FRANCE LWR activities

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FRANCE LWR activities Norbert NICAISE with contributions from AREVA-NP ASN French Nuclear Safety Authority, IRSN French Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (TSO of ASN), CEA French Atomic Energy Commission, EDF Electricité de France IAEA 19th Meeting of the Technical Working Group on Advanced Technologies for LWRs Vienna 25-27 November 2014

Contents Nuclear Power Plants operation Significant safety events Periodic Safety Reviews Post-Fukushima actions Regulatory framework EPR Flamanville 3 Research & Development IAEA future activities IAEA 19th Meeting of the Technical Working Group on Advanced Technologies for LWRs - Vienna 25-27 Nov 2014 2

French Nuclear Power Plants 58 reactors in operation 19 sites Capacity : 63 GWe One operator: EDF owns the NPPs and the sites 34 units 20 units 4 units 1 unit High level of standardization IAEA 19th Meeting of the Technical Working Group on Advanced Technologies for LWRs - Vienna 25-27 Nov 2014 3

Nuclear Power Plants operation NPP fleet under production Number of units Total capacity (GWe) Average age (years) PWR 900 MWe 3-Loop 34 30.8 33 PWR 1300 MWe 4-Loop 20 26.4 27 PWR 1450 MWe 4-Loop 4 6.0 17 Total 58 63 Production 2013 2012 / 2011 Electricity generation from NPPs : 424 TWh 425TWh / 442TWh Percentage of total electricity generation : 74% 75% / 79% NPP availability : 78% 80% / 81% www.statistiques.developpement-durable.gouv EDF action plan in 2014 : reduce the unit outage duration (26 days average value in 2013) With NPPs half way through their service lives, maintenance is of strategic importance IAEA 19th Meeting of the Technical Working Group on Advanced Technologies for LWRs - Vienna 25-27 Nov 2014 4

Nuclear Power Plants operation Electricity production (TWh) Year 2013 9% 13% / 3% / 1% Sept 2014 Nuclear 74% www.statistiques.developpement-durable.gouv Nuclear 83% www.statistiques.developpement-durable.gouv IAEA 19th Meeting of the Technical Working Group on Advanced Technologies for LWRs - Vienna 25-27 Nov 2014 5

Significant safety events Automatic Reactor Trips (year 2013) Average number : 0.59 per reactor No RT in 32 NPPs over the whole year Nuclear Safety significant events (year 2013) INES Level-2 : no event INES Level-1 : 1.2 per reactor (-23% compared to year 2012) Prevalence of events related to Violation of Technical Specifications INES Level-0 : 10.4 per reactor Radiation Protection significant events (year 2013) EDF Inspector General s 2013 report on Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection INES Level-2 : 1 event External contamination of a contractor worker during a sweeping operation INES Level-1-0 : high disparity between plants (0.5 to 5.5 event) IAEA 19th Meeting of the Technical Working Group on Advanced Technologies for LWRs - Vienna 25-27 Nov 2014 6

Significant safety events Blayais 4 (900 MWe) - February 2014 Unit at power operation Inappropriate operations on an electrical panel of the I&C power supply (during control of the panel) -> short circuit and total loss of this electrical panel Inappropriate actions to bring panel back to service -> spurious SIS actuation (and RT) SIS operation during 23 minutes -> Opening 1 PZR relief-valve -> Bursting 1 rupture disk of the PZR relief tank -> small amount of primary water collected in the sump of Reactor Building Radiation check showed no abnormal contamination of the Reactor Building Automatic reactor protections functioned properly Procedures were correctly applied Classified INES Level-1 IAEA 19th Meeting of the Technical Working Group on Advanced Technologies for LWRs - Vienna 25-27 Nov 2014 7

