STATUS, ACHIEVEMENTS & FUTURE CHALLENGES

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STATUS, ACHIEVEMENTS & FUTURE CHALLENGES FOR KANUPP By Muhammad Rashidullah, Senior Manager Technical Division, KANUPP, Pakistan 13 th Meeting of TWG-HWR on Advance Technologies, June 18-20, 2012, Vienna, Austria.

GENERAL PLANT DESCRIPTION 137 MWe CANDU Plant Started commercial operation in 1972 Design life was 30 years completed in Dec. 2002 Plant life has been extended by 15 years (2019) Safety / Design improvement based on PSA, PSR, FSAR etc.

OPERATING PERFORMANCE TILL DATE STATISTICS Units Generated 13,700 MkWH Availability Factor 55.5 % Gross Capacity Factor 28.5 % LAST FIVE YEARS STATISTICS- 2007-2012 (31 May) Units Generated 2402 MkWh Availability Factor 58.5 % Gross Capacity Factor 44.2 %

Life Time Generation (MkWh) Phases of Operation 600 550 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Initial Operating Phase Loss of Vendor Support, a difficult Phase F/M Hose T/G Overhauling and Other Rupture Maintenance Incident Major Maintenance 2) Record Breaking Phase GE-B3 Burning Incident Re-Licensing & Life Extension Phase RLO-I & MH downgrading RLO-II Beyond Design Life Operating Phase Year Total 13,500 Units (MkWh) Generated till December 2011. Total FPY = 13.7

Long Term Nuclear Power Program of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Based on PWRs 02 PWR Units (325 MWe) in operation 02 PWR Units each 340 MWe under construction phase Target is 8,800 MWe by year 2030

REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR PLANT LIFE EXTENSION (PLEX) Periodic Safety Review (PSR) Safety Issues (17+7) Revision of Final Safety Analysis Report (KFSAR) Probabilistic Safety Analysis Report (Level-1 Plus) Decommissioning Plan An Evaluation of Potential Impact on Environment

KANUPP PLEX IN THE LIGHT OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS & PRACTICES Development work at KANUPP enabled it to be close to current international standards but lacked local industrial infrastructure and qualification to participate. Several international missions i.e. Fuel Channel Integrity Assessment (FCIA), Steam Generator Integrity Assessment (SGIA), Balance Of Piping (BOP) reported KANUPP condition as healthy but it had to combat Obsolescence in Computers, Instrumentation & Control. A broad based Master Plan for Safe Operation of KANUPP (ISARMAP) was launched under the umbrella of IAEA TC Project PAK/9/010 (SOK) in 1991.

KANUPP PLEX IN THE LIGHT OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS & PRACTICES (Cont d) Approval of SOK (PAK-9/010) for 4 years 1991-1994. Extended twice for 1995-96 & 1997-98. ISF (PAK-9/022) was approved by IAEA for 1999-2000 as follow up project to complete outstanding tasks in ISARMAP. ISF extended twice for 2001-2002 & 2003-2004 cycles. ISF, Phase-II (PAK-9/026) was approved for 2005-2006 cycle. ISF, Phase-II extended for 2007-2008. LTSK (PAK-9/031) was approved for 2009-2011. LTSK, Phase-II (PAK-2/004)was approved for 2012-2013. In-house facilities like Equipment testing & qualification, In-service Inspection etc. were established.

KANUPP PLEX SAFETY UPGRADES Following are the major safety / design improvements: Installation of Emergency D 2 O Addition System (For SBLOCA) Automatic Boiler Crash Cool Down (ABCC) Logic Protection of Active Drainage Sump From Debris Accumulation Replacement of Activity Monitoring System Seismic Retrofits / Easy Fixes Installation of LOCA Qualified MH-PMs & AD-PMs Automation of Emergency Feed Water System Control Room Habitability For Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) Installation of Third Emergency Diesel Generator Improvement in Fire Prevention and Control

KANUPP PLEX SAFETY UPGRADES (Cont d) Developed Programs i.e. Ageing Management, Safety Performance Indicators, Corrective Action Program, Self Assessment, Equipment Performance Monitoring Developed Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) Developed Limited Scope SAMGs Performed Fire Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) Revised Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Replaced 183 Control and Measuring C&I Loops Replaced Reactor Control System Replaced Fueling Machine Computer System Performed Fuel Channel Integrity Assessment (FCIA) Performed Steam Generators (SGs) Condition Assessment and Cables Condition Assessment

