La seguridad nuclear tras Fukushima y su impacto en el futuro de la energía nuclear Javier Reig Director Seguridad Nuclear OECD Nuclear Energy Agency Curso de Verano UPM Curso de Verano UPM Julio 2011
OECD/NEA Membership Iceland Australia Ireland Austria Israel Belgium Italy Canada Japan Chile Korea Czech Republic Luxembourg Denmark Mexico Estonia Netherlands Finland New Zealand France Norway Germany Poland Greece Portugal Hungary Slovak Republic Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States t Not member of NEA 2
% 80 Nuclear Power Share of Total Electricity Production in OECD Countries (2009) 70 75,1 60 50 51,7 54,4 40 30 29,2 33,1 34,7 35,8 37,4 38,2 39,2 44,9 20 10 14,8 17,5 17,9 20,2 22,8 21,8 18,6 24,7 25,3 0 3,2 4,4 3
NEA Strengths Small size and budget (80 staff members; budget of 14 million euros, + voluntary contributions and projects) Large representation (85% of the world s nuclear power capacity) Non-political forum; climate of mutual trust Tries to pool world s best nuclear expertise among developed countries Narrow focus: in-depth scientific, technical, legal work 4
N l Nuclear Energy E O tl k Outlook 5
A lasting tribute to NEA s 50 years First ever NEA outlook Responding to renewed interest t in nuclear energy Intention to inform the debate 6
Why the renewed interest in nuclear energy? Growth in energy Fossil fuel demand prices CO 2 emissions + Security of climate change energy supply 7
Why the renewed interest in nuclear energy? 8
Why the renewed interest in nuclear energy? Carbon-dioxide id emissions i from fossil-fired fired power plants by far the biggest and fastest-growing sources of CO 2 9
Business as usual to 2050 Population up by 50%... 10
Business as usual to 2050 Energy demand up by 100%... 11
Business as usual to 2050 Electricity demand up by 150%... 12
Business as usual 2050 Population up by 50%... Energy demand up by 100%... Electricity demand up by 150%... CO 2 emissions per unit of energy consumption must be reduced by a factor of 4 Nuclear could make a significant contribution 13
1400 reactors in 2050 439 reactors In June 2008 600 to Nuclear could expand by a factor of 3 14
Potential benefits of nuclear power Virtually CO 2 -free 15
Diverse, politically stable sources of plentiful uranium 16
Cost competitive and very insensitive to price of uranium 17
Managing current and future challenges Unsafe? Actually, safer than base load alternatives 18
Radwaste? Actually, most disposable by 2050 19
Managing current and future challenges Proliferation? NPT largely successful, improved regime under discussion 20
1400 reactors in 2050? Today s reactors are fit for purpose and could provide for a significant expansion to 2050 Significant CO 2 alleviation now Tomorrow s fast reactors can expand the energy available from uranium by up to 60 times Vast resources of virtually CO 2 -free energy 21
1400 reactors in 2050? Vast resources of virtually CO 2 -free energy 22
But! Safety is a must Governments have clear responsibilities: maintain continued effective safety regulation foster progress facilities for waste disposal maintain and reinforce international non- proliferation arrangements provide the stability (policy, regulatory, fiscal) investors require 23
Fukushima Dai-ichi i Nuclear Power Plant Unit 5 Unit 6 Unit 2 Unit 1 Unit 4 Unit 3 Source: http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/gallery/nuclear-e.html Information updated on 24 March 2011
Damages at Fukushima Dai-ichi (March 2011)
Normal sea water surface: O.P. 0m (O.P. : Onahama Point.) If tsunami comes, it runs up the land to a higher elevation. Design basis tsunami, taking account of reflection, was initially O.P. 3.1m and then changed into O.P. 5.7m at Fukushima-Daiichi. The tsunami was perhaps p higher than O.P. 10m at the seashore bank. It ran up to O.P. 14~15m in the site, while the site elevation is 10~13m. Design Basis Tsunami Height Run-up Height OP O.P. 0m Explanation about the Height related to Tsunami
El ti f f t l t d d i Elevation of safety-related devices at Unit 1 of Fukushima-Daiichi
Accident progressions at Unit 1 to 3 reactors (Almost common to 3 units) Total loss of off-site power due to EQ motion Total loss of EDGs due to tsunami Prolonged station blackout Total loss of sea water pumps due to tsunami Prolonged loss of ultimate heat sink Total or partial loss of DC power due to tsunami Loss of plant parameter indications Loss of plant control (Operators connected temporary batteries to I&C.) Occurrence of uncontrollable severe accident Hydrogen explosions in reactor buildings Release of radioactive materials to the environment Sheltering and evacuation of general public
Issues with Design Impacts 1. Clarify the design basis requirements for earthquakes and tsunamis (and other external hazards) Plurally linked seismic centers Damage to offsite infrastructure (electrical grid) Tsunami flooding and associated damage to plant equipment Earthquake generated tsunamis 2. Onsite and Offsite Power Supplies Common cause failures of onsite and offsite electrical power supplies due to external events Battery life considering extended station blackout Capability to connect alternate power supplies to the onsite electrical distribution system Alternative cooling methods for emergency power supply equipment
Issues with Design Impacts 3. Ultimate Heat Sink Alternatives Transfer decay heat from core to environment without electrical power Alternative sources of cooling water or air cooling capability Alternative pumping arrangements Capability to connect alternative cooling water sources to the primary system to cool the core Consideration of the amount of contaminated water generated in alternative cooling methods 4. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Protecting Spent Fuel from Damage Capability to connect alternative sources of spent fuel pool makeup and cooling Protection of fuel in the spent fuel pool from missile hazards 5. Multi-unit Site Considerations Impact of shared facilities in responding to accidents at multiple units Proximity of units on site (physical separation of units)
Issues with Design Impacts 6. Arrangement of Nuclear Power Station on the Site Configuration and location of spent fuel pools within reactor building Interconnections ti between reactor building and turbine building with regard to containing the spread of radioactive liquids Placement of structures on the site to minimize the impact of external events on plant equipment and to maximize accessibility following major external events 7. Flooding Protection of Essential Equipment and Facilities Provide water tight facilities for equipment essential to prevent or mitigate accidents that could challenge the barriers to the release of radioactive material 8. Enhancement to Prevent Hydrogen Explosions Develop strategies for preventing or mitigating the buildup of explosive levels of hydrogen in essential facilities (reactor building)
Issues with Design Impacts 9. Enhancing Containment Venting Capabilities Independence of containment ventilation systems on multi-unit sites Robustness of ventilation systems to withstand external hazards Alternative methods for operation of the ventilation systems with the loss of power and compressed gas systems Capability of the ventilation system to minimize the spread of radioactive material 10.Access to Essential Structures and Equipment Protection of the main control room from high levels of radiation Protection of onsite emergency equipment and buildings from high levels of radiation Communication capabilities within the site Ventilation and lighting without AC power
Issues with Design Impacts 11. Instrumentation for Monitoring Reactor and Primary Containment Conditions Capability to connect alternate power supplies to individual instruments Alternate instrumentation for monitoring essential parameters of the reactor and primary containment Ability to monitor releases of radioactive material without AC power 12. Independence and Diversity of Safety Systems Expanded consideration of independence and diversity in considering the effect of events that have a wide spread impact on site structures, systems, and components Implementing independence and diversity to avoid common cause failures at multi-unit sites 13. Use of Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) in Risk Management Develop insights from PSA for design enhancements for accident management in response to severe external events
Concluding Remarks The accident continues to be a global challenge to regulators and the industry Impact on new projects not yet clear Impact on cost to be assessed New entrants would be delayed