Periodic Safety Reviews Goal ASN : -Existing NPPs have to be improved in the light of new requirements, and the state of the art in the field of nuclear technology - Operating authorization for each reactor, issued at the end of the ten-yearly outage EDF : - Ensure operating NPPs remain safe and competitive. - Take the necessary actions to extend the NPP s service-lives to 60 years. Ten-yearly Safety Reviews ASN/EDF deep preparation long before the ten-yearly outage milestones Planning 1300MWe 1300MWe series : 3 rd ten-yearly outage -> start in 2015 (Paluel 2 : start April 2015) 1450MWe series : 2 nd ten-yearly outage -> start in 2017 900MWe series : 4 th ten-yearly outage -> start in 2019 ASN positions issued June 2013 (generic safety review) External and internal Flooding, Criticality referential, Fires, Digital safety I&C, Explosions, Civil Works, RCS cold overpressure protection, Qualification, Low external temperature, Electrical perturbations, Dilution from RCP seals, PSA Major operations carried out, in addition to the wide-ranging verification/maintenance/inspection program Safety I&C modernization (new equipment based on Teleperm R XS technology), 4 SGs replacement (split in 2 different outages in some units),? IAEA 19th Meeting of the Technical Working Group on Advanced Technologies for LWRs - Vienna 25-27 Nov 2014 8

Post-Fukushima March,11 2011 FUKUSHIMA accident May 2011 ASN resolutions : Licensees to perform Stress Tests (WENRA basis) Sept 2011 EDF : issue of Stress Test reports (19 sites) Nov 2011 ASN Advisory Committee : review of Stress Test reports Jan 2012 ASN national evaluation report June 2012 ASN Technical Prescriptions (License Conditions). 19 site-specific resolutions with around 40 requirements each. compliance deadlines from 2012 to 2018 -> to define a Hardened Safety Core (HSC) [Noyau Dur] SSCs ensuring vital safety functions in beyond-design-basis external hazards (seism, flooding ) Reinforce water/electricity supply, emergency management -> to set up a Nuclear Rapid Response Force [FARN] Specialized crews and equipment for intervening within 24h to any site June 2012 EDF : issue of the Hardened Safety Core design proposals Dec 2012 ASN Advisory Committee : review of the Hardened Safety Core design proposals Year 2013 ASN - IRSN (ASN TSO) - EDF : numerous technical exchanges EDF : start implement HSC safety improvements, set-up the Nuclear Rapid Response Force Jan 2014 ASN Complementary Technical Prescriptions (CTPs) for the Hardened Safety Core. 19 site-specific resolutions with around 16 requirements each. compliance deadlines from 2014 to 2015 -> content : see next slide June 2014 EDF : answers to CTPs (Milestone June 2014) + earthquake topic IAEA 19th Meeting of the Technical Working Group on Advanced Technologies for LWRs - Vienna 25-27 Nov 2014 9

Post-Fukushima Complementary Technical Prescriptions for the Hardened Safety Core (HSC) ASN Jan-2014 ND 01 Reactor Building (RB) : Heat Removal via SG when RCS closed, HR from RB w/o venting ND 02 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) : no Fuel Assembly uncovery ND 03 I&C & Organisational means ND 04 independency of I&C and electrical distribution ND 05 list of functions, list of SSCs (safety classification) ND 06 Sea water level ND 07 Earthquake level (envelop SSE + 50% and 20000 years) ND 08 Design bases for external hazards other than seism/flooding, risks from non-hsc SSCs ND 09 SSCs design methods ND 10 Synthesis Report (design, V&V, manufacturing, controls, tests, qualification, ISI) 2014 2015 Jan,Dec ND 11 Mission time, Management of external hazards (HSC design-basis) beyond mission time June June ND 12 Robustness to external hazards beyond HSC design-basis (incl. Nuclear Rapid Response Force) June June ND 13 Reactor Trip : Control Rods insertion ND 14 Spent Fuel Pool : integrity ND 15 Drop of transport element ND 16 Basemat : barrier integrity in case of out-vessel Core Melt June June June June,Dec Dec Dec Dec IAEA 19th Meeting of the Technical Working Group on Advanced Technologies for LWRs - Vienna 25-27 Nov 2014 10

Post-Fukushima EDF general implementation schedule 2012 2013 2014 2015 - - -2019- - - 2030 PHASE 1 Temporary Diesel Generator Mobile injection pump Current ECC seismic improvement Spent Fuel Pool level meas t available in SBO Spent Fuel Pool modifications to avoid rapid drain-out Improvement of batteries autonomy FARN (1 unit) FARN (4 units) FARN (assistance capability 6 units) PHASE 2 PHASE 3 Modifications & upgrading actions phase 2 instruction Ultimate Diesel Generator Ultimate water supply Emergency Crisis Center Other modifications Modifications & upgrading actions phase 3 instruction To be defined IAEA 19th Meeting of the Technical Working Group on Advanced Technologies for LWRs - Vienna 25-27 Nov 2014 11