KANUPP PLEX SAFETY UPGRADES (Cont d) Installed Medium Pressure Emergency Injection System (FIJW) Installed Redundant Motorized Valves in IJW System (RIJW) Inspection for Feeder Pipes Thinning / Cracking Modified Annulus Gas System for Leak Before Break (LBB) Performed Containment Building Testing at High Pressure Installed Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) & Critical Parameter Display System (CPDS) and Monitoring in ECC and ACC Installation and Relocation of 03 Strong Motion Seismic Instruments and Monitoring in MCR and ECC

ROLE OF IAEA & COG IN KANUPP SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS The role of IAEA and COG has been instrumental in arranging Canadian technical assistance in accomplishment of the tasks of the project. This has enhanced safety of KANUPP significantly in line with the current international standards. KANUPP has so far benefited from IAEA and COG in the following areas: Assistance in the implementation of safety upgrade - Fuel Channel Integrity Assessment - Steam Generator In-Service Inspection Life Assessment Chemistry Control Annulus Gas System Improvement for LBB Detection Inspection of BOP

ROLE OF IAEA & COG IN KANUPP SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS (Cont d) Fueling Machine Ageing Management Feeder Pipe Integrity Assessment Final Safety Analysis Report Revision E.Q Review Containment Building Leak testing Review of I/C Replacement work Review of Neutron Power Instrumentation work Major Safety Improvement. Emergency Core Injection RIJW FIJW Emergency Feed Water

ROLE OF IAEA & COG IN KANUPP SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS (Cont d) Development of expertise for ISI Derived Release Limits (DRLs) Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) The cooperation of IAEA & COG for continued safe operation of KANUPP has helped to end the isolation of vendor support of the plant

FUTURE CHALLENGES KANUPP has operated safely for ~ 14 Effective Full Power Years in 40 yrs of its service life with better performance in last two decades. Recently Mechanical & Electrical Life-limiting equipment at KANUPP has shown aging degradations. Steam Generators and Balance of Plant (BOP) need enhanced inspection. Steam Generators also need periodic water lancing.

FUTURE CHALLENGES Focused approach has been adopted on maintenance workmanship. Next to follow is replacement of some Feeders Pipes, Electrical Transformers, Emergency Diesel Generator and Refurbishment of Main Steam Condenser. Mechanical Equipment manufacturing and replacement.

FUTURE CHALLENGES Back fitting of I&C (secondary side) loop. In-Service Inspection (ISI)/Non-Destructive Examination (NDE). Ageing Management Program (AMP). Support future Nuclear Power Plants Planned at the same site. Site development and infrastructure facilities/support Fukushima Response Actions.

Major FRAP Modifications and Implementation Status Outline Strategy Earthquake Hazard Actions Taken Tsunami / Flooding Hazard Actions Taken Enhancement of Emergency Power Sources Actions Taken Additional Measures for Direct / Indirect Core Cooling Measures to Vent Containment under Severe Condition

Major FRAP Modifications and Implementation Status Startegy Enhancement in defense-in-depth Use of simple technology Easy to implement No / minimum change in existing logic(s) Indigenous efforts (analyses, engineering & implementation) Insignificant increase in risk Cost effective

Major FRAP Modifications and Implementation Status Earthquake Hazard Actions Taken 1. Anchoring / sesimic support of local electrical alarm panels and their respective cable trays of DGs. (CA #1734) Analysis / engineering work completed. CA approved by KSC and PNRA. Material Procured. Implementation work in progress. Target date for completion of this activity is 30-06-2012. 2. Reinforcement of block masonary wall above DE-DG3 bus duct. (CA# 1733) Analysis / engineering work completed. CA approved by KSC and PNRA. Material Partially Procured. Target date for completion of this activity is 30-06- 2012. 3. Anchoring of sesimic instrument and accessories. (CA # 1736) (Completed)

Major FRAP Modifications and Implementation Status Tsunami / Flooding Hazard Actions Taken Tsunami threat along the Karachi coast is meager (as per Assessment of Tsunami Potential on Southern Pakistan ). The worst hypothetical case can generate tsunami waves of ~ 2.84 m. Pump house is at a height of ~ 2.74 m. Distibution room, EDGs, FIJW DGs and EFW system are at ground level 12 m above MSL. No need to construct tsunami wall. KANUPP enlisted with Tsunami Early Warning System (TEWS) of Pakistan Met Dept (PMD) for dissemination of Tsunami warnings. Measures against flooding at critical entrances of plant due to rain will be taken after contour maping and hydrology study which is in progress. Development work for one prototype sluice gate completed. (Target date 30-10-12).

