chapter 11: Name: Due Date: Wednesday, December 4 at the beginning of class. Please mark your answers on a Scantron. It is late if your Scantron is not complete when I ask for it at 9:35. Get
More informationindex 527 customer/market sharing 338, 340 1, infra-marginal customers 35 6, 76 7 marginal customers 35, 76 7, 94 5 overlapping customers 184 5
INDEX anti-competitive foreclosure 378 9, 386 7, 389 Antitrust Logit Model (ALM) 216 asymmetry and collusion 330 2, 339 capacity, asymmetry in 331 2, 371 costs, asymmetry in 331, 371 increasing symmetry
More informationCartels and Public procurement (I)
Cartels and Public procurement (I) Master of Public Affairs Public Procurement Classe 9 Sciences Po Outline 1 Introduction 2 Economic analysis of collusion: Some general considerations 3 Collusion in public
More informationRoundtable on. Competition Policy and Public Procurement
Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy Geneva, 9 11 July 2012 Roundtable on Competition Policy and Public Procurement Written contribution by Lithuania The views expressed are
More informationArtificial Intelligence and Collusion
IIC (2019) 50:109 134 https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-018-00773-x ARTICLE Artificial Intelligence and Collusion Francisco Beneke. Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt Published online: 20 December 2018 Ó The Author(s)
More informationTakeovers and Industry Competition
Takeovers and Industry Competition Professor B. Espen Eckbo 2010 US antitrust enforcement (1) 1890: The Sherman Act 1950: Celler-Kefauver amendment to Section 7 of the Clayton Act Since 1950, the DOJ and
More informationJudging Competition Law Cases: The Role of Economic Evidence
Judging Competition Law Cases: The Role of Economic Evidence Frederic Jenny Professor of economics, ESSEC Business School Lectures on Competition Policy JOINT WORKSHOP CO-ORGANISED BY FNE, CRESSE AND ISCI
More informationPricing algorithms: the digital collusion scenarios
Pricing algorithms: the digital collusion scenarios The classic digital cartel This category serves as a reminder that price fixing cartels are illegal, irrespective of the means by which they are implemented
More information