Post-Fukushima EDF general implementation schedule PHASE 1 : 2012-2015 Increased protection against total loss AC-power or Heat-sink, using mobile equipment On-site mobile equipment deployment all NPPs end 2013 Water pumps, diesel generators, air compressors, logistic Nuclear Rapid Response Force deployment (FARN) assistance 4 units end 2014 Mobile off-site equipment for air/electricity/water supply assistance 6 units end 2015 New Emergency response referential end 2014 Taking into account the FARN implementation Plug and Play connection points end 2014 to end 2015 Facilitating on-site and FARN mobile equipment connection PHASE 2 : 2015-2019 Increased robustness against extreme hazards Additional AC-power and Water supplies, to all reactors and Spent Fuel Pools (1 st systems of the Hardened Safety Core) 1 Ultimate back-up Diesel 1 Ultimate water supply system (groundwater/reservoirs/basins) 1 new on-site Emergency Control Center Protection against extreme flooding Passive tight seals for primary Main Coolant Pumps Reinforcement of the existing sand-bed filtered containment venting system against earthquake Reinforcement of the Emergency Response Organization (on-site management during 24hrs prior to FARN rescue) IAEA 19th Meeting of the Technical Working Group on Advanced Technologies for LWRs - Vienna 25-27 Nov 2014 12

Post-Fukushima Nuclear Rapid Response Force (FARN) ~ 300 people, dispatched in : 1 national headquarter(30 people) in Paris 4 regional centers(70 people : 5 teams, 14 people each) in NPP sites Civaux, Bugey, Dampierre, Paluel ASN IRSN Administration NPP EDF HQ Paris EDF Crisis Center Paris AREVAM Crisis Center Paris Emergency Telecommunication June 2012 : Autonomous satellite GSM in each unit 2012 to 2015 : Fixed VSAT satellite communication in each site Mobile VSAT kit for each FARN center VSAT tool in each national support center IAEA 19th Meeting of the Technical Working Group on Advanced Technologies for LWRs - Vienna 25-27 Nov 2014 13

French Safety Authority ASN Main decisions issued 2014-DC-0462 (to be issued) 2014-DC-0417 (Jan,28 2014) 2013-DC-0360 (July,16 2013) 2013-DC-0347 (May,7 2013) Regulatory framework not Legally binding Legally binding Parliament Law Executive Decrees Power Orders ASN ASN decisions ASN guidelines Management of risk of criticality in NPPs Management of risk of fire in NPPs Management of nuisances and impact of NPPs on Health and Env t Prescriptions for the commissioning tests of EPR FA3 Main guidelines issued n 19 (Feb,21 2013) n 13 (Jan,08 2013) Application of order 12 Dec 2005 on Nuclear Pressure Equipment (ESPN) Protection of NPPs against external flooding MDEP Multinational Design Evaluation Programme Active participation in the MDEP programme for new reactors, in particular, with IRSN (TSO of ASN), in the Working Group dedicated to the EPR reactor, which in 2013 more specifically carried out work on the commissioning tests. Energy Mix in France National debate on Energy Transition opened by French Government Nuclear power share down to 50% by 2025(close to 80% today) ASN contribution to the national debate 2013-AV-0180 (May,16 2013) Importance of having sufficient margins in the electricity system Decision needed on electricity production capacities wrt final shutdown of reactors Law on Energy Transition in 2015 IAEA 19th Meeting of the Technical Working Group on Advanced Technologies for LWRs - Vienna 25-27 Nov 2014 14