Major FRAP Modifications and Implementation Status Enhancement of Emergency Power Sources Actions Taken 1. Energization of Plant Essential Buses through existing FIJW-DGs (2x400kVA) CA # 1729 Use of extra available capacity of FIJW-DGs Limited essential loads can be taken as per requirement. Engineering work completed. KSC and PNRA approved CA. Switches & MCCB purchased. Supply order for cable placed. Target date for implementation: 30-08-2012

Major FRAP Modifications and Implementation Status Enhancement of Emergency Power Sources Actions Taken 2. (a) Installation of a 100 kva DG set and its integration scheme (at higher elevation resilience to tsunami / flooding) To provide continuous power supply (through 24V DC UPS and 220V AC UPS systems) to control, monitoring and signaling systems in case of unavailability of essential power for longer duration. Engineering work completed. KSC and PNRA approved CA. Diesel generator technical evaluation completed. MCCB received. Supply order for changeover switches and cable placed. Stepdown transformer case under opening of bid. Target date for implementation: 31-10-2012

Major FRAP Modifications and Implementation Status Enhancement of Emergency Power Sources Actions Taken 2. (b) Installation of a 100 kva DG set and its integration scheme (at higher elevation resilience to tsunami / flooding) To provide alternate power to FIJW/IJW MOVs (CA #1767) Engineering work completed. KSC approved CA while PNRA raised some queries which are being clarified. MCCB received. Changeover swtiches, distribution panels, cable & fuses under technical evaluation. Target date for implementation : 31-10-2012

Major FRAP Modifications and Implementation Status Enhancement of Emergency Power Sources Actions Taken 2. (c) Installation of a 100 kva DG set and its integration scheme (at higher elevation resilience to tsunami / flooding) To convert existing 230V DC emergency lighting (currently integrated in distribution room) to 220V AC UPS to enhance its reliability. (CA # 1769) Analysis /Engineering work completed. KSC review completed. MCCB, cables, bulbs & distribution panels are under procurement process. Target date : 31-10-2012

Major FRAP Modifications and Implementation Status Enhancement of Emergency Power Sources Actions Taken 3. Provision of Inter-connection Facility for 300 kw Mobile DG with Essential Power System To be connected in severe condition (as a last resort) Engineering work completed. KSC and PNRA approved CA. MCCB, panels and lug purchased. Cable to be purchased. Target date: 31-10-2012

Major FRAP Modifications and Implementation Status Additional Measures for Direct / Indirect Core Cooling Installation of Diesel Engine Driven Pump (using fresh /sea water) for prolong core cooling, at higher location Analysis shows that 100 psig and 100 IGPM capacity pump will be sufficient to inject water into EFW, FIJW, VCW, DSW and SFB. KSC and PNRA approved all CAs. Supply order for diesel driven pump, non safety and safety class 2 piping, fittings and valves has been placed. Target date: 31-10-2012

Major FRAP Modifications and Implementation Status Measures to Vent Containment under Severe Condition Provision for venting of Containment in case of over-pressurization and high H 2 Concentration during SBO Analysis / Engineering work completed. CA is under KSC review. To be sent PNRA for approval in next week. Technical evaluation of material (piping, fitting & valves) completed. Target date: 31-10-2012

Injection of water from the reservoirs located in Tank area into FIJW System through Diesel Engine Driven Pump, FW Ring, Fire Engine & Gravity Feed 28

Provision of Diesel Driven Pump for Core Cooling DMW-TK1 (20000IG) RFW-TK2 (20000IG) BFW-TK1 (27740IG) PW-TK1 (2000IG) FOR FIRE ENGINE CONNECTION FW-HC1 TO BOILERS Flexible Hose GRAVITY FEED LINE TO VCW SYSTEM TO DSW SYSTEM TO FIJW SYSTEM Diesel Driven Pump 100 psi, 100 Igpm FOR FIRE ENGINE CONNECTION TO SPENT FUEL Legend: - Broken lines show proposed system 29

Thank You