EPR Flamanville 3 pre-licensing : systems design, operating procedures, accident analyses, probabilistic analyses M March : Operating License Application submission Commissioning Fuel loading 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Sept : 1 st Steam Generator inside Reactor Building June : start RCS welding Jan : Reactor Pressure Vessel inside Reactor Building July : Reactor Dome over the Reactor Building 2 nd half 2014 : entering the testing phase - Electric distribution tests done - Main Control Room in operation - Pressure tests in Turbine Hall - 1 st system tests in Pumping Station - 1 st system tests in Nuclear Island (CCWS) IAEA 19th Meeting of the Technical Working Group on Advanced Technologies for LWRs - Vienna 25-27 Nov 2014 15

Hardened Safety Core (HSC) perimeter EPR Flamanville 3 HSC is mainly composed of existing equipment protected against extreme hazards (extreme earthquake, extreme flooding, extreme winds, extreme tornado M) Additional water supply : gravitational Make-Up for EFWS tanks and Spent Fuel Pool Additional fuel reserve : Pumping device for supplying UDGs with EDGs fuel Spent fuel pool : Steam Exhaust for pressure control in Spent Fuel Pool Hall Fuel Assembly handling : Devices for secure position Additional local crisis center : to manage an accident on the long term in a robust building protected against extreme hazards Outfall SAB 1 SIS CCWS EFWS tank EFWS CHRS Diesel Generators. EDGs. UDGs Pool on cliff Pumping station SAB 2 EFWS tank MCR Reactor Building Spent Fuel Pool Pool on cliff SAB 3 EFWS tank Diesel Generators. EDGs. UDGs SAB 4 SIS CCWS EFWS tank EFWS CHRS In addition : Mobile means at the disposal of the Nuclear Rapid Response Force (FARN) IAEA 19th Meeting of the Technical Working Group on Advanced Technologies for LWRs - Vienna 25-27 Nov 2014 16

R&D in France for Generations 2 and 3 LWRs A new AREVA-CEA-EDF cooperation agreement ( the institute tripartite ) Created beginning of 2014 with the support of the French government Dedicated to LWR reactors and their associated fuels Target Maintain high level experimental infrastructures Improve the integration of the three partners R&D Main issues Operation Lifetime, safety, fuel performance M New reactors safety, new solutions to mitigate severe accidents M An opportunity to re-analyse the R&D needs to pursue a safe operation of nuclear energy new projects launched, new R&D road-maps IAEA 19th Meeting of the Technical Working Group on Advanced Technologies for LWRs - Vienna 25-27 Nov 2014 17

R&D in France for Generations 2 and 3 LWRs Recent results obtained Fluence computation for the vessel material The FLUOLE2 experimental program in the EOLE reactor, Better fluence prediction (controlling the material embrittlement) after 40, 50 and 60 years Development of the PLEIADES fuel numerical platform The MFRONT module released (OpenSource code, sourceforge.net/projects/tfel) IAEA 19th Meeting of the Technical Working Group on Advanced Technologies for LWRs - Vienna 25-27 Nov 2014 18

R&D in France for Generations 2 and 3 LWRs Recent results obtained Fukushima analyses in the frame of OECD BSAF project In-Vessel Corium Retention studies NEPTUNE-CFD computations of ULPU tests IAEA 19th Meeting of the Technical Working Group on Advanced Technologies for LWRs - Vienna 25-27 Nov 2014 19

R&D in France for Generations 2 and 3 LWRs Success of the VERDON program (part of the International Source Term Project) 4 tests conducted in the VERDON hot cell New results obtained for Fission Products release and speciation CEA is proposing a new VERDON-5 test High Burn-Up UO 2, with B4C impacts (gaseous iodine), and Air ingress impacts looking for partners for VERDON-5 M FP releases FP transport & deposition IAEA 19th Meeting of the Technical Working Group on Advanced Technologies for LWRs - Vienna 25-27 Nov 2014 20

IAEA future activities IAEA is a key contributor to the worldwide convergence on reactor safety Expectations from IAEA in the future : Actively contribute to develop harmonization between national regulations Intensify cooperation with regulators organizations (as MDEP, WENRA), and other international organizations (mechanical / electrical / I&C Codes and Standards, CORDEL?) IAEA 19th Meeting of the Technical Working Group on Advanced Technologies for LWRs - Vienna 25-27 Nov 2014 21

IAEA 19th Meeting of the Technical Working Group on Advanced Technologies for LWRs - Vienna 25-27 Nov 2014 22